INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is a multilingual country but most people can neither read nor write any of these languages. Literacy was 17.9 per cent in 1951 and it was estimated to be 38 per cent in 1995—still among the lowest in the world as Mahbubul Haq laments (Haq & Haq 1998: 51). Because the country is multilingual, however, language is a marker of ethnic identity which makes it a politically sensitive subject. Thus Bengali, Sindhi, Pashto, Siraiki, and the Balochi languages have expressed the ethnic identities of their speakers as dealt with in detail in my previous book Language and Politics in Pakistan (1996). This ethnic aspect, though not the subject of this book, will inevitably be mentioned again and again in connection with language-teaching too. Ethnicity is obviously related to the pursuit of power—mobilization of groups with reference to evocative identity symbols such as language, religion or experience in order to obtain some share in goods and services in a modern multi-ethnic state—and is, indeed, one of the most discussed aspects of modern politics. The other aspect, illiteracy itself, may not immediately appear to be connected with power. However, considering that all middle class employment is dependent upon the manipulation of print languages, it is obviously empowering to be literate—especially in the language(s) of the domains of power. Thus, our focus on the formal and the informal aspects of the teaching and learning of languages will give us insights into the way power is distributed and operates in Pakistan.

First, however, let us list the languages of Pakistan. The Ethnologue published by the Summer Institute of Linguistics lists seventy-two languages (Gordon 2005). However, this list includes deaf sign language and mutually intelligible varieties of several languages. Thus, perhaps a total of fifty-five may be nearer the truth. This estimate includes English, which is a second language for educated Pakistanis, and some languages which only refugees from Afghanistan speak. Moreover, some of these languages can claim no more than a few thousand speakers nor are the boundaries of language and dialect (defined as mutually intelligible varieties of a language) always clear. The major languages according to the 1981 census are: Punjabi (48.17 per cent); Pashto (13.14 per cent); Sindhi (11.77 per cent); Siraiki (9.83 per cent); Urdu (7.60 per cent); Balochi (3.02 per cent); Hindko (2.43 per cent) and Brahvi (1.21 per cent). If Siraiki, Hindko and Punjabi, being mutually intelligible, are considered varieties of the same language, as they are by J.L. Breton in his Atlas of the Languages and Ethnic Communities of South Asia (1997: 198), we get a figure of 60.44 per cent. Among the ‘other languages’ spoken by 2.81 per cent people there are more than fifty names, some of which are known only to professional linguists. These include the languages of the Northern Areas, Kohistan, remote parts of the NWFP, Balochistan, Sindh, as well as the minor languages of Punjab and other parts of the country (see, Annexure 1-A for details). These minor languages add up to more than fifty in number. So many languages are never easy to deal with in the modern state which requires ‘language rationalization’—defined by Laitin as ‘the territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient administration and rule’ (Laitin 1992: 9). However, as in India, there are only a few major languages in which most Pakistanis can communicate. The minor languages, therefore, do not affect what Mahapatra calls ‘the communication environment’ in Pakistan as they do not in India (Mahapatra 1990: 13).

This study concentrates only on the Muslims of Pakistan and north India. Pakistan is the larger
focus but language-teaching in Pakistan cannot be understood unless one takes north India into account. North India is a term used by South Asian scholars, such as Paul Brass, for the Hindi-Urdu and Punjabi-speaking states of pre-partition India. This area is significant for understanding present day Pakistan because ‘this area, especially the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, has been the primary arena in India of religious cleavage—between Hindus and Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in the Punjab’ (Brass 1974: 22). Language-teaching in these areas, especially that of Urdu and Punjabi, is linked with the struggle for power which created Pakistan and agitates both India and Pakistan even now. As the focus is on the teaching and learning of languages still used in Pakistan with special emphasis on how these activities are related to power, it was necessary to exclude Bengali, the language of the majority of the Muslims of South Asia but one which is no longer used in Pakistan. Bengali will, however, be mentioned in other contexts during the course of this study. The emphasis on the Urdu-speaking Muslims of India, who were concentrated in north India but some of whom also lived in Hyderabad, is also necessary because it is their language, Urdu, which is the national language of Pakistan. Even more relevant for our purposes, Urdu has been related with the struggle for power among the Hindus and Muslims; the Bengalis and West Pakistanis; and smaller ethnic groups and the dominant Punjabis in Pakistan. In short, it is at the centre of the power struggle in Pakistan and should be dealt with in great detail. It is also related to Muslim identity in India and, therefore, its teaching helps us understand the Muslim community in north India. This has been done by looking at the policies and processes of teaching and learning languages in the centres of the civilizations of Urdu-speaking Muslims—hence, the focus on north India. But this focus on India, as mentioned earlier, is to help us understand Pakistan better.

There are many ways to approach language learning and teaching in a country like Pakistan. From the point of view of the state the question is: which language(s) should be taught to achieve national (i.e. political) interests—language rationalization? Such a question can only be answered once it is determined what these interests are? Keeping the various ethnic groups together is obviously an interest. Does this mean then, that only one ‘national’ language should be promoted? But suppose this creates a backlash and language-based ethnic movements force the state to change such a policy as the Bengali language movement did in Pakistan (Rahman 1996: chapter 6) and the Dravidian language supporters did in India (King 1997: chapter 4). Would it not be more useful to aim at ‘the 3 ± 1 language outcome’ which Laitin predicts and prescribes for multilingual societies like those of Africa where such rationalization cannot be the norm (Laitin 1992: 18)? Another interest could be the creation of a modern and technological society. For this English seems most cost-effective. And it is because it is cost-effective and empowers individuals and groups that it is expanding so fast. It is a world language with between 235 to 2090 million users. Out of these, 350 million may be quite competent while others would vary in competence. Even if we take cautious estimates of 1200–1500 million people, it is the most used language in the world in the domains of power and high culture, i.e. administration, business, media, research, flying, advertising, travel, and so on. To ignore English would be to get locked out of the most powerful and lucrative jobs in the world because it is, as David Crystal (1997) shows, a world language. But in Pakistan English facilitates the elite and is the marker of upper social status. The promotion of English then goes very much in favour of the westernized elite and is unjust towards the masses. Then there is the question of literacy. Without knowing how to read and write, people cannot operate machines and read instructions. Moreover, literacy creates a change in world view and expectations (Ong 1982). One consequence of this is that literate societies have less children, are more conscious of their rights and tend to accept modernization more easily. Thus, as Myron Weiner has pointed out, schooling (i.e. the acquisition of literacy and numeracy), precedes industrialization and modernization (Weiner & Noman 1995: chapter 6).

The major question for any developing country is always about the creation of the
‘communication environment’, as mentioned by J.L. Breton in the case of India, in the formal domains. This is done by making people literate but, the problem in multilingual countries is, in which language? The language of literacy is, after all, a standardized print-language and not a non-standard spoken variety of a language. Thus, it is taught in schools and has primers, grammars, and dictionaries available in it. A large number of teachers are employed to teach it to children. In short, modern states have to create a policy for the teaching of this language because, unlike the spoken mother tongue, the child does not acquire it simply by listening to others. This policy, called acquisition planning by Cooper, ‘is directed toward increasing the number of users—speakers, writers, listeners, or readers’ (Cooper 1989: 33) of a language. This policy, like other policies, is also connected with world view and power: the nationalist imperative of creating a national identity; of consolidating the rule of an elite; of modernization and development, etc., etc.

The UNESCO published a study in 1953 which said:

It is axiomatic that the best medium for teaching a child is his mother tongue. Psychologically, it is the system of meaningful signs that in his mind works automatically for expression and understanding. Sociologically, it is a means of identification among the members of the community to which he belongs. Educationally, he learns more quickly through it than through an unfamiliar linguistic medium (UNESCO 1953: 11).

But sometimes out of other considerations, such as a large number of non-standardized languages, it may not be practically possible to educate children even at the primary level through the mother tongue. Case studies of African countries have been given by Laitin (1992) but need not all be summarized here. One or two examples may, however, be given by way of illustrating the general trends in ex-colonial countries. In Tanzania, for instance, where there were eighty-nine tribal languages, Swahili, the lingua franca of the coastal region, was chosen as the language of literacy. It is estimated that illiteracy decreased from being 75 per cent in 1961 to 21 per cent in 1981. However, Tanzanian children do not get their early concepts in the school in the mother tongue; they get them by and large in a second language (Laitin 1992: 140; Carron and Bordia 1985: 164). In Ethiopia, another multilingual country, the ruling Amharic-speaking minority had chosen only Amharic as the language of literacy. This policy was abandoned in 1979 when the old regime was ousted and other languages—first five and later fifteen—were made the languages of literacy. An increase in literacy to 90 per cent has been reported. Children do get their basic concepts in their mother tongue but the cost in terms of resources, time, and effort are very high (Carron and Bordia 1985: 166). In general, as Keith Watson points out, ‘if a European language is chosen as the national language and/or as the medium of instruction, there is a danger of cultural and linguistic imperialism and dependency upon the European powers. If, on the other hand, a country opts for a local language as the national language...it can lead to internal conflict and therefore non-cooperation over economic development on the part of certain groups’ (Watson 1993: 36). Moreover, the costs of providing translations, books, and teachers in several languages can be fairly high.

In Pakistan, as we shall see in the following pages, the government has always agreed in principle with the mother tongue principle for primary education. However, most children in Pakistan are not taught through their mother tongues but through Urdu. It is another matter that, at the lower levels of education, the children’s mother tongues are actually used informally to explain the lessons in Urdu. A research study on 500 rural and urban schools undertaken by the project for Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Educational Systems carried out in 1987 concludes that teachers explain in the students’ language but, when they do not know that language, they ‘ask students who spoke their own and the local language to act as translators’. Most teachers (about 60 per cent) used this strategy.
Teachers reported that 44 per cent of the translations were made into Punjabi, 25 per cent into Pushto, 19 per cent into Urdu, 7 per cent into Baluchi, and 5 per cent into Sindhi. In classes that had no assigned translator students received informal help from their classmates, siblings, or parents in understanding what the teachers were saying and in doing their homework (Warwick and Reimers 1995: 39–40).

As expected, more rural than urban teachers had to rely on translators. Most interesting is the observation that the ‘students of teachers who used translators had higher average scores on the mathematics, but not the science, tests than pupils of those who did not’ (ibid.: 40). In short, small children understand concepts more clearly in their own languages than in their formal mediums of instruction. But since these mother tongues are not taught in their own right, students do not have reading or writing skills in them. Thus the literacy in Punjabi and Pashto, otherwise major languages, is low. The following table illustrates this:

**Table 1**
Languages of Literacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Speakers as per cent of population</th>
<th>Additional language as per cent of total speakers</th>
<th>Able to read as per cent of population aged 5 and above</th>
<th>Able to read and write as per cent of population aged 5 and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahvi</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>19.22</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>98.39</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>29.54</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>49.56</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1961: Statements 5.2 and 5.5, IV, 32 & 35.

*This figure is for West Pakistan only.

These figures make it clear that English and Urdu are the major languages of wider communication in Pakistan. They are used as additional languages by a large number of people. The census also reports that more people can read and write English then they can speak it. It goes on to opine that by ‘speaking’ people must have meant speaking fluently and competently because of which the number of speakers is lesser than those who claim to be literate in the language (Census 1961: IV, 39).

English, the ex-colonial language, is so well-entrenched because it has been the language of the domains of power in South Asia since British times and is still used in these domains. Although no reliable figures for its use in Pakistan are available after 1961, it was used by 2.7 per cent of the total population and 3.22 of the population aged five and above at that time (Census 1961: IV, 34–5). This percentage should have increased because the middle class—or, rather the ‘salariat’ as defined by Hamza Alavi (1987)—has increased and the higher jobs require some
competence in English. If those who have passed their matriculation examinations, in which
English is a compulsory subject, are considered to have literacy in English then the figure comes
to 19.56 per cent in 1981 (Census 1984: table 4.6, p. 31). However, most matriculates cannot
speak English and their reading too is limited to very simple texts. This is true for India also
where 25 million out of 850 million people used it as a second language in 1971 (Agnihotri and
Khanna 1997: 116). According to an estimate of 1996, the number of people who can use English
in Pakistan and other countries of South Asia is given in table 2. David Crystal does not tell us
how the figure for Pakistan was arrived at but, on the face of it, it seems higher than expected. In
any case, the figure does not represent degree of fluency or competence. It does, of course, reflect
wide diffusion which is one indicator of the power and desirability of a language.

The reasons for this diffusion of English are as follows: its preservation by the Anglicized elite
in its own interest (Rahman 1996: chapters 4 and 13; 1997); its role as a vehicle of
modernization; its status as the world’s foremost language of wider communication (LWC), (for
diffusion of English in India and Pakistan, see, Breton 1997: 144–5).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>120,093,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>935,744,000</td>
<td>37,320,000</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>20,093,000</td>
<td>5,927,000</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>140,497,000</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>11.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>17.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>18,090,000</td>
<td>1,860,000</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Urdu is also an LWC in Pakistan. Indeed, it is more widespread than English because it is, like
English, the language of jobs, schooling, trade, media, and inter-provincial communication. The
domination of Urdu, like that of English, however, does not go unchallenged. Indeed, it has been
challenged by ethnic groups of Pakistan—notably Bengali, Sindhi, and Pashtun—almost since the
inception of Pakistan (Rahman 1996). It was because of Bengali resentment against Urdu that it
was shown to be less understood in East Bengal than it actually was. Keeping in mind the fact
that he did manage to communicate to people in Urdu, E.H. Slade, the Census Commissioner in
1951, reported that it ‘must be much more widely used than the reports indicate’ in East Pakistan
(Census 1951: 72). Whether this is also true for Sindh, Balochistan, and the NWFP cannot be
determined. However, even if under-reported, the figures for the use of Urdu as a second
language prove that it is the most widely diffused second language, as well as language of
literacy, in Pakistan. All students who have passed the middle (VIII class) examination in
Pakistan are certainly literate in Urdu and this number was 22.70 per cent in 1981 (Census 1984:
table 4.6, p. 31).

Both English and Urdu are formally taught in schools. Sindhi too is taught in some of the
schools run by the state. Pashto, however, is taught only in primary schools and not to all Pashto
speaking children. This arrangement, undemocratic as it appears to be, is not actively opposed by
language-learners in Pakistan for reasons which will become clearer later. At the moment, some
remarks, however, may be necessary.
Language activists generally claim that people want to be taught their indigenous languages and that other languages, mainly English and Urdu, are imposed upon them. This was true about East Bengal where the large size of the Bengali-speaking population, the fact that their language had been taught and used in the lower domains of power during British rule, and that jobs were available in it, ruled out the possibility that the Bengalis would learn Urdu in large numbers. However, in (West) Pakistan, the situation is different. Sindhi is the only language which is used in some lower domains of power and taught at all educational levels, but even so, literacy in Sindhi alone would not enable a person to find higher jobs or move out of rural Sindh. Thus, under the present circumstances people find the indigenous languages ghettoizing, i.e. they restrict upward social mobility keeping one, as it were, in the ‘ghetto’. Because of this people desire instruction in the languages used in the domains of power—languages which are not ghettoizing. A survey carried out by a US Aid team in 1986 indicated this. The team asked how much the local language, Urdu, Arabic, and English should be taught in classes I to III, IV and V, and VI to VIII. The results of the respondents including headmasters, teachers, parents, and community leaders, are given in Table 3.

Table 3
Percentage of judgements about ‘not teaching’ a language in classes 1 to 3 by area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Local Language (%)</th>
<th>Urdu (%)</th>
<th>English (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 11.

These figures are not easy to interpret because the Siraiki-speaking southern Punjab, as the researchers noted, were more keen to have their language taught than people from the rest of the Punjab. Moreover, Sindh includes Urdu-speaking areas while the local language in the NWFP is not necessarily Pashto. Even so, what is clear is that most people want to teach Urdu to children at the earliest stages rather than the local language. This is probably because it is Urdu, rather than the local language (if other than Urdu), which can empower a person by acquiring good jobs (also see, Survey 2000, Appendix 14). This power, ghettoizing languages, even if they are dear to one, cannot confer upon the learner. This would appear to imply that nobody would be able to read any indigenous language of Pakistan except Sindhi.

This, however, is not true because people are taught to read the Quran (in 1981, 38.37 per cent people could read it. Census 1984: table 4.7, p. 33) and all Pakistani languages are written in variants of the Arabic script. Pashto and Sindhi are written in naskh, the script of Arabic itself, while Punjabi and Balochi are written in nastaliq, the script of Persian and Urdu, which is very close to it. So, even those who never go to schools can often read texts in Pakistani languages. Those languages which are taught in educational institutions as optional subjects are popular among students not because of some intrinsic attachment to them but because they are easy options as is evidenced by the large number of students who take them privately (i.e. without
being taught formally in any institution) in the civil service examinations (see, Appendix 9). Moreover a statistician, Sareer Bacha, has computed that students who take Pashto get much higher marks than those who take Urdu and English (in that order) (Bacha, forthcoming). Similar statements can also be made for Punjabi and Sindhi. In short, student interest in the indigenous languages is sustained by their desire to do well in examinations, i.e. as a strategy for empowering themselves by getting good marks. While this is expected and entirely unremarkable, what is remarkable is that texts in the indigenous languages are read by people who do not expect to appear in examinations or benefit from them in any visible manner.

As it happens, such texts have been in circulation at least from the early eighteenth century and are still produced in fairly large numbers. Recently an American scholar, William Hanaway, assisted by a Pakistani named Mumtaz Nasir, produced a study of chapbook publishing in Pakistan. They listed 940 chapbooks in Punjabi, Siraiki, Hindko, Khowar, Pashto, Sindhi, Persian, and Urdu (Hanaway and Nasir 1996: Appendix A, 441–615). Other such books are listed in relevant bibliographies of printed books in the British Library and other libraries. These chapbooks are about Islamic legends, rituals, and values, as well as about more mundane themes. Indeed, many of them are romances featuring traditional lovers (like the fables of Heer and Ranjha), princes and princesses. Some of them also offer the latest popular songs but most are about traditional themes, whether religious or mundane. They are still read, and very often read out to the illiterate, in the rural areas of Pakistan. The following comments sums up the situation aptly:

Very few, if any, chapbooks are written for the common people by members of the learned strata of Pakistani society. It is possible to say, therefore, that at least this sort of popular literature in Pakistan is the literature of the common people, produced and read by them, often with little or no reference to high literature (Hanaway and Nasir 1996: 438).

The existence of these books, unsupported as they are by formal mechanisms of language-teaching, shows that at least some people are literate in their languages and that, at the popular level, they enjoy reading in them. This aspect of spontaneous and informal language-learning in the absence of and in spite of, formal language-teaching, is one which one should study in more detail. This may be one way of approaching the learning of languages.

Another related question, but one which has only been touched upon in passing in this book, is the place of oral literature in the lives of the Muslims of north India and Pakistan. We know that orality permeated the lives of these people. In the religious domain people memorized the Quran—not an easy feat, considering that they do not know Arabic and the Holy book is voluminous. They also memorized tales in verse. One can still find people singing about the story of Heer and her lover Ranjha, probably the best known romantic love story in Pakistan, in the villages of the Punjab. Besides these professional purveyors of memorized texts, all cultivated people were supposed to possess a store of wise saws, idiomatic sayings, anecdotes, and couplets. Poetry recitals (mushairas) were held not only in the refined, courtly atmosphere of Lucknow and Delhi but all over north India and Pakistan. They were held primarily in Urdu but there is evidence of mushairas in other languages, including Hindko, in Peshawar. Qawwalis, which are primarily mystical, romantic poems, with ecstasy-inducing repetitive punch lines, were sung at the shrines of mystics and elsewhere. Songs were remembered by heart and sung at marriages and other ceremonies. In short, the indigenous tradition was historically oral and it was connected with the emotional and the sacred. It was not a written tradition and it was not primarily connected with ratiocination and logical analysis.

As orality is a different way of perceiving the world than literacy—a point brought out by many scholars such as Parry (1928), Notopoulos (1938), and notably by Ong (1982)—an
important question to ask is whether the increased emphasis on writing since the colonial era can bring about, or has brought about, corresponding changes in world view and the attitudes based upon it. If so, how would it affect perceptions of and attitudes towards the distribution of power?

These are difficult questions to answer and ones which cannot be tested empirically because a purely oral community cannot be made available for experimentation. However, some comparisons between madrassa students, who memorize texts more often than elitist English-medium ones who are supposed to analyse them, may be possible.

Let us now mention the educational institutions which give literacy to most children (one says most because out of those who become literate at all some learn at home, from neighbours or the local maulvi in the mosque). These institutions are of key importance because, as Pierre Bourdieu argues, they transmit ‘scholarly or academic culture’ to the young. As this culture ‘is a common code enabling all those possessing that code to attach the same meaning to the same words, the same types of behaviour and the same works’ (1967: 341); it influences what has been called world view in this book.

**Government Schools**

The medium of instruction is not generally mentioned in government reports on schools. However, since all non-elitist government schools use Urdu as the medium of instruction in the Punjab, Sindh, Azad Kashmir (AK), Balochistan, Northern Areas (FANA), most of the NWFP and FATA, table 4 may serve as a rough estimate about the categorization of schools according to the medium of instruction. Pashto is also taught as an additional subject in 10,731 schools according to sources in the Directorate of Primary Education, Peshawar.

The figures for private English-medium schools—either so-called or actual—are only partially available. However, they are concentrated in fairly large numbers in the cities and are also found in towns and sometimes even in remote areas. According to estimates made by the government, there are 76,047 private educational institutions out of which most are schools. Indeed, to be exact, 53 percent are primary, 17 percent middle and 11 percent secondary schools. Most of the primary schools (86 percent) are in the public sector which means that the medium of instruction in them is not English (it is mostly Urdu and some Sindhi) (GOP 2007: 164). The most recent government report on education mentions the medium of instruction which is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Management</th>
<th>No. of Institutions</th>
<th>Medium of Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Urdu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227791</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>57868</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>48475</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>121448</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>151,744</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>50,265</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>41,878</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>59,601</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Private 76,047 57.2% 28.4% 1.8% 12.7%
Boys 6,597 63.7% 10.7% 2.6% 23.0%
Girls 7,602 44.4% 1.4% 1.3% 52.9%
Mixed 61,847 58.0% 32.1% 1.7% 7.7%

* It includes Pashto, Balochi, Arabic etc.

Source: GOP 2006: Table 23, p. 37.

Madrasas in Pakistan

In 1957–58 there were only 119 religious seminaries called madaris or madrassas (the former is the Arabic plural but the latter is commonly used in English) with 4790 students. However, according to a report of 1988, the total number of madrassas in Pakistan was 2891. In 1995 the government reported that the number had increased to 3906 (Directory 1995: 282) and it is still growing though the Minister of Education, in his reply to the Senate to a question as to the number of madrassas, gave the same number even on 11 November 1997. The federal education ministry sent a registration form to about 7000 madrassas in 2000. The press and intelligence agencies report between 15,000 to 25,000 madrassas but do not give sources of their information (Mir 2000: 41). However, the latest government figures are 12,979 madrassas with an enrolment of 1,549,242 and teaching staff of 58,391 (GOP 2006: Table 9, p. 23). The breakdown according to the religious (sub-sect or maslak) affiliation and area is given in Table 5 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Affiliated with</th>
<th></th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Not Affiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wafaq</td>
<td>Tanzeem</td>
<td>Rabta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>12,979</td>
<td>3,686</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5,459</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANA</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOP 2006: Table-10, p. 24
The madrassas teach Arabic as a main subject but they use Urdu as a medium of instruction in the Punjab, urban Sindh, Hindko-speaking parts of the NWFP, Balochistan, and Azad Kashmir. In the Pashto-speaking parts of the NWFP and rural Sindh, Pashto and Sindhi respectively are used as the media of instruction. Pashto and Sindhi, however, are the informal media of instruction because students are examined in Urdu by the central boards of registered and recognized madrassas. Explanation by the teacher is in Pashto and Sindhi but the books are in other languages. However, the Jamiat ul Asariya, an Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in Peshawar, reported using a Pashto primer in its school section and there are books in Sindhi and Pashto which, though not prescribed by the central organizations, are nevertheless available to students for consultation. In Balochistan too, although Urdu or Arabic are the media of examinations, some rural madrassas actually use Brahvi and Balochi for explaining the texts. Maulana Abdul Khaliq Ababaki, head of the Madrassa Jamia-e-Ashrafiya (Mastung), himself a writer of Brahvi, said that Brahvi was the informal medium of instruction at the lower level in his institution (Ababaki Int. 1999). Other informants also reported similar use of Balochi in some Balochi-speaking areas (Dashtiari, Jamaldini and Baidar, Int. 1999). Some madrassas reported using Punjabi or Siraiki in responses to a questionnaire but it was not clear what they meant by ‘teaching’ or ‘medium of instruction’ (Appendix 10). My own field survey of a number of madrassas makes me conjecture that they probably meant that the informal medium of instruction was Punjabi or Siraiki because no institution I visited in the Punjab reported either Punjabi or Siraiki as the formal medium of instruction. Even informally these languages were used as auxiliaries to Urdu and more often in junior classes and the rural madrassas than in senior classes and urban ones.

Some madrasas are affiliated to central organizations which prescribe a uniform curriculum and system of examinations for all. The major organizations are as follows:

1. Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiyyah (Wafaq for short). This was created by the Deobandis in 1959 with its central office in Multan.
2. Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiyyah (Tanzim for short). This was created by the Barelvis in 1960 with its central office in Lahore. The Barelvis address themselves to the peasants and ordinary people and do not mind the excessive adoration of the saints which is part of folk Islam in Pakistan.
3. Wafaq al-Madaris al-Salfiya. This was created by the Ahl-e-Hadith in Faisalabad in 1955. They are highly fundamentalist rejecting the cult of saints and rituals. They are also called Wahabis in common parlance in Pakistan.
4. Wafaq al-Madaris al-Shia. This was created by the majority Shia sect, the believers in twelve _imams_ (Atha Asha’ris), in Pakistan in 1959. The head office is in Lahore (Field Work).
5. Rabta al-Madaris. This was set up by the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1993. They teach more modern subjects and often enable the students to take the ordinary state examinations along with religious ones.

Not all the madrassas are affiliated to these central organizations. The latest official figures, those of 2006, give only 4,491 (34.6%) as not being affiliated to any organized body.

The number of unrecognized, unregistered institutions have probably multiplied since the eighties when, according to numerous newspaper reports, new madrassas were set up with internal and external funding. However, by late 2005 the number of registered madrassas had increased. Even so, many remain unregistered. Thus, a study of the courses of study printed by the central organizations of the madrassas does not provide complete information of the language-teaching situation in them. A few unaffiliated institutions have, therefore, been studied...
during the field work for this book. Even so, this study does not claim to definitiveness or completion.

The madrassas teach a modified form of the Dars-e-Nizami which has been described in detail by Sufi (1941: 73–5). They have a primary section (sometimes called Maktab) either in the same building or a separate one. In the primary section the children are enabled to read, recite, and sometimes memorize the Quran (for comparison with Iran, see, Mottahedeh 1986 and with Sudan, Eickelman 1978). Some madrassas have schools going up to the middle or, mutawassata stage. Dars-e-Nizami proper starts from the Oola (or awwala) stage and takes eight years to complete. The stages have different names, some of which are given later. The number of students and their distribution in Jamia-e-Ashrafia, a famous Deobandi madrassa of Lahore, is presented to give an idea as to what percentage of students go on to higher stages of study in the madrassas.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Percentage of the Total (422)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hifz</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>32.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajweed (recitation)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutawassata</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oola</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salasa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamisa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumina</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>27.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hussain 1994: 34.

Between 1982 and 1987, whereas 371,905 students have read the Quran without understanding it (nazerah), only 45,691 have got the Shahadat-e-Almiya award from all the madrassas (about which figures are available) in Pakistan (quoted from Nayyar 1998: 229—based on reports of the Government of Pakistan). The level of madrassa education corresponds to the following levels of mainstream state education:

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Equivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibtedaiya</td>
<td>Nazera/Hifz</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>4–5 years</td>
<td>Shahadatul Tahfeez ul Quran al Kareem</td>
<td>Primary (V class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tajweed-o-Qirat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutawassata</td>
<td>Hifz/Tajweed etc</td>
<td>6–8</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Shahadatul Mutawassata</td>
<td>Middle (VI, VII and VIII classes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sania Amma Tehtani  Oola & Sania  2 years Shahadat ul Sania tul Matriculation Amma (X class)

Sania Khassa Tehtani  Salasa & Rabia  2 years Shahadat ul Sania tul FA Khassa (XII class)

Aliya Mauqaf Alay;  Khamisa & Sadisa  2 years Shahadat ul Aliya BA Khassa (XIV class)

Almiya Daura-e-Hadith;  Sabia & Samina  2 years Shahadat ul Almiya fil MA in Arabic Aliya uloom-e- Arabia wal Islamia

Source: Field research. As different names are used for the same level in different writings on the madrassas, an attempt has been made to introduce them above.

The way the Dars-e-Nizami is taught and the ideas disseminated through it would be very useful for understanding the world view of the ulema and the rise of sectarian violence in Pakistan. However, the scope of this book is limited to the teaching of languages so that the other subjects taught in the madrassas are not touched upon.

An Outline of this Book

It is a common observation that people prefer to learn languages which will enable them to find jobs and acquire social prestige. Thus, it would have been easier for them had they acquired the standardized varieties of their mother tongue rather than foreign languages. But in Pakistan they cannot find good jobs by restricting themselves merely to their own languages. Why not? The answer to that lies in our history, especially our political and educational history, and part of this book, especially the chapters on Persian, English, and Urdu, will try to provide that answer.

Another aspect of the study of language is that languages are also the vehicles of world view—of certain ways of apprehending reality and forming values. Whether the vocabulary of a language itself codifies or privileges certain aspects of a world view, or the material used in textbooks does so, is not the issue here. The point is that certain world views are privileged. Which world view then is privileged in the languages taught in Pakistan? Does the state have an ideological aim when it enforces the teaching of certain languages, through certain prescribed textbooks, in educational institutions? In order to determine the ideological objectives of the state, the language-teaching textbooks of schools from class I to X have been analysed with reference to Islam, Pakistani nationalism, and the military. The assumption is that the more the lessons on these three themes, the more ideologically loaded is the textbook. In addition to that a sample survey of the opinions of school children of class X has been carried out (see, Survey 2000). Questions are not only on views about languages in education but also on such controversial and sensitive issues as the rights of non-Muslim minorities, the development of nuclear weapons, the conquest of Kashmir, and so on. The idea is to see in what ways the students of Urdu-medium schools, English-medium schools, and madrassas differ ideologically from each other. While the differences are not necessarily the result of the medium of education itself, they do indicate that different groups of Pakistanis think in different ways and are not likely to agree to any major state decision about issues affecting their future. As vernacular medium schools are attended by lower
and lower-middle class students; the elitist English schools by the middle and upper classes; and the madrassas by very poor and generally rural students, we are dealing with the perceptions of different socio-economic strata of society about these vital issues. The question then is whether Pakistanis are so divided ideologically that any change in the distribution of power is also likely to change the ideological nature of the dominant elites? This survey might provide tentative answers to this question (see, Appendix 14).

Pakistan also teaches foreign languages. The questions are whether this activity is related to power, in this case national interest, in any way or not? Further, as several foreign bodies help in this kind of teaching, the question arises as to what aims they have in mind? Are these aims somehow related to power? These are some of the questions which this book raises and tries to answer.

The attempt at connecting language-teaching with power, or politics taken in a wide sense, is not new. Among others, Robert Phillipson has written about the teaching of English by the United States and Britain as part of the projection of the power of these countries abroad (1992). Pennycook, also writing about the teaching of English as a second (or other) language, makes the general remark that ‘language teaching is in some sense political would seem uncontroversial since it is clear that many decisions about what gets taught, to whom, how, when, and where, are made at high levels of the political hierarchy’ (Pennycook 1989: 590). And, indeed, language planners have been aware for quite some time that these decisions are political, i.e. they have a bearing on the pursuit of power by the ruling elite and others. There are also studies of how language is connected with identity and ideology; with the domination of an elite; with resistance to this domination and how all these, in their turn, are connected with power. Yet, despite the availability of this knowledge about the connection between language-teaching and power, there is no study of this subject with reference to the Muslims of north India and Pakistan. This is surprising, considering that this area is rich in languages and it is almost in living history that the language of power and prestige has changed from Persian to English. Moreover, it is an area, unlike Europe and America, where the indigenous languages of the people are denied even as media of instruction at the lowest level. These facts make a study of language-teaching among the Muslims of the relevant area a very promising area of political enquiry.

A major part of the book, however, is historical. In the absence of there being any history of which languages have been taught among the Muslims of north India and Pakistan, this part of the narrative is meant to provide the empirical base which is necessary to answer the questions about power and world view given above. The historical portion attempts to go beyond, but is also narrower, than G.M.D. Sufi (1942) and N.N. Law’s (1915) excellent studies of the education of Muslims in India. The attempt to go beyond involves a comprehensive study of what language-teaching policies were adopted and how the people responded to them. This, to my knowledge, has not been done before, though reports on the teaching of languages have been published from time to time. For instance, such reports have been published by the Society of Pakistan English Language Teachers (SPELT) for English and by the Ministry of Education on language policies in general and some languages, such as Arabic (Misri 1984), in particular. Mostly, however, the focus of previous histories was on education as a whole and not specifically on the teaching of languages (see, Jaffar 1936; Ahmad 1985; Saleem 1980; Kazim 1971 a & b). But this is what makes it narrower; with other subjects being left out. The only thing I can say, by way of defence, is that languages are important enough to be the focus of historical enquiry by themselves and, therefore, this book may be considered an attempt to fill an existing need: a history of language-teaching and learning among Indian and Pakistani Muslims.

A brief description of what is to follow, some sort of road map of the book, is in order. The next chapter (Chapter 2) is concerned with what may be called the ‘theoretical framework’. This chapter is meant to provide definitions and the analytical framework for such abstract concepts as
power, ideology, world view, and language acquisition (the teaching and learning of languages). After this, there is a chapter on the teaching of Arabic (Chapter 3). This chapter traces out the teaching of Arabic from medieval times till the present. There are, of course, several works on Arabic writings produced in India. The *Nuzhat al-Khawatir* by Abdul Hai (1869–1923) in eight volumes, the last completed by his son Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, records the names of several ulema who produced such works (Hai 1947). However, this book is voluminous and in the form of a dictionary of biography. For a thematic account of works produced on different genres of knowledge Zubaid Ahmad’s doctoral thesis on *The Contribution of India to Arabic Literature* (1946) is very useful. For a historical narrative, but one which adds nothing new to our knowledge, one can read volume 2 of the *Tareekh-e-Adabiat* which is on Arabic literature in South Asia between 712 to 1972. None of these works, however, are on the teaching of Arabic though they contain references to textbooks used in the Arabic madrassa. The textbooks and their authors, especially those of the Dars-e-Nizami used in the madrassas, are also described by Rahi (1975), Mubarak Shah (1998) and Gangohti (1969). While these works contribute to our understanding of the teaching of Arabic among Pakistani and north Indian Muslims, they do not provide a historical narrative of this teaching or do they relate it to other factors. This chapter, apart from providing a history of the teaching of Arabic, also aims at understanding how the language became a symbol of Muslim religious identity and how it was used by the madrassas in an anti-colonial, anti-modernity role and by the Pakistani state as a legitimating symbol. The major language of the Muslims of medieval India was, however, Persian. Its study is the subject of Chapter 4 but the focus there is on how the language lost its value as it lost its power. Thus the history of the decline of Persian in the British period, the period when the distribution of power underwent a revolutionary change, is the major part of the historical narrative.

After having covered medieval priorities in language-teaching, we come to the languages which the British taught to the Indian Muslims. Thus Chapter 5 is on the teaching of English and Chapters 6 and 7 on Urdu. After Gauri Viswanathan’s excellent study on the political aspects of the teaching of English Literature in India (1989), there is little one can say with any pretence to originality. However, despite a plethora of studies on the history of English in India, including my own earlier work (Rahman 1996: Chapter 3 & 8 and 1996 b), there are gaps in our knowledge. For instance: how did the Muslims react to English? Why and how did they accept it? Chapter 5, entitled ‘English and Indian Muslims’, therefore concerns itself with the way the Indian Muslims reacted to English. Urdu, contrary to many Pakistanis’ view, was also taught formally, for the first time, by the British. Chapter 6 is about the history of the teaching of it in British India and Chapter 7 is on its teaching and role in present day India where it is an identity symbol of the Indian Muslims and, therefore, at the centre of the Hindu-Muslim struggle for power. Chapter 8 is on the teaching of Urdu in Pakistan and how it is related to the power struggle between the elite of the centre and ethnic groups in Pakistan. As we shall see, Urdu is part of a power struggle in both Pakistan and India. After these chapters on Urdu we come back to English—the teaching of English in Pakistan (Chapter 9). This is a subject on which I and Farida Malik, among others, have written earlier. My work is essentially on what is known as the Urdu-English controversy, i.e. whether English or Urdu should be the medium of instruction in Pakistan? (Rahman 1996: Chapter 13) Farida Malik’s work describes how English is taught in the educational institutions of Pakistan (Malik 1996). Other studies on the role of English in Pakistan are really about the technical aspects of teaching it, such as the publications of SPELT or on the kind of English being taught in Pakistan (Pakistani English). Questions of power, ideology, world view, and values remain untouched. Does English bring Pakistanis in contact with the Western world view? Is it in the interest of the West that this should happen? If so, is that why the British Council and the American Center make efforts to teach English to Pakistanis? But is this world view necessary for Pakistanis if democracy and liberal values are to be preserved? Is the study of English, then,
necessary for keeping liberal democracy alive in Pakistan? These are questions which this chapter tries to answer. The answers are based not only on printed documents but also on fresh evidence from the field—the survey of the opinions of school students from English and Urdu medium schools as well as the madrassas mentioned earlier (Survey 2000).

The indigenous mother tongues of the people of Pakistan—Sindhi (Chapter 10), Pashto, (Chapter 11), Punjabi (Chapter 12), and Balochi, Brahvi, and the minor languages of the country (Chapter 13) are the subjects of the next four chapters. The aim is twofold: first, to find out in what formal and informal ways these languages have been learned by the people of the ‘Indus region’ (as defined so interestingly by Aitzaz Ahsan in his Indus Saga [1996]); and second, to relate the teaching, or demands for teaching, these languages to ethnicity and power. In Chapter 13, on the teaching of minor Pakistani languages, the word minor refers to the size (i.e. number of speakers) and not to importance or any other evaluative attribute. That is why Balochi and Brahvi, otherwise major ethnic identity symbols are part of this chapter. It also includes Siraiki which was classified as Punjabi earlier. Thus, many of the earlier manuscripts mentioned in the chapter on Punjabi can also be classified under the head of Siraiki. In this book, however, they have been put under Punjabi because it is only recently that people have begun to differentiate between these two mutually intelligible languages. Other minor languages are Kashmiri, Gujarati, Hindko, and the languages of the Northern Areas and Chitral.

Chapter 14 is on the teaching of foreign languages in Pakistan. It gives a brief outline of the attempts of the Pakistani state and private institutions to teach French, German, Persian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Turkish, Russian, and Hindi, etc. It also refers to the attempts of foreign governments to teach their respective languages in Pakistan. Chapter 15, the most important chapter from the theoretical point of view, is concerned with the way ideology and world view are connected with language teaching. It examines the transition in world view, and consequently the language texts, from the medieval to the modern Victorian period during British rule. Then it focuses on how language textbooks are used to support the ideological imperatives of the Pakistani state. The focus is how the aim of language teaching, in addition to other instrumental aims, is also to create Pakistani nationalism and support for militaristic policies in Pakistan. The conclusion, Chapter 16, which follows this chapter, puts these insights into perspective by relating them to the overall issue of power. Thus, besides providing a historical account of the way the Muslims of north India and Pakistan have been taught languages, the book also provides answers, however inadequate and tentative, into the way language-teaching is related to ideology, world view and, in the final analysis, to power.
NOTES

1. Literacy has been defined variously in different census reports. In 1951 the ‘ability to read’ was defined as the ability to decode the symbols on a surface. In 1961 it meant the ‘ability to read with understanding’. Thus, in 1951, ‘no emphasis was laid on ability to understand what could be read’ (Census 1961: IV-35). In 1972 the question asked was ‘whether a person can read and write with understanding’ while in 1981 it was: ‘whether a person can read a newspaper and write a simple letter’ (Census 1984: 27).

2. The dialects of Pashto (3), Balochi (3), Hindko (3), Greater Punjabi (Pahari, Potohari) are subsumed under the language head itself. English, Sign Language, Badeshi (which is dead) have been excluded. Marwari, mentioned twice, is entered only once here. Kundal Shahi, not mentioned in the Ethnologue, is, however, included. Lexical similarity and intelligibility of varieties of a language are given if known. Judgments concerning a form of speech being a language or a dialect are not given in Annexure 1-A.

3. These figures were supplied by the Deputy Director, Directorate of Primary Education, Peshawar.
## Annexure 1-A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language or Dialect</th>
<th>Other Names/ Lexical Similarity to other Languages and Dialects</th>
<th>Where Spoken</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aer</td>
<td>None. 78% lexical similarity with Katai Meghwar and Kachi Bhil; 76% with Raburi; 76% with Kachi Koli.</td>
<td>Jikrio Goth around Deh 333, Hyderabad and Jamesabad. Also in Kach Bhuj in Gujrat (India).</td>
<td>200 in 1996</td>
<td>Gordon 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagri</td>
<td>(Bahgri ; Bagria; Bagris; Baorias; Bauri). Dialect of Rajasthani 74% lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil of Jodhpur; 54% with Jandavara.</td>
<td>Sindh and Punjab (nomadic between India and Pakistan)</td>
<td>200,000 in Pakistan including 100,000 in Sindh</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balti</td>
<td>Baltistani, Sbalti</td>
<td>Baltistan; also India.</td>
<td>270,000 (Pakistan) 337,000 (World)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 8 &amp; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bateri</td>
<td>(Bateri Kohistani; Batera Kohistan; Baterawal; Baterawal Kohistani) 58-61% lexical similarity with Indus Kohistani; 60% with Gurgula.</td>
<td>Indus Kohistan Batera village (East of Indus North of Besham)</td>
<td>28,251 (Pakistan) 29,051 (World)</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaya</td>
<td>Lexical similarity to Marwari sweeper 84% and to Malhi 75%; Bhat 73%; Goaria,72-73%; Sindhi Meghwar 70-73%, Sindhi Bhil 63-71% and Urdu 70%.</td>
<td>Kapri Goth near Khipro Mirpur Khas (Lower Sindh)</td>
<td>70-700 (in 1998)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahvi</td>
<td>Brohi, Brahuidi, Kurgalli, Brahuigi, (no similarity with any language in Pakistan but with many loan words from Persian, Balochi and Urdu.</td>
<td>Kalat region and East Balochistan. Also spoken by small communities in Sindh and Iran etc.</td>
<td>2,000,000 in Pakistan and 2,210,000 in all countries (1998).</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burushaski</td>
<td>Mishaski, Biltum, Werchikwar Khajuna (language isolate with no similarity with any language. Some words borrowed from Urdu,</td>
<td>Hunza, Nagar, Yasin valleys (Northern areas)</td>
<td>87,049 (2000)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 37 Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Lexical Similarity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dameli</td>
<td>(Gudoji, Damia, Damedi, Damel) 44% lexical similarity with Gawar-Bati, Savi, and Phalura, 33% with Kamviri, 29% with Kativiri.</td>
<td>Damel Valley 5000 (Southern Chitral) (in 1992)</td>
<td>SSNP-5: 11 Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehvari</td>
<td>(Deghwari) Iranian language somewhat close to Persian and influenced by Brahvi. also see Persian</td>
<td>Dehvari Kalat, Mastung 13,000 (Central Balochistan) (in 1998)</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200 &amp; Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhatki</td>
<td>(Dhati) Dialects are Eastern, Southern and Central Dhatki, Malhi and Barage. Varies from Northern Marwari but intelligible. 70-83% lexical similarity with Marwari dialects.</td>
<td>Lower Sind in Tharparkar and, Sanghar. 131,863 (Pakistan) 148,263 (World)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domaaki</td>
<td>(Domaski, Doma) loan words from Shina and Burushaski but not intelligible to speakers of both.</td>
<td>Mominabad (Hunza &amp; Nagar) 300 plus (in 2002)</td>
<td>SSNP 2: 79; Author's Personal observation in 2002.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghera</td>
<td>(Sindhi Ghera, Bara) Quite different grammatically from Gurgula and similar to Urdu. 87% lexical similarity with Gurgula. 70% with Urdu.</td>
<td>Hyderabad Sindh; 10,000 (India) (in 1998)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goaria</td>
<td>75-83% lexical similarity with Jogi; 76-80% with Marwari sweeper; 72-78% with</td>
<td>Cities of Sindh 25,426 (in 2000)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marwari Meghwar;
70-78% with Loarki.
(Gabaro, Gabar Khel)
62% lexical similarity
with Indus Kohistani;
60% with Bateri; 65-
68% with Chilisso;
40-43% with Shina.

Indus Kohistan (on
the eastern bank,
Kolai Area, Mahrin
village)
200 or less
(in 1990)
Breton 1997:
200 &
Gordon 2005

Gowro
(Gabaro, Gabar Khel)
62% lexical similarity
with Indus Kohistani;
60% with Bateri; 65-
68% with Chilisso;
40-43% with Shina.

Swat, Dir, Northern
areas, Azad Kashmir
and Punjab
300,000-700,000
plus
(in 1992)
SSNP-3: 96 &
Gordon 2005

Gujri
(Gujuri, Gojri, Gogri
Kashmir Gujri, Gujuri
Rajasthani)
close to Hindko and
related varieties of
Greater Punjabi. 64-
94% lexical similarity
among dialects.

Karachi, other parts
of Sindh. Major
language in India.
45,479,000 in
India and
46,100,000 in all
countries.
Probably 100,000
in Pakistan.
Gordon 2005.

Gujrati
(Gujrati)
close to Hindko and
related varieties of
Greater Punjabi. 64-
94% lexical similarity
among dialects.

Karachi, cities of
Sindh
35,314 (in 2000)
Gordon 2005

Gurgula
(Marwari, Ghera) 87%
Lexical similarity with
Ghera and
related varieties of
Greater Punjabi. 64-
94% lexical similarity
among dialects.

Karachi, cities of
Sindh
35,314 (in 2000)
Gordon 2005

Hazargi
(Hazara, Hezareh, Hezare’i) similar to
Persian and
related varieties of
Greater Punjabi. 64-
94% lexical similarity
among dialects.

Quetta and other
cities of Pakistan.
Also in Afghanistan.
156,794 (in 2000)
Gordon 2005

Hindko
(Hazara Hindko, Peshawar Hindko, Hindki) a variety of
Greater Punjabi. Intelligible to Punjabi
and Siraiki speakers.

Mansehra, Abbottabad, Haripur, Attock Districts. The inner
city of Peshawar and Kohat
e etc.
3,000,000 in 1993
i.e. 2.4% of the
population.
Gordon 2005

Jandava
(Jhandoria) 74%
lexical similarity with
Bagri and Katai
Meghwar, 68% with
Kachi Koli.

Southern Sindh from
Hyderabad to Mirpur
Khas; also in India
5000
(in 1998)
Gordon 2005

Jatki
(Jatgali, Jadgali, Jat)

Southern Balochistan and
Southwest Sindh.
Also in Iran.
100,000
in both countries
(1998)
Gordon 2005

Kabutra
(Nat, Natra) intelligibility with
Sansi and Sochi. 74%
lexical similarity with
Sochi.

Umarkot, Kunri, Nara Dhor (Sindh); also in India
1,000
(in 1998)
Gordon 2005

Kachchi
(Cutch, Kachi) similar
to Sindhi.

Karachi
50,000
(in 1998)
Gordon 2005
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Region and Numbers</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalami</td>
<td>(Bashgharik, Dir Kohistani, Bashkarik, Diri, Kohistani, Dirwali, Kalami Kohistani, Gouri, Kohistani, Bashkari, Gawri, Garwi)</td>
<td>Upper Swat 60,000-70,000 (in 1995)</td>
<td>Baart 1999: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalkoti</td>
<td>69% lexical similarity with Kalami but Kalami speakers do not understand Kalkoti.</td>
<td>Dir Kohistan in Kalkot village 6000 (in 2002)</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200; Zaman 2002; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamviri</td>
<td>(Skekhani, Kamdeshi, Lamertiviri, Kamik) there is a variety of Kativiri also called Skekhani.</td>
<td>Chitral (Southern end of Bashgal Valley) 2000 (in 1992)</td>
<td>SSNP-5: 143-156; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>(Keshuri)</td>
<td>The Valley of Kashmir &amp; Diaspora in Pakistan 4,391,000 in India. About 105,000 in Pakistan (in 1993)</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200; Gordon: 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khetrani</td>
<td>Similar to Siraiki but influence by Balochi</td>
<td>Northeast Balochistan 4,000</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khowar</td>
<td>(Chitrali, Qashqari, Arniya, Patu, Kohwar, Kashkara)</td>
<td>Chitral, Northern areas, Ushu in northern Swat 222,800 (Pakistan) 242,000 (World)</td>
<td>SSNP-5: 11&amp;25-42; Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohistani</td>
<td>(Indus Kohistani, Dir Kohistani, Kohiste, Khili, Maiyon, Maiya, Shuthun, Mair)</td>
<td>Indus Kohistan West bank of river 220,000 (in 1993)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koli Kachi</td>
<td>(Kachi, Koli, Kachi Koli) similar to Sindhi and Gujral (78% lexical similarity) but being influenced more by Sindhi in Pakistan. Its dialects are Rabari, Kachi Bhil, Vagri, Katai Meghwar,</td>
<td>(Lower Sindh) 170,000 (in 1998)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koli Parkari</td>
<td>Zalavaria Koli and Tharadari Koli. (Lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil and Tharadari) 77-83% lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil; 83% with Tharadari Koli</td>
<td>Lower Thar Desert Nagar Parkar. Also in India.</td>
<td>250,000 (in 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koli Wadiyara</td>
<td>(Wadiyara, Wadhiyara) intelligibility with Kachi Koli and its varieties.</td>
<td>Sindh in an area bounded by Hyderabad, Tando Allahyar and Mirpur Khas in the north, and Matli and Jamesabad in the South.</td>
<td>175,000-180,000 (in Pakistan). Total in Pakistan and India 360,000 (1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loarki</td>
<td>82% lexical similarity with Jogi and 80% with Marwari.</td>
<td>Sindh---various places; also in India</td>
<td>21,000 (in 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marwari</td>
<td>(Rajasthani, Meghwar, Jaisalmer, Marawar, Marwari Bhil) 79-83% lexical similarity with Dhatki; 87% between Southern and Northern Marwari; 78% Marwari Mehwar and Marwari Bhat.</td>
<td>Northern Marwari in South Punjab North of Dadu Nawabshah. Southern Marwari in Tando Mohammad Khan and Tando Ghulam Ali etc.</td>
<td>220,000 (in 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memoni</td>
<td>Similarities to Sindhi and Gujarati</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Od</td>
<td>(Odk) similarity with Marathi with some Gujarati features. Also influenced by Marwari and Punjabi 70-78% lexical similarity with Marwari, Dhatki and Bagri.</td>
<td>Scattered in Sindh &amp; south Punjab</td>
<td>50,000 (in 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ormuri</td>
<td>(Buraki, Bargista) 25-33% lexical similarity with Pashto.</td>
<td>Kaniguram (south Waziristan) some in Afghanistan etc</td>
<td>1000 (Pakistan) 1050 (World)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and the dialects mentioned earlier). Dialects of Persian spoken in Pakistan. The standard variety is used for writing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialect</th>
<th>Area Description</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>SSNP Code</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phalura</td>
<td>(Dangarik, Ashreti, Tangiri, Palula, Biyori, Phalulo) 56-58% lexical similarity with Savi; 38-42% with Shina</td>
<td>7 villages near Peshawar, etc. (in 1990)</td>
<td>SSNP-5: 11&amp;67-95;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sansi</td>
<td>(Bhilki) 71% lexical similarity with Urdu; 83% with Sochi.</td>
<td>North-western Sindh 16,200 (in 2000)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 93;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shina</td>
<td>(Sina, Shinaki, Brokpa)</td>
<td>Gilgit, Kohistan 300,000 (Pakistan)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 93;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi Bhil</td>
<td>(Bhil) close to Sindhi. Its varieties are Mohrano, Sindhi Meghwar, Badin etc.</td>
<td>Badin, Matli, Thatta 56,502 (in 2002)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 93;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torwali</td>
<td>(Kohistani, Bahrain Kohistani) 44% lexical similarity with Kalkoti and Kalami.</td>
<td>Chail and Bahrain 60,000 (Swat)</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushojo</td>
<td>(Ushoği) 35-50% lexical similarity with varieties of Shina.</td>
<td>Upper part of Bishigram Valley 1000 (in 2002)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaghri</td>
<td>(Vaghi Koli) 78% lexical similarity with Wadiyara Koli.</td>
<td>Sindh many places. Also in India. 90,000 in India. 10,000 in Pakistan. (in 1998)</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakhi</td>
<td>(Kheek, Kheekwar, Wakhani, Wakhigi, Wakh) some influence of Burushaski.</td>
<td>Northern ends of Hunza &amp; Chitral; Afghanistan; China; Tajikistan 9,100 (Pakistan) 31,666 (World)</td>
<td>SSNP-2: 61;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanetsi</td>
<td>(Tarino, Chalgari, Wanechi) 71-75% lexical similarity with Southern Pashto.</td>
<td>Harnai 95,000 (East of Quetta) (in 1998)</td>
<td>SSNP-4: 51</td>
<td>Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yidgha</td>
<td>(Yidghah, Luthuhwar) 56-80% lexical similarity with Munji in Afghanistan. Also influenced by Khowar.</td>
<td>Upper Lutkoh Valley 6,145 (in 2000) (Western Chitral)</td>
<td>SSNP-5: 11&amp;43-66;</td>
<td>Gordon 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We acquire a language by learning it; somebody teaches it. Sometimes, but rarely, we teach it to ourselves. Is there any difference in language- teaching and learning? Why does the sub-title of the book refer only to learning, and not to teaching? And what have power or ideology got to do with either the learning or the teaching of languages? These are some of the questions this chapter attempts to deal with though the arguments given here do not claim to be definitive, or even satisfactory answers to these questions.

By language-learning I do not mean what the proponents of learner-centred, rather than teacher-centred, education call ‘learning’. They argue that the teacher is merely a facilitator and the learner is the active agent contrary to what used to be assumed earlier. For the purpose of this book, however, the term learning refers to the demand for learning a language. When people are willing to learn a language, they demand it. The process of teaching, then, is a response to this demand. The focus on teaching, on the other hand, looks at the supply side. In an open-market situation public demand will create and condition supply. In other situations, however, such an equation will not hold. One may force the teaching of a language by decree and offer no choice. In such cases one would be justified in concentrating only on teaching policies and not on learning because it would no longer be possible not to appear to learn a language which is being forcibly taught even if one resists it subjectively and manages to unlearn what little one might have been forced down one’s throat. Although the sub-title refers only to ‘learning’, this book is also about language-teaching policies and practices.

The term which subsumes both learning and teaching situations is acquisition. It has the disadvantage of being somewhat unfamiliar and technical. Moreover, linguists use it to refer to the way children learn languages. The sense in which it has been used here is a special sense; an extension of the original meaning of the term. These are disadvantages but they are outweighed by the advantages. Among the advantages is that the literature on language planning already refers to ‘acquisition planning’. The use of the term is justified as follows by Cooper:

When planning is directed towards increasing a language’s uses, it falls within the rubric of status planning. But when it is directed toward increasing the number of users—speakers, writers, listeners, or readers—then a separate analytic category for the focus of language planning seems to me to be justified (Cooper 1989: 33).

This, however, is the definition of acquisition planning which has been called simply ‘teaching’ in this book. The term acquisition, as used here, refers also to learning, i.e. the demand for acquiring a language for rational (jobs, power, skills, etc.), or extra-rational (literary, emotional, snobbish, etc.) reasons. The rational reasons are also called pragmatic, instrumental, and utilitarian at other places in this book. The extra-rational ones are sometimes called personal, hedonistic or emotional. In the context of this book the terms rational and extra-rational are not meant to be evaluative. Extra-rational is not meant to have any kind of negative connotations for which the term ‘irrational’ is used. It only refers to those dimensions of our needs which cannot be measured in terms of computable or visible gains such as more money, better jobs, more prestige, and so on. This does not mean that the extra-rational objectives are any less valuable—indeed they may be subjectively even more valuable and gratifying for a person than tangible gains—than rational ones. It also does not mean that the choice of investing energy, time and money on learning a language which does not bring material gains is in any sense an unintelligent
or irrational choice. In the context of one’s emotional needs and subjective desires it may be eminently rational. The only reason it is being classified as extra- (not ir-) rational is to provide us with an analytical category by which to analyse the demand for learning a language. In the extra-rational category, then, fall the reading and writing of one’s mother tongue when it is not used in jobs nor considered prestigious. One only makes the effort for purely personal reasons—such as that the literature in that language gives one gratification, satisfies some deep desire or some such private reason.

In general, perhaps, the situation of the Muslims of north India and Pakistan falls somewhere in between these two ends (language-teaching and language-learning ones) though inclined more to the open-market pattern in some essential respects. First, no language was ever imposed and then forced upon them by dictatorial fiat. Indeed, no kind of teaching, let alone language-teaching, was made compulsory for the whole of the population of South Asia at any period of history. And, lastly, public demand for the languages which were taught from time to time—Arabic, Persian, Urdu and English—was never absent. Indeed, it was often considerable and teaching one language rather than another (such as English and Urdu instead of Persian) was often a response to this demand. It is because of these factors, especially because of demand from the civil society, that this book is mostly about the patterns of learning different languages among the Muslims of Pakistan and north India. Hence the sub-title is not misleading though, of course, there is more in the book than it promises, i.e. policies about teaching languages and especially about what texts are taught and for what ideological aims. First, however, let me define some of the other terms I will use in this book. These are as follows:

1) Rational (pragmatic, instrumental or utilitarian) language-learning—defined as the demand for learning a language in order to empower one’s self by acquiring the potential to acquire employment.
2) Resistance (or ethnic) language-teaching—the teaching of one’s ethnic language in order to resist the domination of a language of power. The objectives of this are mostly rational but the element of the extra-rational, such as hatred of a dominant language, enters into the motivation pattern also.
3) Ideological language-teaching—the transmission of ideas, values and perceptions of reality which create or influence one’s world view through language-teaching, especially language texts. The spread of one’s language abroad as well as the language-teaching policies of states for their own citizens come under this category. This too falls in the ‘rational’ category.
4) Extra-rational language-learning—the learning of languages purely because they gratify one, or for other emotional and private reasons. The learning of one’s mother tongue if it is not used in the domains of power falls in this category. While elements of the extra-rational appear in the forms of language acquisition mentioned earlier, most of this kind of language-learning is for pleasure. Hence the terms hedonistic or pleasure language-learning may be used for it.

These categories are tentative and not rigid or all-inclusive. The idea is to see whether most patterns of the acquisition of languages are explained with reference to them or not.

As mentioned earlier, one purpose of the book is to explore language-teaching policies in detail while the other is to see the pattern of demand; of learning a language. Of course language-learning and language-teaching are two sides of the same coin and one cannot look at one without looking at the other. And when one has looked at both sides one discovers that the value of the coin, what it buys in the market, is power—that it is generally the quest for power which enters into the equation whether people demand to learn a language or whether some powerful entity, such as the state, makes policies to teach it. The idea that individuals and groups learn a language
for economic reasons while the ruling elites teach it for political ones is well known (Watson 1993: 28). What is less often appreciated is that both these motivations can be subsumed under the desire for power.

Power is a notoriously difficult concept to use. It is generally used without an explanation by linguists. For instance, David Crystal tells us that a ‘language becomes an international language for one chief reason: the political power of its people—especially their military power’. Later, he tells us that while a militarily powerful nation establishes a language worldwide ‘it takes an economically powerful one to maintain and expand it’ (Crystal 1997: 7–8). In short, power is something which includes both the coercive apparatus; the means for giving pain; and the means for buying things; the means for giving pleasure. In my book Language and Politics in Pakistan I said that if power is exercised it would ‘increase the tangible or intangible means of gratification of its possessor’ (Rahman 1996: 8). This is not a definitive definition. Indeed, introducing the work of some of the most eminent scholars of the present era on power, Steven Lukes writes:

It turns out that there are various answers, all deeply familiar, which respond to our interests in both the outcomes and the location of power. Perhaps this explains why, in our ordinary unreflective judgments and comparisons of power, we normally know what we mean and have little difficulty in understanding one another, yet every attempt at a single answer to the question has failed and seems likely to fail (Lukes 1986: 17).

This being the case, I will neither attempt a single answer nor insist on any particular definition. One would still have to point out a few crude indicators of the ‘outcomes’ and ‘location of power’. For ordinary people the outcomes would perhaps be the possession of the means for living a good life. However differently ‘the good life’ is defined in different historical periods and cultures, it cannot but have some basic requirements: food, housing, clothing, freedom from fear, and the respect of ones’ fellow human beings. This last, subsumed under ‘recognition’ by Francis Fukuyama (1992: 146), may not appear to be as essential a requirement as the satisfaction of bodily wants but we are talking about the ‘good’ life and not merely subsistence. For life to have value, more than merely bodily wants must be satisfied and the desire for ‘recognition’—leading as it does to war and heroism and all kinds and other extra rational deeds—is the foremost among them. An even better life would entail the possession of leisure and the capability of having one’s desires gratified. These desires could be innocent, such as the possession of books, pictures, and the esteem of many people; they could be excessive, such as the desire for possessing more than anybody possesses: and they could be monstrous, such as the possession of sex slaves, indulging in sadistic practices, and forcing everybody to defer and submit to one. Whatever the desires may be, an indication of being powerful would be the capability to gratify them. It would merely be a credible capability which need not always be used. But, because it is a capability, a quality analogous to potential energy in physics, it cannot exist without a system to support it. At the crudest level this system is physical strength. One can force a few things out of weaker people by physical force alone. This kind of power is called ‘primary coercion’ by Gellner. But such power is not lasting and it needs only one other person to join the victim to be defeated. What is crucial is that people should allow a person, or persons, to possess power voluntarily; to recognize that it is legitimate ‘authority’—authority as defined by Hannah Arendt (1969: 45)—and not merely brute force. And what gives legitimacy to power in human societies, even simple ones, let alone complex modern ones, are ideas or, as Gellner calls them, ‘social rules’ (Gellner 1988: 146). All ideas for the organization of societies—tribal mores; kingship; priesthood; democracy; socialism; fascism—are based upon some agreement, some support, some acquiescence among a number of people even if, as it sometimes happens, an unusual individual can create enough terror to be obeyed by others even after this consensus is destroyed or seriously eroded. For the
most part, then, one can agree with Barry Barnes when he claims that:

Social power is the added capacity for action that accrues to individuals through their constituting a distribution of knowledge and thereby a society (Barnes 1988: 57).

Indeed, as Foucault observes, ‘knowledge and power are integrated with one another’ (Foucault 1975: 52). Foucault explains this further by describing how discourses transform individual consciousness. He tells us why we obey power:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault n.d.: 119).

The production of discourses is especially important because they create and express the belief system, the world view, by which we judge everything. Thus the supreme exercise of power lies in shaping ‘people’s’ world view upon which their values and actions are contingent. Indeed, social conditioning through schooling and the media is the most important way of changing world view whether undertaken by business organizations or the state (Galbraith 1984: 131–4).

This kind of power, that of constructing reality, is called ‘signitive’ power. We shall have more to say about it elsewhere. The other two kinds of linguistic power may be called ‘pragmatic’ and ‘symbolic’ power. Pragmatic power is based ‘on the communicative dimensions of language’ (DeKadt 1993: 160). Symbolic power refers to the association of a language with attributes which have a value, positive or negative, in the mind of the perceiver. For instance, English is associated with modernity, knowledge, and education in Pakistan while Punjabi is not. Instead, Punjabi is associated with informality, warmth, solidarity, rusticity, and lack of education. Such symbolic weights are not the intrinsic part of a language as people assume; they are the products of the way a language is used. If it is used by powerful elites, especially in the domains of power, then it becomes associated with positive attributes of a formal kind. If not, it may have a negative symbolic load. In short, the symbolic load of a language is connected with power. The languages of powerful elites and those used in the domains of power have a positive symbolic value. Other languages have either a negative value or a value which is positive for informal and affective dimensions but not formal and instrumental ones.

The third kind of power, pragmatic power, is based on the communicative dimensions of language. The very acts of writing and creating (literary) texts—what Pollock calls ‘literization and literarization’ (2006: 499)—were exercises in ‘culture-power’. They were based on particular choices people made at some point in time—choices about using local languages for certain purposes (vernacularization) or, as in the case of Sanskrit, using a trans-local code for similar purposes (cosmopolitanism) (Pollock 2006: 499). And every choice empowered some people more than others. Nowadays this depends on the way a language is used in the domains of power, such as the machinery of the state or the corporation. Indeed, as we move to the modern state, power becomes more and more detached from individuals (such as the sovereign) and ‘becomes a machinery that no one owns’ (Foucault 1977: 156). Let us now turn to the organizational machinery through which power circulates in modern societies.

The more this machinery becomes elaborate and impersonal with modernization, the more does language give one access to it. That is where the demand for learning the language of the visible machinery of power comes in. This visible machinery is associated for the most part with the state in Pakistan—government, bureaucracies, military, judiciary, education, research, media—but in other countries private domains of power, such as corporations, are very powerful
The language of the domains of power is an empowering device. Those who know it, control it, manipulate it, have an obvious advantage over those who do not. This, however, is only a trend and not an absolute principle in a modernizing country like Pakistan. In the Pakistani countryside, for instance, power is intimately connected with the possession of land. Landowners, or feudal lords, as they are called somewhat misleadingly, exercise power irrespective of whether they can manipulate a written language or not. Indeed, they can even acquire political power without acquiring English in any degree of proficiency. Similarly, religious leaders possess power without having the ability to manipulate English. It is only in the modern sector—the civil and military bureaucracies, media, education, commerce, and research—that entry is denied without the ability to use the language(s) used in a particular domain. But even here ability in the use of a language is not directly proportional to either one’s actual power or the capability of acquiring it even in that domain. If that were so, professors of English would have had more power than politicians, generals, bureaucrats, and corporate chiefs. The situation is otherwise, not only in Pakistan but in all countries. However, while greater ability in language use does not by itself make one more powerful, the inability to use it at all (being illiterate), does disqualify one from the modern literacy-dependent domains of power. Language, then, is an enabling factor for acquiring power in a modern society. However, even before modernity had created a huge bureaucratic network dependent on the manipulation of the written word, certain linguistic styles were a mark of power (social superiority). In ancient Greece, for instance, there was a movement called \textit{attikismos} which made people imitate the style of classical Athenian authors at the end of the first century BC According to Simon Swain who has studied it in detail:

\begin{quote}
The aim of \textit{attikismos}, stylistic and linguistic, was to differentiate the leaders of Greek letters and speech from the broad mass of Greek speakers in order to signal clearly that they had command of the best sort of Greek (Swain 1996: 21).
\end{quote}

In the same way educated people have differentiated themselves from the masses either by speaking a different language—Latin in Europe, Persian in India, European languages in ex-colonies—or using learned words from foreign languages in their own vernaculars. In South Asia, before the colonial impact, one function of language was to differentiate the educated elites from ordinary people (Washbrook 1991: 182). This function is served by English and Urdu, in that order, in Pakistan.

Class supremacy is maintained by denying people an educational system which gives them as much control of the language of the domain of power as the elite. Male dominance was also maintained in the same way. In the medieval age, indeed, there were manuals advising people not to educate their daughters. According to the \textit{Qabus Nama}, an eleventh century Persian manual of behaviour: ‘if you have a daughter … When she grows up, entrust her to a preceptor so that she shall learn the provisions of the sacred law and the essential religious duties. But do not teach her to read and write, that is a great calamity’ (Iskandar, circa 11C : 125). Another classic of didactic literature, the \textit{Akblaq-i-Nasiri} (c. 13C) by Khwaja Nasir uddin Tusi, also said that women should not be taught how to read. Even the great Muslim reformer Sir Syed Ahmad Khan advocated modern English education only for men because they would find jobs and the Muslim community would be thereby empowered. For women, as Dushka Saiyid points out, he wanted the continuation of traditional methods of education at home (Saiyid 1998: 44). Indeed, as C.M. Naim tells us, women like Bibi Ashraf who learned how to write had to struggle against the weight of these opinions (Naim 1987). Gail Minault, also discussing the beginnings of women’s education in colonial India, points out that ‘the taboo on writing was based on the anxiety that if a girl knew how to write, she might write letters to forbidden persons’ (Minault 1998: 24). In short, that she would be empowered as far as her personal life is concerned and this in itself would
potentially decrease male power in society. The teaching of the ‘language of power’, then, was confined to the elite of power.

The language of power is not the spoken language of everyday life and, therefore, has to be learned. This language has certain characteristics: it is a standardized variety of a language; it is a print language; it is highly valued; it is not spoken by the common people; it is an elitist possession. Not only is it a standardized language in the sense of possessing fixed spellings, written grammars, dictionaries, and printing conventions but it is also used by the ruling elite in the domains of power. The use of a language in such domains by the modern state, or ‘language rationalization’ is a matter for the ruling elite to decide. As ‘administration and rule’ account for most of the powerful, lucrative, and prestigious positions which the modern state can offer, Laitin is right when he clarifies that when language rationalization occurs ‘a citizen needs to have facility in a single language in order to take advantage of a wide range of mobility opportunities in the territory’ (1992: 9). In short, while language rationalization is a means of extending the power of the modern state it also results in empowering a group, generally the educated elite of the centre, at the expense of marginal groups. The standardized language used by the state in the domains of power has the potential of empowering those who learn it while disempowering those who do not or cannot. How languages are standardized and rationalized too has much to do with power. In the case of English, for instance, it was standardized not because it was structurally or intrinsically any better than the non-standardized, region-bound varieties of the languages we stigmatize as dialects. It was standardized by complex processes in which powerful elites, clerks of the chancellery and the clergy had a hand as John Honey (1997: 84) tells us (also see Fisher 1986). Then the educated classes, state bureaucrats, clergymen, publishers and writers spent money on teaching it, printing dictionaries and books in it and using it in the domains of power. As these classes occupied positions of power in the state apparatus, they made the standard variety the language of the domains of power (‘rationalization’) at the expense of all the other varieties of English and their speakers. This made standard English empowering and functionally useful because it constantly enriched itself in vocabulary and other resources as it met the growing needs of a modern society. We often mistake this greater functional usefulness for ‘superiority’ but that is an evaluative term which one can do without as long as one remains at the purely theoretical level. However, as people live on the pragmatic level and not on the purely theoretical one, they cannot but help using evaluative terms for everything including languages. And at that level it would be a folly to deny that the standard variety of a language is not empowering—at least at present. In other words we all agree in supporting the system of the distribution of power simply by accepting the standardized variety of a language as the ‘correct’ or ‘elegant’ language. The non-standardized varieties of a language, or non-standardized languages, are often given less prestige than standardized ones even by their own speakers. This is not because of the nature of the language but because of its use in the domains of power. The crucial factor is power, not language. The crux of the issue is whether a language can empower one or not. Scotton, who concludes after mass surveys that Africans place language in a hierarchical order, gives support to what may be called the ‘expected-utility theory’ (1972). This is explained as follows by Laitin:

People make individual assessments of the benefits of speaking a language (multiplied by the probability of actually receiving them) and then subtract the cost of learning it (Laitin 1992: 32).

Laitin himself goes on to use the game theory to account for the learning of languages. His conclusion is that people are willing to learn languages other than their own ‘as instruments for the fulfillment of economic or social goals’ but this does not happen without their feeling ‘a sense of loss, of alienation from their roots, of betrayal’ (1992: 52). This is a point which we will take
up in what I call ‘Resistance LT’.

As we have already remarked, in most countries the standardized variety is an elitist possession. This means that it ‘sells’ best in the linguistic market. The notion of a ‘market’ comes from Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist, who argues that linguistic exchange ‘is also an economic exchange which is established within particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit’ (Bourdieu 1991: 66). In other words, languages do not communicate only meaning in any neutral sense; they also communicate power. Thus words are valued according to who speaks them; which class they are associated with and what image they have in a society. Speech codes associated with powerful groups in a society, such as European languages in ex-colonies or the standard language anywhere, do not convey meaning alone but also the power of their history and contemporary associations. That is why, even if they are saying the same thing, standard English sounds authoritative and correct to most people in Pakistan. In the English-speaking world the pronunciation, idiom, vocabulary, and even the grammar of the common peoples’ varieties—the regional or working class varieties—is different. That is why standard English has to be learned in school as Honey has pointed out in his well argued book significantly entitled *Language is Power* (1997). In this context it should be mentioned that Bernstein pointed out in a series of articles, that working-class children use a ‘restricted code’ while middle-class ones use the ‘elaborated’ one which is what the schools use. The former is dependent on the context and leaves out connecting and explanatory words. The latter is detached from the context and uses glosses, fillers, and logical connectives. These are matters of verbal strategy, of style rather than language, but their effect is that of restricting the entry of working-class children into the world of education and extended power. Besides, the school, which teaches the latter code, tries to bring about a linguistic change which devalues the speakers’ way of life. According to Bernstein:

Such language change may involve for the speaker the experiences of isolation, bewilderment and defencelessness, whilst the structure of the ‘teaching’ situation may well be felt as persecutory (Bernstein in Hymes 1964: 257).

However, not teaching the standard variety altogether, as arguments about the structural equality of all languages appear to imply, would be ghettoizing. In Arab countries, there is a diglossic situation which Ferguson pointed out in his now classic article on diglossia (1959). Demotic Arabic is used in the family and all the informal domains of interaction. Classical Arabic, which is nobody’s mother tongue, is taught in schools. Those who cannot, or do not, go to school are automatically shut out of the formal, modern, domains of power. For the Muslims of South Asia, the language of the domains of power was generally a foreign language. Under the Mughals it was Persian and under the British it was English. Lower domains of power—such as the lower courts, schools, private businesses, vernacular media, mosques, tombs of mystic (sufi) saints—did function in the vernacular languages but there was a hierarchy in which the vernaculars came right at the bottom. Indeed, for most Muslims of north India and Pakistan, their mother tongue (if it was other than Urdu) came last. At present, in Pakistan, English occupies the top position. Next comes Urdu and right below them all the mother tongues (Rahman 1996: 228–48). And not only in Pakistan but in all ex-colonial countries, the local languages are devalued vis-à-vis the language of the former masters. In Nigeria (Oladejo 1993), India (Agnihotri & Khanna 1997), and Tanzania (Mekacha 1993) English continues to be the language in which the elite is educated and through which one climbs into positions of power, affluence, and cultural significance. In India, even in Varanasi which is the heart of the Hindi movement (the movement to promote the use of Sanskritized Hindi which is a symbol of the Hindu identity and part of Hindu nationalism),
the citizens ‘vote for Hindi education, yet send their own children to English-medium schools’ (Laitin 1992: 69). In Pakistan the mushrooming of schools advertising themselves as being ‘English-medium’ tells the same story. In Tunisia, they talk of Arabization while teaching their children in private French schools (Laitin 1992: 113). In all these countries the major focus of language-teaching is the acquisition and retention of power. Westernized elites know that they will acquire positions in the higher bureaucracy, commissions in the officer corps of the armed forces and increasingly in NGOs, international organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations if they have command over English. Thus they spend enormous amounts on teaching good English to their children. Languages of power, then, are an ‘investment item’ as Laitin said about European languages in Africa (1992: 80). They are invested into because they have the potential of making one powerful.

So far we have talked only about the acceptance, and hence the demand, for learning a language. However, another reaction to the high valuation of a language could be resistance to it. I have dealt with the resistance to Urdu and English in Language and Politics in Pakistan earlier. But language movements, which that book mostly deals with, are expressions of dissatisfaction with the centre. Language is a symbol of identity which gives a focal point for mobilization to a group which, both for rational and extra-rational reasons, wants a greater share in power and goods and services than it is given. The role of language in language movements, or ethnic assertions, is symbolic or iconic—that is, language is not just a means of communication but stands for a way of life or a symbol of identity. In South Asia identity used to be related to shared blood or essence (jati). It was also role-oriented so that the weavers (julaha) were a jati as were the barbers (nai). Modernity changed the way group identity came to be seen. As David Washbrook explains, the ‘novel principle of linguistic identity was accepted, but only in a way which fitted into a pre-existing cognitive structure’ (Washbrook 1991: 203). Thus Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Siraikis came to take language as the essence of their identity as if it were extended kinship, blood, or substance. Washbrook concludes from this that the new modernist principle of categorization lost its revolutionary implications and that ‘society changed—in order to remain the same’ (ibid.: 203). While it is true that people take identity as a given and not a constructed category despite the fact that the Siraiki and Mohajir identities have emerged only lately, it seems to be true for perceptions of identity at any given point in time anywhere in the world and not only in South Asia. What is significant for us, however, is how languages are taught and learned by ethnic activists in order to strengthen—and in fact very often create—perceptions of identity. The activists of these movements are aware of the nexus between language and identity though they often believe that they are resurrecting their linguistic and cultural heritage. They resist the dominant language rhetorically and those who learn the ethnic languages also resist them by investing in their own languages which are not empowering at least in the beginning. Whereas language-learning, that is to say the learning of the language of power, is immediately empowering those who learn ethnic languages, opt for creating a new power base, or at least repudiate the old one. In language-learning, which is the consequence of accepting a language for whatever reason, individuals, or groups, take their share in power by accepting the basic premises upon which the power networks of the system are based. Language movements, on the other hand, confront the system to change its realities using language as a symbol of unity. In short, while pragmatic language learning acquiesces in the system, at least temporarily, using language as a tool or device to enter the system and use it for one’s advantage, language-resistance, or teaching ethnic languages to resist the dominant powerful language, rebels against the system using language to create an alternative system of networks of power.

In general, pragmatic language-learning is the more established pattern of behaviour. Thus during the anti-British movement for Indian independence the Indian elite kept up its demand for more and better English-teaching; Baloch, Brahvi, and Pashtun parents did not support the efforts
of Baloch and Pashtun language activists to teach their children their mother tongues as enthusiastically as they supported other aspects of their ethnic identity (Rahman 1996: 150 & 168) and, despite the widespread realization and resentment in the Pakistani middle class against English as an elitist preserve, everybody who can afford to have their children educated in English-medium schools, does so. In short, like human behaviour for the most part, pragmatic language-learning is not revolutionary. It is mostly utilitarian and its goals are rational. Resistance LT, on the other hand, is symbolically revolutionary and its goals may both be rational (destroying the dominant system of power and building up an alternative one instead) or extra-rational (nostalgia, romantic attitude to the past, preserving one’s traditions, etc.).

In some cases people learn languages precisely because they have symbolic significance. The symbols and meanings of moribund or obscure languages are kept alive by ‘half-forgotten poets and lonely philologists’ as Laitin says (1988: 293). In certain political conditions they come to life and take on a new significance. As a general rule, Laitin argues that such ethnic projects succeed only if there are sufficient people believing that they will succeed. To explain this he introduces the analytic concept of ‘tipping’. A certain social group ‘tips’ from one kind of behaviour to another. This ‘tipping’ or ‘cascading’ occurs ‘because people’s choices about their actions are based on what they think others are going to do’ (Laitin 1998: 21). When this is applied to the learning of an ethnic language, it means that people will tip towards learning it to the extent that they believe that other people are doing so. Laitin uses this model in his analysis of the behaviour of Russians living in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Among the ‘rational’ payoffs he enumerates for reaching the tipping point are: ‘expected economic returns, in-group status, and out-group status’ (ibid.: 29). In short, both tangible and intangible gratifications, which in terms of the analytical model in this book can be called empowerment, lead to ‘tipping’. Thus, tipping towards learning an ethnic language occurs when a community or some influential activists among it feel that it would empower the group. As the element of the extra-rational is involved, it is difficult to predict when the tipping point would be reached. However, pragmatic aspects of it—such as the possibility of getting jobs—can be calculated. But even when the language is of no pragmatic value in the strictly utilitarian sense (i.e. it cannot get one jobs, etc.), it may be useful as a symbol of resistance; a marker of a proposed alternative to established power. During the Irish struggle against English domination, Irish Gaelic, for instance, had this kind of significance and people did try to learn it though it was not of value as far as jobs and getting on in the world were concerned (Hindley 1990: 37–9). This phenomenon, which has been called resistance (or ethnic) LT, serves a political purpose—that of consolidating, and hence empowering, a dominated group. It is categorized as language-teaching here because it is sustained more by the efforts of the language-teaching policies of ethnic activists rather than the actual demand of the learners. Indeed, while the learners may learn their ethnic languages for symbolic or political reasons, they may actually demand to learn the prevalent language of power to get on with their lives till the system of distribution of power does not actually change. The site of the struggle includes cultural aspects. Language, clothes, lifestyle, religion—indeed all markers of difference—are used to emphasize differences not similarities. A consciousness of difference gives strength to the claim of separate identity, separate nationality and, therefore, more regional autonomy or even a separate country for a sub-national group. Some of the better known cases of resistance LT are the teaching of Welsh in Wales to prevent it from dying out (Khüf 1976; 1986); the teaching of Catalan in Catalonia, Spain, where Franco’s policy of suppressing that language had created tremendous popular resentment (Mar-Molinero 1989; Grant and Docherty 1992); the teaching of Dutch to the Flemish population in Belgium (Swing 1982); and the teaching of French in Quebec after 1982 (Martel 1996; Fortier 1994); and the teaching of Hebrew in Israel (King 1997: 31). In Algeria, under French rule, while most schools were French-medium ones, there was an underground movement led by Arabic-medium
institutions against French control (Kelly 1982). Such movements may or may not be successful. Success depends on many factors including initial motivation and resources. In the case of Welsh both are not enough to reverse the trend but, since the English are dominant, the resistance is just enough to keep the movement going. In Ireland, when the English left, resistance became a thing of the past and pragmatism took over. People, therefore, learn English not Irish to succeed in life though lip service is paid to the latter. In Catalonia the brutal Franco years having produced a high degree of antagonism, and local jobs being available in Catalan, make the pro-Catalan language policy sustainable. In the case of Belgium the Flemish minority has turned into an active pressure group and uses language as an identity symbol. In Canada the intensity of French resistance, based on cultural pride and the possibility of getting on in French, makes LT policies successful. In Israel the success is greater than all other countries because a dead language, which was nobody’s mother tongue, has come alive. As it is the only language which unites Jews from all over the world (Rabin 1973: 69) and, as King points out, the holocaust had created such a strong emotional resistance to other languages (as icons) (King 1997: 31), Israel resuscitated Hebrew through the most successful experiment in resistance LT ever. This experiment was conducted largely in the schools. Indeed, ‘what led to the use of Hebrew at home was its prior promotion as the language of instruction at school’ (Cooper 1989: 13).

But Israel is an inordinately highly motivated and powerful country. Less powerful countries, and especially less powerful communities surrounded by powerful people, do not succeed in learning their languages which become ghettoizing stigmata for them. The major reason for this lack of success is that there are no economic benefits following the learning of powerless languages. Precisely because there are neither economic benefits for learning Hawaiian nor much active resistance to English-speaking Americans from the mainland, the LT programme to save Hawaiian from extinction is not a success (Kawamoto 1993). Similarly, the forces of utilitarianism contribute to the failure of Quechua LT. It has been dominated for four centuries by Spanish in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Recently schools have begun to teach it in order to keep it alive. However, urbanization (bringing more people in the domain of utilitarian motivation) continues to foster Hispanization so that there is little hope of a reversal of roles between Spanish and Quechua (Gleich 1994). Indeed, it was rejected after three years of experimental teaching in Peruvian schools in the 1970s precisely because Quechua speakers did not want to spend time and effort to learn it (Hornberger 1989).

So, if there is little demand for learning minor ethnic languages, why do modern states spend time and resources on teaching them. Indeed, despite these efforts some languages are dying anyway. One answer is that there are liberal humanists who do not want languages, which are repositories of distinct human cultures, to disappear for ever. But such people, however vocal, can only be very few. When the decision-makers allocate resources for the teaching of these languages they respond to the demands of such people, and members of the language community in question, out of political considerations. In democratic countries the decision-makers consolidate and expand their power base, their vote bank, and get a good reputation for their liberal and fair policies. Thus France, which had actively suppressed all languages, except standardized Parisian French in the past, now gives some measure of protection to Basque, Breton, Catalan, and Corsican languages (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993). In New Zealand, after the marginalization of the aboriginal language, Maori, the Ministry of Education declared some support for it in 1982 (Paulston and McLaughlin 1994: 60–61). In Canada, despite some opposition, the languages of immigrants—‘heritage languages’—are supported in some schools (ibid.: 62) and in Europe too, some minor languages are being revitalized (ibid.: 66). But these efforts are symbolic moves in the power game. Their success depends not only on state efforts and resources but also, and much more so, on the degree of motivation which the speakers of the language in question manifest for learning it.
This motivation, as mentioned before, depends on the pleasure or psychological gratification the learner derives from learning to read and write the language; his or her resistance to the dominant language and, even more so, on whether there are chances of any change in the way it will be used in the domains of power both nationally and internationally. Even people who resist the domination of a language, or its speakers, might nevertheless continue to learn it because they feel that it will continue to empower them individually as long as good jobs are available through it and people treat it as a symbol of social prestige. The classical case of this kind which comes to the mind is that of the South African black population under the apartheid system. They resisted being taught their own mother tongues because they were ghettoizing. The black leaders assumed that social prestige, good jobs, goods and services—all that power brings—would only come through English. They knew that depriving them of English meant depriving them of access to power. Hence, they, while opposing white domination, nevertheless also opposed mother tongue education (Reagan 1987; Janks 1990). Even in the case of English Honey cites cases of marginal or working-class groups in Britain who want to acquire standard English precisely because it is empowering (1997: 202). And in South Asia just the number of schools which promise to teach English, or use English as a medium of instruction, is large enough to indicate how people are keen to learn English so as to empower themselves. Indeed, it is the elite which keeps the supply side of English limited, probably more because of its exorbitant cost than anything else, to a number of quality schools—a situation which can well be compared to a ‘linguistic apartheid’.

This particular aspect of linguistic apartheid—locking people out of power by not teaching them the language used in its domains—is an extreme form of ‘elite closure’ defined as the limiting of the ‘access of non elite groups to political position and socioeconomic advancement’ (Scotton 1993: 149). Aristocratic regimes practiced elite closure openly. One had to be a gentleman to buy a commission in the British army till the nineteenth century. Similarly, one had to be white for political office in the United States till even after the Civil War. Modern, democratic regimes are committed to equality, non-discrimination between citizens, justice and fairplay—at least in theory. Thus they cannot close the ranks of the elite in the name of blue blood, sex, race, or language. There is only one ground for discrimination which is valid even in a liberal democracy. This is cognitive ability which manifests itself in the form of skills. Linguistic skills—the ability to speak, write, and read the language of the domains of power—are absolutely necessary for most jobs, even menial ones, in a modern democratic state. Hence elite closure is not so much closure as ‘restriction’ and it works through the education system.

A state may not teach all its citizens. In that case the illiterate are locked out of the power apparatus though they remain part of it in some capacity or the other. Another state may teach one language to its common citizens but use another one in the upper echelons of the domains of power. In this case those who are taught the elitist language will have much easier access to power than those who are not. The latter category of people will demand it and hanker for it. A third case may be the teaching of the language of the domains of power indifferently to ordinary people while the rich have access to high quality instruction. This is true for schools in the inner cities in the United States where English is taught so poorly that school graduates seldom possess the skills to rise high in the society after leaving school while children in good school districts (i.e. richer localities) and expensive private schools are equipped with much better skills. Laitin gives examples of ‘elite closure’ from Africa. The gist of his findings is that the elite uses European languages in the domains of power and African ones for informal domains thus excluding the common people from power by establishing ‘a system of stratification that is inherently inegalitarian in that it puts up extra barriers to social mobility’ (Laitin 1992: 57–8). That is why the Nigerian academic, O.O. Oyelaran, calls this phenomenon ‘exclusion’ (1990: 24). In Pakistan this happens by teaching only a very small number of children in expensive English-medium schools while allowing the rest to remain either illiterate or acquire some competence in
Urdu (or Sindhi in parts of Sindh) and some knowledge of English in government schools or, alternatively, a little Arabic, Persian, and Urdu in the madrassas.

In the cases we have been considering so far, we have concentrated on pragmatic or utilitarian language learning. The only cases of language-teaching policies which came into discussion were about the teaching of languages for non-utilitarian reasons such as resistance or ethnic LT. The purpose was to show that sometimes some people do learn languages for other than utilitarian reasons. We have also briefly touched upon elite restriction: the refusal to teach a language, or not teaching it adequately or in the same degree and manner, so as to restrict the number of entrants into elitist positions. In such cases pragmatic language-learning is the major strategy for those who are disempowered to empower themselves.

In short, although states may not appear to impose languages—indeed they may appear to ration them and give them only as a rare privilege—it is their policy which increases or decreases the demand for them. The mere fact of using them in the domains of power creates the demand. It is, therefore, quite untrue that people (except for a few) demand a language because of its intrinsic worth; because they are fond of it; because they want to be enlightened; because they cherish the literature in it; because they want to become part of the community which speaks it. Only a few people desire, or even get the chance, to integrate themselves in another community. Only a very few intellectuals really relish foreign literature and even fewer seek enlightenment for its own sake. Generally people learn the powerful language for instrumental, rational reasons because it is the only key to power which personal effort can give them. However, they also learn this language because of emotional, extra-rational reasons. In such cases it is not only because of ethnic resistance or consciousness of identity for which some people learn even their ghettoizing mother tongues. Sometimes the emotion involved is the desire for ‘recognition’; for being like the powerful; for the snobbish value of the powerful language. This is understandable in view of Paulo Freire’s view of cultural imperialism. It does not presuppose only an outside power as invader. The ‘invasion’ is real enough but the invader is not only the outsider but also his insider ally. The values internalized by this ally lead to what Freire calls ‘the cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded’. The process is best described in his own words:

For cultural invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become convinced of their intrinsic inferiority. Since everything has its opposite, if those who are invaded consider themselves inferior, they must necessarily recognize the superiority of the invaders. The more the invasion is accentuated and those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders: to walk like them, dress like them, talk like them (Freire 1989: 151).

The powerful language, then, gives prestige and a positive self image and not just jobs. It is the key to the world of power—it provides gratifications both tangible and intangible; both goods and services and ego-boosting. The demand for a powerful language, then, has both rational and extra-rational aspects. However, for the most part, the demand is really a product of the policy of the state which made that language the currency of the market of power in the first place. So, although language teaching is not necessarily imposed in the open-market model, the conditions which create value in the market are imposed. In the final analysis they are meant to be in the interest of those who create and control the market. However, a number of people from classes which could hardly have risen high in a more static feudal or agrarian society, do get the chance of rising in the world by learning the languages of power. In this sense, then, the language-learning market is an open rather than a closed market. It can be penetrated or used by the powerless to gain power but ultimately it is largely controlled, manipulated and under the influence of the powerful and helps to keep them in power. This is so because, as already indicated, the decision as to which language will be used in the domains of power is very much a
political decision. This is the gist of various studies on language policy such as that of Heath (1972) on Mexico in the 1970s; and Watson’s (1983) on Malaysia in the 1970s and 1980s. In all these cases the policies are, as Watson points out, ‘political in so far as policy makers seek to use language policy to strengthen their own position’ (Watson 1993: 28). The decision about which language(s) to teach to whom, then, is related to power. It is a decision which consolidates and expands the power of the ruling elites even if those elites keep recruiting new people, new groups, and new classes as conditions keep changing.

But why do ruling elites use their own languages, or languages which they consider prestigious, in the domains of power in the first place? Why do they want to increase the number of the users of their own or adopted language—a policy which we identified as ‘acquisition planning’ following Cooper (1989: 157–63) earlier in this chapter, and of which teaching is a major component? One obvious answer is that it is administratively more convenient for these elites. A second one is that it is psychologically gratifying for them. After all, those who learn the languages will never speak—the one activity everybody indulges in most of the time—it as well as the native speakers or those who have near-native competence in them. Only a very small number of the learners will write it like the best native or near-native speakers but most others, both while speaking and writing, will feel inadequate and insecure. This puts most ordinary non-elitist learners in a position of permanent inferiority vis à vis the elitist speakers who remain exemplars, norm-setters, and linguistic (hence cultural) ideals for ever. This eventuality might not have been cynically planned but it is a consequence of adopting policies which privilege a language by making it the language of power. Yet another answer, and one which relates to what we have called the signitive power of language, might be that language gives access to the world view of the powerful and the acceptance of this world view by the less powerful consolidates the system of the distribution of power in the first place. That, in other words, ‘language is a means of propagating ideologies’. An excellent analysis of the relationship between power and ideology is given by James Tollefson (1991). He refers to the fact that certain assumptions, such as those relating to superiority or virtue, appear commonsensical but only because they are based on certain ideological assumptions. Thus, in his own words, ‘ideology is connected to power, because the assumptions that come to be accepted as common sense depend upon the structure of power in a society’ (Tollefson 1991: 10–11). The contribution of schooling to the preservation of social rank and privilege—that is to say power—has been analysed by Khleif, and language-teaching has a key role in it because, among other reasons, it ‘determines the conceptual categories by which we experience the world’ (Khleif 1986: 223). In this context the work of Michael W. Apple is especially relevant (1979; 1982; and 1993). Apple argues that the curriculum in schools—he takes examples of American schools but the concept is universally relevant—is meant to create and maintain the hegemony of the powerful elites of the society.

**Ideological Language-teaching**

However, even more than language texts it is history which is used to propagate one’s ideology and create a world view which supports the powers that be. The notorious state interventions in historiography in modern times have been those of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Soviet decision-makers. Less notorious are the colonial experiments in education and the distortion of American history by erasing parts dealing with slavery and the annihilation of the native Americans (also called Indians) (Fitzgerald 1979). The ‘hidden curriculum’ in America, as Apple argues, ‘serves to legitimate the existing social order since change, conflict, and men and women as creators as well as receivers of values and institutions are systematically neglected’ (1979: 102). In India the Congress, with a view to creating a composite Indian nationalism by eliminating the tension
between Muslim and Hindu identities, promoted history which de-emphasized the role of religion and emphasized that of economic and political factors in India’s past. The National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) textbooks do not vilify Muslims but they do not accept Islam as a basis for the creation of Pakistan (Behera 1996: 198). The Hindu nationalists, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), wants to control ‘history as a justification for a Hindu identity for India’ (Thapar 1993). In 1977 Morarji Desai conceded the Hindu nationalists’ demands (in this case the Jan Sangh’s) by banning well-known histories. Among others Romila Thapar’s Medieval India; Bipin Chandra’s Modern India, and R.S. Sharma’s Ancient India were withdrawn from the schools. The Janata government, however, lost its hold on power in 1979 and the Indian History Congress endorsed the textbooks reaffirming its commitment to the ‘scientific and secular approach to the study of history’ (Behera 1996: 200). However, in the 1990s when the BJP came to power in several Indian states, including UP, the question of Hinduizing history again came to the forefront. According to Behera who describes this debate, the BJP failed to convince the Indian National Congress at its 54th session in December 1993, and the debate goes on. Now that the BJP is in power for the second time after winning the October 1999 elections, there are attempts by Hindu nationalists, as reported in the press and on the Internet, to Hinduize historical and other texts. For instance, in February 2000 the Oxford University Press was made to return the typescripts of Sumit Sarkar and K.N. Pannikar who were contributing to the 20-volume-history of the Indian Council of Historical Research. Indian liberal and left wing intellectuals responded by demonstrating against this ‘saffronization’ but the extremist ideology is said to be infiltrating school books (Dawn, 20 February 2000). The teaching of Sanskritized Hindi in schools has, of course, been an attempt at the formation of a distinct Hindu identity for a long time in India.

In Pakistan, too, the main ideology-burdened texts, or propagandist texts, are historical, political, and sociological in nature. The subject of Pakistan Studies contains elements of all three and is meant for disseminating state-supported ideologies. As we have seen, such a use of history is not new. All official historians were made to conceal those aspects of the truth which would annoy the powers that be. However, the power of the modern state is much more than the pre-modern one. This power is derived not only through a much more powerful coercive apparatus than before but also by the fact that the modern state can reach out to more people through the media and through school textbooks than its predecessors. Since our focus here is on language-teaching, we shall only consider the language-teaching textbooks. What kind of ideology is presented in them? But, first, what is the difference between the terms ‘ideology’ and ‘world view’ which are used in this book.

The concept of ideology, as used by the Enlightenment philosophers such as Destutt de Tracy, referred to ideas—especially ideas which challenged traditional systems of belief. The term is used in at least three senses. First, to refer to certain specific beliefs. Secondly, to refer to false or distorted beliefs and thirdly, to refer to all kinds of beliefs whether true or false. Marxists have generally used it in the second sense. Karl Mannheim, one of the foremost analysts of ideology, distinguishes between what he calls ‘the particular conception of ideology’ and the ‘total conception’ of it. The former, he says, ‘denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent’ (Mannheim 1929: 55), while the latter means ‘the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group’ (ibid.: 56). The second meaning comes close to what may be called world view. Thus, it is very often difficult to distinguish between ideology and world view as different writers use these concepts differently. Although not semantically or logically limited in its nature, the term ideology has political connotations. It refers in contemporary usage to political, economic, and social ideas presented, or disseminated, by groups contending for obtaining power over peoples’
consciousness. The state, for instance, disseminates its dominant ideology everywhere. Religious groups in the Muslim world counter this with their ideology. Both may do it through textbooks, of which language textbooks may be a part, which makes it necessary for us to look at such textbooks. In short, when we use the term ‘ideology’ in this book we will use it for ideas given by organized bodies, such as the state or a ruling elite, in pursuance of some objective—national integration; maintenance of group hegemony; domination over other groups and so on. Ideology, then, forms the basis of certain lines of action or acceptance of certain actions or arrangements in public domains. However, the way Tollefson uses the term ‘ideology’ is no different from that which is called ‘world view’ below (1991: 10–11).

World view is a concept used by anthropologists for understanding how primitive peoples understand reality. The terms ‘cognitive view’, ‘world view perspective’, ‘basic assumptions’, ‘implicit premises’, ‘Weltanschaung’, ‘World Outlook’ and simply ‘ethos’ are used as synonyms. Redfield describes world view as ‘that outlook upon the universe that is characteristic of a people’ (1952: 30). George M. Foster, another anthropologist, calls it ‘cognitive orientation’ and defines it as follows:

The members of every society share a common cognitive orientation which is, in effect, a universalized, implicit expression of their understanding of the ‘rules of the games’ of living imposed upon them by their social, natural, and supernatural universes (Foster 1967: 300).

Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir contributed to the thinking on world view by arguing that language structures thought and, therefore, the world view was in a sense shaped by language (Carroll 1956; Sapir 1921). Although later work proved the extreme deterministic interpretations of Whorf wrong, there is agreement that language and world view are in a circular relationship—something which Nietzsche among others pointed out long ago (Strong 1976, in Shapiro 1984: 84). The problem, however, is whether the concept of world view can be used for people in complex, literate societies? After all, in such societies there are so many influences, especially in this age of the TV and the computer, that there can never be anything like a coherent system of beliefs such as one might expect in a primitive tribe anthropologists write about. While this is true, it is difficult to come up with another term for dominant assumptions, beliefs, and values, even if they are in a state of flux and vary from region to region and class to class in a complex, developing society like that of Pakistan. Thus, while ideology refers specifically to politics or religion in Pakistan, the term ‘world view’ may be used to refer to all kinds of beliefs as a whole. It must be emphasized, however, that in a complex, heterogeneous society like Pakistan, there cannot be a single or monolithic and unchanging world view. There can only be fluid, diversified, pluralistic world views in various degrees of flux. It will, therefore, be useful to refer to the world views of sub-sets of people such as peasants, students of a certain socio-economic class or urban Pakistanis. However, while world view cannot be measured or even fully understood, it is possible to understand what kind of ideology is presented in a certain textbook. Textbooks, after all, are chosen to reinforce or create certain kinds of orientations to reality, and to see what kind of thoughts they give can tell us at least what certain powerful decision-makers consider desirable. Textbooks, being the products of a certain culture and being written in a certain language, contain much more than the ideas people deliberately put into them. That is why they may influence not only the ideas relating to politics (ideology in the narrow sense) but all ideas, all assumptions, all values (world view). In short, certain desiderated ideas, certain changes in ideology and world view, may be connected with power. But why focus on language texts when historical and social studies texts are also written with ideological purposes in mind?

One answer is that language not only reflects but also reinforces values. It does not give us a transparent code for expressing reality but allows us to give shape and coherence to innumerable sensations, masses of jumbled data, countless shapes of undifferentiated tangibles. It gives us the
very taxonomies which allow us to perceive things. It gives us binary and other forms of
oppositions. It reduces the complexity of the world thus making it expressible. But it does all this
by privileging a human, ethnocentric and largely subjective point of view. Imagine what would
have happened to our categories of solid, liquid, and gas, if we were smaller than electrons. For
us, then, reality would be empty space with such large empty spaces between atoms, let alone
larger units, that any differentiation between relative densities would be meaningless. This means
that the solid world of common sense is describable only from a subjective point of view. Calling
it solid itself is possible only from the point of view of an observer bigger than the smallest
particles in nature. Indeed, the very fact that our languages are translatable; that we can
understand each other—contrary to the strong version of the theories of linguistic determinism
attributed to Sapir and Whorf—is proof only of the fact that human beings are essentially similar,
not that ‘reality’ is as human beings agree it is. But in human languages the differences are
intriguing. These differences are expressed through the vocabularies of good and evil, kinship,
emotions, and attitudes, norms of behaviour which every language possesses. This ‘sightive
power’ of languages (De Kadt 1993: 160), dependent as it is on the linguistic construction of
social reality, make them vehicles of world view. School language-teaching textbooks, therefore,
help in constructing social reality for students. They do it in two ways: first through a choice of
emotive terms and second by presenting ideology-laden items—poems, prose pieces, letters,
conversations, exercises. The second strategy is dealt with in detail elsewhere and will be referred
to in other contexts too. Let us, therefore, say a few words about the first one. The first strategy,
that of using value-laden diction, is an integral part of language even if it is not consciously being
manipulated to reinforce certain values. Most adjectives concerning human attributes and actions
are valuational. Thus, in most cultures, being ‘intelligent’, ‘fast’, ‘enterprising’, ‘bold’,
‘confident’, ‘charismatic’, ‘beautiful’, ‘rich’, and ‘respected’ are terms of positive valuation. But,
it can be argued that they all come from subjective assumptions. One of these assumptions,
however unconscious, is that power and its manifestations, dominance or rank-seeking, are
justified. The qualities of having better cognitive abilities than other people; or of possessing
greater courage; or of having other distinguishing characteristics finally make a person stand out
and become more powerful and potentially more capable of dominating other human beings.
Beauty and riches are also distinguishing features which everyone does not possess. Prestige,
respect or ‘recognition’ are consequences of being distinguished; of being better than others. But,
whereas all these qualities are in the interest of those who can be distinguished, they are against
the interest of those who are condemned never to be distinguished. All those who are ‘stupid’,
‘slow’, ‘cowardly’, ‘diffrident’, ‘dull’, ‘ugly’, and ‘poor’ should logically regard all the qualities
mentioned above as negative attributes—as weapons with which a minority is endowed and
which, very unfairly, gives it power over others. The overall framework of power, however, is so
universally accepted that everyone, including those excluded from its realm, accept it as being
positive. Thus, our agreement to use words at all mean that we accept a certain view of reality, a
certain construction of normalcy, which is power-laden in the sense that it is not in everybody’s
interest.

But, apart from such ideological subtleties of language use, Pakistani textbooks and official
media use deliberately ideology-laden and emotive words. Among these, those in the first cluster
revolve around the concept of martyrdom (shahadat) in a holy war (jihad). Since the first war
over Kashmir with India in 1948, the Pakistani state has been using the vocabulary of jihad for all
its wars. Maulana Maudoodi, the leader of the Jamaat-e- Islami, declared that sending ‘vigilante
groups organized by the government to conduct a covert war in Kashmir could not be fighting a
jihad, nor could the government surreptitiously support a jihad while professing to observe a
cease-fire’ (Nasr 1996: 42). However, the government used jihad vocabulary to rouse deeply felt
religious emotions against India. This became so much a feature of official vocabulary that even
Christian army officers who die in wars are called *shaheeds* (martyrs). Indeed, all army officers, even when they die in accidents, are called *shaheeds*. Great national leaders, not to be left behind, whether killed by the state (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) or by unknown causes (Ziaul Haq), are also declared as being martyred (*shaheed*). Indeed, even India used the term for its own dead in the Kargil episode of June 1999—when certain armed men penetrated into the Indian side of Kashmir—irrespective of religion. This is how a religious concept has been transformed into a political (nationalistic) one in South Asia.

Another cluster of words concerns politics. Secularism has been translated as *la-diniyat* (literally speaking ‘not having a religion’ or ‘lack of faith’) in Pakistan. This makes the readers of Urdu feel that those who support secular politics are atheists or, at least, not good Muslims. The term ‘democracy’ has been used by everyone but it has meant different things. Ayub Khan’s ‘basic democracy’ was control over electoral colleges while Ziaul Haq’s Islamic democracy was a camouflage for his own rule. General Pervez Musharraf too talks of ‘true democracy’ without introducing civilian control, elections and a party system which are seen as being necessary in a democracy. Similarly, all welfare programes—the socialism of Bhutto and the welfare state of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif—have been named ‘Islamic’ to appease the clergy which would otherwise condemn them as being leftist philosophies.

Other clusters of words refer to social and cultural aspects. The male dominating values of our culture are reflected in the way women’s sexuality is stigmatized while men’s is controlled at the expressed, public level, but actually flaunted at a sub-level of male interaction. Thus, while women cannot confess to having male friends, let alone lovers, in all but highly Westernized social circles, men boast about their conquests to their friends. While it is a disgrace for a family if a woman has sex outside marriage, it is much less of a disgrace for a man. Words pertaining to honour—*izzat, asmat, ghairat, sharm, haya*—all refer much more saliently, much more seriously, to female waywardness than to male. Indeed, in most areas of Pakistan, men’s honour lies so much in the control of female sexuality that they kill women for it. From this notion of sexuality comes the strong imperative of hiding away the female, seen primarily as a sexual object, from other males. Hence words like ‘the family’, ‘*androon-e-khana*’, ‘*ghar wale*’, (both meaning those who live inside the house), *bacche* (children) are used for the wife in middle class and working class families. In Pakistani languages female cousins are called sisters and even in Pakistani English the term cousin sister is used for them (Rahman 1990: 72).

Literary and language-teaching texts use these clusters in varying degrees. Thus, in the vocabulary itself they reinforce a world view contingent upon male-dominating, sexuality-denying and aggression-validating values in the social sphere; religious and nationalistic values in the political sphere and a definite bias towards the sacralization of war and the military in the sphere of foreign policy. These values are also reinforced in English-medium schools but, since pupils of Urdu-medium schools are less exposed to liberal-humanist values in English fiction, foreign TV programmes and at home, they are more exposed to them than their English-medium counterparts.

In any multilingual society, if some language is privileged then it becomes ‘imperialistic’ in the sense that it prescribes its ‘reality’ to speakers of other languages (De Kadt 1993: 160). If there were no other competing ‘realities’—and there always are, of course—the act of making other people forget their own language and speak the language of the dominant group would be the most extreme example of colonization. And, indeed, despite other ‘realities’ getting into the way, it is. That is why the American Africans, the Hawaiians, and the people of the Caribbean are so inauthentic: they have no language, no genuinely indigenous culture to fall back upon. The highest forms of their culture come from the English (or French) using countries. They may react to this domination but there is no grand tradition to fall back upon. They are, as it were, clones but somewhat defective ones. In short, to spread one’s language is to spread one’s world view; to
empower one’s culture; one’s apprehension of reality; one’s definition of what is valuable and what is not. This is so not only because world view is coherent in the words themselves or even in the way they are used. It is also because texts, discourses, and messages in that language become available to people of another culture. Those people, then, come in contact with one’s world view through texts other than the ones they are taught. This makes it possible for them to become influenced and, thus, to become more understanding of the people whose language they know. That is why, as Pennycook reminds us, the teaching of English as a second or foreign language is a political project whether the teachers and the learners know it or not (Pennycook 1989). Hence language-spread policies are good investment. Language-spread policies are part of the foreign policy of most countries which can afford them. This, however, is the subject of the chapter on the teaching of foreign languages and will not be touched upon here.

In short, the acquisition of languages is connected with power in many ways. Pragmatic language-learning empowers a person to join the ‘salarait’ which has the ability to gratify itself through the manipulation of the printed word. Language-teaching policies enable groups to dominate, close ranks through restricting entry to jobs, etc., and to assert their identities. By the same token, however, resistance LT allows the dominated groups to resist this cultural hegemony. Ideological LT allows foreign powers and the state to privilege their ideology and, hence, to project their power and indoctrinate people to support them and accept this power. All these forms of language acquisition are rational. Because their outcomes are visible, they are easy to explain. They should be taken into account in any study of language acquisition so as to avoid what Tollefson calls the neo-classical approach. The neo-classical researcher assumes that people have a free choice and decide, presumably by a cost-benefit analysis, as to which language they will study. This study agrees that cost-benefit analysis does go into the decision to learn a language but it does not treat the learner as a free agent. It follows what Tollefson calls the ‘historical-structural approach’ which views language-teaching policies as ‘one mechanism by which the interests of dominant sociopolitical groups are maintained and the seeds of transformation are developed’ (1991: 32). I have, therefore, tried to give the historical background of how languages were taught and to whom? Who was given easier access to empowering languages and who was not? What language texts were used and whose interests they were meant to serve? In short, I have looked at the history of language acquisition in order to understand whether those who are powerless and marginalized are in that condition because they did not make the right choice—i.e. did not learn Persian or English—or because they could not? Moreover, I have raised the issue, though it should be explored further, whether the very issue of which language to learn, if any, is not made by the powerful and in their own interest or not? But language acquisition is not only a matter of rational calculation, it is too complex to be just that. The extra-rational forms of language acquisition are more difficult to explain. We said that elements of the extra-rational enter into what we have classified as rational language acquisition. For instance, one may learn a dominant language because one is impressed by its speakers or resist it because one hates them. But exactly how much emotion enters into any language acquisition enterprise is difficult to determine. Similarly, while it is obvious that some people learn languages without expecting any determinable benefits, it is difficult to say whether they do it out of love, interest, intellectual curiosity, or other psychological factors. In any case, such factors differ so much from person to person, that no attempt has been made to survey such people and find out what their motives are. This is the only form of language learning which I have not been able to connect with power. To understand it fully, one would need to be a social psychologist. That is why I have provided data for it—maybe one can call it pleasure language-learning—but no analysis or explanation of it. A study of the patterns of the learning or teaching of language provides valuable insights into questions of how power is distributed; what world view is privileged, and in whose interest it is, which is what this book is about.
Equipped with these theoretical insights and analytical concepts let us see how languages have been learned and what policies have been made to teach them to the Muslims of north India and Pakistan.

NOTES

1. Not all ruling elites use their languages in the domains of power. The Turkish speaking Mughals used the highly valorized Persian in India. In recent years Bhasa Indonesia rather than Javanese, the language of the ruling elite of Indonesia, has been chosen by the ruling elite of Indonesia to be the national language. In ex-colonial states, indeed, the ruling elite generally chooses to use the ex-colonial language which the bureaucracy is trained in at the highest level rather than its own mother tongue even if it is linguistically homogeneous which it is generally not (for a historical survey of the languages used by empire builders, see Toynbee 1933–1949, Vol. 2: 57–62).
ARABIC

Arabic entered South Asia with the coming of the Muslims to this part of the world. The areas of present-day Sindh and the Punjab were conquered later—the first in AD 711–12 and the second in 1026—but the Arabs came to India as merchants ever since historical records exist. Thus Arabic derived a number of words, generally referring to goods imported from India, and there were settlements of Muslims in Sri Lanka (Sirandip), the Maldives, and the Malabar coast (Nadwi 1972: 69–71 & 259–301). That is why a number of works which were produced in Arabic by Muslim scholars of the Carnatic (Koken 1974) and Tamil written in the Arabic script is still called Arwi. Indeed, while the Muslims of north India were more under the cultural influence of Persian, those of south India derived much inspiration either from indigenous Dravidian roots or from Arabic. Thus schools called Pallikoodam taught Arwi and the Quran in south India from very early times (Alim 1993: 54). By the late thirteenth century Alauddin Khilji (1290–1316) and Malik Kafur laid the foundation of Muslim (non-Arab) rule in the south but the Arabic influence lingered on and even now Muslims demand instruction in Arwi as it is an identity symbol for them (Alim 1993: 125).

According to historians Persian was the official language from 1030, i.e. from the beginning of the Ghaznavid rule in the Punjab (Saleem 1980: 92). However, it may have been used earlier too, because Abu Ishaq al Istakhri tells us in AD 951 that ‘the people of Multán wear trousers, and most of them speak Persian and Sindí, as in Munsúra’ (Istakhri 951: 29). The evidence about this is inconclusive because Ibn Haukal tells us that ‘the language of Mansúra, Multán, and those parts is Arabic and Sindian. In Makrán they use Persian and Makránic’ (Haukal 1193: 39). One does not know quite what to make of the statements of these Arab writers but it is likely that some members of the elite, the kind of people who meet foreigners socially, must have picked up Arabic and Persian. Indeed, on the evidence of certain Arabic sources, the historian Athar Mubarakpuri, concludes that some Hindu rulers knew Arabic or at least some verses which they could quote on appropriate occasions (Mubarakpuri 1989: 315–16). Some Arab families, settled in Sindh and Multan during the Arab conquest, must also have retained their mother tongue and, of course, Muslim children must have been taught the Quran, and grown-ups advanced subjects, probably in Arabic. At some period it is possible that Arabic might have been the official language of what is now southern Pakistan. We are told that:

Walíd next abolished the Greek language and character from the public office of finance, and substituted the Arabic,—thus still further freeing the Arabs from the trammels which these foreign systems had interposed (Elliot 1867, Vol. 1: 461).¹

As Walid was caliph between 705–715, this suggests that Greek was used as official language even till the eighth century. Greek entered this part of the world even before Alexander’s conquest of this area before 327 BC and was used here ‘for at least a century and a half even upto AD 44. When Appolonius of Tyana encountered it during his journey to Taxila’ (Woodcock 1966: 130). If this statement is true, Greek remained in use in this part of the world longer than most accounts would have us believe (for the language of the Indus valley upto AD 1000, see, Rahman 1996a). Arabic is said to have been the official language of the Ghaznavids. According to a contemporary historian, Nasir Uddin bin Umdatul Mulk, a Persian poet and minister of both Subaktagin and Sultan Mahmood, called Abul Abbas Fazal bin Ahmad Isfaraini had substituted Persian for Arabic in the business of the state. However, Khwaja Ahmad bin Hasan ul-Maewandi,
who succeeded him in 1014, changed it back to Arabic again (Munawwar 1972: 27–8). Apart from such brief references of this kind there are no contemporary documents to suggest to what extent and how Arabic was used in different domains. However, even when Persian became the established language of the Muslim rulers of north India, Arabic continued to be used in more domains—especially those connected with ceremonial, liturgical, and religious symbolism—than it is now. For instance, up to the reign of Humayun inscriptions were mostly in Arabic. A survey of such inscriptions in north India states that:

Persian started gaining ground at the end of the 13th century. Scattered examples of Persian inscriptions dating from the 12th and the 13th centuries are also found in other parts of India. But the first Persian inscription in the States under survey dates from Muharram, 687 (the month began on 6th February, 1288). By the time of Akbar, Arabic became reserved for the Quranic and other religious inscriptions only (Parhar 1985: 1).

Whether Arabic was actually the medium of instruction at any level is not clear. According to Sufi it was ‘no doubt, the chief medium of classical study’ (1941: 34) before the thirteenth century. But Sufi presents no evidence for this nor is it clear as to what ‘classical study’ was. It is, however, clear that Arabic was an important part, possibly the major part, of the curriculum in pre-Mughal times. According to Hafiz Shirani Arabic was used by learned people. The Khilafat Namas of the sufis were in this language and they also wrote letters in it. For instance, Sheikh Fariduddin wrote a letter to Sultan Ghausuddin Balban (reigned 1266–1287) in it (Shirani 1929: 83).

By the time of Sultan Balban, the outline of the course in Arabic studies—part of which is still in place in South Asian madrassas—is discernible. Among the books of grammar were: Misbāh, Kāfiya, Lubbu’l Alba, and Irshād while the chief text in literature, or rather belles lettres, was the Maqāmāt al Harîrī (Sufi 1941: 17). The Maqāmāt was written by Abu Muhammad al-Qasim al-Hariri of Basra (1054–1122). He composed these prose pieces, embellished by verses as was the fashion of the day, as a model of elegant prose. The writings revolve around the adventures of a character called Abu Zaid of Seroug. This character deceives people into giving him charity; indeed, deception is a fine art. The narrator, Hareth ibn Hammam, who is also deceived by him, comes to admire his wit and linguistic abilities. Indeed, the Maqamat was written as a model of elegant Arabic prose style. The sheer power of rhetoric is such that none can resist Abu Zaid’s chicanery. Theodore Preston, explaining this power writes:

It was not uncommon for a destitute stranger to enter the learned circle where the choicest wits of a province were assembled, and, as soon as an opportunity was offered, compel them all to acknowledge his superiority to themselves, and win their bounty by some feat of marvelous improvisation, or a lucid decision on some perplexing difficulty in grammar or rhetoric (Preston 1850: xi).

This was because the Arabs attached tremendous importance to the Arabic language. As Ibn-e-Khaldun (1332–1406) tells us:

It should be known that poetry was the archive of the Arabs, containing their sciences, their history, and their wisdom. Leading Arabs competed in it. They used to stop at the fair of ‘Ukáz. to recite poetry. Each would submit his product for criticism to outstanding and intelligent personalities. Eventually, (Arab poets) came to vie in having their poems hung up at the corners of the Holy Sanctuary to which they made pilgrimage... (Ibn-e-Khaldun 1379: 410).

Out of this pre-Islamic poetry the Saba Muallaqat (seven odes suspended in the Kaaba) are still
well-known and are available in English translation (Clouston 1986). Later, because the Quran was written in classical Arabic, its language took on a unique religious significance (Preston 1850: x). One of the reasons for retaining pre-Islamic poetry, such as the famous Saba Mu‘allaqat in the curricula of the madrassas today is because the language of this verse is close to the language of the Quran. Indeed, as the Arabs came in contact with foreigners and Arabic began to change, the changes were seen as a catastrophe and even a heresy (Shalaby 1954: 44–7; Ibn-e-Khaldun 1379: 322). Arabic grammar, therefore, was written to guard against this change—‘corruption’ in the words of Ibn-e-Khaldun—and the first to codify the rules of classical Arabic was Abul Aswad al Du‘ali who did so upon the advice of the Caliph Ali (Ibn-e-Khaldun: 322). Du‘ali died in Basra which, along with Kufah, were the two centres of Arabic grammar in the early age of Islam. Those who were skilled in the use of Arabic were held in special esteem such as only famous scholars are in certain academic circles today. Thus, the linguistic elegance of the Maqāmāt became a model from which some of the traditional madrassas have not escaped so far in India and Pakistan.

The Maqāmāt was often memorized. In India, for instance, Sheikh Nizam-ud-Din Aulia (1234–1324) had read the Maqāmāt under the instruction of Shams-ul-Din Kharizmi and had memorized forty maqāms (Hai 1947, Vol. 1: 163). R.P. Dewhurst, a British officer who inspected Darul Uloom Deoband, wrote in his report on 29 March 1902, that ‘many of the students are able to compose with facility in the language [Arabic]. Several of them have even committed to memory substantial portions of the Makamat of Hariri’ (quoted from Rizvī 1981: 270). The Maqāmāt was a model or an exemplar—a ‘paradigm’ in one of the senses used by Kuhn (1962)—and a number of people wrote similar works in the Muslim world. In India Sayyid Abu Bakr wrote Al-Maqāmāt al-Hindiyyāh (1715). In this the maqāms are named after Indian towns—Surat, Ahmadnagar, Lahore, etc.—but the protagonist, Abul Zafar al-Hindi is as great a trickster as the legendary character of al-Hariri (Ahmad 1946: 225–8).

The Maqāmāt, as well as other Arabic works, served as examples to be imitated. Arabic, after all, was a specialization and not a living language, indeed not even a second language as Persian was for the elite, in India. Thus, most of the works which were produced in Arabic were produced by the ulema and for the ulema. It is not surprising that they are so little known or that they are imitative. What is surprising is that they were produced at all. And if one sees the Nuzhat al-Khawātīr or Zubaid Ahmad’s thesis on the Arabic works produced in India, one is surprised that people should have written on subjects as diverse as commentaries on the Quran, Hadith, jurisprudence, mysticism, scholastic theology, philosophy, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, history, grammar, lexicography, rhetoric, prosody, literature, and belles lettres (Ahmad 1946; Hai 1947; Tareekh Adabiat Vol. 2).

Arabic was part of the traditional course of studies of a Muslim gentleman, though only those who wanted to specialize in Islam to function as judges (qazīs), theologians (ulema), or clergymen (maulvis) learnt it in greater detail in the Arabic schools (maktab) and madrassas. Thus Sher Khan (d. 1545), who wrested away the Mughal empire from Humayun, studied ‘thoroughly the Kafiyah with the commentaries of Qadi Shihab al-Din and also some books on other subjects. He read the Gulistan, Bustan, and Sikandar Namah, etc.’ (Sarwani c. 1586: 9).

Arabic was looked upon as a religious symbol and the historian Badaoni tells us that its importance declined when Akbar turned against traditional Islam. Badaoni reports that ‘Reading and learning Arabic was looked on as a crime…Even the letters which are peculiar to the Arabic language…were avoided’ (Badaoni c. 1595b: 316). Badaoni must have been talking about the court because there is no evidence that the teaching of Arabic stopped in the rest of the empire. However, the fact that Badaoni’s mind linked Arabic so closely with Islam indicates that it was seen as a major symbol of the faith. Texts during Mughal India were roughly the same as they had been earlier. Even the Mughal princes were taught Arabic and Aurangzeb’s son, Muazzam
Shah, is said to have spoken ‘Arabic so correctly and elegantly that even the Arabs of Arabia praise it’ (Khan 1710: 319). This must have been unusual, if it is true, because it is unlikely that spoken Arabic was emphasized so much. What was emphasized was grammar and it was so overstressed that Aurangzeb, the most Islamic minded of the Mughal emperors, is reported by Francis Bernier to have protested against this emphasis to his tutor, Mullah Saleh. The King said:

A familiarity with the languages of surrounding nations may be indispensable in a king; but you would teach me to read and write Arabic; doubtless conceiving that you placed me under an everlasting obligation for sacrificing so large a time to the study of a language wherein no one can hope to become proficient without ten or twelve years of close application (Bernier 1826: 176–7).

If this is indeed true, it shows that Arabic was very much a part of the study at the highest social level but that practical-minded people, as Aurangzeb was, did not think too much study of it was necessary. However, the usual texts in Arabic continued to be taught. Indeed, because of Aurangzeb’s interest in the Islamic jurisprudence, he got the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri compiled which gave much impetus to Islamic learning and, therefore, to the ulema who specialized in Arabic.

Abdul Haq of Delhi (1551–1642), a notable religious scholar of his day, learnt the usual treatises on Arabic grammar from his father Shaikh Saif Uddin (d. 1582) and even wrote a treatise in Persian on the Kāfiyā (Sufi 1941: 57). The books given by Abdul Quddus from different sources mention the following books: Mizān, Lubbu’l Albāb, Jāmī, and the Sharh of Kāfiyā by Daulet Abadi. In rhetoric the Mukhtasir and Mutawwal were taught (Quddus 1972: 229). Shah Waliullah (1702–1760) also read Arabic grammar (Kāfiyā and Jāmī) before proceeding with his studies in Islamic theology (Sufi: 70). Courses of reading revolved around these paradigmatic texts but it was in the eighteenth century that a fixed syllabus came into being. The person who is credited with having made it was Mulla Nizam Uddin of Sihali (a town near Lucknow), (d. 1748), and it is, therefore, known as the Dars-e-Nizami. Arabic was, of course, the focus of teaching in this course because it was meant for people who would use it. It was not a revolutionary syllabus but a conservative one because it further endorsed the canonical texts already in use, some from the thirteenth century (like the Kāfiyā), (see the contents of the course in Annexure 3-B). The teacher who is said to have mastered these texts is generally one who can quote from them freely. The Sharh of Jami, also called Sharh Mullā, or simply Jami or Mullā by the British, was considered so abstruse by a British commentator that he wrote that its study ‘ought to be abolished as soon as possible, it being the acme of absurdity’ (Presidency 1854: Appendix III, p. xviii). It too had to be memorized. Memorization is tantamount to mastery. The memoirs of eminent theologians abound in the recounting of miraculous feats: such as Imam Taqi ud Din having learned three of the maqāmāt of al-Hariri in less than a day (Shahabi n.d.: 6).

Memorization, rather than original critical analysis, seems to be a consequence of a world view in which the authority of the texts was indisputable because they were believed to be either revealed or were produced by the great scholars of the past. Since subordination to both divine authority and tradition (hence ancestral interpretations) was necessary, the major pedagogical emphasis was on memorization rather than analysis. As Francis Robinson tells us, ‘person to person transmission was at the heart of the transmission of Islamic knowledge’ (Robinson 1996: 67). However, this does not mean that there was no possibility of change, flexibility, or movement at all. There certainly was, as Eickelman has pointed out in his study of Islamic education (1978) in Morocco. But, while shifts in knowledge occur and carriers of Islamic knowledge are not only madrassa-educated people for whom the ‘mnemosyne was an essential feature of the legitimacy of knowledge’ (Eickelman 1978: 512), it remains true that in the madrasas of South Asia, memorization remains the dominant mode of the core syllabus, though commentaries, informal methods of learning, and emphases keep changing even here. The
traditional texts also had a number of erotic passages which were part of the reality being portrayed. They too confirmed existing certitudes: the ubiquitousness of desire; the frailty and deception of women; and the necessity of control over one’s own base passions and women. The world of the medieval texts was supernatural, magical, and not one of logical cause and effect. Although the texts were meant to be moral, this morality was not puritanical. A paradigmatic text in Arabic—Alf Lailā wal Lail (One thousand and one Nights)—celebrates the joys of the body much more than the Maqāmāt. In this tale, the narrative formula is simple. Shahrazad, the beautiful virgin offered to a misogynist king who kills virgins after deflowering them every night, manages to stay alive by keeping the king curious about what would happen next in a never-ending tale. Within the tale are tales within which are more tales featuring a world of magic, fantasy, beauty, and eroticism which provided the model for all the stories told by human narrators, parrots, mynah birds, and so on. However, although Alf Lailā was known, it was not part of the famous Dars-e-Nizami. It came to be part of Arabic studies in Indian universities later and, being translated widely, was known to most educated people.

The Dars-e-Nizami gradually became a symbol of identity. It was taught all over Muslim India and the textbooks taught in the Punjab (Leitner 1882: 73) are not much different from those taught in UP or Bengal (Adam 1835, 1836, and 1838). As this identity took shape in reaction to the reality of British conquest and the introduction of modernity as a consequence, it was seen in the light of a bulwark of defence against the onslaught of modern (often perceived as being anti-Islamic) ideas. The British went away but modernity came to stay and Arabic, especially as taught through the Dars-e-Nizami, became a major part of the defence against the modernist threat. This aspect of Arabic will, however, be taken up later. At the moment let us look at the way the teaching of Arabic changed as a result of British rule.

**Arabic-teaching upon the British Arrival**

When the British arrived they found the following kinds of schools in India:

1. Quran schools
2. Quran and Persian schools
3. Arabic and Persian schools
4. Arabic schools
5. Persian schools

In the educational reports of the North-Western provinces we are told that the Persian schools taught the Gulistan, Bustan, Bahar-e-Danish, Sikandar Namah, and a few models of letter-writing and Persian prose. In general schools are categorized as Persian-Arabic schools and Hindi-Sanskrit schools. In 1848, we learn that the number of the former was 4255, while the latter were only 3711 in the North-Western provinces—the heartland of north Indian Muslim elitist culture. In some cities, such as Delhi, Muslim cultural dominance was such that the British remarked upon it as follows:

The proportion of Persian to Hindee schools was 5:1, which, considering that the Hindu population of the city is greater than the Mussulman, was remarkable (Edn. NWP 1850: 25).

The reports do not always distinguish between Persian and Arabic schools nor between their subcategories given above. However, for some places the number of Arabic schools is given. Some examples are given in table 9. This sample of sixteen towns and cities out of a total of thirty-one
should be enough to indicate that the proportion of Persian to Arabic schools was 13:1. The number of Arabic schools was always less because Arabic did not lead to jobs in the apparatus of the Mughal and the British (till 1837) states to the extent Persian did.

Among the Arabic schools, the Quran schools were the most numerous. These were sometimes called *maktabs* and they taught the rudiments of the alphabet—both the *naskh* for reading the Quran without understanding and the *nastaliq* for reading simple Persian texts, as well as Urdu ones—and some basic numeracy.

**Table 8 (1 of Chapter 3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Persian Schools</th>
<th>Arabic Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panipat</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohtak</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffarnagar</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meerut</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligarh</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijnaur</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahjahanpur</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muttra</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agra</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainpuri</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etawah</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cawnpore</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allahabad</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaunpur</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benaras</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazipur</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1903</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edn. NWP: 1850. Table showing number and state of Arabic and Persian schools.

In the Punjab, eastern part of Bengal and Assam, according to British sources, they ‘are started by a Mianji [a local teacher] in a village’ and had, on the average, about twenty pupils each (Edn. I 1909: 323). The same was true for the rest of north India. The Quran and Persian schools added a little Persian to the course. The Arabic and Persian schools taught both languages but at a basic level. The Arabic schools proper taught the *Dars-e-Nizami* in which Arabic and Islamic knowledge were the foci of study.

One does not know what most British officers felt about the teaching of Arabic but those who wrote official reports were generally not sympathetic. Adam called them ‘Kath-Mollas’ and accused them of having memorized a little Arabic (Adam 1835: 105). Henry Stewart Reid, reporting on the teaching of languages in the schools of parts of UP in the middle of the nineteenth century, says that those who read the Quran only memorize it in the Quran and Persian schools. Thus, he opines, ‘the boys reading therein might otherwise be employed in acquiring a store of useful knowledge’ (Reid 1852: 41). He was not sympathetic even to those who read Arabic with understanding because he mentions elsewhere in the same report that ‘Arabic learning had declined and good teachers of it were hard to come by’—a state of affairs which he views with some satisfaction (ibid.: 39). Because of this decline, writing in Arabic decreased.
While a number of people had written in the language earlier (as evidenced by the entries in *Nuzhat al-Khawātīr* which records their names), this number declined in the British period as the teaching of Arabic declined.

By the middle of the century the Anglicist policy of education (from 1835 onwards) had already been in force for fifteen years and the tide had turned much against Arabic. In 1780, when the British created the first educational institution in India, the Calcutta Madrassah, the policy was Orientalist, i.e. continuation of traditional Persian and Arabic education for the Muslims and Sanskrit for the Hindus in order to conciliate their elites and prevent an uprising against British rule. This does not mean that the traditional system of education was not disrupted because of the colonial impact. It was, indeed, disrupted because, whereas the older system was personalized and flexible, the colonial one was not. In the older system boys went to the homes of teachers generally reading specific books with those who were reputed as being masters of them. The British opened institutions and the old forms of patronage to the individual teachers dried up. Thus the new system, though concentrating on predominantly traditional courses to begin with, brought about far-reaching changes in education which have been described in the case of Iran by Mottahedeh (1985) and, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco by Eickelman (1978).

As Arabic was an important language for Muslims the British policy was to teach it to some officials. It was known to some English scholars—Sir William Jones began learning it at Oxford in 1764 with the help of a native of Aleppo (Teignmouth 1804: 32)—though it does not seem to be as well-known as Persian. Its significance had, however, been realized much earlier when the General Council of the Church at Vienna had suggested the establishment of teaching posts in Arabic, Hebrew, Chaldean (Syriac), and Greek at the universities of Paris, Oxford, Bologna, and Salamanca. The motive, according to Robert Weiss who reports this, was ‘missionary enthusiasm’ but the orders were neglected and Arabic studies did not flourish in Britain (Weiss 1952: 1–2). Now that the British ruled Muslims and needed to use their laws to govern them so as not to cause offence, they needed to teach it more effectively to at least some officers. Consequently, it was taught at the Fort William College where the professorship of Arabic was one of the first to be established. A report of the Council Chamber of 29 July 1800 to the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, says that knowledge of Arabic is necessary for learning good Persian and Islamic law. Besides, continues the report:

The study of Arabic is however peculiarly necessary at Bombay, and may become indispensable in proportion to the extension of our relations with the Nations inhabiting the coasts of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs.

In short, in order to exercise power both inside India and outside it—the former by governing Indian Muslims more effectively and the latter by establishing more advantageous relations with the Middle East, Arabic was to be taught (Fort William Vol. 2). The purpose of the courses in Arabic was not only to teach the language but also to acquaint the learners with the classics of Arabic language and literature which learned Muslim opinion in India respected. Thus the novice had to learn grammar from the *Shāfiyā* and *Fusūl-e-Akbarī* and literature from *Maqāmāt al-Harīrī* and *Mīsbāḥ*—texts which the *maulvis* had studied themselves and which they could respect (Fort William Vol. 1).

### Arabic in the Madrassas of British India

Next to Islam itself, Arabic is the *raison d’être* of the madrassas. As mentioned earlier, although there were madrassas since the beginning of Muslim rule in India, they were not the only schools
Muslims attended. Those with worldly aims, such as the service of the state, studied Persian, or rather more Persian than Arabic, either in Persian schools or in the madrassas themselves. When British rule was established, the madrassas became part of the defence against Western influence. Madrassas established by Indian ulema specialized in creating these tendencies. However, ironically enough, as already mentioned, the very first educational institution established by the British in India was the Calcutta Madrassah. Here too Arabic was the major language to be taught. The course was traditional in that Arabic grammar was taught through traditional books, many of them part of the Dars-e-Nizami, and the literature part included works other than the Maqāmāt (Sufi 1941: 91–3). However, gradually the traditional syllabus would become the preserve of the madrassa-based religious elite while the teaching of Arabic was modified by the state. This madrassa-trained clergy was anti-colonial and conservative and Arabic was one of the symbols it used for both tendencies. However, the non-governmental madrassas were specifically meant to preserve the Muslim past from Western encroachment. Thus the constitution of the Darul Uloom at Deoband declares that one of its aims was:

To preach and disseminate Islam and to preserve and defend the religion; to propagate Islam through writing and speech; and to cultivate in the Muslims; through education and preaching the morals, actions and sentiments as those of ‘the best decades’ (Khayr al-Quran) and the pious ancestors.

Another aim refers specifically to the colonial, Western state as follows:

To keep off and avoid the influences of the government and to maintain the freedom of thought and knowledge (Rizvi 1980: 108).

In short, the madrassa became one of the responses to the power of the West. The West had come to dominate militarily but the Muslim religious scholars (ulema) and the unofficial clergy (maulvis), would try their utmost to resist the Western world view. This they would do by adhering as far as possible to pre-modern texts. Arabic, being the language of the original sources of Islam, was to be the major focus of study. It was, so to speak, not only a language but the major linguistic symbol of orthodoxy, Islamic identity, and resistance to modernity.

Modernity, however, was powerful. For one thing, the state, the most powerful vehicle of modernity, controlled most of the jobs. For another, modernity entailed organization, standardization, and more efficient communication. Thus, to capture some part of the job market, the maulvis would have to acquire some language used in the domains of power. Moreover, to disseminate their Islamic ideology better, they would have to organize, print books and pamphlets, teach students, and use modern techniques of communication. Thus, without wanting it, the ulema made compromises with modernity. First, they adopted Urdu, a language used and promoted by the British, to acquire jobs (Metcalf 1982: 206–10, 215). Second, they used modern techniques—examinations, printing presses, loudspeakers, Urdu textbooks, networks of madrassas, etc.—to preserve their ideology and to keep resisting the alien, modern one. Third, the old system of itinerant students going from teacher to teacher and being graded according to the number of books they had studied out of the Dars-e-Nizami syllabus rather than the number of years spent, also came to an end (for a biography of an itinerant student of Arabic, see, Leitner 1882: 78–9). In their place came uninterrupted residence in madrassas and fixed durations of study.

While the madrassas tried to keep aloof from it, the modern state responded by trying to ‘colonialize’ the religious sector as Jamal Malik argues. By ‘colonialization’ Malik means that the regime ‘not only expands into hitherto untouched areas and thus colonizes them, as, for example shrines and religious schools, but also aims at traditionalizing colonial structures such as the
Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Zakat system’ (Malik 1996: 24). This policy expands the power of the state, conveying its world view, to institutions with other world views.

In the case of the madrassas, the teaching of languages other than Arabic (and some Persian) has always been an issue. While some of the ulema, such as those of the Nadwat ul Ulema, have felt that English should be taught because it would empower the young ulema by expanding the job market for them (Shahabi n.d.: 156 & 160), others have resisted this intrusion because English would bring in modern, Western concepts into the ulema’s minds. This debate went on in pre-partition India as it goes on now. Finally, the Madrasah Education Committee which deliberated the question in 1940, suggested the teaching of English to madrassa students while reducing the burden of Arabic. Among other things the Committee also suggested the teaching of Arabic grammar through easy books written in the vernacular (Report Madrasah 1941: 31). But the ulema did not take kindly to this attempt at interference with their cherished system of education. The debate goes on even now, as we shall see later, with the Pakistani state trying to induce the ulema to teach English and Urdu and the ulema resisting this (Report 1962, in Malik 1996: Table 11, p. 127).

Arabic in British Institutions

As we have seen the British Orientalists studied Arabic both for its own sake as a repository of one of the world’s great civilizations and because it helped them understand, and hence colonize, the Muslim world. George Sale (1697–1730) translated the Quran into English after a long sojourn in the Arab world. In India, however, British officials learned it far less than they learnt Persian. The British also taught Arabic to Indians but not in the way the madrassas did. Their purpose, after all, was not to resist modernity but to preserve a classical language valued by Muslims whom they did not want to alienate. Thus a report on the Calcutta Madrassah says that ‘any sudden and violent overthrow of their [Muslims’] cherished and traditional Arabic studies would be greatly resented by the Mahomedan community generally’ (Edn. M. 1886: 44). Indeed, there was a revolt by students at the Calcutta Madrassah on 4 and 5 April 1851 on the grounds, inter alia, that Dr Sprenger (the principal) had discontinued the ancient Arabic books ‘Mybazu and Sudra’ and ‘because of having to read in Oordoo instead of Arabic’ (Presidency 1854: Appendix 2, p. x). Arabic was, after all, the lingua franca of the learned in the Muslim world. Though writing in Arabic had never been anything more than a minority activity, the ulema had been producing learned works in it as we have noticed earlier. This writing decreased but did not come to an end in British times. Shah Waliullah wrote his magnus opus, Hujjat Allah al-Baligha in it and other scholars, such as Ghulam Ali (1704–1785), Azad Bilgrami and Sayyed Murtaza Ali Bilgrami Zubaidi (1732–1791) had travelled in the Arab world and written in it. Murtaza’s Taj al-‘Urūs was ‘a voluminous lexicographical commentary on the famous Qamus of Majd al-Din Firozabadi’ (G. Khan 1998: 15). Azad was an accomplished poet of Arabic (Ahmad 1946: 204, 249–55). Later, Tafuzzul Husain (1727–1800) translated the scientific literature of Europe including Newton’s Principia from European languages into Arabic because he assumed that ‘Arabic was to remain the language of science in India and other parts of the Islamic world’ (G. Khan 1998: 274). Thus, while continuing to teach Arabic, the British made it part of their larger project to change the world view of Indian Muslims. The change is clearly evidenced by the syllabi of the newly created universities—those of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay—after 1857. In Calcutta the Arabic texts for the matriculation examination of 1857 were Alf Laila and Nafrat ul Yaman. For the BA course more material from these books, as well as Ikhwān us Sağā, Maqāmāt, and other prose works, were prescribed. The poetical works of Ibn Farid and other books of Arabic verse were also prescribed (Sufi 1941: 112). The syllabi of Bombay and Madras differ
only in details. Basically, the traditional pattern of concentrating more on old books of grammar had been broken. The emphasis on prose and poetry was new. As a consequence of this emphasis a number of new texts were produced. Maulana Zulfiqar Ali, an alumnus of Delhi College, specialized in Arabic literature and wrote commentaries and Urdu translations of *Divan-e-Hamāsā, Divān-e-Mutanabbi, Sabā Mūʾallaqāt*, and *Qasīdā-e-Bant Saʿād* (Rizvi 1980: 163). Moreover, some of the texts themselves were, as it were, more imaginative and pleasurable than the traditional language texts. The *Alf Lailā*, a highly delectable collection of tales, as has been mentioned earlier, would no longer be countenanced in contemporary Pakistan which has become more puritanical than Muslim society was a century ago.

Arabic was slowly phased out, often with the open or tacit support of Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, from state institutions in British India. In 1873, some Hindu members of the Punjab University Senate said:

It is quite unnecessary, nay a waste of educational funds, to give more encouragement to the study of Persian and Arabic in Government Schools and Colleges, inasmuch as the people have every means of studying these languages in their own institutions (Senate 1873: 89).

In the 1870s Arabic (like Sanskrit) began only in the seventh class. Students came to the classical languages with knowledge of Persian and Urdu. Already by this date, at least in state institutions, Arabic was a marginalized subject which the students did not master. The Muslims generally did not complain about this, though there are instances of people doing so. One such complaint, recorded in the proceedings of the Punjab University, is that of Muhammad Latif, editor of the journal of the Anjuman-e-Punjab, who wanted an improvement in the standard of learning Arabic (Latif 1883). Even in the madrassas, or at least those of them which were influenced or controlled by the state, there was much discussion on teaching Arabic. In the madrassas of Bengal, where Bengali and Urdu were also taught in addition to the usual Persian and Urdu, it was considered too much of a burden for small children and it was proposed in 1940 that it should begin from class V rather than class III (Report Madrassah 1941: 78–9). However, Muslim reformers who emphasized the Muslim identity of Indian Muslims, or sought to reinforce it through symbolic means, made it a point to teach Arabic. Thus, whereas most private reformers’ schools taught the Quran (without understanding), Abdul Haq, a highly religious reformer from the Punjab, set up a boys’ school in 1908 and a girls’ school (Madrasat ul-Banat) in 1926 at Jalandhar, in both of which he taught the Arabic language and literature in addition to the usual subjects (Minault 1998: 251–2). The Indian Statutory Commission also reported on the symbolic value of Arabic and Persian saying that Muslims attach ‘great importance to Arabic and Persian and classical languages of Islamic religion and culture, and to Urdu as a linguistic bond of union among Mohammadans throughout India’ (ISC 1929: 193). In Sindh, for instance, B.H. Ellis, the famous Assistant Commissioner who standardized the alphabet of Sindhi, wrote in his report on education in the newly-conquered area:

The Arabic is usually learnt (though to a very limited extent) as the foundation of Persian; and to declare it banished from the schools would certainly keep away many who would otherwise attend.

He, therefore, recommended limiting the supply of Arabic by keeping it confined to the three chief district schools in ‘Tatta, Halla, and Roree’ and decreasing its demand by making it expensive by ‘the imposition of a higher fee (four annas)’ on those who would study it (Ellis 1856: para 91, p. 26). In short, though Arabic was not to be banned so as to avoid giving affront to Muslim opinion, both its demand and supply were to be decreased. In keeping with this policy schools advertising themselves especially as Islamic, as well as a few others, went on teaching it.
It was taught to Muslim boys, for instance, in the Sindh Madressah. Indeed, out of the 487 pupils learning Arabic, 303 were in the Sindh Madressah—perhaps so as to defend the institution against any accusation of bringing in new western learning (Edn. S 1938a: 47). However, the symbolic value of Arabic clashed with its utilitarian value and, in order to empower themselves, the Muslims generally learned English and Urdu while genuflecting piously in the direction of Arabic.

Later on, the teaching of Arabic took on a utilitarian colour in South Asia. Modern Indian universities, like the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, now teach Arabic on modern lines to train interpreters. Even the traditional madrassas sometimes genuflected in the direction of modernity. In its 1980 session, the Darul Uloom of Deoband, the foremost Islamic seminary in South Asia, declared that ‘it is necessary to popularize the Arabic language on a public plane’ and that arrangements should be made for teaching it through modern linguistic methods (Rizvi 1980: 381).

By the end of British rule, Arabic was taught in two different ways. The state schools and universities offered it as an optional subject. It was generally taken by students as an easy option which increased one’s marks in the overall examination. Even at the MA level a pass degree in Arabic did not generally reflect one’s ability to read and write the language. It was also taught in the madrassas but here the texts were so anachronistic and difficult and such was the emphasis on rote learning that students emerged with as little ability to use it as a living language as their counterparts in the universities.

Arabic-teaching in Pakistan

Because Islam was the major identity symbol of the Pakistan movement, the rulers of Pakistan, however secular and westernized, could not ignore it once the new state was established. Precisely because of its symbolic significance Islam continued to be used as a symbol of national integration in the face of the threat from Bengali ethnicity. Arabic, being an Islamic language, was often considered an antidote to ethnicity, especially Bengali ethnicity. Hence one reason why it was proposed as the official language of Pakistan, even as late as in October 1971, was because of its political neutrality and assumed integrative potential (Shaheen 1971). It was also considered, along with Persian, a repository ‘of our vast cultural heritage’ and the first educational meeting of the new state gave it a place, albeit a vaguely defined one, in Pakistan’s educational system (PEC 1947: 12). But, while the secular elite used Islam for political purposes, there were people who subordinated politics to its demands. For them Pakistan was not obtained for Muslims so as to save them from Hindu domination and competition for resources and power, it was obtained to create an Islamic state and society. Thus the tension between the religious and secular was part of the politics of Pakistan from the beginning. Arabic, being a symbol of Islam, was part of this ongoing debate also. The proposals to use Islam as a symbol of national integration (to counter ethnicity) and Pakistani identity (versus secular modernist or ethnic definition of such identity) were part of this debate.

To take the proposal to use Arabic to counter ethnicity, in April 1950, Zahid Hussain, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, said that Arabic should be the national language of Pakistan during his presidential address at a meeting of the Halqa-e-Arabab-e-Zauq, a literary organization. He was opposed by many people, notably Abdul Haq of the Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu (PT, 16 April 1950). Later, the general body of the Halqa disapproved Zahid Hussain’s view adopting a resolution that ‘Urdu alone can and should become the official language of Pakistan as well as its lingua franca’ (PT, 24 April 1950). On 22 January 1951 the East Bengal Muslim League Council recommended to the central government that Arabic be adopted as the
state language of Pakistan. This was, in reality, an attempt by most Bengali members to protest against the Centre’s policy of patronizing Urdu. Indeed, the members said clearly that they would not waive the claims of their language for any language except Arabic because it symbolized Islamic solidarity (PT, 23 January 1951). This decision was criticized, among others, by the Buddhist League (PT, 12 February 1951). On 10 February 1951 the Aga Khan, a well-known political figure and spiritual head of the Ismaili community, pleaded the case of Arabic as the national language of Pakistan at the opening session of the Motamar-e-Alami Islami at Karachi. Among other things he also said that Urdu was not used till the British period and that it was associated with the downfall and decadence of the Indian Muslims (PT, 13 February 1951). He also gave many positive arguments in favour of Arabic. Among other things he said that Arabic was known not only to the Arabs but also to the educated Muslims of Africa. ‘Arabic as a universal language of the Muslim world will unite, Urdu will divide and isolate’ (Aga Khan 1978: 28). Later on Dr U.M. Daudpota, a famous Arabic scholar from Sindh, also gave similar arguments. Among other things he pointed out that adopting either Urdu or Bengali or both as state languages would be tantamount to discrimination against the speakers of other languages. Since other people would not be able to compete with those whose mother tongue is Urdu all central services will be monopolized by Urdu-speaking people’ (Daudpota 1978: 31–2). These and other arguments advanced for Arabic have been summed up by H.M. Matin, one of its enthusiastic supporters. They are: the religious necessity and symbolic significance; integration of all the provinces of Pakistan in the name of Islamic brotherhood and equal difficulty in acquiring the language; privileged access to the Arab and Muslim world as a whole and hence the possibility of leading this world, etc., etc. (Matin 1954; for similar arguments, see Yusuf 1969).

The issue was never seriously taken up again though there have been people advocating that Arabic should be the national language of Pakistan even after the separation of East Pakistan (for such views, see Nadwi 1974 Faruqi 1973). Just before the creation of Bangladesh, Ahmad E.H. Jaffer said that he would start a movement for the acceptance of Arabic as the national language of united Pakistan (MN, 2 May 1971). A few people responded enthusiastically in the press but the movement never took off.

The government of Pakistan, however, realized the impracticability of using Arabic as an official or national language because nobody, not even the religious scholars, could actually use it. It expressed a resolve that the universities should be provided facilities to teach Arabic along with other foreign languages (PEC 1947: 51). Speech-makers exhorted educational experts not to prepare policies which would adversely affect the position of Arabic (ABE 1950: 7), but the fact was that Arabic was merely a symbol; a pious cliché. The ruling elite and the public in general did not take any interest in acquiring it. Although students of Islamic history, philosophy, and law were advised to learn the rudiments of the language—indeed that was one of the recommendations of a committee set up to report on the University of Karachi—it remained entirely ignored as a language of scholarship (UKE 1957: 34 & 36).

The government did, however, try to use the Arabic script for writing Bengali as a way of countering Bengali ethnicity. In the second meeting of the Advisory Board of Education the government’s ideas were put forward by Fazlur Rahman, the minister of Education, as follows:

…the Arabic script will be a potent means of promoting cultural homogeneity and unity of national outlook. As I have said before, our aim is to produce before the world a social order conforming to the best traditions of Islam. In achieving this aim our first effort should be to carry the Islamic world with us and one means of doing this is through the adoption of the Arabic script (ABE 1949: 9).

Some people even claimed that the Arabic script had indeed been used to write Bengali earlier. A.M.A. Hamid, a parliamentarian, said he had seen letters and old documents of Bengali in it. Thus, if Bengali were written in the Arabic script it would be the revival of an old practice and
not a new innovation (LAD-P 27 March 1951: 473). The religious right, which opposed the Bengali language movement, demanded that Arabic and not Urdu should be the national language not only of Pakistan but of all Muslim countries. In West Pakistan some ulema, including Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, too were sympathetic to the idea (Ansari Int. 1998). Needless to say this demand came from a very small minority and the government paid no attention to it. In January 1951 the Jamiat-e-Hizb Ullah, a religious party, held a get-together in Sylhet presided over by Maulana Idrees. Along with it the Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam also held a similar convocation presided by Syed Sulaiman Nadwi. Both decided that East Pakistan should adopt ‘Pak-Bangla’ (Mushtaq 1997: 10). This ‘Pak-Bangla’ was Bengali written in the Arabic script and purged of Sanskritic words.

Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, a respected scholar of Islam, was a strong supporter of the idea that all the languages of Pakistan should be written in the Arabic script. His son, Dr Zafar Ishaq Ansari, said that there was a movement called ‘Huroof ul Quran Tehrik’ in the nineteen fifties. The aim of this movement was to spread the use of the Quranic script (naskh) for the writing of all Pakistani languages. The activists of the movement took out a weekly from Chittagong and were most active in East Pakistan. Indeed, the major reason why Maulana Ansari supported it, and why the movement was born in the first place, was political—the unity of script was supposed to lead to national integration. Also, it was felt that the Bengali script, being a derivative of the Brahmi family of scripts, was associated with Hindu identity and hence had to be Islamized. With this objective in mind the government too gave a grant to the Anjuman-e-Huroof-ul-Quran (Dhaka) for promoting literacy, ‘utilising the children’s familiarity with the script of the Holy Quran in Maktabs and Madrassas’. The literacy was to be in Bengali—exactly the task performed by the Adult Literacy Centres earlier (LAD-P 20 December 1963: 1313). Later, Maulana Ansari was among those who advised Ayub Khan to introduce the Arabic rather than the Roman script for writing all the languages of Pakistan. As a result many Urdu textbooks were also printed in the Arabic (naskh) rather than the usual Persian (nastaliq) script afterwards (most of this information comes from Ansari Int. 1998).

Because of the idea of changing the script of Bengali being in the air, the government felt encouraged to embark upon an experiment to reduce the force of ethnicity by the use of the Arabic script for writing Bengali in East Bengal. Thus, twenty centres were set up in East Bengal to teach Bengali to adults in the Arabic script. In April 1950, about 600 people received instruction in these centres. According to another report thirty-seven unaided private centres too ‘have been started by the local people’ for the same purpose (LAD-P 11 Oct. 1950: 421–2). These ‘local people’ must have been in a minority (probably Biharis or from the religious right) because the experiment was resented by many Bengalis and they opposed it at different fora. In the National Assembly too, members from East Bengal opposed it on the grounds that all old literature of Bengal, written in the Bengali script, would become a sealed book for the younger generation (LAD-P 2 March 1951: 471–2). Meanwhile a small minority kept up the demand for Arabic in the press and questions were asked in the central legislature about it. E.H. Jaffer, for instance, asked whether Arabic would be compulsory in centrally administered schools and received no for an answer (LAD-P 25 March 1953: 665). However, in the document entitled ‘The Language of the Republic’, which made Bengali one of the national languages of Pakistan in addition to Urdu, it was promised that provisions would be made for teaching Arabic in secondary schools (LAD-P 14 March 1954: 83). The teaching, however, was to be optional at both the school and the higher level. Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari is said to have contributed to this development with reference to Arabic (Ansari Int. 1998).

A number of people made private efforts to promote the teaching of Arabic in the nineteen fifties. Mohammad Hussain al Azmi, Secretary of Motamer-e-Alami Islami, formed an association in 1949 for the teaching of Arabic. Zahid Hussain, of the State Bank, and Maulana
Zafar Ahmad Ansari among others were associated with the Jamiat ul Arabia, a Karachi-based association for teaching Arabic (Ansari Int. 1998). Kamal Faruqi, who wrote much in the press in support of Arabic, formed an association called the ‘Society for the Advancement of Arabic’, also for teaching the language, in 1975. One of its founding members, Dr Ahsan ul Haq, told the author in an interview that it offered courses in basic, advanced, and Quranic Arabic and many people attended these courses in order to immigrate to the Arab world in search of employment. Nowadays, the number of students have declined (Haq Int. 1999). Maulana Yusuf Binori created the Majlis-e-Ilimi in Karachi in order to promote Arabic language and literature from an Islamic point of view. All these private efforts showed a shift from Persian to Arabic as far as the teaching of the classical languages of Indian Muslims were concerned. A number of Arab teachers also came to Pakistan on the invitation of Pakistanis who wanted to promote Arabic. Two Egyptian academics, for instance, were associated with the University of Peshawar and several from Syria were teaching Arabic in various seminaries (Shahabi n.d.: 193).

**Arabic in Pakistani Madrassas**

Arabic occupies the centre stage in all madrassas and is sometimes claimed to be the medium of instruction in them which it is not. However, it is an optional medium of examination, the other being Urdu. The real medium of instruction, as we have mentioned earlier, is Urdu in most of them but in the Pashto-speaking areas it is Pashto, in the interior of Sindh it is Sindhi, and in some parts of Balochistan it is Brahvi and Balochi along with Urdu. Arabic books are explained in these languages but the formal, written explication in the books themselves is often in Arabic itself or sometimes in Persian. This is because the core textbooks of Arabic grammar—sarf and nahw—are from the Dars-e-Nizami, which, as we have seen, incorporated even older texts. Nahw is sometimes called grammar. However, the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Vol. 7) says that it studies ‘the ending of words in articulation (kalam). It comprises nine sections in which the endings (awakhir) of the three types of Arabic words (nouns, verbs, and particles) are examined successively, according to their inflexion (i‘rab) or their basic form (bina)’ (pp. 914–15). Since al-Azhari, an Arab lexicographer, observes that the Greeks described nahw as ‘the science of words and the study of this science’, it is sometimes confused with morphology. The *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, however, translates sarf as morphology (Vol. 9: 53) which makes nahw the equivalent of syntax. But these terms are not to be understood as the kind of syntax and morphology taught by modern linguists trained in the West. Both sarf and nahw are prescriptive and their underlying aim is not the investigation of language to see how it functions but to preserve it against change. Apart from that, rhetoric and literature are also taught. Some of the traditional texts still taught in the Pakistani madrassas are as follows:

**Sarf**

1) *Abwāb: Abwāb as-Sarf* by Hāфиз Muhammad bin Barak Allah Lakhwi (d. 1893) is an easy book on sarf often taught in the Shia madrassas. Its author is from a famous family of the Punjab (for information about the author’s father, see Bhatti 1982: 119–38).

2) *Bahāi: Sarf-i Bahāi* by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd as-Samad al-Harīsī, known as Sheikh Bahā’ ad-Dīn (1546–1621) is in Persian. It was very popular when Persian was commonly understood by madrassa students.
3) *Fusūl: Fusūl-i Akbarī* by ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Karīm (n.d). The text is written in Persian and is taught in the Shia madrassas. It is used even now by most madrassas. The book, as well as its explanations in the margins, is in Arabic.

4) *Irshād (S): Irshād as-Sarf* by ‘Abd al-Karīm (n.d). The text is written in Persian but its explanation in the margins is in Arabic.

5) *Mīzān: Mīzān as-Sarf* is a well-known and ancient book on *sarf* but its author is unknown. The lists of authors published by madrassas include the following: Sheikh Sā‘ādi, Wajih Uddin bin Uthmān, Mullāh Hamzā Badāyyuni, ‘Ali ibn Mustafā bin al-Haj Hasan (d. 1505-1506) and Sirajuddin Usmān al-Awadhī (d. 1357). However, at least one of these authors, al-Awadhī, is reported to have studied the *Mīzān* himself (Gangohi 1969: 324). As such one can only conclude that the authorship of this important text remains unknown.

6) *Munsha‘īb*: This is another well-known book on *sarf*. It is written by ‘Abd al-Karīm bin Muhammad Badāyyuni but not much is known about the author. Some people have attributed it to other authors.

7) *Muqaddimāt: Jam‘ al-Muqaddimāt* Vol. 1 contains two works on *sarf*: *‘Amonīla* and *Sharh ‘Amonīla*. It is written in Persian and is taught in Teheran. It is taught in the Shia madrassas.

8) *Panj: Panj Ganj* is a work on *sarf* which is not used in most madrassas now. It is probably by Sirajuddin Uthmān al-Awadhī though some people have attributed it to ‘Abd al-Karīm ud-Dīn Jaunpuri.

9) *Sarf (M): Sarf-i Mīr* by ‘Abd al-Karīm bin Muhammad Mīr Sayyid ash-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (1339–1413) is a very well-known work on *sarf*. It is used even now by most madrassas. The book, as well as its explanation in the margins, is in Arabic.

10) *Sīgha: ‘Ilm as-Sīgha* (1859) by ‘Inayāt ‘Abd al-Karīm (1812–1863). This book explains Arabic *sarf* in Persian. The author was in exile in the Andaman Islands for his part in the anti-British war of 1857 when he wrote it. What is remarkable is that, although the author had no written material while writing it, he produced a treatise which is used even now, both in Persian and in Urdu translations, in the madrassas. Unfortunately some people write ‘Inayāt Ullāh but Gangohi (1969: 321) confirms the name ‘Inayāt Ahmad.

11) *Shaffiyā*: A well-known treatise on *sarf* by Jamāl ad-Dīn ‘Abū ‘Amr Uthmān ibn ‘Umar ibn al-Hājib (1174–1248). This book is written in Arabic and there are several commentaries on it. Although based upon al-Zamakshari’s *al-Mufassal*, it is a famous text of grammar in its own right.


**Nahw**

1) *‘Aqīl: Sharh Ibn ‘Aqīl* by Bahā’ ad-Dīn ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Abd al-Latīf (1298–1367) is a canonical work on the subject. Both the text and its explanations are in Arabic.

belonged to an illustrious sufi order. He was taught grammar, as well as other subjects, by Fakhruddin Zarandi. He is said to be the author of Panj Ganj, Mizan, as well as Hidayat. However, Mizan was certainly not written by him. In some books the authorship of this book is attributed to Abu Hayyan Nahw (d. 1344–45), (see Rahi 1975: 43).

3) Irshad (N): Al-‘Irshad fi n-nahw by Qazi Shahabuddin Daulatabadi (d. 1445) is regarded as an excellent work on the subject and is taught in the madrasas of the Muslims of north India since centuries (Ahmad 1946: 197–9). The author was born in Deccan and studied in Delhi and knew the problems of South Asian students of Arabic grammar. There is another book, Risala tul Irshad by Taftazani also.

4) Jama: Sharh Mulla Jama is a famous book on nahw by ’Abu Barkat Nur ad-Din ‘Abd ar-Rahman Jama (1414–492). Jama is famous as a Persian poet too but his commentary on the Kafiya, originally entitled Al-Fawaid ul Ziai has made him immortal among the grammarians.

5) Kafiya: Al-Kafiyya fi n-nahw by Ibn al-Hajib is an Arabic text in rhymed couplets of which the explanation too is in Arabic. It is abridged from al-Zamakhshari’s (d. 1144) al-Mufassal which is one of the pioneering works on grammar. The Kafiya is part of the traditional curriculum of all the madrasas but, since it is considered a very difficult text, it is sometimes substituted by easier ones. Almost every great grammarian has tried his hand at writing a commentary of this canonical work (for a list see Gangohi 1969: 321–2).

6) Ma’itah: Mi’a ‘amil (written and read as Ma’itah Amil in Pakistan) by ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 1078) is a canonical text of nahw. The text which is taught in the madrasas is in Arabic and the explanation is in Arabic.


8) Mir (N): Nahw-i Mir is a well-known book of nahw by Ali bin Muhammad, better known as Mir Sayyid ash-Sharif al-Jurjani. The book and its explanations are both in Arabic. It is still in use in Pakistani madrasas.

9) Sharh: Sharh Mi’a ‘amil (circa. 14 c.) is a commentary on Mi’a ‘amil, the famous book of nahw mentioned earlier. There is a controversy about its authorship. Some attribute it to Mir Sayyid ash-Sharif al-Jurjani while others advance the claims of Jama, Husain ibn Abdullah Nautani and others. The book taught in the madrasas is in Arabic but the explanation is in Persian.

10) Tahsil: Tahsil un Nahw by Abdullah Gangohi is said to be an easy book on the subject. The explanations are in Urdu.

Rhetoric

1) Mukhtasar; Mukhtasar al Ma’ anin (1355) by Sa’d ad-Din Mas’ud ibn ‘Umar as-Sa’d at-Taftazani (1322–1389) is a commentary on Talkhis. It is still taught in the madrassas.
2) *Mutawwal: Mutawwal*, written in 1347, by Taftazānī is also a commentary on *Talkhīs*. It too is taught in the madrassas.

3) *Talkhīs: Talkhīs al-Miftāh* is an abridgement and commentary on *Miftāh*. The author, ’Abu ‘Abdullāh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Qazwīnī was probably born in 1267–68, though some people give 1261–62 as the date of birth. He died in 1338. This book is still used in the madrassas.

4) *Miftāh: Miftāh al-‘ulūm* by Sirāj ad-Dīn ’Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf ibn ‘Alī ibn Muhammad as-Sakkākī (d. 1228). This book deals with figures of speech, literary embellishment, the use of linguistic devices for literary purposes, i.e. rhetoric.

**Literature**

Apart from the works described earlier, the following are included in the curricula of most madrassas:

1) *Hamāsā: Diwān al-Hamāsā* by Abū Tammām Habīb (786–845) is an anthology of Arabic verse. Most of the poems celebrate the tribal virtues of manliness, aggression, and courage. There are couplets which would be considered obscene by contemporary Pakistani standards. The Urdu translation of Maulana Izaz Ali is used in the madrassas in addition to the Arabic version.

2) *Mutanabbī: Diwān al-Mutanabbī* is the poetic collection of Abū al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbī (915 or 916–965). Mutanabbī is considered a highly accomplished poet specializing in formal perfection. His themes are aggressiveness, courage, tribal warfare, and other Arab virtues. There are some couplets which would be considered too erotic nowadays. For instance:

   The beloved’s clothes have divided her body in two halves, within the shirt is the delicate part of the body. Below is the one with fleshy thighs and heavy buttocks.

   Such couplets are typical samples of Arab descriptions of feminine beauty.

3) *Qasīdā: Qasīdāt al-Burdā* by Ka‘b ibn Zuhair (d. 632) is a famous panegyric in the praise of the Prophet of Islam. It serves as a model of several such works produced throughout in the Muslim world.

4) *‘Ajab* c. 19 C. *‘Ajab al-‘Ujāb fī mā Yūfid al-Kuttāb* by Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Shirwānī al-Yamanī (d. 1840). This is not taught any longer.


6) *Nafhat al-Yaman*. c. 1820S. by Ahmad al-Yamanī. This is not taught any longer.

7) *Nahj al-Balāghah*. c 10 C. by ‘Ali ibn Abī Tālib [mostly taught in Shi‘ā madrasās]

8) *Sab’a*. c. 7C *Sab’ā Mu’allaqāt* by several pre-Islamic Arab poets narrated by Abul Qāsim Hammād bin Sabūr bin al-Mubārak al-Rāwiyah (d. 772).
In addition to the works described earlier—such as the Maqāmāt or Alf Lailā—a work written in India during British rule also became part of Arabic studies in India. It was called the Naḥfat al-Yaman bī Dhikrīḥ al-Shajān. It was compiled by Ahmad al-Yamanī (d. 1840). He was a native speaker of Arabic, having been brought up in Yemen, but came to Calcutta and worked as a teacher of Arabic in Fort William College. The book has five chapters with short stories, literary anecdotes, debates, poems, proverbs, and so on (Ahmad 1946: 219–20).

Among the books on sarf and nahw the only ones which the students can read themselves are those few in which the explanation is not in Arabic or Persian. The ulema are aware of this because of which some books, such as the famous Ilm us-Ṣīgha, were translated in Urdu. In a commonly used translation in the madrassas which use Urdu as the medium of instruction, Mohammad Rafi Usmani’s Urdu translation of Ilm us-Ṣīgha is used. Mufti Mohammad Shafi, who wrote the foreword of this translation, says that the study of this book is necessary to understand the Quran and that, Persian being no longer understood, the Urdu translation should be used instead (Usmani 1979: 5).

Inayat ur Rahman, the Sheikh ul Hadith at the Jamiat ul Salfia in Islamabad (an Ahl-e-Hadith seminary), told the present writer that even the books which have explanatory notes in Persian are actually taught in Urdu. The Sheikh allowed me to sit in his class and he explained the text in Urdu. The students were encouraged to memorize rules through mnemonic verse and often completed sentences left incomplete by their teacher. Memorization is encouraged and the Tanzeem ul Madaris (Barelvi) says it in the instructions given in the course outline, that in the first year (Oola) students should be made to memorize prescribed parts of the books of sarf and nahw. In short, the madrassas of Pakistan still follow memory-based, probably traditional, practices for learning sarf and nahw.

Nasir Amin, an anthropology student who spent six months in Qamar-ul-Uloom Jamia Moazmia, a Barelvi madrassa in Gujrat (Punjab), reported that the madrassa teachers say that command over nahw comes from memorization while that on sarf needs logical reasoning. In their words, one needs the brain of a dog (kutte kā dimāgh) for nahw while for sarf one needs the brain of a king (shāh kā dimāgh). Thus for nahw the students practice takrār. This is described as follows:

Certain special body movements are involved in this exercise. Two students are sitting on floor folding their legs and putting these on each other, one is listening and the other is telling. The student who is telling upper portion of his body (belly & head) is moving to and fro. Sometimes telling person has closed his eyes and wherever he forgets the lesson, the listening person interrupts and tells few words of lesson and telling person again starts his lesson (Amin 1998: 42—English as in the original).

This account supplements Eickelman’s comment that peer learning has a role to play in Islamic education though it is often neglected (1978: 503). Even for sarf, so far as the present author could make out, students memorize written examples. If they have a sufficiently large corpus of sentences in their memory, they know where to place parts of words and what stress patterns to use. In short, the emphasis is on authority and not on dissent; on following the lead, not on blazing new trails; on acceptance, not on questioning; on traditional rote learning of grammar rather than any new language learning technique. Some of the features of this medieval way of learning belong to the age of orality. Indeed, according to Ong, ‘the residual orality of a given chirographic culture can be calculated to a degree from the mnemonic load it leaves on the mind, that is, from the amount of memorization the culture’s educational procedures require’ (Ong 1982: 41). Such procedures inhibit original thinking, analysis and questioning—exactly what the ulema need to safeguard their world view from the invasive inroads of modernity. This, however, is a point to which we will return later.
It is not that the ulema are completely unaware that new techniques of learning Arabic exist. Indeed, Mufti Mohammad Shafi refers to them conceding that the direct method of learning a language is the most effective way of learning it. However, this is the way of learning conversational, modern Arabic, and not the classical language of the Quran. To understand the language of the Quran, he argues, it is necessary to learn the traditional branches of grammar—sarf and nahw—through the traditional texts (Usmani 1979: 6–7).

**Change from Within**

Not all of the ulema condemn all change. Many feel that changes in language-teaching should be encouraged. Among these changes is the proposed reform in the teaching of Arabic. Maulana Abdul Majid Nadwi, a writer and compiler of Arabic texts, writes as follows:

This is a very surprising and incomprehensible thing that some individual or group should spend a large part of their lives and their mental capabilities in studying compositions written in the Arabic language but still remain entirely incapable of expressing themselves in it. This experiment in languages is only the characteristic of the Arabic madrassas and learned councils of India (my translation from the Urdu of Nadwi Vol. 1, 1951–52: 9).

This criticism is not new. Central Asian modernizing Muslims, the Jadids, had also lamented the fact that their madrassa teachers from Bukhara were less competent in Arabic than Europeans who had learnt it according to new methods (Khalid 1998: 174). Modernist Muslims in India, especially those connected with Aligarh, kept pointing out that the graduates of madrassas could neither speak nor write Arabic. Indeed, the Nadwatul Ulema, a famous madrassa of India which started functioning in 1898, emphasized the acquisition of functional Arabic and not only its classical and bookish version (Hashmi 1989: 141–2).

The ulema of Pakistan are also aware of these facts. A number of them, such as Sahibzada Zubair, head of the Barelvi Madrassa Jamia Mujaddid Rukn ul Islam in Hyderabad, told me that his students could not speak Arabic. His own son, he said, had graduated from the madrassa and was then in the National Institute of Modern Languages (NIML) in Islamabad and still could not speak Arabic whereas, in his own case, his father used to speak to him in that language (Zubair Int. 1999). Indeed, most commentators on the curricula of the madrassas have come up with similar complaints. Some suggest that books like the Kāfiyā and the Sharḥ Jāmi should be eliminated from the curricula. In their place, the argument goes, modern books teaching communicative Arabic should be substituted (Shah 1998: 460).

The Institute of Policy Studies, an organization of the Jamaat-e-Islami, too emphasizes change. As usual, the old Arabic texts are subjected to criticism on the grounds that they are very abstruse and old-fashioned. Such texts, the reformers point out, encourage memorization. However, as already mentioned, a substantial number of the ulema want just that. They oppose reform on the grounds that there would be a dilution of the Islamic canon and that, in the name of reform, the modern world would steal in (IPS 1987). In any case the Jamaat is a revivalist (Nasr 1994 and 1996), not an orthodox, party which accepted Ayub Khan’s proposals about changes in the curricula of the madrassas in 1959 (Malik 1996: 128) despite opposition to his government otherwise. Even the other schools of Islamic thought which run madrassas are no longer quietist and conservative any more. In some ways they have become revivalist and active since the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan. This revivalism, however, is preached through other than language texts; by visiting fighters from the frontlines and revolutionary pamphlets. Even in the context of the teaching of Arabic, however, some changes may be noticed.
A major change is that some compilers, such as Abdul Majid Nadwi, go so far as to suggest that the *Maqâmât al-Harîrî* is no longer relevant for the present-day ‘âlim. Criticizing the traditional ‘âlim, Nadwi says that he would consider it easier to express himself in poetry than in prose though this is unnatural (Nadwi 1954–55: 16). That is why his own textbook contains essays on such famous institutions of India as the Qutub Minar, Deoband, Nadwa and so on (Nadwi 1955).

In the IPS seminar a number of ulama pointed out that the madrassas emphasize sectarianism—an apprehension generally expressed by liberal intellectuals such as A.H. Nayyar (1998)—and that, among other things, they should promote ‘the ideology of Pakistan’ in addition to theological learning (Hashmi 1987: 201). But the ulama have generally resisted the state’s attempts to turn them into ‘instruments of nationalism’ (Malik 1996: 175) as we have seen.

As far as the teaching of Arabic is concerned, the changes from sect to sect are minor. All sects teach the canonical works in grammar—*Sarf-e-Mîr, Kâfiyâ, Nahw-e-Mîr, Sharh Jâmî, Ilm us-Sighâ, and Sharh Ma’îthâ ‘Amîl*. As mentioned earlier, these books are in Arabic and the commentary in the margins is in Arabic or Persian. The students, who neither know Arabic nor Persian, cannot understand the rules which are often in Arabic verse, the original purpose of which was to aid memorization. These ancient books of Arabic, then, serve more as a symbol of continuity than as pedagogical texts. Some madrassas do, however, have more modern texts for actually teaching Arabic (see Annexure 3-C). Among the registered madrassas, the Shias use the Arabic textbooks for the VI, VII and VIII classes prescribed in government schools while the Barelvis use *Arâbî Kâ Muâllîm* (Vols. 1 to 4), (Report Madrassas 1988: 57–93). The Deobandis have *Al Tahâqat ul Asriâh* (Razzak 1980) and *Al Tahâqat ul-Jadîdiah* (Misri n.d.). These are easy books which explain Arabic in Urdu. The latter book even has pictures in it which are otherwise missing in the books of madrassas. The list given in the report on the madrassas (1988) does not mention *Arâbî Kâ Muâllîm* which is used by the Barelvis too. This book is in use in some of the Deobandi madrassas visited by the author. The Ahl-e-Hadith teach Mushtaq Ahmad Charthawali’s *Ilm un Nahw* and *Ilm us Sarf* (3 vols.), both in Urdu, in the first year (*Oola*). They also make use of the *Tarih ul-Jadîdiah* which has been mentioned above. In some of their madrassas, one finds books on teaching Arabic published in Saudi Arabia. The teachers of one madrassa claimed that while those who read the traditional texts in Arabic could not read, write and speak it, they had introduced the new books and had been teaching the three skills since 1977 (Aziz Int. 1999). In a Jamaat-e-Islami madrassa, or college, in Mansoorah (near Hala, Sindh), the course was of eleven years duration. All the students were taught religious subjects, as in the other madrassas, as well as the subjects in state schools and colleges for examinations leading upto the BA degree (Amiruddin Int. 1999). Ameen Misri’s *Jadîdiah* (2 vols.) was used to teach Arabic in addition to the traditional textbooks prescribed by the central office of the Jamaat in Mansura at Lahore. Charthawali’s books on *sarf* and *nahw* were given greater emphasis presumably because they were simpler and therefore more useful for learning Arabic than the traditional texts. The overall aim of this institution, like those of other Jamaat’s institutions, was to create revivalist Muslims—people who would combine traditional Islamic learning with the kind of modern skills, both linguistic and others, which would enable them to take power in a modern state. Thus both English and Urdu (and in Sindhi also Sindhi) are taught while Persian is ignored. In short, notwithstanding the symbolic presence of the classical grammatical texts, attempts are being made to teach Arabic to students through easier and more modern books than the *Dars-e-Nizami* provides.

The exercises in prose and comprehension, subsumed under *insha*, too are modern. The Ahl-e-Hadith, for instance, use the textbooks prescribed for higher secondary classes (XI and XII). The Bravelis use the *Insha tul-Arabia* while the Deobandis use the *Muâllîm ul Insha* series respectively. The Ahl-e-Hadith also use a series called *Mukhtarât Min Adab ul Arab*. This was
written by Abu al-Hasan Ali Nadwi, an ‘ālim from the Nadwatul Ulema at Lucknow. These series have articles different from the classical Maqāmāt. The Muallim ul Insha series, published by Abdul Majid Nadwi, in the early 1950s has articles on contemporary issues. The essays have a revivalist rather than a conservative tone. They are about the way Islam is perceived in the West, the lack of Islamic values in Egypt (drinking, unveiled women), and the unity of the Islamic ummāh. In one article the world of the Alf Lailā is explicitly condemned. Indeed, Abdul Majid Nadwi makes it clear that the sentences for translation into Arabic from Urdu and vice versa have been chosen with an ideological motive in mind. They are meant for those who ‘in future will become the soldiers of Islam’ (Nadwi 1951–52: 11). The purpose of such writings is both to teach Arabic which the older texts did not effectively do and to create revivalist Muslim ulema both conscious of the role of Islam as an agent of change in the world and willing to become reformers. Whereas the older texts took the students to the medieval world and were conservative, these modern texts bring them into the modern world where the battle between Islam and other ideologies is being fought and are, therefore, revivalist.

The literature textbooks, however, are entirely conservative. They are symbolic of the past and serve to retain a sense of continuity between the past and the present. When asked in the interviews whether the erotic references in these texts did not scandalize the students who are shielded from such things in the madrassas, the ulema replied that some texts were not taught in full. Moreover, they were taught in the classroom situation where they were taken as serious exercises in linguistic discipline rather than readings for pleasure. My own feeling is that these classical texts are beyond the students’ competence who memorize them at best but cannot take them as living literature. Hence they can neither enjoy nor fully comprehend their erotic implications.

**Arabic in State Institutions**

In the 1960s, possibly because of Ayub Khan’s repression of religious revivalism, anti-government feelings were expressed by supporting Urdu and Arabic vis à vis English. Thus some members of the National Assembly protested against Arabic being optional. They wanted it to be compulsory (LAD-P 25 January 1964: 1764). Arabic, however, remained an elective subject from class VI in non-elitist state schools. The elitist English-medium schools did not have it at all though they did start teaching Islamic studies and Urdu (LAD-P 1 June 1966: 234). The Commission on National Education, which Ayub Khan had set up, had nothing to say about Arabic except that Islamic scholars must acquire ‘a thorough knowledge of it’ while, at the same time, be conversant with modern knowledge. The regime’s aim was to enable a modernist interpretation of Islam to replace the conservative and revivalist interpretations which opposed Ayub’s reforms in Muslim personal law and other matters (Edn. Com. 1959: 214). Dr S.M. Yusuf, Professor of Arabic at the University of Karachi, called Arabic studies in the universities ‘dehydrated’ because Arabic sources are not taught (Yusuf 1969). The government too acknowledged that the universities are not seen to provide ‘the same measure of training in the religious disciplines and knowledge of the Arabic language as the Madrassah scheme of education’ but the governments’ idea of integrating the two systems did not appeal to the madrassas (CSPW 1966: 142). The state did, however, go for cosmetic measures with an eye on pleasing the Arab world. Among such steps was the publication of an Arabic quarterly called Alwai from Beirut (LAD-P 13 May 1968: 451).

In the proposals for the new education policy, circulated by the Chairman, Air Marshal Nur Khan, it was said that the madrassas perpetuate old-fashioned teaching of Arabic (Edn. Pro. 1969: 11). However, because of the fear of resistance from the madrassas, no radical change was made
either during Yahya’s or during his successor, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto’s, rule. During Bhutto’s rule, however, the Arab world became a major employer of overseas Pakistanis. Although most Pakistanis were labourers, not even literate in Urdu, there was some interest in Arabic for utilitarian rather than purely religious reasons (Malik 1996: 271). For religious, or symbolic, reasons the 1973 constitution made the state committed ‘to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language…’ (Article 31(2)(a) in ‘The Principles of Policy’ of the Constitution). The government, somewhat surprisingly, employed teachers qualified from the madrassas for teaching it when it was introduced as a compulsory subject in classes VI to VIII in the state schools (Malik: 271). The government also opened classes of Arabic in twelve branches of the Pakistan National Centres in 1974 (LAD-P 15 April 1975: 535; see editorial in J, 3 March 1974). It also published books and documentaries in Arabic to project Pakistan and Bhutto (LAD-P 5 February 1975: 65). A number of Egyptian teachers of Arabic were invited to Pakistan and an agreement was signed with the Arab League for Economic Cultural & Scientific Organization (ALECSO) for help in developing the curricula in Arabic and establishing a centre for training its teachers (LAD-P 3 June 1975: 160). A number of institutions—notable among them the National Institute of Modern Languages (NIML) and the Peoples’ Open University (later known as the Allama Iqbal Open University)—developed courses in modern Arabic. Dr Tufail Hashmi, Head of the Arabic and Islamic Studies department at AIOU, told the present writer in an interview (Hashmi Int. 1999) that the first programme of the department was the development of a course on easy Arabic for the TV and the radio. This elementary course was very popular attracting between 10,000 to 15,000 students per semester. The NIML began with a diploma and other courses for people, including defence forces officials, who would need to understand modern, spoken and written, Arabic. The aim was to create interpreters of the language for official purposes. However, the NIML went on to introduce MA in Arabic in the late seventies (LAD-P 24 June 1976: 135). The Saudi Arabian government has done much to promote the teaching of Arabic in Pakistan. Thus an agreement was signed between the Open University and the Saudi Arabian government to support institutions for the support of Arabic (ibid.). The total spent on the teaching of Arabic in 1975–76 (in Pakistani rupees) was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Amount (in Pakistani rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>547,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sindh</td>
<td>85,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Karachi</td>
<td>94,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Punjab</td>
<td>237,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Bahawalpur</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Peshawar</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is not known how much money the Saudi or other governments spend on the teaching of Arabic in the madrassas. However, the author saw many books published and printed in Saudi Arabia in some of the Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas he visited. The information disclosed officially by the government on the teaching of Arabic in all types of institutions, including madrassas and universities, is given in a book entitled Al-Lughāt ul Arabia Fi Bākistān (Misri 1984).

The ulema too made efforts to increase the role of Arabic in the country. The Central Institute for the Promotion of Arabic and the Translation of the Quran (Markazi Idārā Farogh-e-Arabī Tarjumā Qurān), for instance, promoted its teaching in ways which supplemented the governments’ efforts (J, 24 Oct. 1974). Also, in a conference for the promotion of the language,
they recommended that a university be established for this purpose with the help of the Arabs; that Arabic should be a compulsory subject at the secondary and even higher levels; and that the existing universities be given the task of establishing different specializations in the language (Nadwi 1974: 56–8). Later, during Zia’s period too, the ulema emphasized the teaching of Arabic and the Quran (Consolidated 1982). At present a number of organizations promote the teaching of Arabic with a view to making people better Muslims.

For all he did for Arabic, Bhutto was not keen to strengthen the Islamic lobby. He only meant to conciliate it so that it would not oppose him. However, the Islamists joined hands with his opponents to remove him from power. General Zia-ul Haq, who benefited from this situation by imposing martial law, played up the Islamic symbolism to gain the support of the Islamists. In the National Education Policy of 1979 Arabic was explicitly, and emphatically, connected with the ideology of Pakistan and with Islam (Edn. Pol. 1979: 48). Among other steps of a symbolic nature, one of the aims of the new policy was to make ‘arrangements for teaching of Arabic’ in all schools and colleges’ (Edn. Pol. 1972: viii). The pragmatic reasons, as a representative of the Task Force on Education pointed out in 1982, were as follows:

A further factor (for learning Arabic—besides its religious character) and one specially relevant to the working class Pakistani, is the economic opportunity represented by the nearby Arabian Gulf (Talal 1982, quoted from Malik 1996: 272).

And, indeed, the new education policy did recommend the setting up of a ‘functional course [in Arabic] for illiterates, particularly those intending to serve in the Middle East’ (Edn. Pol. 1979: 49). Thirty Arabic language centres, co-ordinated by the Allama Iqbal Open University, were to be established at a cost of Rs 44.32 million in all the big cities and even in the small towns of Pakistan where most of the emigrant workers to the Arab world lived (Edn. Pol. 1979: 57). These centres were supposed to offer elementary, secondary, advanced, and functional courses, all of six months’ duration. The last one was meant for illiterates intending to emigrate to the Middle East (Edn. Pol. 1979: 57). Arab countries promised books and teachers for these centres. The demand for Arabic teachers rose and in 1982, while there were only 2500 teachers, the demand was for 6000 (Talal 1982: 11; quoted from Malik 1996: 272–3). The Allama Iqbal Open University began a nine-months course to train about 2000 teachers per year (Hashmi Int. 1999). This course was a great success and by 1986 this gap had been filled (Malik 1996: 273). They were not necessarily the graduates of the madrassas. However, the Task Force did concede that ‘teachers may be had, for both the teaching of Arabic and Islamiyat at the middle level, from among the graduates of the various Deeni Madaris’ (Talal 1982: 5; also see Action 1984: Chapter 9). Among other things Zia-ul Haq financed a number of publications in Arabic, the list of which was presented to the parliament, during the 1980s (LAD-P 14 April 1982: 30; Edn. Pol. 1978: 12). Above all, in 1982 Ziaul Haq made Arabic compulsory for schools from class VI to VIII (Malik 1996: 271). As Arabic was not examined as a compulsory subject, as Urdu and English were in the matriculation examination, it was not taught in most private schools. Indeed, it was not taught even in state administered schools in all the provinces. The elitist English-medium schools also did not teach it. In short, as usual, the lower-middle class rather than the Westernized elite remained most exposed to Islamic associations as it had always been. The books were prepared by the Open University which also prepared the Lughat ul Islam. The latter was meant to be ideologically suitable for Pakistani students and thousands of them were exposed to it. Dr Hashmi, who was instrumental in promoting it, regrets that it is no longer in use (Hashmi Int. 1999).

During Ziaul Haq’s days the International Islamic University too was established in Islamabad. Here Arabic and English are the media of instruction. However, students do not know Arabic in the beginning and are given a foundation course in it. Here Arabic is taught through easy
textbooks which are based on modern rather than traditional methods of language-teaching. Gone are the old textbooks of sarf and nahw, the dread of madrassa students, and in their place are textbooks with real life situations, pictures and conversations. These books, published in Saudi Arabia, are emphatically Islamic in content, however. Females are either not shown or shown in roles such as mothers, sisters, students, and teachers. All observe the Islamic dress code (the hijab) and Islamic rituals are emphasized. According to the students and teachers of the university, students learn to speak Arabic in one year whereas in the madrassas and state schools in South Asia they never learn it at all.

An innovative feature of Ziaul Haq’s educational policy was the establishment of 5000 mosque and 5000 mohallā (i.e. locality) schools during the five-year-plan at the rate of about 1000 schools per year. The Arabic script was taught to all students here because reading the Quran, without, however, understanding it, was compulsory (Edn. Pol. 1979: 10). In the mosque schools the children were supposed to be taught by a teacher in the local mosque. In the mohalla school an elderly woman taught girls how to recite the Quran at her house (ibid: 14).

Despite all Ziaul Haq’s efforts, a US Aid report for which research was carried out in 1986, reported that while most people agreed that Arabic should be taught, very few said that it should be taught all day like Urdu. Those who did agree that it should be taught said only one period a day was enough for it (Appendixes 11, 12, & 13). The private English medium institutions, as mentioned earlier, ignored it altogether because their students either took the British ordinary and advanced level school examinations or, even if they did take the Pakistani matriculation, the paper of Arabic was not compulsory. The Muslim League government of Nawaz Sharif, therefore, instructed all schools to certify that their students have studied Arabic and Holy Quran in VI, VII, and VIII classes (Notification No. 3870 Acad/BISE/Pesh 10 May 1999). With the military’s dismissal of Nawaz Sharif and his government on 12 October 1999, it is to be seen how far these instructions will be implemented.

At the higher level, where Arabic is optional, it is taught through traditional curricula (mostly literary) and teaching techniques (translation and grammar drill). All the major universities have departments of Arabic where MA degrees are offered. The NUML, Open University and Islamic University have modern departments of Arabic. In the other major universities of Pakistan—Karachi, Sindh, Punjab, Peshawar, Bahawalpur, etc.—Arabic is taught at the BA, MA, M.Phil. and the Ph.D. levels (Field Research, 1999 and Misri 1984). Moreover, some of the universities also offer certificate and diploma courses in Arabic. The courses in the universities are mostly literary. Besides classical literature, modern Arabic literature is also taught in some departments. For instance, in Karachi University new courses written by linguists as well as an Arabic language laboratory have been introduced (Haq Int. 1999). However, students cannot easily converse in Arabic though some make efforts to do so and succeed. The teaching is generally in Urdu and the examination is heavily dependent upon translation of passages which are repeated every year and are well-known to students. This makes Arabic an easy subject. However, almost every university teacher I interviewed wants to remedy this. Dr Akram Chaudhry, Professor of Arabic and Chairman of the Arabic Department at the Oriental College, Punjab University, said that his predecessor had made it compulsory for students to answer 20 per cent of the questions in Arabic and that he had increased this to 40 per cent (Chaudhry Int. 1999). At the NUML, according to Dr Ziaul Haq, the Chairman of the Department of Arabic, the emphasis is on functional and conversational Arabic. Because of this focus on functional Arabic, newspapers and other contemporary sources are also used (Haq Int. 1999). At the Sheikh Zayed Islamic Centres of the Universities of Peshawar, Punjab, and Karachi an MA in functional Arabic is being offered from 1999. At Lahore a language laboratory has been set up and at Karachi, too, there are facilities for teaching spoken Arabic. The idea is to teach modern Arabic so as to enable the students to speak it (Zia Int. 1999; Ijaz Int. 1999). The Shaikh Zayed Islamic Centres, besides
having been generously helped from abroad, also get grants from the federal government. In 
1999–2000 this federal grant was Rs 3,669,000 for each centre (Expenditure Vol. 1, 1999: 308). 
This means that if they have the will, these centres can really revolutionize the teaching of Arabic 
at the higher level.

Arabic is used more in Pakistan than Persian which was once so crucial a part of Muslim elitist 
culture. This is both because it is a religious symbol and because it is useful for employment in 
the Arab world. In a survey carried out for a dissertation by a student, all respondents felt that 
Pakistanis were supposed to know Arabic as a religious language; 88 per cent felt that the 
downfall of the Muslims was because of their neglect of it and yet, paradoxically enough, 48 per 
cent also felt that teaching Arabic was reactionary (BANO 1995). As the student who carried out 
this survey did not use sufficiently sophisticated sampling techniques it is not possible to be sure 
of the results. However, in general, people do seem to regard Arabic as a religious symbol though 
many feel that its teaching need not be compulsory. According to my survey of students’ opinions 
carried out for this book, the response towards Arabic was as follows (all figures except those in 
brackets are percentages):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10 (3 of Chapter 3)</th>
<th>Students’ Demand for Arabic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madrassas (Total 131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sindhi-medium (132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urdu-medium (520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English-medium (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cadet Colleges (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinary (119)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?

Length of instruction? | 25.19 | Nil | 0.19 | Nil | Nil | 0.84 |

Q-3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?

Length of instruction? | 18.32 | Nil | 0.19 | 2.06 | 1.16 | 0.84 |

Q-3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?

Length of instruction? | 58.02 | 11.38 | 33.27 | 29.80 | 47.67 | 29.41 |

It is, however, often chosen by students as an easy option. For instance, it is an easy option for 
students in the Civil Service (CSS) examinations, the university and board examinations as well 
as the oriental examinations (see Appendices 2.1; 4, 8, and 9). Indeed, according to a statistician, 
students get more marks in it than Pashto, Urdu, and English because of which those who take it 
fare better in competitive examinations (Bacha, forthcoming).

For the state, which teaches it compulsorily, it is part of indoctrination—a symbolic 
reinforcement of the Muslim identity of Pakistanis with a view to mobilizing their religious 
sentiment in order to prevent their falling prey to ethnic nationalism or losing their antagonism 
towards India. In short, though stronger than Persian, Arabic is now in the service of the state and 
no longer remains a living force in the lives of the Muslims of Pakistan.
NOTES

1. The Arabicization of the state under Abdal Malik and Walid I was carried out in the whole of the Ummayad empire. In Damascus the public registers were changed from Greek to Arabic. In Iraq and the Eastern Provinces they were changed from old Persian (Pahlavi) to Arabic (Hitti 1937: 217).

2. The legend is that the Caliph Umar, upon learning that some people pronounced the Quran so incorrectly as to corrupt the meaning altogether, told Abul Aswad to make rules about Arabic usage. Later, the Caliph Ali actually guided Abul Aswad when he was devising the rules of nahw (Urdu Daira Ma"rif-e-Islamia Vol. 14, section on ‘sarf’, pp. 200–204).

3. Both the Aga Khan’s and Dr Daudpota’s statements have been quoted from Sind Quarterly VI: I (1978), 26–33. However, the Aga Khan’s address was delivered in 1951 as reported in the press and Dr Daudpota wrote his article before Bengali and Urdu had been declared as national languages.

Annexure 3-A

Books on Arabic Language & Literature Taught in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Book</th>
<th>Evidence of First Use (Year)</th>
<th>Subsequent Use (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ajaib ul Ujāb</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alī Lālā</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>Early 20th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamāsā</td>
<td>Not clear</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutanabbāi</td>
<td>Not clear</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusūl</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hīdāyat</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hīdāyat us Sarf</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sīghā</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irshād (N)</td>
<td>15th century</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irshād (S)</td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang-i-Nahw</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang-i-Sarf</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāfiyā</td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td>Throughout—till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labbul Albāb</td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td>No evidence of later use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqāmāt</td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td>Throughout—till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mīthāb</td>
<td>13th century</td>
<td>Upto the 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukhtasar</td>
<td>16th century</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutaawwal</td>
<td>16th century</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mīzan</td>
<td>16th century</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushaib</td>
<td>17th century</td>
<td>Throughout—till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahw (M)</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naḥfat al-Yemen</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>Early 20th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panj Ganj</td>
<td>Not clear</td>
<td>Till 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabā Ma‘allaqāt</td>
<td>Not clear</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarf (M)</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jāmi</td>
<td>17th century</td>
<td>Throughout—till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharh</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqīl</td>
<td></td>
<td>Till now</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the names of books in an abbreviated form are given above (see bibliography for key to abbreviations).
### Annexure 3-B

**Dars-e-Nizami**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
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### Annexure 3-C

**Prescribed Arabic Textbooks by the Central Organization of Madrassas**

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</table>

Source: Sufi 1941: 73. Sufi does not mention the authors of the above books. However, other sources suggest their names (see bibliography for details).
Fieldwork suggests that there is flexibility in the selection of textbooks. The above outline, therefore, provides nothing more than a list of canonical texts out of which some are taught.

**Annexure 3 D**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Speakers in Pakistan</th>
<th>1951*</th>
<th>1961*</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mother Tongue</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>3,398</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional language commonly spoken</td>
<td>63,794</td>
<td>250,522</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
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</table>

NB: Detailed data on languages was not taken after 1961.

* Census 1951: Tables 7 and 7-A (Population = 75,635,496)

* Census 1961: Statement 5.1 and 5.2 (Population = 90,282,674)

**Annexure 3 E**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ability to read and write Arabic</th>
<th>Ability to speak Arabic fluently</th>
<th>Ability to read Quranic Arabic without understanding</th>
<th>General Literacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>75,842,000</td>
<td>0.23 (out of population aged 5 and above)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>10.5 (out of Muslims)</td>
<td>22 (out of population aged 5 or above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>93,720,613</td>
<td>0.46 (out of population aged 5 and above)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>6.29 (out of total population aged 5 years and above)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>84,254,000</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>38.37 (out of Muslims of 5)</td>
<td>26.17 (aged 10 and above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Arabic newspapers and Periodicals</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percentage of Arabic out of total</td>
<td>Circulation of Arabic publications</td>
<td>Total circulation in all categories</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1571</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1750 (fortnightlies) 5000 (monthlies)</td>
<td>7,310,986</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1750 (fortnightlies) 5000 (monthlies)</td>
<td>7,458,662</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>5100 (dailies)</td>
<td>7,589,136</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>5100 (dailies)</td>
<td>7,976,177</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>945</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>5350 (dailies)</td>
<td>8,250,635</td>
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Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of Pakistan, May 2004.
PERSIAN

Persian was not the language of the Afghans and the Mughals who ruled India. According to Zahiruddin Babar (1483–1530), the founder of the Mughal dynasty in India, he captured Ghazi Khan, a chief of the ruling Lodhis, and ‘ordered a person well acquainted with Hindustani to interpret my words to him, one after another’ (Babar 1528: 459). This appears to imply that there were at least some chiefs who did not understand Persian as spoken by Babar. Moreover, Babar also says before his battle with Ibrahim Lodhi that ‘our affair was with a foreign tribe and people; none knew their tongue, nor did they know ours’ (ibid: 470). Notwithstanding these statements, the Lodhis have left behind coins, orders, and other documents in Persian. Thus it is certain some of them must have known Persian since they used it in the domains of power. Babar himself wrote his memoirs (Tuzk) in Turkish and the Mughal princes kept using it as a private royal language almost till the end of their rule. However, no matter what the language of the rulers themselves might be, Persian had been established as the language of culture in north India much before the Mughals.

Indeed, if we are to speak of Persian linguistic influences rather than medieval Persian itself, then we can go back to the sixth century BC. The Gandhara region, which extended at least up to Taxila (Dani 1986), was ruled by the Persians at about this period. Thus, in some of the inscriptions of Darius ‘clear mention has been made of Hit(n)du, that is, the Punjab territory, as a part of the realm’ (Gupta 1958: 33). Moreover, an Aramaic-Greek inscription of Asoka, the great Buddhist ruler of around 265–238 BC, was found near present-day Kandahar in April 1957. Carratelli, writing on this discovery remarks:

…the region had been an old Iranian province and it is logical to assume that the tradition of the Achaemenian state language was maintained. Satrapal offices must have survived during Macedonian domination (when Greek was added) and continued their use of Aramaic when the Mauryas took over. The importance of Aramaic for administration purposes in the former Iranian provinces is borne out by the Taxila and the Pul-i-Durunteh inscriptions (Carratelli & Garbini 1964: 12).

Aramaic ‘came to the fore’ at ‘the time of the Assyrian empire and became the principal means of communication in the Persian empire’ (Garbini 1964: 61). It was, therefore, a kind of lingua franca in the northern part of present-day Pakistan.

Another linguistic gift of Iranian origin was the Kharoshthi script. This script, which is written from the right to the left (Dani 1979), was used by the Iranian rulers of this part of South Asia and the Maurya kings who succeeded them. That is why the edicts of Asoka at Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra (Pakistan) are in Kharoshthi rather than Brahmi, the script used for similar edicts in the rest of India (Sircar 1957: 29–30). A Buddhist text, the Gandhari Dhammapada, written in this script around AD 269 was discovered in Chinese Turkestan (Katre 1964: 33). This suggests that this script of Persian origin remained in use in areas of present-day northern Pakistan and surrounding regions for many centuries. But leaving these early influences aside, let us see how Persian became ascendant in medieval north India.

Persian in Medieval India

Although Arabic was the language of Islamic culture in the beginning, it was Persian which
became the dominant vehicle of Islamic culture in India. Indeed, as Arnold Toynbee suggests, India fell in the ‘Iranic’ zone after the Muslim conquest and not the ‘Arabic’ zone where Arabic remained the *lingua franca* (Toynbee Vol. 1: 32–7). Thus Persian was the dominant language which the Turkish and other conquerors of India used in preference to their mother tongues because it was the vehicle of a culture which had tremendous prestige in their eyes (Yarshater 1998). Persian seems to have been made the official language of the court of Ghazni in place of Arabic by the initiative of Abul Abbas bin Ahmad Isfaraini, who has been mentioned earlier in the chapter on Arabic. It was also he who introduced the poet Firdausi to the court of Sultan Mahmood (Ghani 1941: 71–2). Persian was the language of edicts, even when Hindavi and the Devanagari script were used alongside, of the Muslim kings of pre-Mughal India. According to the historian Badaoni (1540–1615), even during Ghaznavid rule Ustad Abul Faraj Runi and Masud Sa’ad Salman (d. 1121), both poets of Persian and other languages, flourished in Lahore (Badaoni 1595a: 551). Persian poets kept flourishing in Lahore for some time to come. Sultan Beirim (d. 1152), son of Masud, is described as a ‘great promoter of literature’ by the historian Ferishta. According to him:

Several works were, by his order, translated from various languages into the Persian tongue; among which was an Indian book, called the Kuleel-oo-Dumna (Ferishta 1612, Vol. 1: 149).

This Kuleel-oo-Dumna (or *Kalīla wa Damīnā*), was a collection of tales, strung together by a connecting narrative, of Indian origin originally written in Sanskrit. Its name has been given as *Karīnkā Ṣ Dūrnā* and *The Fables of Vishnumarma* in different sources. It was translated into both Persian and Arabic. The Persian translation was made from the Arabic version of Abdullah ibn al Muqaffa in AH 304 (916) for Nasr bin Ahmad of the Samanid dynasty. It was put into Persian verse by the poet Abu Abdullah Jafar bin Muhammad, better known as Rudaki. One of its later Persian versions, by Husain Waiz Kashifi of Herat (d. 1504), became famous as the *Anwār-e-Suhaili*. In 1587 Akbar’s minister, Abul Fazl, wrote his *Iyār-e-Dānīsh* based on *Anwār-i-Suhaili*. Both books remained part of the canon of Persian studies in India for many years to come. The names of poets like Nizami Ganjwi (born between 1141–46; died between 1180–1217), Masud Ziauddin Nakhshabi (d. 1350), Amir Khusrau (1253–1325) and Hasan Sijzi (d. 1328) are well-known. Also according to Ziauddin Barni (died between 1351–88), the writer of *Tarikh-i-Fīroz Shahi*, Muhammad Sultan, the son of Ghiasuddin Balban, was a patron of Persian studies. As governor of Multan he invited Persian scholars to attend his court. Says Barni:

His attendants used to read (to him) the *Shāh-nāmah*, the *Diwān-i Sanā’,* the *Diwan-i Khākani*, and the *Khāmsah* of Shaikh Nizami. Learned men discussed the merits of these poets in his presence. Amir Khusru and Amir Hasan were servants at his Court...(Barni c. 14C: 19).

Indeed, according to the details furnished by Abdul Ghani (1941), and more recently by Muzaffar Alam (2003: 131-159), Persian literature was well-established under the Ghaznavids, the Khiljis, and the Tughlaqs before Babar entered India in 1526 (also see Schimmel 1998: 147-71).

Thus, the Mughals encountered an established tradition of formal writing when they entered India and not an empty slate on which they could write whatever they wished. Persian writing in Mughal India has been discussed in English by Ghani (1923: 30) as well as in Urdu by Ahmed (1974) and the *Tarikh-e-Adabiyāt* (vols 3, 4 and 5 abbreviated as *Tarikh* 1971-72). In any case, there were many people in the Mughal camp who wrote Persian. Babar had been helped by the Iranians and, even more importantly, Humayun had stayed in Iran and reconquered India with their help (Alam 1998: 319). Moreover, and this crucial point has been made by Muzaffar Alam, Akbar wanted his influence to spread to Iran and, for this reason, courted ‘the non-conformist and
dissident Iranians’ who ‘found a natural refuge in India’.

Akbar intended thus to neutralize the awe and the impact the Iranian Shah had exercised over the Mughal household because of the Iranians’ help to Babar and Humayun’ (Alam 1998: 321).

Moreover, Persian poetry, adopted by the Muslim mystics to express their tolerant views, was also suitable for the Mughals’ policy of preventing religious antagonism from breaking up the empire. This point too has been explained by Muzaffar Alam as follows:

Persian poetry, which had integrated many things from pre-Islamic Persia and had been an important vehicle of liberalism in the medieval Muslim world, helped in no insignificant way in creating and supporting the Mughal attempt to accommodate diverse religious traditions. Akbar must have got support for his policy of non-sectarianism from the verses like the ones of Jalal-ud-Din Rumi whose masnavi the Emperor heard regularly and nearly learnt by heart (Alam 1998: 332).

Possibly it was with some such intention that Akbar also got Hindu legends and works of knowledge translated from Sanskrit to Persian (Badaoni 1595a: XVII & 95). It was also in Akbar’s reign that it became possible for Hindus to acquire power by joining the network of state functionaries by learning Persian. Earlier, revenue accounts were kept in Hindi by Hindu clerks but ‘Todar Mal ordered that all government accounts should henceforth be written in Persian’. Commenting upon this development Blochmann, the translator of the Ain-i-Akbari where this information is given, says that this development ‘may well compare to the introduction of the English language in the courts of India’ (Fazl 1590: 377). The Hindus, who had first started learning Persian in Sikandar Lodhi’s time (1489–1517), now learnt it in such large numbers that the Kyasths and Khatris became a Persianized, and even culturally Muslimized, class not unlike the Anglicized Muslims and Hindus of later days.

Thus, people like Harkaran Das Kambuh of Multan (Mohiuddin 1971: 215–20), Chandrabhan Brahmin, Madho Ram, Sujan Rai, and Anand Ram wrote Persian works which became established models of excellence. What is more significant is that these Hindu writers used Islamic norms of writing. They began their works with bismillāh (in the name of Allah), and very often followed this with a hamd (poem in praise of God) and a nā’at (poem in praise of the Prophet of Islam). A number of histories, collected by Elliot and Dowson in volume VIII of their famous The History of India as Told By Its Own Historians (1867), written by Hindus, have a Muslim tone. Umrao Singh’s Zubdetu-i Akbār (Vol. 8: 374–5); Harnam Singh’s Sa’ādat-i Jāved (Vol. 8: 336–54); Subhan Rai’s Khaḷaṣaḷa-t Tawāriḵh (Vol. 8: 5–12), to name only a few of them, look like works written by Muslims as Dowson notes. Even during British rule the Hindu elite, or at least the Muslimized part of it, followed Islamic rituals in education. Rajindra Prashad, later the president of India, tells us in his autobiography that a maulvi sahib taught him the bismillāh and after that the Karīma of Sa’adi (Prashad 1956: 27). In short, certain aspects of Muslim verbal behaviour did become part of the cultural norms of Persianized Hindus as a result of the dominance of Persian.

The contribution of Hindus to Persian literature (Abdullah 1942); letter writing (Momin 1971) and bureaucratic norms and conventions, especially of the Mughals (Khan 1994), is well known. One effect of this stylized, highly conventional writing was to sustain the prevalent structure of power.

What to say of the Muslims who benefited from Mughal rule, the Hindus too upheld the same power structure. The Mughal king Akbar (r. 1556-1605) won their loyalty through marriage alliances and employment and they became Muslimized in culture (Abdullah 1930). Madrasās, which were institutions for education rather than only Islamic education, took in and trained Hindus through Persian which was the instrument of this cultural Muslimization. The graduating
Hindus became the *munshīs* of the empire. Among the best known among them are people like Chandra Bhan Brahman (d. 1635), Harkaran Das Kambuh (c. 1622) and Madhu Ram (c. 1707). Chandra Bhan’s letter to his son has a passage which gives useful insights into the educational values of that period.

Beginning by emphasizing the value of good calligraphy, he says:

> Although the science of Persian is vast, and almost beyond human grasp, in order to open the gates of language one should read the *Gulistān*, *Bustān*, and the letters of Mulla Jami, to start with.

This is followed by a long list of books on history and ethics. Then comes an even longer list of poets—forty four among the ‘earlier’ ones and twenty four among the ‘modern’ ones—which is cut short only because of the brevity of the communication (Abdullah 1942: 240-242. Available in English in Alam 2004: 130-132). What is more important for us is that throughout Chandra Bhan Brahman advises his son to be loyal to the social order. The author is impressed by Persian and the elite culture it represents. This makes him a fitting symbol and tool for spreading Mughal cultural hegemony (as defined by Gramsci 1929-1935: 12) over the ruled which, I argue elsewhere, is one of the effects of Persian education during Muslim rule over India.

**THE LEARNING OF PERSIAN BY FOREIGNERS**

When Muslim kings of India were powerful, foreigners who visited their realm—especially those connected with the court itself—learned Persian. Ibn Battūtā (1303-1368 or 9), the Moroccan traveler who came to India in 1333, learned it so well that he conducted all his business in it. One of the earliest European travelers, John Mildenhall (visited during 1599-1606), wrote an application (he calls it ‘Ars’ which is a corrupted form of *Arzī*) to the king asking him for trade concessions for the British. He learned the language in six months with the help of a ‘schoolmaster’ (Foster 1921: 57).

Another traveler, Nicholas Withington (1612-1616) reports that Jesuits preached ‘first in the Persian tongue, that the Armenians and Moores may understand’ (Foster 1921: 223). Thomas Coryat (1612:1617) learned Persian and it helped him immensely in his travels across the Great Mughal’s empire (Ibid, 284). The Jesuits, whose purpose was conversion, translated the Bible in Persian. Father Jerome Xavier, who is supposed to have translated the Bible himself, reports an earlier translation. He wrote in 1604 that they had sent to Rome another ‘book of the Gospels in Persian, the translation of which is more than 300 years old’ (Maclagan 1932: 214). The Jesuits’ aim was to convert the Mughal elite to Christianity and, when Jahangir showed interest in the Persian version of the Bible, they presented it to him in 1606 (Guerreiro 1930: 30–31). They also presented him a book ‘containing the lives of the Apostles in Persian’ (ibid.: 43–4). These translations added to the corpus of knowledge available in Persian. The Jesuits also indulged in religious debate with the Mughal theologians. Once, in one such debate, Jahangir ‘asked them if they had understood what he had said. They replied that they had, and repeated the words he had used’ (Guerreiro 1930: 61). Other Europeans too have left accounts which supports the contention that when a language is used by the powerful, it is learned by natives and foreigners alike because all are affected by power.

The Mughal language policy was not very different from that of the British. Both used non-Indian languages as languages of command—to use Bernard Cohn’s (1985) words—restricting them to a narrow elite. These elites were highly skilled in the languages of power, Persian and English respectively, and assimilated the cultural norms and world view of the rulers.

**PERSIAN, CLASS-IDENTITY AND WORLDVIEW**

Persian was a symbol of upper-class breeding and cultural elitism rather than Islam as such—Arabic being that symbol *par excellence*. However, since Muslims were the major part of this
elite, it was also seen as a symbol of Muslim identity. Mir Jamal uddin Inju, who compiled his Persian lexicon *Farhang-e-Jahāngīrī*, at Akbar’s behest, makes the point that Persian, along with Arabic, is also a language of Islam (Alam 1998: 329). However, notwithstanding anything Inju or others might have said, Persian literature was not theological. It was mostly poetic and the worldview of this poetry was not Islamic as interpreted by the *ulemā*. Its best works were in the ṣūfī tradition where love stood for divine love; the beloved, often symbolized as a beautiful boy, stood for an immanent deity and wine was a metaphor of mystic distraction. At another level, this literature celebrated romantic love, dwelt upon boyish and female beauty, mentioned drinking as a matter of course and with a certain iconoclastic, heterodox pride and had several erotic passages. These aspects of Persian literature will be dealt with in detail later (Chapter 15).

One of the most popular textbooks of Persian was *Bahār-e-Danish* written by Shaikh Inayatullah Kumboh (1608–1671) sometime in 1650–51? The author’s younger brother, historian, Mohammad Saleh Kumboh, has praised this work as a model of sophisticated workmanship (Kumboh Vol. 2, 1660: 862). It must have become part of the syllabi of Persian schools because it is mentioned in a manuscript copy of *Khulāsatul Makātib*, written in 1688 (Sufi 1941: 78). Thus it was used in all the Persian schools and educated men (and some women), both Muslims and Hindus, were acquainted with it in Mughal India. During British rule too, according to the education reports, it was taught in nearly all the schools and its ‘style and idiom’ were ‘regarded as the best models of composition’ (Reid 1852: 54).

The story begins with the author, Inayatullah, going into a garden with his friends. As the friends are enjoying the beauty of the garden a Brahmin youth (*Brahminzāda*) comes in. The youth is so beautiful that all of them are smitten by his good looks. The Brahminzada warns them against being seduced by mere externals and narrates a tale, within which there are other tales, to illustrate this philosophical truth. The tales themselves are not relevant here. What is relevant is that they belong to the magical, medieval worldview to which the *Alf Lailā* and other medieval tales belong. The other point is that the representation is unashamedly in the male chauvinist tradition. Women are cunning, lustful, unfaithful, unchaste and inconstant. This is especially driven home by the tale of four women who vow to deceive their husbands.

The four beautiful wives are enamoured of a handsome youth with whom they vow to fornicate in the presence of their husbands. One ties a bandage on her husband’s eyes and, while he milks a cow, enjoys herself with the youth. The second one pretends to be possessed by an evil spirit which can only be exorcised if she is carried on the shoulders of her husband and other relatives. The spiritual healer, who is none other than the same youth in disguise, is inside the litter where he has sexual intercourse with her. The third one takes her husband to a tall palm tree with supposedly magical properties. She tells him that if he climbs up the tree he would see incredible sights. When he does so she calls the youth who copulates with her in open daylight. Seeing this the husband shouts at her and hurries down only to find her all alone—the youth having run away by this time. She then climbs up the tree herself and accuses her husband of being in the act of sodomizing a boy. He tells her to climb down and believes her story that the tree makes one hallucinate. The fourth pretends to be ill and the cure lies in the hands of a certain physician (the same youth) using a certain method—i.e. being with the patient behind a curtain. The youth then has access to her body while she places her head on the husband’s knee outside the curtain.

The sex scenes are quite explicit though metaphors and similes are used instead of explicit tabooed words. The burden of the stories is the moral inferiority of women. The men, who are their partners in fornication, are never vilified to the same degree nor are men in general seen as being deceitful, inconstant, lustful, and wayward as women are. The idea that women should be controlled by men is not only illustrated from the tales but also reiterated as a formula repeatedly.

Another textbook, written in the Punjab and mentioned as part of the curricula of Persian
schools in that province (Leitner 1882: 63), was Maulana Muhammad Akram Ghanimat’s Masnavī Nairang-e-Ishq (called Masnavī Ghanīmāt). Ghanimat, whose dates of birth and death are uncertain (date of death is given as 1688 in some books) but who definitely flourished in the seventeenth century, was born in Kunjah, a small town near the Pakistani city of Gujrat. He was a courtier of Jahangir’s governor of Lahore, Mohammad Mukarram. He probably wrote his famous Masnavī during the days of his association with the governor’s court (some give the date 1684 for this event). Soon, the Masnavī became part of the curricula of the schools and almost every educated Muslim in Mughal India knew it. The story is about Shahid, a poor boy whose beauty captivates men and women alike. Even judges, teachers, and religious people are smitten by his charms. When he enters a city he gathers such crowds of admirers around him that the ruler throws him promptly out. However, the ruler’s son, infatuated with Shahid, brings him back secretly and instals him in a magnificent house. Later on Shahid leaves him for a beautiful girl who is as smitten with his good looks as the male lovers. The story ends, as usual, on the mystic theme of all earthly quests ending in nothingness and beauty being but a symbol and evidence of God.

The Gulistān and Bustān, poetic collections of Musleh Uddin Sa’adi (d. 1292), without having read which nobody could pretend to be learned or even educated, too mentions the love of boys (amrad parasti) as if it were as natural as the love of women. In chapter 5 of the Gulistān one tale begins as follows:

I saw a religious man so captivated by the beauty of a youth, that his secret became public…(Sa’adi n.d.: 179).

and another one:

There was a certain youth of most exquisite beauty, to whom his tutor, through the frailty of human nature, became attached…(Sa’adi: 184).

**Rhymed Tales**

Rhymed tales, or dāstāns, were also part of the traditional course of Persian studies. The Khulāsātul Makātīb (1688) mentions, among other books, Yusuf Zulaikhā, Shirin Khusrāw, Lailā Majnūn in verse and Tūtī Nāmā, Anwār-e-Suhailī, Iyār-e- Dānish, and Bahār-e-Dānish in prose. These were taught by famous teachers, sometimes but not always, attached to educational institutions. Bairam Khan, for instance, was taught a version of the Yusuf Zulaikha legend by Abdul Ghafor Lari (Badaoni 1595a: 588). Likewise, Ziauddin Nakshabi translated the Tūtī Nāmā from Sanskrit into Persian probably in 1330. There are fifty-two stories in this version of the Tūtī Nāmā. Later on Abul Fazl also wrote the Tūtī Nāmā, again containing fifty-two tales. We are told that some of the more obscene tales were expurgated (Shah 1971: 861). However, by the standards now in vogue in Pakistan, even the expurred versions would not pass muster. That, indeed, is true for all the tales which were part of the curricula before the British arrived. The tales are always formulaic. The hero and the heroine are beautiful beyond description. They fall in love but there are circumstances which prevent legal cohabitation. In the end they generally die. In Jami’s (d. 1492) Yusuf Zulaikhā, since Yusuf is described as a prophet of God in the Quran, the impediments in the way of the union are his own moral scruples. Zulaikha is married to his Egyptian benefactor and, no matter how much she tries to tempt him, he remains oblivious to her charms. In keeping with prevalent literary norms, the description of Zulaikha’s bodily beauty and the methods she adopts to tempt Yusuf are erotic. Yusuf Zulaikhā was not only taught in the
schools, it was also translated into Urdu and became a part of popular entertainment for educated Indians in the nineteenth century. However, the later version deviated from Jami’s original so that, while the central story remains the same, the descriptions, dialogues and minor events keep varying. The mystic aspect of the romantic tales in general is best explained in Annemarie Schimmel’s words:

Persian poetry is filled with pairs like the rose and the nightingale, and when the nightingale’s longing is endless, so is the moth’s wish to cast itself into the flame and immolate itself to reach union with the highest goal. Whether Farhad and Shirin, whether Mahmood and Ayaz or Majnun and Laila, Yusuf and Zulaikha— they all express the same longing for the last union that can be reached only through suffering (Schimmel 1998: 170).

In a sense then, these fables drew upon a lore common to some of the greatest pre-modern civilizations of the world. The rhymed tales— such as Yusuf-Zulaikha and Shīrīn-Farhad— are mostly about romantic passion. This was generally love at first sight between a man and a woman (or a boy). The passion was so intense that it made the lovers oblivious of social hierarchies, norms of society, societal taboos, material well-being, and even pain and death. Interpreted in a mystic way the love passion served as a metaphor for the mystic’s (sūfī’s) quest for an immanent deity. Falling in love with the beloved, then, was like an epiphany— ‘the encounter with a god’ as the Greeks called it. The epic, which generally ends in tragedy, is redeemed in the eyes of the people whereas mere love affairs are not.

Despite these deeper, mystical undertones, medieval Persian and Arabic literary texts were full of Rabelaisian humour and erotic scenes. For this reason they would embarrass the modern Pakistani establishment which is highly puritanical. Nor, for that matter, would they be approved of by the liberal Pakistanis who are not puritanical. They (the liberals) would disapprove of them because they are anti-feminist; indeed misogynist. As already mentioned, women were regarded as lustful, foolish, cunning, faithless, deceitful, and unintelligent. They were always to be controlled through men and through the fear of immediate as well as divine punishment. This medieval world view, born as it was in an unabashedly male-dominating culture, was reinforced by a constant reading of the Persian classics. The readers of these classics also assumed, because they belonged to a powerful elite or were associated with it, that they were culturally and intellectually superior to the speakers of the vernacular languages of India.

**Indian Muslim System of Education**

Persian occupied a place of honour in the traditional system of schooling as we have already seen. The higher institutions of learning for Muslims, the madrassas, taught the Dars-e-Nizami as in Mughal days. However, the Persian content of the curricula was reduced till it remained only nominal. Arabic, as we have seen, was the main language of the madrassas because their object was to produce the ulema.

Records of madrassās, meant for training functionaries of the state and the religious establishment, exist from the tenth century. Mansoor (Sindh), for instance, had the madrassa of Qazi Abu Muhammad Mansoori (c.10 c); Lahore; Ajmer, Delhi, Uchh, Multan, Deecan, Jaunpur, Badayun and Bengal all had madrassās Minhāj Uddin Siraj, the author of the history book Tabaqāt-e-Nāsiri (c. 1260) was the administrator of Madrassa-e-Ferozi in 1227 at the orders of Nasir Uddin Qabacha (r. 1205-1228) at Uchh (Mehr 1975: 13). They existed when Ibn Battuta visited India in the fourteenth century. (Battuta c. 14C: 230). In these madrassās the medium of instruction was Persian and books on Arabic grammar, such as the Meezān us Sarf, probably by
Siraj Uddin al-Awadhi (d. 1372), had explanations in Persian (Baloch 1971: 69). Later, during the Mughal period, the number of madrassās increased.

There is much historical evidence about royalty learning Persian. They were generally given instruction by private tuition engaged for this purpose. Sher Khan (d. 1545), who began life as a landlord’s son and not a prince, however, studied at a Madrassa in Narnaul (between Hisar and Jaipur) which had been built in 1520. Here, among other things, he studied Nizām’s *Sikandar Nāmā* and, of course, the inevitable *Gulistan* and *Bustān*. (Sarwani c. 1586: 9; Sufi 1941: 52). The legend of *Heer Rānjhā*, as narrated by Waris Shah (1722-1798), mentions the *Nām-i-Haq, Khāliq Bāri* as primers and the usual canonical works of literature prose and ethics numbering thirteen as part of the curriculum in the Punjab(Sufi 1941: 109. Also see Shāh (1766). This curriculum did not change much since the British found it much the same when they arrived (Leitner 1882: 55-57). Indeed, the madrassās of the Bengal and Behar (Adam 1836: 199-215) as well as present-day U. P also taught the same with some minor variations (Reid 1852: para 153, p. 52).

**Pedagogical Material and Values**

Most pedagogical material meant to teach children how to read Persian dates from a period when children seem to have known an Indian language better than the spoken language. One of the most well known of these primers, or lexicons, is the *Khāliq Bāri* which is widely attributed to Amīr Khusrāu (Mirza 1934: 232). However, Hafiz Shirani, a painstaking researcher, attributes it Ziauddīn Khusro (written around 1621-22) (Shirani n.d: 7). A number of such primers came on the scene during the fifteenth century and were certainly used teach Persian through Hindvi (the predecessor of Hindi and Urdu) while others, like Abu Nasr Farahi’s *Nisāb ul Sabiyyān* (1661) taught Arabic through the medium of Persian (Shirani n.d: 7). The *Khulāṣatu’l Makāṭib* (written in 1688) tells us that students were taught the alphabet, then the primers, and then they graduated to middle level books (*Gulistan* and *Bustān* of Sheikh Musleh al-Din Sa’adi (d. 1292) and then the more advanced books. The other books were about prose and composition, poetry, history and ethics (For details see Annexure 1). A boy was supposed to be four years, four months and four days of age when he began his studies. The ceremony, called *bīsmillāh* (in the name of God), was, however, often postponed till the child was seven years old. The child was taught the Persian alphabet, the primers, the middle level books and then, if he undertook further studies, the more advanced books (Reid 1852: para 153, p. 52). Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817- 98), the great reformer of education in India, was also educated in the same way by a private teacher (Hali 1901: 35).

The primers were not only meant for teaching the alphabet and the rudiments of the Persian language. They also disseminated the world view on which the civilization using that language was dependent. The moral values endorsed in the *Pand Nāmā* and the *Karīmā* are patriarchal and hierarchical. Hospitality and silence are approved of; miserliness and talkativeness condemned. Women are considered inferior and untrustworthy. The advice given to the young student, presumably male and often addressed as *pisar* (son, boy), is to shun women and not get emotionally involved with them. The *Nām-e-Haq* is a guidebook on ritual worship and cleanliness.

The most important part of letter writing was the knowledge of the form of address, tiles and honorifics (*alqāb* or *adāb*) (for other constituents see Alam and Alavi 2001: 16) These were elaborate and calibrated according to the respective power differential (be it because of disparity in age, rank, wealth, religion, gender or whatever) of the addressee and the addressee. Then the language of the letter had to show deference or authority, coupled always with courtesy, according to circumstances. A copious vocabulary, knowledge of literature and stylistic graces were highly appreciated. In short, a successful letter writer upheld the values of hierarchy,
conservatism (by adhering to conventions) and intellectual brilliance without heterodox analysis (by spending one’s mental energy and learning on memorization and stylistic gymnastics).

FEMALE EDUCATION IN PERSIAN

Although some Muslim women always had some education, mostly the Qur’an which was read without understanding (nāzra), reading and writing was not always considered appropriate for women. The Қабуs Қамa, a manual of appropriate behaviour dating from the eleventh century advises that a daughter need not be taught how to read and write though she may be instructed in the rudiments of religion (Iskander c. 11C: 125). The Akhlāq-e-Nāsīrī, a widely read book of ādāb in Mughal India, is equally mistrustful of ‘womens’ education (Naim 1987: 112-113). As education at that time was in Persian it appears that men, while enjoying the aesthetic, amorous and erotic appeal of this literature, were uncomfortable about their women getting exposed to it. This became very clear during Victorian India when the Indian reformers of education spoke out strongly against it.

Nazir Ahmad (1833?-1912), the didactic novelist, recommends the study of Urdu and simple arithmetic besides the Qur’an and religious books, in his novels. However, his character Nush in Taubah un Nush (1874) teaches the Gulistan to his wife but censors one fourth of it by blackening its lines. These, he explains to her, were obscene (Akhtar 1994: 410-411). In Fasānā-e-Muttili (1885) the protagonist Muttilla learns Persian in school and the eroticism of this literature makes him conscious of his beauty and wayward in behaviour thus ruining his life (ibid, 630). However, Persian could be safely studied under good supervision. Thus in Majalis un-Nissa (1874) Khwaja Altaf Husain Hali (1837-1914), another reformer, shows his character Zubaida Khatun being taught at home, first by an ustānī (female teacher) and then by her father. Besides the inevitable Gulistan and Bustan, she also reads the ‘Iyār-i-Dānish (Minault 1998: 36).

However, despite this bias women were educated in Persian. Ibn Battuta found in a town in Malabar (Hinawr) ‘thirteen schools for girls and twenty-three for boys’. This was unusual because he remarks that it ‘a thing which I have never seen elsewhere’. (Battuta c. 14C: 230). The women of this town knew the Qur’an by heart and, Persian being the language used by Muslim educated people, this language was certainly taught in these schools.

Women from the most powerful families, not having to conform to public opinion, did get educated. The names of such women are found in many historical sources and are as follows:

Gulbadan Begum, (born 1523) author of the Humāyūn Nāmah. Salima Sultana, niece of Humayun; Nur Jahan; Mumtaz Mahal; Razia Sultana; Chand Bibi and several Mughal princesses (Sufi 1941: 81-82; Rafiq 1982: 196-211. For Mughal princesses also see Badakhshani 1971: 95-98. Although details of their education are seldom provided, it appears that princesses and women from eminent families were instructed at home by women teachers. For instance, Inayatullah Khan’s mother Hafiza Maryam, had been commissioned to teach Aurangzeb’s (r. 1658-1707) accomplished daughter, Zeb un Nissa Begum (1639-1689) Khan, S: c. 1750s: 821). The princess Jahan Ara, daughter of Shah Jahan, wrote a letter and couplets in Persian to a sūfī called Mulla Shah (Ahmed 1974: 132-133). Minor royalty of the latter period, such as the Begums of Bhopal, seem to have regarded education as an accomplishment in women of their stature. Sultan Jahan Begum, the third woman ruler of the state, learnt Persian as well as English (Minault 1998: 25). Her granddaughter, Abida Sultana, also studied Persian for less than an hour daily (Sultaan 2004: 23).

Women from the ashrāf classes were educated if their fathers taught them or kept teachers to do so. For instance, Azizunnisa Begum (1780?–1857), Sir Syed’s mother, read elementary Persian and the Qur’an (Panipati V. 16: 682. quoted from Minault 1998: 14). There is evidence that some of the women of the Hindu Kaesth class, which had taken to Persian, also knew the language (Durga Prasad in Tazkiratun Nissâ as quoted by Abdullah 1942: 233). But, ironically enough, the society also gave enough autonomy to courtesans who lived in surrogate
families run by women (gharānās), to enable them to control their education. And some of the best of them were taught Persian. According to Leitner, who must have conversed with ashraf men of the Punjab, the ‘superior class of Hetairai are known to have received an education in Persian poetry and in calligraphy’ and this is the reason, he claims, that Persian poetry, ‘which has an almost intoxicating effect on the native mind, is sternly prohibited to be heard or read by most respectable females’ (Leitner 1882: 98). Umrao Jan Ada, the protagonist of Mirza Hadi Ruswa’s novel of the same name, says she was taught the Karimā, Amad Nāmā, Gulistān and other books of Persian (Ruswa 1899: 54-55). While the courtesans needed the language to entertain gentlemanly customers, this was precisely the reason the middle class mistrusted it.

It appears, however, that in the primary schools (maktabs) boys and girls Hindus as well as Muslims, studied together (Abdul Latif 1971: 34 and Leitner 1882: 105). This has been reported as the normal practice in Pakistan’s rural areas by people in their seventies (Malik 2005). There were also female indigenous schools which admitted small boys in various districts of the Punjab (Leitner 1882: 98). This was also true of other parts of India. According to the testimony of Badruddin Tyabji before the Hunter Commission of 1882: ‘There are some Koris [Qaris] or Mulas in the chief centres of Muhammadan population who teach the Koran and perhaps a little Hindustani and Persian to the girls’ (Tayabji 1882: 501). Though these schools taught the Qur’an (nāzrā), some of them taught the primers of Persian also. In the Punjab, according to Leitner, ‘some of the ladies are good Persian scholars, and in a distinguished Muhammadan family that I know, I have been given to understand that several of the ladies are excellent poets’ (Leitner 1882: 104). This was the condition of the Punjab in the 1880s when Leitner collected his data. However, even today, curiously enough, some women, otherwise illiterate, know the Karimā by heart and narrate it in women’s gatherings even now in the Pakistani Punjab. It is possible that, like the Qur’an, they also memorize the primer (personal communication).

Modernity brought ideas of women’s emancipation, especially through education. Muntaz Ali (1860-1935, a reformer, expressed them in his book Haqūq un Niswān. He launched the paper ‘Tahzib un-Niswan’ in Urdu from Lahore in 1898. He commends books of good Urdu style as well as the Gulistān and Bustān (Minault 1998: 83). His wife Muhammadi Begum (1878?-1908) learned Urdu on her own (Minault 1998: 111-112). Mumtaz ‘Ali taught her Persian (Ibid, 112). The Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam made five primary schools for girls in 1885 and increased them to fifteen by 1894. The curriculum included Persian (Minault 1998: 176). At this time, indigenous schools did sometimes teach Persian to girls. Although Persian was being phased out of the domains of power, it had such prestige that it was considered too much of an accomplishment to be denied altogether to young ladies. Thus, when Syed Karāmat Husain (1854-1917) founded the Lucknow Girls’ School, Persian was taught along with Arabic, Urdu and English (Minault 1998:223). Another educationist, Rokeyā Sakhat Hossain (1880-1932), who was a Bengali also established a school in Calcutta where Persian was taught in the beginning (Hossain 1988: 41-42). It was phased out, like it was in the boys’ schools, but because it could not empower the learner and not because of gender discrimination.

**Informal Learning of Persian**

Apart from formal schooling, boys (and some girls) learned Persian informally from people literate in it. Literacy in it was greatly valued both for instrumental reasons (employment) and extra-rational ones (prestige). Thus, according to Muzaaffar Alam ‘even ordinary literate Muslims like soldiers, for instance, were expected now [by the late 17th century] to read simple Persian’ (Alam 1998: 329). It was perhaps for such people that Persian chapbooks were written. These were written in simple Persian and were of a religious nature. One such chapbook, the Hujjat-ul-Hind, is in the British Museum and its purpose is to make rural, or less educated, Muslims knowledgeable about the rudiments of their faith and more conscious of their Muslim identity.
Such chapbooks were in circulation during Shahjahan’s time (r. 1628–1658), which is also a period when chapbooks in indigenous languages came to be written (Alam: 330).

Notable among those who learned Persian informally was Guru Nanak (1469–1539), the founder of the Sikh religion in the Punjab. This is what the Siyyar-ul-Muta’ākhiriṇ says about the way he was educated:

There was then in those parts a fakir or religious of note, called Seid-hassen, a man of eloquence as well as wealth, who having no children of his own, and being smitten with the beauty of young Nanec, upon whom he cast his eyes, conceived an affection for him, and charged himself with his education (Khan Vol. 1, 1789: 83).

Guru Nanak not only learned Persian but learnt it so well that, according to the same authority, he translated passages from it to his native Punjabi. Most people, however, merely got basic literacy though quite a few, aspiring to become poets, sent their Persian verses to be corrected to an established poet who became their teacher (ʻustād). Thus Ghalib corrected the Persian poetry of Munshi Hargopal Tufta, Haqir, and other people (Russell and Islam 1969: 95–7).

**Persian for British Officers**

Being aware of the importance of Persian for trade and political negotiations in India, there was a proposal for establishing a professorship of Persian at the University of Oxford. This printed pamphlet, probably written by Warren Hastings (1732–1818) and Henry Vansittart (1732–70) outlines the necessity of promoting the knowledge of Persian among young gentlemen who might be expected to administer India. Among the arguments for introducing Persian ‘into our Seminaries of Learning’ the first is that Persian will ‘promote the interests which this country has lately acquired in the political, as well a\ the commercial affairs of Indostan’. The second is relativist—that it would give the British insights into a great civilization. The clinching argument is that it will enable the British ‘to discharge the difficult offices of government’ which, given the growing power of the company, is absolutely vital (Persian 18C). However, Persian did not become a subject of study at Oxford University. It was, of course, taught at the Haileybury College established in 1806 at Hertford. This college closed down in 1858 but while it functioned, it taught generations of future civil servants. A report of 26 October 1804 outlining the necessity of teaching Persian says that the French ‘carry on the most important negotiations at Asiatic courts without the intervention of an Interpreter’ whilst the English cannot. It then goes on to say that ‘political reasons might be assigned why there ought to be Seminaries at home for promoting the study of the most general and distinguished of the languages spoken in our Eastern Territories’ (Haileybury 1804: 18). Accordingly, Persian was taught at the college along with ‘Oordoo or Hindostanee, Telougo’ and ‘Arabic, Bengalee, Hindu and Mahratta’ at the request of the student. These arrangements continued at least upto October 1852 as mentioned in a report of that date (E. Thornton 1852). The names of some Indians—Ghulam Haider, Hasan Ali, and Mirza Khalid—exist in the records of October 1812 (Haileybury 1804). For those who were not at Haileybury, there were private teaching institutions such as the London Oriental Institute whose annual reports show that both Persian and Hindustani were taught. The 1925 report mentions such classics as Gulistān, Bahār-e-Dānish, Anwār-e-Suhaili, Tūti Nāmā, and the Divān of Hafiz. Sandfort Arnott and Duncan Forbes, who were associated with this institution, also wrote memorials to the effect that oriental languages were neglected and that Persian and Hindustani should be part of the examination of non-Haileybury writers too (Haileybury 1829–1833). Thus, even before young Englishmen came to India, they could pick up some Persian in England.

Soon after the East India Company assumed the charge of collecting the revenue of Bengal in
1765, the British had to use Persian more often and more frequently than before. Thus, for reasons which Bernard Cohn (1985) as well as Edward Said describe in their work, British officers began to take great interest in Persian. Some of them, of course, became fond of it for its own sake and retained a lifelong interest in it. Among the Indians who travelled to England at this early period, I’tisam al-Din and Abu Talib both met people who were greatly accomplished in Persian. I’tisam al-Din visited England between 1767 and 1769 while Abu Talib went there in 1799. I’tisam al-Din was asked to teach Persian to students and helped William Jones with his Persian studies while reading the ‘historical literature available in Persian’ in Britain (G. Khan 1998: 76). Abu Talib, however, was critical of Jones’ grammar and says that ‘having been written when he was a young man, and previous to his having acquired any experience in Hindoostan, [it] is, in many places, very defective’ (Talib Vol. 2, 1810: 42). Abu Talib taught Persian to students (ibid., Vol. 1: 200) and says that people were ‘so desirous of learning the oriental languages, that they attended self-taught masters, ignorant of every principle of Science, and paid them half-a-guinea a lesson’ (ibid., Vol. 1: 164, emphasis in the original). He tried to set up an institution to teach Persian but appears to have met with governmental indifference in the beginning. Eventually, however, he reports that the ministers ‘made me an offer of 6000 rupees (£ 750) annually, with liberty to reside either in Oxford or London, to superintend it, but as I had then resolved to return to India, and was disgusted with their former apathy on the subject, I politely excused myself’ (ibid., Vol. 1: 164). However, Abu Talib reported that some British scholar-administrators, such as John Wombwell and William Chambers, spoke Persian fluently (ibid., Vol. 1: 185–6).

Persian was, of course, a major subject at Fort William College. The professorship of Persian was one of the original nine professorships established in that institution. The Persian class was large, as was that of Hindustani, and the curricula of 1801 to 1805 include the well-known classics: Tūtī Nāmā, Iyār-e-Dānish, Bahār-e-Dānish, Qissā Hātim Tāi, and the Gulistān (Fort William Vol. 1). We learn from the autobiographical accounts of a number of British officers, not only early ones like H.T. Prinsep (1792–1878), but also later ones such as John Beames who came to India in 1857–58 how important it was for them to learn Persian whether at Fort William, Haileybury or privately. In 1809 when Prinsep came to India, he was lodged in the Writers’ Building where he learned Persian standing first in it, ‘second in Hindoostanee and fourth in Bengalee’ (Prinsep 1904: 59). When Beames came to Calcutta in 1858, the young officers were taught by Munshis and examined by an English officer. The Munshis with a good reputation were much sought after and were paid an extra sum (Rs 30 per student was paid officially) by the officers themselves (Beames 1961: 80–81). The officers knew that Persian would have to be learned as it was necessary for carrying on the business of the empire in India (Cohn 1985: 284-7). As we have seen earlier, even after 1837, when it was no longer the official language of rule, it was considered politically important. A report of 1909 attributes its importance to the ‘political position’ of Iran and because educated Muslims in Afghanistan and India know it (Treasury 1909: 117). We have seen how the use of Persian in the domains of power was part of what is called the Orientalist language policy—the continuation of established practices so as to give the Indians as little ground for revolt as possible (Rahman 1996: 98–9). But, by constant use and the perusal of the Persian classics, some British officer-scholars themselves internalized the Indian attitude towards languages. As Persian was highest on a scale on which the village dialects were lowest, the British too came to express admiration for the ‘elegance’ of Persian and contempt for the ‘uncouth rudeness’ of the local languages.

Matters of policy aside, many of these early Orientalists genuinely appreciated Persian poetry and Mughal culture in general. The cultural domination of the Muslim elite was intact in the early part of British rule. Thus British officers became ‘White Mughals’ Darlymple puts it (Darlymple: 2002). There were, therefore, a handful of Europeans who could not only speak and write Persian
as business required but even enjoyed and wrote poetry, the distinguishing mark of a cultivated gentlemen, in it. These Persian poets were not only English but also French, Armenian, Portuguese, and of European and Eurasian extraction. Some of them were: Edward Henry Palmer (1840–87), John Thomas (served with Begum Sumru about 1782); Lt.-Colonel Shadwell Plough (1858–1903); Lt.-Colonel James Skinner (1778–1841). The names of others and specimens of their verse have been preserved in Ram Babu Saksena’s monumental work on European and Indo-European Poets of Urdu and Persian (1943). Some of these early Europeans not only wrote poetry in the literary languages of India but also dressed and lived like Indian aristocrats. They seem to have genuine affection for things Indian which was missing among the Englishmen trained in the ‘Anglicist’ ideology who replaced those brought up in the ‘Orientalist’ fashion up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

With such facts in mind it would be reductionism to conclude, on the basis of an erroneous but widespread misunderstanding of Edward Said’s theory, that all Orientalists were calculating imperialists with no real liking for the Oriental classics. Eventually, of course, Persian was dethroned but the Orientalists did not acquiesce into this without regret (Rahman 1996: 36–7).

Although Persian was abolished as the court language in 1834, the Persian Interpreter—an official who interpreted Persian correspondence to high functionaries of the company and wrote letters in that language to outsiders—was attached to the personal staff of high-ranking officials. Thus the C-in-C (Sir Henry Fane between 1835-38) had an interpreter on his staff during this period as his daughter, Miss Isabella Fane, testifies (Pemble 1985: 55).

Fall of Persian

Although, as mentioned earlier, the Muslim elite knew Hindavi, the ancestor of Urdu, by the time of the Mughal king Shahjahan, it was Persian which remained the language of prestige. Indeed, according to Shahjahan’s biographer Kumboh, the king generally spoke fluent and unembellished Persian, purged of high-flown rhetorical devices, though he could also speak ‘Hindi’ at times (Kumboh Vol. 1, 1660: 218). The decisive challenge to the power of Persian came from English, the language of the new conquerors of India.

Shamsur Rahman Faruqi, in an otherwise highly informative article on the sociology of Persian and Urdu in the nineteenth century, dismisses the theory that Persian declined ‘after the site of power shifted from Delhi to Calcutta’. His argument deserves to be quoted at length:

First and foremost, it was the Indians themselves, and not the British, who knocked down Indian Persian and Urdu from the pedestal of cultural value, and they did not put English, but Iranian Persian, in the space vacated by Indian Persian and Urdu. Iranians had no political power in India in the eighteenth century. They may have enjoyed cultural prestige in small areas, but they had no kind of power. Second, Persian, and Urdu continued to be languages of high culture in India for a long time, until late in the nineteenth century (Faruqi 1998: 16).

Unfortunately, there is much that is wrong with these arguments. Leaving aside the case of Urdu for the moment, the argument boils down to the facts that (a) Indians lost confidence in their own norms of Persian usage sometime in the eighteenth century and that (b) Persian retained cultural prestige for many years after it ceased to be used in the domains of power.

According to argument (a), the loss of confidence in Indian Persian is said to have begun at the end of the eighteenth century and ‘the wind became a storm by 1827–28’ with Ghalib refusing to accept the authority of any Indian including that of the poet (Abdul Qadir) Bedil (1644–1720) whose Persian poetry he once admired (Faruqi 1998: 24). However, the great exemplars from Iran were highly valued even earlier. After all Mahmood Shah I, the Bahmuny ruler of Deccan (r.
1378–1397) is said to have invited the poet Hafiz from Shiraz to Deccan because he valued his poetry (Ferishta c.1612. Vol. 2: 347–9), though Mullah Shaeda, who flourished in Shahjahan’s time, is said to have been critical of the Persian while he admired the Indian writers of Persian (Kumboh Vol. 3, 1660: 827). The crucial point is that the eighteenth century which is said to be the age of loss of confidence is also the age of loss of political power. The Mughal empire was obviously falling apart as Ghulam Hussain Khan’s Seir Mutaghērin [more correctly spelled as Siyyār-ul-Muta’āhirīn] (Khan 1789) so clearly and poignantly demonstrates. The Mughal emperors were at the mercy of bands of marauding Marhattas and Rohillas even earlier than Lord Lake’s conquest of Delhi in 1803. Is it not possible, then, that the Indian Muslim elite lost confidence in endonormativism in Persian usage because of its loss of power? Elites which have no political power to fall back upon insist more emphatically on other markers of elitist status: sartorial, culinary, linguistic, behavioral, cultural, and so on. Language was probably such a marker and it had to be purged of Indian associations because the elite owed its distinguished status initially to conquest, hence to foreignness. This also explains why Urdu was Persianized and deliberately purged of Hindi words at about the same time as Amrit Rai has described (Rai 1984: Chapter 5; also see Alam 1998: 347). Thus, if Iranian Persian was privileged at the expense of the Indian variety, it was probably because of self-contempt—one of the signs of political failure. An obvious parallel which comes to the mind is the fact that, even after years of using English, there are non-native varieties of the language and that Pakistani English is one of them (Rahman 1990). However, most people in Pakistan still consider British English the only acceptable variety of English. Indeed, the term Pakistani English is still an ego-shattering invective and not a neutral description of a variety of English. What is true for modern Pakistanis, who have passed through colonial rule, could also be true for the elite of India in the eighteenth century which had just started experiencing colonial rule.

It is, of course, true that Persian retained cultural prestige even after 1837 when, after the Anglicist victory, it ceased to be the language of the courts, but cultural patterns do not change overnight. However, the nineteenth century is the time when they did change, slowly but surely. Let us, therefore, look at the period of the decline of Persian more closely.

First, although Persian was replaced by the vernacular languages in the courts and by English at the highest level of government, the large number of people literate in Persian did not vanish immediately. Indeed, according to Lelyveld, the ‘old reservoir of people literate in Persian and able to participate in sharif culture continued to preside over most of the courts and government offices, even of the British Raj’ (Lelyveld 1978: 33). Persian appeared to dominate the polite mind if not the official institutions created by the British. Even many British officials regarded it as the supreme language of politeness and culture. Thus Ghalib tells his friend in a letter of 1858 that John Jacob, who died in his youth, discouraged people from writing in Urdu while encouraging them to write in Persian (Ghalib 1858). Ghalib himself wrote to the British Chief Secretary in Persian in 1863 (Ghalib 1863) though he wrote to his Indian friends (except Tipu Sultan’s maternal grandson) in Urdu since long (Ghalib 1866). People of Ghalib’s generation—and, indeed, till the end of the nineteenth century—were very proud of their knowledge of Persian. Ghalib’s letters and poetry provide ample evidence of his expertise in Persian. He boasted:

\[
\text{Fārsi kī mīzān yani tārāzū mērē hāth mēn hai}
\]

The criterion [or measuring scale] of Persian is in my hands (Ghalib 1862).

As we have seen earlier, Ghalib was a recognized authority on Persian believing in preserving its ‘purity’ by not Indianizing it. In his view, which he expressed in his book Qata-e-Burhān, all Indian lexicologists had Indianized Persian and none, therefore, could be approved of (Letters to
Mirza Rahim Beg in Mehr 1982: 551–61). In 1825 ‘at the request of friends, he collected the
general principles of Persian letter-writing in a popular booklet called *Panj Āhang*’ (Varma 1989:
125). In 1842 he was offered the professorship of Persian at the Delhi College which he did not
accept because Thompson, secretary to the government of India, did not receive him at the gate
(ibid.: 127). But, however much Ghalib may have looked down upon Urdu, the excellence of his
Urdu letters and his poetry are ample proof, if any is needed, that it was in Urdu that he was at his
best. Persian was only part of the intellectual and social snobbery of the day. It belonged to the
past, the past which was glorious in the eyes of those members of the Muslim elite who lived
under British rule, and its psychological significance as a symbol of power, success, refinement,
glory, splendour—all that was positive—was tremendous. Thus, as Varma says, Ghalib’s ‘public
non-acceptance’ of Urdu ‘was, probably, more a peg to hang his unrationlized alienation from a
historical period of which this language had become a singularly striking symbol’ (Varma: 36).

**Anglicist Policy towards Persian**

As mentioned earlier Persian was replaced by the vernacular languages of India in official
domains between 1835–37 as part of the change from Orientalist to Anglicist policies of
governance. The order itself was rather cautious and gave subordinate authorities much discretion
to ensure that there should be no political agitation or unrest (the order is reproduced in Adam
1838: 305–306). However, the change was nothing short of revolutionary in import. As this
change has been described in detail before, it need not detain us here (Rahman 1996: 36–7). What
needs to be noted is that some British officers did express concern about the revolutionary
potential of the language. Adam reported that the Muslims learned Persian because ‘It is the
language of the former conquerors and rulers of Hindustan from whom they have directly or
indirectly sprung, and the memory both of a proud ancestry and of a past dominion—the loyalty
which attaches itself rather to religion and to race than to country—attract them to its cultivation’
(Adam 1836: 108). C.A. Bayly describes how Persian newspapers were widely disseminated
among the educated elite. The fear, as expressed by R. Cavendish, Resident at Gawalior in 1833,
was that if a resolute man sat on the throne in Delhi he could agitate for his rights through these
newsletters (Bayly 1996: 287). And not only Cavendish but probably other officials also feared,
as Bayly puts it, that ‘Persian was the language of dissidence and its suppression was therefore
desirable on political grounds’ (1996: 286).

Apart from this Persian was also a mark of identity; a compensatory symbol. Such
compensatory symbols appear irrational to unsympathetic aliens. Thus some British officers,
especially the ardent Anglicists, were impatient of it. They wondered why Persian was allowed to
continue at all. Judge Fred J. Halliday wrote in a report on the Calcutta Madrassah on 16 March
1852:

> What is it to us whether the rising generation of Mussalmans know Persian or not? or why should we
> trouble ourselves about a language which we have sedulously excluded from our courts and offices, and
> which if we let it alone, will soon in India die a natural death (Presidency 1854: xxvi).

Others were ambitious about the complete ascendancy of English. Captain A.R. Fuller wrote in a
report of 1863–64 about the Punjab:

> If sufficient encouragement be afforded, English will soon take the place that formerly belonged to
> Persian. Already natives who have received a good English education usually correspond in that
> language, in preference to the vernacular. It is my belief that English will become in time, what Persian
> never has been, the commercial language of the country…(Edn. P 1864b: 21).
This is reminiscent of the gloating of an earlier Anglicist, Charles Trevelyan, who wrote to Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General who brought about the demise of Persian, as follows:

…the abolition of the exclusive privileges which the Persian language has in the courts and affairs of court will form the crowning stroke, which will shake Hinduism and Mohammadanism to their centre and firmly establish our language, our learning and ultimately our religion in India (in Philips 1977: 1239).

But the government was not willing to go quite so far. The zealous Fuller was reprimanded. The Lieutenant-Governor, refuting the idea that Persian could be eliminated, made it clear that it would remain necessary for examinations (Thornton 1865: 7).

This did not deter individual officers from attacking Persian. In 1871–72 the Education Report of the NWFP (then a part of the Punjab) said:

Persian is a language nowhere spoken in the Punjab, except perhaps in the city of Peshawar itself. It is the vernacular of no class of the people. Its use is confined to men of rank or Munshis of Government offices; and by devoting so much attention in its schools to its study the Government has embarked on a policy of questionable wisdom (Edn. P 1873: 61).

One reason why the British did not abolish Persian at once, apart from the fact that some of them were genuinely fond of it and had perfect command over it, was that it was firmly entrenched in the educational system of the people. A boy was first taught the Persian alphabet for two months and then the Khaliqbari or the Karima of Sheikh Sa’adi. In the villages they taught the former while in the cities the latter was more popular (Reid 1852: para 153, p. 52). The same system was in practice in Bengal, Behar (Adam 1836: 199–215), and Punjab (Leitner 1882: 55–7). After this the Gulistan and Bustan were read. Then, if the boy studied any further, came other works: Yusuf Zulaikha, Bahar-e-Danish, Sikandar Namah, and several Inshas. The Inshas were meant to provide models of composition and letter-writing while all the other works were well-known books of Persian tales. The manuscript copy of Khulasatul Makatib (1688) mentioned earlier provides us with a list of texts used in India at that time (Sufi 1941: 77–8, reproduced in Annexure 4-A). These texts were also taught in Bengal and Behar (Adam 1836: 199–215) as well as in the Punjab (Leitner 1882: 62–4).

In the early part of the nineteenth century schools functioned in Persian, not Urdu, in north India. Such schools are also mentioned in ‘Fisher’s Memoir’, one of the earliest documents of British rule in India. William Adam, in his reports on education in the Presidency of Bengal also gives detailed descriptions of Persian schools (Adam 1835, 1836, and 1838). In the Punjab, which the British conquered in 1849, there were 458 Persian schools in the early 1880s. The number of students, however, was not high being only 4015 and W.R.M. Holroyd, the Director of Public Instruction, reported that only 95 contained more than twelve students while 247 had as few as only six or less students. Some of these schools were established by rich men or by village notables such as lambardars. The boys often learnt Persian texts by heart or translated them into Urdu (Edn. P 1883: para 26, p. 10). In Bengal and Behar the number of Bengali schools was much larger than the Persian ones, but the study of Persian was held in great esteem especially among the Muslims (Adam 1836: 199–215).

Apart from Persian schools, Persian was also part of the curricula at all levels in the madrassas. The British eventually introduced educational policies which led to the marginalization of Islamic learning. However, as we have noticed before, ironically enough, the first major educational undertaking of the British was the establishment of the Calcutta Madrassah in 1781. Warren
Hastings paid Rs 57,745 for the establishment of this institution which he later charged to the company. Later, according to H.T. Prinsep, a civil servant whose claim to fame will be discussed later, the madrassa received a grant of land to yield Rs 29,142 in 1819 which was guaranteed by the government at Rs 30,000 (Prinsep 1904). According to ‘Fisher’s Memoir’ the ‘original intention of the founder appears to have been, to promote the study of Arabic and Persian languages’ and Islamic law (Fisher 1826: 2). A certain philanthropist, Mr Fraser, also opened a school in Delhi to teach Persian to eighty Indian boys in 1814. He wanted to develop this into a larger institution where ‘Persian and Hindoo languages’ could be taught (ibid.: 25). The British-established Agra and Delhi colleges taught modern knowledge but here too the languages taught were classical—Persian, Arabic and, at Agra, Sanskrit. English too was taught but the emphasis was on Persian. However, according to a letter of the Court of Directors to Bengal dated 5 September 1827, at Agra the ‘Hindoo’ language was also supposed to be taught (ibid.: 155). What exactly is meant by ‘Hindoo’—Hindustani? Urdu? Hindi? any other?—is not clear but it is clear that a vernacular language was admitted to a college at this early date. Most students, of course, took Persian. As it was needed in the courts of law and general administration, the British were only acting in the interests of the Raj by teaching Persian. Thus, in keeping with the Orientalist policy of upholding traditional institutions and conciliating the Indian elites, the establishment of institutions which taught Persian was part of political policy.

During British days the medium of instruction in the madrassas changed from Persian to Urdu though some of the books of Arabic, as we have seen, had, and still have, explanations and translations in Persian. The traditional texts in Persian (for example at Deoband) were: Amad Nāmā, Karīmā, Nām-e-Haq, Hamd-e-Bārī, Gulistān, Bustān, Rāh-e-Niẓām, Anwār-e-Suhaili, Yusuf Zulaikhā, Sikandar Nāmāh, Hikāyat-e-Latīf, Mufīd Nāmā, and some Inshās and letters. (Sufi 1941: 133–4) and so on. While the madrassas eschewed the traditional amorous texts as far as they could, they were part of curricula elsewhere. Apart from the madrassas, the government examined candidates in the Maulvi, Munshi, and Pandit examinations. The Maulvis were examined in Arabic, the Pandits in Sanskrit, and the Munshis in Persian. There were three stages of the examination at the end of which the candidate was required ‘to show an accurate knowledge of Persian Grammar and Prosody, to carry on a conversation with fluency and elegance in the Persian language, and to read and translate passages’ from a number of books including classics like Shāh Nāmā and Āīn-e-Akbarī (Proceedings 1873: 141).

**Persian—The Lingering Glory**

Persian was replaced for several reasons: the idea of providing justice to people in their vernacular languages rather than a foreign language; appealing to the masses rather than only to the elite and, though this is expressed only in letters by a few officials, to symbolize the end of Muslim ascendancy (Rahman 1996: 36). In 1832 the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras began the experiment and in 1837 Bengal followed suit (see Act XXIX of 1837). In the areas now in Pakistan, except in Sindh, the vernaculars were not used either. In Sindh, B.H. Ellis, a famous British administrator, said:

The Persian has so long been cultivated in Sind, for its literature, as well as on account of its being the language of official records and accounts, that any present attempt to establish schools where the Vernacular only is taught would probably fail; while the combination of the two is likely to lead to the study of Sindhi, now not learnt at all, but which will become popular by degrees, as the language is more and more used in the transaction of official business (Ellis 1856: para 89, p. 26).
Ellis did, however, recommend the charging of a fee for teaching Persian while keeping the teaching of Sindhi free. This is how Sindhi replaced Persian in the schools in Sindh. In most of the other areas now in north India and Pakistan it was Urdu which was recognized as the vernacular language by the British. While Persian lost to English in the higher domains of power inhabited initially only by Englishmen, there was a tussle between Urdu and Persian in the lower domains, both private and public, which the Indian gentlemen (ashraf) occupied.

The British introduced Urdu in the Persian schools by the middle of the nineteenth century in north India. But this, they reported, made the schools unpopular. Individual British officers had their own views about introducing Urdu into them. A number of officials noted at various occasions in the nineteenth century that ‘the chief reason why our Vernacular schools are so unpopular is, because so little Persian is taught in our lower classes’ (Hutton 1866: para 3). Sometimes, they tried to increase the content of Persian; even of teaching Persian literature produced in Iran (Fuller 1866), while at others they toyed with the idea of appointing teachers knowing only Arabic and Persian, rather than the certified teachers of the British educational system (Thornton 1866), in schools. In general, however, the British continued to emphasize Urdu and by the twentieth century the public had come to accept it as a substitute for Persian. While Urdu and Hindi were being introduced in the schools, Persian still dominated the courses of the higher institutions of education. Indeed, the distribution of language learning corresponded to the power-and-class structure. Villagers, who were mostly Hindus in UP, went more to Hindi schools than their urban counterparts who went to Urdu ones. The elite studied Persian or, if it was a modernizing elite, English (King 1994: 98–101).

Persian was necessary not only because of its prestige but because the language of the courts, wherever it was Urdu, was actually Persianized Urdu. Thus, as a report of 1873–74 put it: a ‘large vocabulary of Persian and Arabic words and a free hand’ was always ‘sufficient to form the needful insha’ (compositional style). However, the report went on to say, the Government schools ‘teach the vernaculars, with a little top-dressing of Persian…’ (Edn. NWP 1874: 23) their pupils were at a disadvantage in the business of life than the products of the old Persian schools. Whereas in 1863 Sir Syed supported the learning of English in a lecture delivered in Persian (Khan 1863), in 1888 when he was awarded the KCSI, the British officer presiding over the ceremony made his speech in Urdu (Hali 1901: 321). Linguistic attitudes had changed so fast that the language of elitist discourse was no longer Persian. Likewise, the British patronized Urdu so much that they used it sometimes on ceremonial occasions where Persian would have been used earlier and English took its place later. Even so, when in 1942 Maulana Nadvi, having been released from prison, came to the Darul Uloom Deoband, probably the most famous Islamic seminary in India, the head of the institution read out panegyrics which he ‘himself had composed in Persian’ (Rizvi 1980: 241).

**Persian in Decline**

Upto VI class, even upto 1877, Persian was still taught and Arabic (or Sanskrit for Hindus) began in class VII (Senate 1877). However, by now Persian was in decline. Its rival was not Urdu as yet but English—the language of the most lucrative and powerful jobs (positive responses towards English, demand for it, and so on will be referred to elsewhere). In the context of Persian the evidence of some Hindu members of the Punjab University Senate is revealing. These members claimed that in the Punjab the complaint is that government throws away its money on this language [Persian], which seems only to raise a class of pauper munshis (of whom there is no lack at present), instead of usefully employing it on the diffusion of English (Nobin et al. 1873: 89). As these members were Hindus it might be imagined that they were anti-Persian because the language was symbolic of Muslim cultural dominance. But the Muslims too expressed similar
opinions.

A caricature of the pauper munshi (or maulvi) fawning at the feet of the ‘kiranee’ (English copyist) is drawn by Rahim Khan, a member of the Punjab University’s senate, in his memorandum of 17 April 1872. The English copyist makes between fifty to sixty rupees a month while a munshi gets five to six (Khan 1872: 283–4). Even the Anjuman-e-Punjab—well-known for its championing of Persian—complained that too much time was spent on it and that this time should be utilized for learning English. Holroyd, the Director of Public Instruction who had always championed the cause of the Oriental languages, was stunned by the unexpectedness of this response. He, therefore, criticized the petition though he reluctantly conceded that it should be given attention since the ‘natives’ were to be conciliated. However, Holroyd really suspected that the petition was inspired by rich people who could afford to teach their sons Persian at home—that somebody should not desire to teach Persian to boys at all was not credible for him (Holroyd 1871: 117–18).

Ironically, when in 1883 the National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta did point out that Muslims had suffered as a consequence of the abolition of Persian, they did not demand Urdu in its place. They asked ‘that measures should be adopted and means afforded to facilitate the study of English by the Muhammadans’ (Memorial 1883: 145). Similarly, Mohammad Latif, Secretary of an Arabic journal on Muslim education, emphasized that higher education should be in English though he began by claiming that it was in Persian and Arabic that the Muslims had reached the highest point in their education (Latif 1883). The Muslims, it may be concluded, were learning to say good bye to Persian when the nineteenth century was drawing to its close.

But British officials were still being encouraged to learn Persian. The reward for passing an examination was Rs 1200 in 1872 while it was only Rs 750 for Urdu (Home 1872: 576). Since Urdu was necessary for daily life in British India—even the servants were ordered about in a basilectal form of it—a lower pecuniary reward for it is understandable. But to give 1200 rupees for a language dying out in Indian society implies that it had intrinsic worth and would be useful—a legacy of the past which took time to discard.

**Demise of Persian-teaching**

By the beginning of the twentieth century Persian was no longer in demand as a language of instruction. The British now felt it could be eliminated from the syllabi. In Bengal, the Governor-General made out a case for teaching Bengali, Urdu, Arabic, and English as follows:

> The Governor in Council believes that if Urdu is properly taught, it will contribute as much to the culture of Muhammadan[s] at the present day—as Persian did some 50 years ago. Under the circumstances, His Excellency in council has decided, not without regret, to omit Persian from the school course (Report Madrasah 1941).

In 1914 a report on the Punjab also said that, although Persian was a part of studies ten years earlier even in the rural schools, it is ‘now entirely omitted except where there is a definite local demand for it’ (Edn. P 1914: 12).

After this, Persian declined steadily. Its place was taken by English and Urdu. In the elitist domains of power where it had held sway from the mountain fiefdoms of the Karakoram and the Himalayas now in Pakistan to the feudal estates of Bengal, it was replaced by English. Thus, all the successors of the British—the ruling elites of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—use English and it is taught in elitist institutions all over South Asia. The other successor of Persian, at least for the Muslim intelligentsia of north India, was Urdu. Urdu replaced Persian as the identity symbol of the Muslim intelligentsia in British India. However, this change was gradual and the
idea that Persian was a symbol of Muslim culture, if not of past Muslim power, lingered on. In Sindh, for instance, where the influence of English was less, the desire for studying Persian remained strong. In 1907, during the All India Mohammadan Educational Conference, there was a complaint that Persian had been done away from the school courses years ago (Report Conference 1907: 11). Commenting on this the Commissioner of Sindh A.D. Younghusband, wrote to the Governor of Bombay that ‘some cautious experiments might now be made in the direction of its re-introduction’ (Letter dated 27 July 1908, SA). Later a report of 1916 specifically recommended that ‘the study of Persian be encouraged by the award of allowances to masters in selected schools and that Persian be recognised as an alternative to Native Accounts in the Vernacular Final Examination’ (Report 1916: 4, item 20). Such attitudes lingered on and even in 1929 the British reported that Muslims attached great importance to it (ISC 1929: 193) and there was demand for teaching it in Sindh. Indeed, in this province, in 1937, out of 1290 students 1034 took it for their matriculation examination whereas only fifty-nine took Arabic and 132 Sanskrit (Edn. S 1938a: 87). Even at Aitchison College, an elitist English-medium public school for the aristocracy, where no Persian is taught nowadays, it was taught in British days. Indeed, Aitchison sent Anwar Sikandar Khan, their senior Urdu and Persian Master, to Iran from where he brought a knowledge of modern Persian and teaching material which, says the report, ‘are possessed by no other school in India’ (Aitchison 1937: 5). By this time, it is possible, however, that Persian was studied not only for its symbolic value but also because Persian courses were easy, mostly consisting of memorizing a few lessons or translating passages, and students got high marks in them. Thus, the popularity of Persian—such as it was—was no longer based on its intrinsic merit or symbolic cultural value but because it was a ‘soft’ option.

Another change introduced by the British was the gradual substitution of modern texts instead of the classical ones. One reason why this was done was because they, as well as the Indian reformers, began to find the classics embarrassingly erotic (Rahmān 2002: 506). Thus, Maulana Muhammad Hussain Azad wrote Fārsī Kī Paehlī Kitāb in 1870 in Lahore; Shiblī Nomānī wrote Nisāb-e-Fārsī (1894) and so on. There were books for matriculation, intermediate, B. A and so on. This happened in the high tide of Victorian prudery, but even as early as 1830 the Calcutta Book Society reported new books: Roebuck’s Persian Primer and a grammar (Fisher 1832: 90). The shift from things Indian to British, modern products of the intellect, had begun in the early part of the nineteenth century.

Indeed, whatever the lingering sentiment for it, Persian had become a marginalized subject by the end of British rule. It was no longer part of elitist schooling which was now in English but was taught either in the madrassas or in vernacular-medium schools. Even there, it was either an easy subject or an optional one. In short, by the time Pakistan came into existence the teaching of Persian had become a secondary matter.

**Persian in Pakistan**

The teaching of Persian falls into three major categories in Pakistan. First, there are the madrassas which teach it as part of their conservative educational philosophy. Then, there are non-elitist state schools, colleges, and universities where it is an optional subject—and a soft option at that. And, lastly, there are institutions, such as the National University of Modern Languages and the Khana-e-Farhang, where modern, spoken Persian is taught according to modern techniques so as to enable students to become interpreters in functional modern-day Iranian and Afghan Persian. Let us, therefore, take the madrassas first.
Teaching of Persian in Pakistani Madrassas

Persian lingers on in the madrasas mainly because they value tradition which, to them, appears to be associated with the pre-colonial glory of Muslim rule. It is no longer the language of learning and the secular system of education has discarded it but the madrasas still teach it, though at a much reduced level, because they remain resistant to certain aspects of modernity and, therefore, value continuity. Persian literature may have been a source of embarrassment for some of the more puritanical ulema after the reformist zeal of Shah Waliullah and his disciples in India. However, during the heyday of Persian, the madrasas also taught Persian literature. In 1551 Abdul Haq of Dehli studied the *Bustān* and *Gulistan* of Sa’adi as well as the *Divān* of Hafiz before learning the Arabic texts from his father Sheikh Saif Uddin (Sufi 1941: 56–7; also see Nadwi 1936: 118–23 for the Persian curricula of the madrassas of India).

The Persian schools, of course, taught much more Persian literature. But even if the madrasas did not teach them, the *Gulistan* and *Bustān* did have chapters on love, and in this chapter there were references to love, even to love of boys. Poetry was, indeed, suspected by the ulema and there is a religious decree of a Deoband alim who blames poets for having ‘fanned the flames’ of unnatural lust (Zafeeruddin 1965: 37). Drinking wine, asking for kisses, desiring the beloved—however much they might be metaphors for the mystic desire for union with an immanent deity—could not but focus the minds of the students on the aesthetic and erotic aspects of life. Since Persian literature was understood till recently it is possible that the ulema did not think it safe to teach those texts which were about worldly pleasures. In most madrasas visited by the author, the chapters on love in the *Gulistan* are not taught nowadays.

The books which the ulema did approve of, and which remain necessary texts even now, were Attar’s *Pand Namā, Nām-e-Haq* and Sa’adi’s *Karīma*. These books are didactic and they are in Persian rhymed couplets. Although they are ‘safe’ from the ulema’s point of view, being about morality, this morality is strictly medieval and patriarchal. Both *Pand Namā* and *Karīma* approve of hospitality and condemn miserliness. In both silence is a virtue and spontaneous talkativeness is not. In both women are inferior, untrustworthy and alluring as, indeed, are beardless boys. Both belong to a male world confident in its superiority. Women are faithless and the wise must suspect them. As *Pand Namā* has it:

*Awal az zan dāshītan chashm-e-wafā*
*Sauda-e-dil ra bas khata bāshad khata*

At first women appear to be faithful. Understand that giving one’s heart to women is a mistake; a great mistake.

and *Karīma, Gulistan* and *Bustān*, the basic texts which are taught in madrasas, reinforce this attitude.

*Nām-e-Haq*, however, is a guidebook on Islamic rules of cleanliness and worship such as are found in all the languages of South Asian Muslims as given in detail elsewhere in this book. It is, therefore, about cleanliness, ablutions, prayers, and other rituals. In a way all these books complement one another. The reality of the world view in the other books is supported by the rituals which are part of the faith. That is probably why the ulema feel that any idea challenging their patriarchal world view is a danger to the faith itself.

The other books too are taught through rote learning. In the end, the products of madrasas can neither write nor speak modern Persian. In some Shia madrasas too, although the textbooks of Persian are those prescribed for classes VI and VII in government schools, there is no special emphasis on teaching the language as such. Indeed, in some the traditional Persian texts are not
prescribed as they are in some Sunni madrassas (see Annexure 4-B for details of the major sects and sub-sects). However, since a number of books on other subjects, mostly printed on excellent paper in Iran, are part of the curricula and the teachers claim that students can read and understand them, it is possible that Shia clergymen are better than their Sunni counterparts in Persian (Shakeri Int. 1999). For the most part one may conclude that the teaching of Persian is meant to keep a symbolic link of continuity with tradition. That is why only the traditional texts, the ones which were used in medieval India, are used in most madrassas while modern Persian literature is ignored. Persian, like all the other languages, is meant to reinforce the ulemas’ world view not to disrupt it.

**Persian in Other Institutions**

English-medium schools do not teach Persian at all. Vernacular-medium schools offer it as an optional subject. It is taught from class VI till class X and the textbooks prescribed by the Textbook Boards are fairly easy. The emphasis is on translation into Urdu and rote learning. An analysis of the ideological contents—those relating to Islam and Islamic personalities; nationalism and the military—of the textbooks gave the following results:

**Table 11 (1 of Chapter 4)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Percentage of Ideological Lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balochistan%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IX</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class X</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1998.

Like schools, Persian is also an optional subject at the BA level and in the examination of the central superior services of Pakistan. At all levels, students say that they take Persian because it is an easy option and one in which they expect to get high marks. Most students who obtained high marks cannot, however, speak Persian.

In the traditional universities Persian literature is taught at the MA and higher levels. In an interview Dr Sajid Ullah Tafhimi, Chairman of the Department of Persian at Karachi University, said that speaking the language was emphasized in the certificate and diploma courses (both of one year each) in his department. He also said that they had included modern post-revolutionary literature in the MA course also (Tafhimi Int. 1999). In the other universities too there were courses in both classical and modern literature. However, Dr Noor Mohammad Mahr, Chairman of the Persian Department at NUML, claims that nearly all students from his department can actually speak modern Persian. He says that he himself, though the winner of a gold medal in the subject (this medal is given to the student who stands first in MA), could not ask for water in a hotel in Iran when he visited that country for higher studies for the first time. At the NUML, since the emphasis is on functional linguistic ability, it is not surprising that the emphasis should be on spoken Persian. However, despite this emphasis, even successful students report and are observed to face difficulty in speaking and understanding native speakers of Persian.

Among the institutions which try to teach modern Persian the foremost is Khana-e-Farhang
which is administered and financed entirely by the Iranian government. It offers courses in Persian at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Hyderabad, and Multan. The Karachi and Lahore centres were set up very early and the Rawalpindi one was set up in 1968. According to Iranian officials, the Karachi centre used to draw between four to five hundred students in the fifties. Even upto 1998 there were over 200 students in the Rawalpindi centre. Now, however, there are no more than 170 students studying Persian in the Rawalpindi Centre. Exact figures were not available about the other centres but Iranian officials said that there were around fifty students in Karachi, between 80 to 100 in Lahore and an average of forty to fifty in the other centres. Likewise, there were no exact figures for expenditure, but an employee from the Rawalpindi centre said that approximately $300 were spent per month on the teaching of Persian in that centre (conversation with officials of Khana-e-Farhang, Rawalpindi). Iran also promotes Persian studies in Pakistan through other ways. In 1971, for instance, the Iran-Pakistan Institute of Persian Studies was established. One of the functions of the Institute is to collect information about the teaching of Persian in higher educational institutions in Pakistan. The Institute also distributes books and enables teachers of Persian to go on short trips to Iran. Lately, probably because of the growing Shia-Sunni antagonism and the attacks on Iranians carried out by the Sunni extremists, Iranian help has decreased. However, even now the NUML is given books and teachers from Iran. For Iran, the teaching of Persian is a means of cultural diplomacy. It helps to sustain friendly ties between the two countries and projects Iran’s positive image in Pakistan (Mehdi Int. 1999; Mustafavi Int. 1999).

On the whole, however, Persian is all but dead in Pakistan. According to Dr Tahira Siddiqui, Professor of Persian at the University of Karachi, Persian is being finished off in Pakistan. In Sindh, it is bracketed with drawing among the optional subjects. As most schools have teachers of drawing but not those of Persian, students tend not to take it (Siddiqui Int. 1999). Dr Ghulam Nasir, Chairman of the Department of Persian at the University of Peshawar, also agreed with this. Indeed, he claimed that Persian was no longer an option at the school level in the NWFP which is not correct though it is true that very few students study it in schools (Nasir Int. 1999). In Balochistan, however, there is a sizable Persian-speaking community (between 20 to 23 per cent in Quetta) and Persian is a popular option. Besides the Department of Persian at the University, there are private bodies like the Anjuman-e-Farsi, Hazara Cultural Association and Bazm-e-Maddahan-e-Khusrau which keep up literary activity in Persian. They publish magazines like Ogal (Bazam-e-Khusrau) and Tuluh (Hazara Students Federation) and even run a language centre to teach Persian. The presence of the Hazara community, who speak a dialect of Persian, ensures much greater understanding of the language than elsewhere in Pakistan. A number of Hazaras write poetry in Persian even now as Sharafat Abbas’s history (1999) tells us. Thus, Quetta is probably the only city of Pakistan where chapbooks, such as the tale of Gul Bakaoli, are available in Persian. This shows that there are people who are literate in the language and read it for pleasure (Abbas Int. 1999). At the BA level out of a total number of 8996 candidates, 4787 took Persian as an option but the fact that 99.5 per cent passed suggests that here too, as elsewhere in Pakistan, Persian is a ‘soft’ option for most students (Appendices 4, 8 & 9). While there is no proof that the government is deliberately trying to eliminate Persian, it is true that it is no longer seen as a prestigious or useful subject. Thus, though it is still studied for the most part by students who want to get a high overall percentage in examinations, very few students study it for other reasons. The response of matriculation students towards Persian is as follows:
Table 12 (2 of Chapter 4)
Students’ demand for Persian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Madrassas (N=131)</th>
<th>Sindhi-medium (N=132)</th>
<th>Urdu-medium (N=520)</th>
<th>Elitist Cadet colleges (N=97)</th>
<th>Ordinary colleges (N=86)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium of instruction?</td>
<td>0.76 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?</td>
<td>3.82 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?</td>
<td>22.14 Nil 3.85 8.24 12.79 7.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 14.7. All figures except those in brackets, are percentages.

The decline in the fortunes of Persian which had started with the coming of the British has now made it all but an unknown and uncared for language in Pakistan and north India. It lingers on as a link with the past or as a convenience for students or, in the case of modern Persian, because of the efforts of Iran and the requirement of interpreters for official and other purposes.

NOTES

1. According to some historians Ghanimat was employed by Mirza Artaq Beg at Sialkot. Artaq Beg’s son Abdul Aziz fell in love with a girl called Shahid and the story was written at Aziz’s request (Naqvi 1971: 426). Whatever the facts may be, in the masnavi itself Shahid is a boy.

2. The ulema interviewed for this book conceded that some of the classical texts could be embarrassing. However, they added that the classroom situation was such that the minds of the students were more concerned with the linguistic rather than the erotic aspects of the texts.

3. A collection of poems called Diwan-i-Makhfi collected in 1724, is credited to Zeb un Nissâ. However, some ascribe it to another Makhfi. For the English translation of the first fifty ghazals see Lal & Westbrook, 1913.
Annexure 4-A

Persian books taught to Indian Muslims are given below (Sufi 1941: 77–8). For details of books, see bibliography (Section 1).

Prose

3. Letters of Abul Fazl.
4. Handbook of Sheikh Inayatullah, Secretary to Shahjahan.
5. Bahār-e-Sukhan by Shaikh Mohammad Salih.
7. Epistles of Shaida and Mullā Tughra.
8. Līlavaṭi translated by Shaikh Faizi.

Poetry

1. Gulistān & Bustān (beginners) by Sa’adi
2. Yusuf Zulaiḥā by Jami
3. Tuhfat-ul-Ahrār
4. Naẓhat-ul-Abrār
5. Sīkandar Nāma by Nizami
6. Makhzan-ul-Asrār
7. Hafī Païkar
8. Shīrīn Khusrau
9. Lailā Majnūn
10. Qiran-us-Sā’dain by Amir Khusrau
11. Matlā-ul-Anwar
12. Ijāz-e-Khusravi
13. Works of the poets Shams-i-Tabriz, Zahir-i-Faryabi, Sa’adi, Hafiz Shirazi, and Sa’ib. Also the Qasāid of Badr-i-Chach, Anwari, Khaqani, Urfi, and Faizi.

Note: Books of history and ethics have been omitted.

Annexure 4-B

Textbooks of Persian in Pakistani Madrassas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Deobandi</th>
<th>Bareli</th>
<th>Ahl-e-Hadith*</th>
<th>Shia**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI: Mushtaq Ahmad &amp; Karīma</td>
<td>Rahbar-e-Fārsi by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII: Gulistān (Chapters 7 &amp; 8)</td>
<td>Fārsī Zahān</td>
<td>Fārsī for VI, VII &amp; VIII</td>
<td>Fārsī for class VI, VII &amp; VIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kā Āsān</td>
<td>VI &amp; VIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qāida</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII: Gulistān (Chapters 1 to 4)</td>
<td>Fārsī Bol Chāl</td>
<td>Karīma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Oola Nil

*D No books for Persian were given in the outline in Report Madrassas 1988. In some institutions, however, Persian is an option.

**Some Shia madrassas teach Persian as an option to some students (e.g. Madrassa Abu Tarab in Hala (Saeedi Int. March 1999). However, most of the books of Shia madrassas are printed in Iran and are written in Persian.
5

ENGLISH AND INDIAN MUSLIMS

The political aspect of the introduction of English in British India, as far as the rulers are concerned, has been explored earlier (Raina 1994). It has also been shown that, while both Orientalists and Anglicists aimed ultimately at consolidating British power in India, the former were less inclined to radical interventionism and had a modicum of romantic respect for India. The latter, however, were more self-confident and saw India in evolutionary terms as backward and fit only for radical reform (Rahman 1996b). The nexus between British power and the teaching of English literature in India has also been explored, notably by Gauri Viswanathan (1987; 1989), and indirectly by a number of other scholars (Joshi 1994). Viswanathan’s major contribution is that she suggests (a) that English literature played a socializing role of the kind which religion played in Britain; (b) that the aim of this socialization was to disseminate values which would control Indians not by the crude use of force but by convincing them that British rule and civilization were superior to theirs and beneficial for them; and (c) that literature would create an ideal moral force, a model or paradigm (in one of the senses used by Kuhn 1962: 175), which the Indians could look up to. Whereas individual English people could be wrong, unpleasant or immoral, the abstract hero of the canonical ‘Leavisian Great Tradition’ of literature was essentially moral and could never cease being an exemplar. But, whereas Viswanathan’s focus is British power and the role English had in relation to it, others have shown interest in the Indian (mostly Hindu) reception of English. The point that the acquisition of English, primarily through its literature, facilitated the acquisition of good jobs for Indians is obvious enough. What is less obvious is that English became ‘an emblem of power’, as Ranajit Guha puts it, not because of the British imposition of it (Guha 1988: 22), but because the Indians collaborated with them in a rearrangement of a pattern of power prevalent since Mughal days (Niranjana 1994; Bagchi 1994: 147). However, the history of the demand and reception of English literature in India, Trivedi rightly complains in the course of his critique of Viswanathan’s focus on British policies alone, is yet to be written (1994: 182).

This chapter aims at providing an account of the way the Muslims of India, especially those of north India and areas now included in Pakistan, responded to English. There are, of course, scattered references to the work of Muslim reformers such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Nawab Abdul Latif in this context, but no coherent account of this response is available. However, mere narration of the history of the change in the attitude of Muslims from rejection to its acceptance and acquisition—is not the only purpose of this study. What is even more important is to understand in what way this change of attitude is related to power. The history of the British decision to teach English to the Indian elite after 1835 has been recorded at several places (for a brief overview, see Rahman 1996: 36–7). What is less often emphasized is that they kept teaching the masses in the vernaculars and, therefore made English into a marker of elitist schooling and the key to powerful government jobs and high social status. In short the British created conditions because of which one would become impoverished and powerless (unless one was connected with landed or commercial bases of power) in the colonial set-up if one did not learn English. That is why, without actually imposing the teaching of English by decree, the British created a demand for it. As this demand first arose in Bengal, and initially among Hindus, let us consider this background before moving on to the Muslim community.
Demand for English in Bengal

The most obvious answer as to why Indians started learning English in Bengal is because it was where the British established their rule first. After all, business did require English and, as Gholam Hossein Khan, the author of the *Siyyar-e-Muta’akhereen* tells us, translations were required. The translator, we are told, ‘exacts as many *eshreffies* (or double guineas) as there are lines translated’ (Khan 1789, Vol. 3: 210). Even if this is not literally true, English must have been of utilitarian value in establishing contacts, and hence empowering oneself, with the British.

A deeper answer, and one which gives us an insight into the phenomenon of resistance to an alien world view, is that the ‘demand for English studies may be seen as an indigenous attempt to stem the growing menace of Orientalism’ (Bagchi 1994: 147). But why was it felt that Orientalism, with its menu of Persian or Sanskrit, was to be countered at all? Bagchi’s answer is that it offered ‘spiritual liberation’, the ‘ideological equivalent of what has been characterized as “civil society”’ (ibid.: 148); that it was neither Hindu nor Muslim and, therefore, offered ‘non-denominational spirituality’ and a ‘secular outlook’ (ibid.: 150). This might well be true, but why should a ‘secular’ or ‘non-denominational’ outlook have been more attractive for Bengali, educated Hindus, the ones who welcomed English first, than the Persian and Sanskrit classics they were used to? Perhaps, as Bagchi contends, because the modernizing Bengalis could liberate themselves both from the ‘orthodox pandits and the Sahib Orientalists’ (ibid.: 152) but also, one feels, because the dominant classics for the service of the state—of acquiring power under the Mughals and even under the British till 1837—had been Persian ones. However romantic or erotic these might have been, they were products of Muslim culture. As we have mentioned earlier, these literary products had formulaic, liturgical beginnings which even Hindu authors dutifully reproduced and were, in the final analysis, symbols of Muslim cultural and intellectual dominance. So, a secular intellectual space was as much a reaction to Muslim cultural dominance as a pragmatic response to the realities of British rule. Thus, Holt Mackenzie, a British officer with long experience of India, testified before a Parliamentary Committee of 1832 that the Rajah of Bhurtipoor had started learning English,

upon the avowed ground that the supreme government being English it was reasonable that he, a Hindoo prince, if required to acquire a language foreign to his state, should select the language of the existing supreme power, in preference to the Persian language of the Mogul court (Parliamentary Committee 1832: 279).

Writing in 1861, when the Mughal court was no longer in existence, Nawab Abdul Latif (1828–93), the Bengali British civil servant and reformer who, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, tried to encourage the Muslims to study English, requested British decision-makers to introduce English in exclusively Muslim institutions because if Hindus were allowed to enter them, the competition would no longer be fair. He said:

Many Hindoos of Bengal cannot be found to devote one half of their time to acquire a language (Persian) whose influence is gradually receding, which can give them no money and, as Hindoo society in the Metropolitan Districts is at present constituted, little social advantage (Latif 1861: 38).

Thus, argued Latif, while Muslims will learn both Persian and English, Hindus will spend little time on Persian thus beating the Muslims in English. Testifying before the Education Commission (1882), Babu Haris Chandra said:

The days are gone by when Brahmans and Pandits learnt their Gaitris (the most holy verses) through the
He then went on to condemn Persian literature for its amorous and erotic content (Edn. Com. NWP 1884: 201). Although such acerbity of tone was a product of the tension between Hindus and Muslims manifesting itself in the form of the Urdu-Hindi controversy among other things in the nineteenth century, it is likely that Persian was held in much less value by the Hindus than by the Muslims even earlier.

In short, for educated Hindus, Persian could be discarded without much ado being a medieval foreign legacy. Indeed, the new Hindu identity which was taking shape incorporated aspects of what Krishan Kumar, the Indian scholar of education, calls the ‘rival perspective’ which ‘starts with the Plunder of the Somnath temple’ (Kumar 1996: 16). This perspective rejects symbols of Muslim domination and Persian was, of course, one of them. A new foreign legacy, the key to modernization, was to take its place: this was English.

Modernization entailed an awareness of new categories; new ways of classifying people. One of these was classification around the religious affiliation. It did exist earlier, of course, but became more salient as local, clan or occupational categories fell back and the larger identity labels, such as Hindu and Muslim, came to the fore. British preoccupation with the religious question, their censuses, their quotas for jobs, places in educational institutions, etc., consolidated these identities which the Mughal court and officialdom, being bureaucracies, also knew. Thus, among the Bengali Hindus who demanded English was the ‘modernizer’ Raja Rammohun Roy as well as the conservative anti-secular Hindu Raja Radhakanta Deb (Bagchi 1994: 147). While the Bengali Hindu elite, or at least a section of it, welcomed English, the Muslim elite shied away from it.

**Muslim Mistrust of English**

The first recorded ideological response to English, and one which moulded Muslim opinion and was referred to throughout the nineteenth century, was the religious edict (fatwa) of Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1823) who was one of the most influential opinion moulders of the Muslims of India. The fatwa, which was given in response to a question, is as follows:

There is no harm in reading English, i.e. recognizing the English alphabet, writing it and knowing its terms and meanings, provided that this knowledge is gained for intentions which are lawful to Islam. The hadith says that Zayd bin Thabit, in accordance with the orders of Prophet Muhammad, learned the art of both the Jewish and Christian scripts and languages in order to write the Prophet’s replies to their letters in their languages. However, it is undesirable and illegal to learn English with the intention of flattering Englishmen and gaining their favour (Aziz n.d.: 571–2, original in Urdu; quoted from Rizvi 1982: 240–41).

Shah Abdul Aziz further distinguished between employment which was allowed and that which was not allowed by the Islamic law (sharia’h). Military service, services requiring deference to the British, and services requiring acts which are forbidden (haram) were disallowed. Service in the courts, or in the education and revenue departments, was not disallowed but, since social interaction, personal relations and intimacy entered everywhere, orthodox Muslims felt it was better to stay away from them too. And, since English was learned primarily for employment, they also stayed away from English.

Following the famous fatwa of Shah Abdul Aziz, other Muslim ulema too declared it lawful to learn English. Maulana Badiul Hai of Lucknow, an alim of the famous religious seminary at
To study the English language or learn to write it is prohibited if it be for the sake of resemblance [with the British], but if the purpose be this that we may be able to read letters written in English or know the contents of their books, then it matters little (Original in Urdu in Hai n.d.: 20).

Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, of the Darul Uloom Deoband, said:

It is correct to learn the English language, provided one does not commit a sin and there may be no impairment in religion (Original in Urdu in Gangohi n.d.: 54. Quoted from Rizvi 1980, Vol. 2: 231).

However, none of these religious edicts succeeded in doing away with the ordinary Muslims’ prejudice against English.

Nazeer Ahmad (1830–1915), the famous Urdu novelist, tells us that when he joined Delhi College, probably in 1845, the principal wanted him to study English but:

My father said clearly that he would rather have me die; have me beg in the streets; but would not tolerate teaching me English (my translation from the original Urdu, in Siddiqui 1971: 54).

Nazeer Ahmad also writes the following Urdu couplet to show the animosity the Muslim clerics (maulvis) bore to English.

Nama angrazi ke parhne ka agar leta koi
Maulvi dete thay fatwa kufir ka ilhad ka (Siddiqui 1971: 35)

If anyone even took the name of studying English the maulvis passed the edict that they were infidels and atheists.

Even Nazeer Ahmad himself, educated though he was in the liberal Delhi College, seems to have finally overcome his religious scruples about acquiring English when he learned it in the company of Abdullah Khan, a very orthodox and practicing Muslim, whom he stayed with after the upheaval of 1857 (Siddiqui 1971: 82). Thereupon, he learned English and, of course, got his son educated in it.

Another well-known Muslim intellectual, Zakaullah of Delhi, did study English at Delhi College. He too, like Nazeer Ahmad, came from a religious family and his biographer, C.F. Andrews, makes the point that it must have been a struggle for his father to break with tradition by allowing his son to study English because the new learning was ‘being openly called “kafir”, or infidel; it was openly said to produce atheists’ (Andrews 1929: 58).

Beginning of Muslim Acceptance of English

Notwithstanding this fanatical rejection of English by the Muslims of north India in the nineteenth century, there seems to have been a more pragmatic attitude towards it earlier. Nothing is known of the first Indian, or Indians, who learnt English. However, the historian Khafi Khan tells us that he had an interview with Yakut Khan, the commander of an island off Bombay, who described how the English had conquered a ship in which an acquaintance of his was travelling. This acquaintance told Yaqut that the Englishmen took revenge for an earlier defeat they had suffered at his (Yaqut’s) hands. Their words, in English, were translated to the acquaintance by a
fellow traveller (Khan 1733: 423). It is not quite clear who the translator was and how much English he knew. However, if he had learned English, then this must be a very early instance of doing so because it occurred in Aurangzeb’s days (r. 1658–1707). Later, the English started employing functionaries, both office and factory employees and domestic ones, to help them carry on their trade in India and they often had a smattering of English. Some of these servants were taken back to England. Of course, the servants brought in by Englishmen could only have had a few words of English but more genteel people, such as Munshie Mohomet Saeed who advertised for pupils in 1777 could ‘speak and write English tolerably’. Likewise, a certain Syed Abdullah, who settled in England in the 1850s as a ‘professor of Hindustani’ must have known English (Visram 1986: 63). The gentlemen travellers, such as I’tisam al-Din, who went to Europe in 1767 and returned to Calcutta in 1769, did not learn it but regretted not having done so (G. Khan 1998: 76). Mir Mohammad Husain (d. 1790), who went to Europe in 1775 and stayed two years there including a year in England, ‘acquired a reasonable knowledge of English language, enabling him to translate books from English into Persian’ (ibid.: 93–4). The only Indian who published in English was Dean Mahomet (1759–1851). In his excellent study of this unique Indian Muslim who converted to Christianity after marrying an Irish woman, Jane Daly, and later became famous as the proprietor of a bathing saloon in Brighton, Michael Fisher describes his two books, Travels (1794) and Shampooing (1822). The first book is in the epistolary tradition of the newly emerging novel of this era, while the second work is located in the medical discourse of the period. In Fisher’s words, ‘Dean Mahomet mastered the classically polished literary forms of the day, complete with poetic interjections and allusions’ (1996: 208). Abu Talib, who went to England in 1799, travelled with a captain who said: ‘I will undertake to teach you English during my voyage’ (Talib 1810: 18). Apparently he learned some English during his stay in England. Tafuzzal Husain Khan (1727–1800) also learned English from his British patrons in India and read books in it (G. Khan 1998: 276). While the early settlers in Britain could not help learning English, the elitist travellers did not have to do so. Yet they manifested no aversion to English. Perhaps they were too secure in their world view to think of English as a threat. Indeed, they took it as a vehicle of new knowledge which they themselves kept producing in Arabic and Persian. As Persian was still ascendant in India and a Mughal emperor still occupied the throne at Delhi, they may not have felt that their cultural identity or the power of their social class were under imminent threat.

There were also Muslims in English-teaching schools in Bengal, Madras and Bombay—the first centres of British rule—much before Zakaullah and Nazeer Ahmad’s days. As early as 1814, for instance, there were Muslim students at Chinsura (Hampton 1947: 35). In 1824, out of a total of eighty-three Muslim students studying at the Hooghly Imaumbarah, sixty were studying English (Fisher 1826, in Basu 1952: 105). In 1829, at the Meerut Free School, thirty-four Muslim, sixteen Hindu, and twenty-one European students studied English (Fisher: 94). In 1829 the Calcutta Madrassah, the oldest seminary of Muslim education established by the British, also started teaching English. It seems, however, that the Muslims who studied English did not belong to the most powerful or prestigious social classes. According to a letter of 4 August 1853, Muslim students of the Calcutta Madrassah belonged ‘to the lower orders of Mohamedans’ (in Richey 1922: 105). This is borne out by a report on the English department of the Madrassah which says:

with the exception of the sons of some of the professors of the college and of the highest Mahomedan Law officers in the Hon’ble Company’s Courts, the pupils belonged chiefly to the classes of petty shop keepers, retailers, attornies and Moonshies; and that, with a very few exceptions, the study of English had failed to make any impression on the better class of Mahomedans (Presidency 1854: 2. Reproduced verbatim by Abdul Latif in Haque 1968: 189).
The English department never had more than 156 students and in 1852, when Abdul Latif was asked to advise the Council of Education about teaching English language and literature to Muslims, it had only thirty-one (Presidency College 1854: 2, Appendix 1). The lower classes probably studied English for pragmatic reasons. With even a smattering of English they could get employment with the British. In any case, unlike the higher classes of Muslims, they were not concerned with loss of power and identity as they lacked both even in pre-British days. The resistance to English, therefore, came from the higher classes and it increased in the nineteenth century as British control and hegemony became more and more obvious.

The Council of Education did, however, feel that Muslims could be induced to study English. A letter of the Council of Education to the Bengal Government (dated 4 August 1853) said:

Mahomedans of rank and respectability have sent their sons to St. Paul’s School and the Parental Academy, because these are the only Seminaries, not of a strictly Missionary character, open to them, in which they can become proficient English scholars (Richey 1922: 106; also in Presidency 1854: 9).

The Council, therefore, felt that in the Muslims of Bengal there was ‘a growing desire for sound English education, though it is doubtless still much less ardent, and less general, than that felt by the Hindus’ (Presidency 1854: 9).

The problem at Calcutta Madrassah, and other similar institutions, seemed to be that English was not taught in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Muslim elite. Abdul Latif made these requirements clear to the British. In his ‘Minute on the Hooghly Mudrassah’, he said that the Muslim elite consisted of the orthodox religious scholars (the maulvies) and the ‘worldly class’ who used to study Persian under the Mughals:

The worldly class consists of those who are not anxious for an Arabic education, but would content themselves with sufficient Persian to enable them to transact business and move in society. This class is by far the most numerous, and possessed of wealth and property, including as it does the nobility, the gentry and the merchants; and it is by this class, that the benefits of an English education will be appreciated and sought after (Latif 1861, in Haque 1968: 24).

However, he pointed out that Persian was still a symbol of social prestige for Muslims and a Muslim father ‘would be very willing to make his son apply himself to English, if he could carry on at the same time his Persian reading’ (in Haque 1968: 192). Therefore, advised Abdul Latif, an Anglo-Persian department was to be created at the Madrassah. This was ‘intended only to extend the benefit of an English education to the children of Mahomedans of the higher order’ (Richey 1922: 107; advised in Presidency 1854: 10–12).

In 1853 Abdul Latif set about to elicit the opinions of educated Muslims about European education. For this he offered a prize of Rs 100 for the best essay entitled: ‘On the advantages of an English Education to Mahomedan students’.

elaborate Essays were received from the Punjab, Oudh, the North-Western Provinces, Bengal, Behar, and even Bombay. While some of the Essayists wrote strongly against giving English education to Mahomedan children, quoting Scripture for their purpose, and even denounced the giver of the Prize as an enemy and revolutionizer of Islam, others took a more favourable view of the question (Haque 1968: 165).

These ‘others’ must have been making their wishes felt because the famous Education Despatch of 1854 says that the ‘increasing desire of the Mahomedan population to acquire knowledge has given’ much satisfaction to the Directors of the East India Company (Despatch 1854: 388).

Those who did not approve of English on religious grounds did, however, remain an adamant
minority even up to 1872 when Sir Syed carried out a survey similar to that of Abdul Latif. Again, one of the prejudices against English was the view ‘that to read English is unlawful and forbidden by the laws of Islam’ (Khan 1872: 141). However, all the essayists pointed out that those ‘who suppose that to read English is wrong and forbidden by their religion are evidently in error’. Indeed, the fatwa of Shah Abdul Aziz, quoted earlier, was referred to as the authority which declared it as being lawful (Khan 1872: 142). However, no matter what the learned said, many Muslims remained prejudiced against English for religious reasons till the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus Altaf Hussain Hali, biographer of Sir Syed and a famous poet of Urdu, reports that ‘the Muslims regarded learning English sinful’ which was one reason why Sir Syed formed the Scientific Society in 1863 to get books translated from English to Urdu (Hali 1901: 127). Ironically, even Sir Syed himself was not in favour of teaching English to females as he clearly stated in a speech in January 1884. He argued that, whereas males required English to find jobs (i.e. to empower themselves), females could do with traditional education so as to be aware of their religious rights and obligations (Saiyid 1998: 52). Women’s magazines, which were meant to reform women, did not always approve of modern education either and ‘learning the English language’ was viewed with hostility as it ‘was seen as a source of corruption of Muslim women’ (Tehzib-e-Niswan 21 June 1926; quoted from Saiyid 1998: 53).

Another reason, not explicitly mentioned by either the reformers, their opponents, or by the British, was the subtle connection between English and loyalty to the British. One gets hints of this perceived nexus in conversations and private papers. For instance Theodore Beck, principal of Aligarh College, wrote to his mother on 18 January 1886 that an Indian reformer, Amjad Ali, ‘thinks the only way to make Muhamedans loyal is to educate them in English, for with English education greater freedom of thought comes and the old prejudice against kafirs disappears’ (Beck MSS 1886). In short, English brought about a transformation of world view making Muslims more liberal and therefore less unaccepting of British culture and ascendancy. The ulema and the anti-British lobby among the Muslims too understood this—hence their opposition to English. In short the opposition was not merely religious. It was part of the tussle of power between the old world which lay dying and the new one which the pro-English reformers were bringing into being.

**Muslim Acceptance of English in North India**

In north India, whose cultural centre was Delhi, the English class at Delhi College played a major role in acquainting the Muslim elite with English. Such classes were strongly opposed by the most vocal Muslim leaders in 1829 when they were first created. According to C.F. Andrews:

They [the Muslim leaders] were firmly and solidly convinced that the foremost reason in the minds of the British authorities for the opening of the classes in English was to convert their children to Christianity and to make them gradually adopt the Christian manner of life (Andrews 1929: 35).

But despite this opposition there were ‘as many as three hundred eager young students’ by the end of 1831 (Andrews 1929: 34). After 1857, when the crown took over and the old Persian-using elite lost its social importance, English spread so fast that Munshi Zakaullah, the pioneer of Western education, issued a warning on behalf of Urdu:

To abandon Urdu for English; to bring up Musalman children, so that they do not know how to write or read fluently in Urdu, but prefer to write in English, is the surest way to bring about the neglect of the Muhammadan religion (Andrews 1929: 97–8).
The language which was now championed as the symbol of Muslim identity was no longer Persian but Urdu. However, the link between English and lack of piety, indeed of religious conviction altogether, remained strong. The British were, of course, aware of it and reported even as late as the 1870s that ‘the Mussulman is unfaithful if he gives English the preference to Arabic’ (DPI-NWP 1870: 384). The madrassas, especially the major seminary at Deoband, did not include English in the curricula. The only madrassa which ventured to do so was the Nadwatul Ulema at Lucknow. One of its leading lights, Shibib Nomani (1857–1914), felt that ‘for the propagation of Islam in Europe and for its effective defence from European critics, the knowledge of English language was essential for a modern alim’ (Hashmi 1989: 140). But Shibib was exceptional in that he was associated with Aligarh of which Sir Syed was the founder. Even so, in the beginning (1898), the founder members gave no place to English in the course of studies. It was allowed, but only as an optional subject in 1900 and when it finally became compulsory in 1905, it was because of Shibib’s efforts who now had a powerful position in the Nadwa (Hashmi 1989: 135). However, as the other madrassas did not have men like Shibib, they did not include English in their curricula at this time. Meanwhile, English started spreading in secular, job-oriented, institutions such as Aligarh—the brainchild of Sir Syed. Sir Syed’s efforts in spreading English, especially through the college (and later the university) at Aligarh, are well-known. Sir Syed himself spoke little English. According to Beck, in a letter to his mother dated 8 March 1886, ‘The Syed then proposed my health. For the first time in his life he spoke in English. His grammar was very defective but there was no doubt as to his meaning’ (Beck MSS 1886). But such was his influence that even conservatives started sending their children to learn English. Beck mentions in a letter to his mother (14 February 1886) that even the Sherwani family whose conservatism was such that they were not expected to take to English, allowed their children to study it. Maulvi Abdul Shakur Khan, the head of the family, reported Beck, is ‘allowing 3 Sherwanis to learn English but he is sending them to the Agra College’. This, suggests Beck, ‘shows the strength of the Syed’s influence, for it is certainly due to him indirectly’ (Beck MSS 1886). Yet, the pro-English influences contended with the anti-English ones for final victory over the Muslim mind. It was a question of identities, world views and lifestyles in conflict. Even Sir Syed, notorious for his naturalist interpretation of Islam and suspect in the eyes of the orthodox for championing English and Western education, accepted the nexus between learning English and the dilution of the Islamic identity in his own manner. He did so implicitly by not agreeing to teach it to women as mentioned earlier and somewhat more explicitly for men too. In a speech he said:

These young men here who know English will forgive me if I say that no one who has studied English and acquired a taste for English learning can be absolutely convinced by all that modern Islam embraces.

But Sir Syed’s view was that true Islam, being the religion of nature, would only be strengthened by reading modern subjects. What would be rejected were ‘those doubtful concepts which have clouded the bright face of Islam or which have been unwittingly attached to it’ (Hali 1901: 254).

But however much Sir Syed and others might justify it, the orthodox felt, however vaguely, that English and the modern knowledge to which it was the key, would bring about changes in their world view. This, indeed, was true. English is the vehicle of modernity and the world view upon which it is based is quite different from that of any faith including Islam. The apprehensions of the orthodox were well-founded but English spread fast—even faster than the British rulers were willing to supply it.
Anglicist Policy and English

The actual changeover from the Orientalist to the Anglicist language policy has been described in detail by several scholars and need not be gone into here. Suffice it to say that most British officers outside the General Committee of Public Instruction (GCPI), including the Governor-General Lord William Bentinck, were already Anglicists by 1835 so that such a change was not immediately precipitated by Macaulay’s famous Minute of that year but was due since the 1830s when the Indians had shown willingness to learn English. It is, therefore, not necessary to describe the events which led to the deadlock between the Anglicists and the Orientalists in the GCPI, the intervention of Macaulay and the resolution of the Governor-General giving state patronage to the teaching and more extensive use of English in the domains of power (for details, see Rahman 1996b). It is, however, worth noting that this change of policy was greatly hastened because of language teaching and learning. There was no sudden administrative order imposing English on India but a slow building up of demand for it by offering it first as an additional subject and then offering jobs through it even while Persian continued to be the official language. Then, with the changeover to English, Persian too was removed without any political resistance.

After Lord Auckland’s minute of 24 November 1839 the Anglicist language policy was firmly in place. But, whereas neither Macaulay nor any of the Anglicists had ever suggested that the masses should be educated in English, some people took that to be the intention of the government. In Bombay, for instance, there was a controversy which has been described elsewhere (Rahman 1996: 41–2; for original sources, see Richey 1922: 1–31). The point at issue was whether English was to be the medium of instruction in all institutions or, whether the vernacular languages were to be used in this role. This was settled in favour of the vernaculars at the lower levels in ordinary schools though elitist, English-medium schools, were established soon. In the North-Western Provinces ‘the smaller English schools were abolished, and instruction in English was confined to the Colleges from 1843’ (Long 1868: 14). The Despatch of 1854 indicated what Anglicization was expected to achieve:

1. [It was to] ‘secure to us [the British] a larger and more certain supply of many articles necessary for our manufactures’.
2. [function] as a market of ‘an almost inexhaustible demand for the produce of British labor [sic]’.
3. [English] education was to ‘raise the moral character’ of Indians.
4. [Anglicization was to] supply ‘servants to whose probity’ offices of trust may be given (Richey 1922: 365).

The Despatch also gave a clear verdict on the medium of instruction—it was to be the vernacular of the area—and proposed a policy for the teaching of English:

In any general system of education, the English language should be taught where there is a demand for it; but such instruction should always be combined with a careful attention to the study of the vernacular language of the district, and with such general instruction as can be conveyed through that language; and while the English language continues to be made use of as by far the most perfect medium for the education of those persons who have acquired a sufficient knowledge of it to receive general instruction through it, the vernacular languages must be employed to teach the far larger classes who are ignorant of, or imperfectly acquainted with English (Despatch 1854: 367–8).

But the zeal for the promotion of English evinced by the local authorities had to be curbed sometimes by the home authorities. A Despatch from the Directors (12 May 1847) is critical of the requirement that government service would be given to a person who shows ‘a critical acquaintance with the works of Bacon, Johnson, Milton and Shakespeare’ in English literature to
say nothing of other subjects. It says that ‘this high test, instead of promoting, will in effect discourage the general acquisition of the English language. Those who cannot hope to pass this test will not think it worth their while to bestow any time upon learning the English language, at least with a view to employment in the public service’ (Richey 1922: 91). As it was, English was a difficult subject for Indian students. It took up much of their time and energy. It was a hurdle because the students were familiar only with one technique of learning it—that of memorization. The teachers and the examination system only encouraged them in this. According to one scholar:

This educational experience encouraged students to treat college English books as texts to be learned word for word, supplemented by little extra assigned reading which would have provided an intellectual context, and with next to no leisure reading in English. The impact of the few chosen works was thus sharpened, in Bombay, by the students’ unfamiliarity with other aspects of the intellectual tradition from which their texts had been drawn (McDonald 1966: 456).

Because it was necessary for government employment, English became the major criterion of a ‘good’ school. Thus Adam reported in 1835 that ‘the desire to obtain an acquaintance with English tends to the neglect of the vernacular language and has led to the discontinuance of elementary schools’ (Adam 1835: 25–6). Thus, at times the British had to deny English education at the lower, non-elitist levels to keep up its scarcity value. In short, the British rationed out English while the Indians, even Muslims among them, started demanding it.

**English in Sindh**

The present province of Sindh (also written as Sind) was part of the Bombay Presidency till 1936. In Bombay English schools were to be established in ‘Zilla towns’—towns where the district administration was located—and the people of the town were supposed to subscribe at least Rs 500 for its establishment to show their interest (Richey 1922: 163).

But English was not only learned in schools. Indians acquired it from others who used it for official or business correspondence. In Bombay ‘almost every English writer, Purvoo, Parsee, and Portuguese’ had pupils who learned English and worked in public offices without pay till some vacancy fell open and they occupied it (Fisher, in Basu 1952: 125). In Bombay too three Elphinstone professorships of ‘English language and European arts and sciences’ were established (Fisher 126). Only one professor was to teach ‘languages and general literature’ at a prestigious salary of Rs 1000 per month (ibid.: 127).

In the 1820s and 30s, the period to which the above lines refer, Sindh was not part of the Bombay Presidency but there were Muslims, mostly Gujarati-speaking ones, in the major cities of the Presidency. But even these urban Muslims did not show much desire for learning English. A report for 1831 says:

Your committee observe that the boys who have made the greatest progress in the English schools are the Hindoos; they are left longer in the schools by their parents than other boys, who, though equally intelligent and quick, are more irregular in their attendance. Few or no Mahomedan boys even enter the schools (Fisher, in Basu 1952: 132).

English-medium schools, which were primarily meant for Europeans, started functioning in Sindh soon after the British conquest. The Karachi Free School, for instance, started functioning in 1846. This school was funded by Captain Preedy, the collector of Karachi, who thought he would help spread Christian morality through it. In 1847 an Indo-British School was set up in Karachi
under the patronage of Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sindh. This, however, was for the education of ‘European and Anglo-Indian children’ (Khuhro 1978: 247). Richard Burton, Orientalist, explorer and spy, suggested that English schools should be established at Karachi, Hyderabad, and Shikarpur and that students should study English after having first got a thorough grounding in Sindhi (Khuhro 1978: 252). However, the government was not too eager to open English schools mainly because of the expense. However, in Shikarpur, Captain Goldsmith established a small English school (Shaikh 1995: 19). In 1854 the Grammar School was founded and in 1861 Reverend J. Willy established the St Patrick’s school for boys and St Joseph’s Convent for girls in Karachi (Khuhro 1997: 49). The idea of establishing a school on the lines of a public school or a Chief’s College at Hyderabad to teach the sons of Baloch chieftains and Sindhi landlords was under discussion in the 1840s also. The correspondence about it among various officials lasted from 1845 to 1848. It is referred to by Ellis in his famous report where he writes that Captain Rathborne, the Collector of Hyderabad, even suggested that fines imposed for forgery on two landowners be used for such an educational enterprise (Ellis 1856: para 30, p. 13). Initially, the idea was that the chiefs themselves would provide an annual sum of Rs 3000 if the government matched this subscription. Later, because of bureaucratic delays, the chiefs were reported to have lost interest in it nor were teachers of English found. Hamida Khuhro, who describes this early effort for establishing the equivalent of the Aitchison College of Lahore, remarks that ‘it seemed unduly churlish of the Bombay government to withdraw from the scheme at the last moment but this attitude of the Bombay authorities and their reluctance to finance projects in Sindh was to be a feature of the relations of the presidency Government with that province’ (Khuhro 1978: 251–2). Ellis, reporting about the same incident, observes that the ‘great distance would have precluded the attendance of many scholars otherwise anxious to obtain an English education’ and adds that the establishment of ‘one English school in each Collectorate appeared to be the least that could be sanctioned’ (Ellis 1856: para 50, p. 17). Moreover, Ellis recommends ‘the establishment of scholarships in English schools, to maintain, while studying, those pupils who had much distinguished themselves at Vernacular schools’ (ibid.: para 84, p. 25). Such a system was apparently agreed upon in the ‘Kurachee English school’ where two monitorships would be ‘held by the most advanced and diligent of the pupils’ (ibid.: para 80, p. 25). In short, far from being forced down upon unwilling people, the British did not supply English to the extent the power relations they had created made people demand it. Indeed, the Muslims of Sindh really started learning English when Hussanally Bey Effendi (1830–95) took the initiative of establishing a school for them.

Majid K.B. Hussanally Effendi (as he spells his name on his visiting card in the museum at the Institute of Sindhology, Sindh University, but who is spelled as Hasan Ali and Hassanally in other documents) was born on 14 August 1830 at Hyderabad. He was a self-made man. He studied the Quran and Persian in his own primary school but made efforts to teach himself English with the help of a Christian clerk when he himself was a clerk in the Deputy Collector’s office (Shaikh 1995: 23). Hussanally made efforts to establish a madrassa at Karachi through an organization, called the Sindh Branch of the Central National Mohamedan Association, of which he was the president. He had to fight on two fronts: his own compatriots who mistrusted English education and the authorities who were aloof and arrogant. He did the former by carrying on a crusade in favour of English education in his weekly journal called Muawin-i-Majmai-Mohammadi. As for the latter, he started cultivating British officers through petitions, meetings, and memorials. Memorials of 1882 onwards addressed to the Viceroy suggest that he, like Sir Syed, wished to get British endorsement for his project by dwelling much upon the theme of loyalty to the Raj. However, there was also an underlying note of warning—that there would be trouble if the Muslims were ignored. R. Nallace, to whom Hussanally must have written, replied on 5 May 1885 about the Madressah as follows:
It will provide not only a thoroughly good education for Mahomedan boys, but what is still more to the point it provides for them a home in which their moral training will be well cared for (Edn. Com. 1882: para 580, p. 505).

English, no doubt, was part of this salubrious ‘moral training’ in British eyes. At last the Madressah-tul Islam was established in 1885 at Karachi.

The Madressah was meant to educate Sindhi Muslims so as to make them participate in the modern, English-using, world without losing their Islamic identity. After all, as recently as in 1882, the Education Commission had reported that the Muslims were ‘strongly against the study of English’ (Edn. Com. 1882: chapter IX, p. 986). Yet, they wanted to empower themselves by learning English too. This could only be achieved by making an institution teaching English like Aligarh. The Sindh Madressah, then, was a residential institution, like Aligarh, and a number of famous names, including those of M.A. Jinnah (admitted 1887), Shahnavaz Bhattu, Abdullah Haroon, I.I. Kazi, and Ayub Khuhrro (b.1901) studied in it. After Hussanally Effendi, a number of British principals, notably Thomas Henry Vines (1903–1922) did much to improve the Madressah. In 1906 the Madressah had over 301 pupils in the English branch and 276 in the vernacular one. This was an improvement from 1903–4 when there were 208 in the English branch and almost 249 in the vernacular one (Report Madressah 1906). In the beginning, of course, ‘such was the dislike for English education that for a long time the English classes were very thinly attended (Shaikh 1995: 39). The Madressah itself did much to dispel the bias against English among the Muslim elite of Sindh.

Besides the Sindh Madressah there were other elitist schools too which combined traditional education with English. The Larkana Madressah, which was one such institution, was established in June 1900 by the efforts of the Collector of the district who wanted the Sindhi feudal landowners (zamindars or waders) to acquire English which was taught here upto the V standard. His methods were rather coercive which Hamida Khuhrro, whose father Ayub Khuhrro also studied in this institution, describes as follows:

When a zamindar came to call on the Collector, as most of them would do about once every two months or so, the Collector would ask the zamindar how many children he had and of what age. Then he would bring up the matter of their education and tell the zamindar that he must send his sons to the madressah. If there was any reluctance the Collector would issue orders that the offending zamindar was to be denied an interview and his privilege of a ‘chair’ in the ‘durbar’ was to be taken away. Naturally the zamindar would be very alarmed at this and would hasten to send his sons to the madressah (Khuhrro 1998: 31).

These tactics were endorsed in Resolution 15 of the All India Mohamedan Educational Conference in December 1908 not only for the Larkana Madressah but for all Muslim feudal lords. The Larkana Madressah, however, produced some really competent people. One of the most illustrious alumni of this Madressah, who has been mentioned in another context earlier, was Omar bin Mohammad Daupstota, later a famous scholar of Arabic and Persian.

The Madressah had both an English and a vernacular branch. This was an innovation which the Sindhi waders did not quite appreciate yet. However, from 1901 to 1906–7 the number of boys in the English branch was more than those in the vernacular branch (Larkana 1906: 2). Ayub Khuhrro’s father, Shah Mohammed, had hired a tutor to teach him English even in the village. But even he was not quite willing to teach him more English at Larkana. However, because of familial pressure, he eventually relented and Ayub Khuhrro learnt English (Khuhrro 1998: 32–3). In the meantime, attitudes were changing because English was empowering even for the feudal
lords of Sindh who did not need to seek employment but did want to acquire political power. After all, it was because Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, father of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ‘had a working knowledge of English’ that he was a member of government bodies and possessed both patronage and influence (Kuhuro: 33–4).

Other madrassas were established in the north and south of the Hyderabad district. One was opened in Jacobabad, yet another one in Petaro, and one was planned for Sukkur (Report Conference 1907: 7). The British policy was to encourage such madrassas because, as the Commissioner said in his speech to the All India Mahomedan Educational Conference held at Karachi on 26 December 1907, the Muslims of Sindh were so backward that, even while he preferred them for employment, he could not employ them simply because it would be unjust to the more-qualified Hindus. One way to redistribute jobs, and therefore share in state power, more equitably was to open more madrassas. The Collector said:

Then we have our Madressahs of which the most important, indeed the parent of them all, is the Sind Madressah here at Karachi, presided over by our friend, Mr Vines, while the newest is that now being opened at Pithoro by that most enthusiastic of district officers, Mr Mackenzie (Report Conference 1907: 5).

The Muslims of Sindh, like Muslims elsewhere, ‘entertained some religious objections to the study of English’ (Ali 1907: 16). Thus, a report of 1916 states that ‘only one boy of 1100 Mahomedan males attends a school in which English is taught’ (Committee 1916)—this, despite the efforts made by the British and some Sindhi Muslim reformers to teach the Muslims English. However, the desire for empowerment was so great that even the Muslims overcame their scruples and sought to learn English as time passed.

English in the Punjab

In north India—initially the areas of Agra, Oudh, Bihar, etc. and later the Punjab—the control of education shifted from Bengal to a local authority in 1840. Here, to begin with, there was less incentive and fewer opportunities to study English. There were very few European residents, hardly any businessmen conducting their business in English, no Supreme Court, ‘no English Bar or Attorneys, no European Sea-borne Commerce, with its shipping and English sailors’ and so on (Richey 1922: 228). Thus English, if it was to be learned at all, was to be learned only from government educational institutions. The Punjab was conquered in 1849 and, despite few opportunities, there was much desire for acquiring English. As early as in 1849–50 a college was founded at Amritsar and a report says its attendance increased from 107 to 153 in a year and ‘of those, about one fourth study English’. It is further reported that ‘in Lahore, as well as Umritsur, the anxiety to acquire English is remarkable’ and many ‘nobleman and gentlemen have their sons taught English privately’ (Richey 1922: 280). Even about the Muslims, not known for taking to English education, the report says that they, ‘though formidable in numbers, are less bigoted, less bound by traditionary practice, than their co-religionists in any part of India’ (Richey 1922: 281). Mission schools were, therefore, established in Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Amritsar, Ferozepur, Ludhiana, Ambala, and so on (ibid.: 282). Although colleges were English-medium, most English-medium schools were either missionary schools, European schools, public schools set up by government departments and Chiefs’ Colleges. All of them, including the missionary schools, received grants (Despatch of 1859, in Richey 1922: 439).

By 1864, English was taking the place of Persian, the former elitist language of India. The statement by A. R. Fuller, the Director of Public Instruction of the Punjab, of English taking the
place of Persian has already been quoted in the chapter on Persian. Fuller, however, believed in making efforts to make this come about. As such he made efforts to make English popular in the Punjab. Among other things he appointed pandits in Branch schools to teach Urdu, Persian, and English. The pandits were told that ‘the principal object in appointing them is to induce the boys to study English’ and they would retain their appointment only if this took place (Edn. P 1864b: 3–4). Moreover, he also offered scholarships to the pupils for this purpose (ibid.: 32–4). These efforts bore fruit and the number of students increased year by year so that in 1865 ‘no less than 264 girls were studying English in addition to the boys’. I.H. Thornton, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, wrote that the government approved of this trend for political reasons among others. In his letter of 30 August 1865 to the DPI he wrote:

This growing desire to acquire English, and to go beyond the beaten track of Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic, is certainly not to be discouraged; it is indicative of a growing freedom from prejudice in favour of old routine, and a tacit expression of confidence in English rule (Thornton 1865).

In short, if a change in world view in the direction of modernity and Anglicization occurred, the products of government schools would be more supportive of the Raj than those of the completely alien indigenous system of education. Even if, as British officers were aware, Indians learned English for instrumental reasons, the fact remained that their thoughts would be influenced by it. In British parlance English would be ‘vastly elevating’, i.e. would be a moral force which would make Indians admire British values and, by implication, British rule (Edn. P 1865: 120). W.R.M. Holroyd, Fuller’s successor, consolidated the gains Fuller had made in establishing the teaching of idiomatic English without focussing on literature from the beginning (Holroyd 1867). During this period, the early 1870s, English was allowed to become the medium of instruction for mathematics and general knowledge in government district-level schools (Holroyd 1871). But Holroyd was also a great champion of Urdu, indeed his contribution to the creation of a new type of Urdu literature imbued with Victorian values is well-known (Pritchett 1994: 35–7), and he was nonplussed when the Anjuman-i-Punjab presented a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor requesting that English, not the oriental languages, should be the focus of government schooling (Anjuman 1871). However, as mentioned earlier, for political reasons Holroyd agreed with the proposal (Proceedings 1871a: 118). The Education Commission of 1882 summed up the situation correctly when it reported that it appears that the government wanted more Urdu while the Anjuman-e-Punjab insisted on an increased dose of English. ‘Finally, English was used for upper and Urdu for lower classes’ as the medium of instruction for certain subjects—Mathematics, Geography, and History—as well as an important school subject in its own right (Holroyd 1871). The Muslims of Punjab did not object to oriental languages but acted from instrumental motives. Other Muslims too acted in the same way and for the same reasons. The National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta, for instance, sent a memorial to the Viceroy, Lord Ripon. They asserted that as from 1864, ‘munsiffships and pleaderships’ could only be obtained by passing an examination in English rather than in Urdu, they had fallen much behind the Hindus in government employment. Therefore, they suggested ‘that measures should be adopted and means afforded to facilitate the study of English by the Muhammadans’ on a preferential basis (Memorial 1883).

Indeed, even girls were to be taught English. In the Muslim Ladies Conference at Aligarh in March 1914, the Begum of Bhopal commented adversely on the prejudices of the newspapers of the Punjab which were hostile to the teaching of English to girls but not to boys. Fatima Begum, the editor of the women’s magazine called Sharif Bibi, argued, in Dushka Saiyid’s words ‘that having mothers who were conversant with English would give the Hindu men an advantage over Muslims’ (Saiyid 1998: 60). In short, the prejudices against English were being overruled by the
demand for it and hence the requests that the government should increase its supply were becoming more frequent and forceful.

Such requests made the government increase the dose of English but ordinary state schools—non-elitist ones—could never compete in English with the elitist English-medium ones. Whereas the latter taught students to speak with ‘good’ pronunciation, the ordinary schools could not. Neither their teachers nor students came from homes where they were exposed to English nor did they come in daily contact with English people or even English-speaking Indians. Thus, as one inspector of schools reported in 1912, ‘English continues to be the weakest subject’ and the major weaknesses were ‘incorrect expressions’, ‘faulty pronunciation’ and ‘accent’ (Edn. P 1912: 46). In the mission schools, on the other hand, a report of 1915 said that ‘English is very well taught, and the girls usually speak and write with facility’ (Edn. P 1915: 17). Dushka Saiyid, while discussing the spread of English among Punjabi women, tells us how Kishwar Abid Hussain and Jahanara Shahnawaz, both belonging to powerful Punjabi Muslim families, got their education in English schools. She then goes on to add:

If Kishwar Abid Hussain went to Sacred Heart School first, and then to Queen Mary’s later, my mother, who is about the same age, also went to a convent school. The generation before that, my grandmother’s and Kishwar Abid Hussain’s mother’s, did not set eyes on a school (Saiyid 1998: 81).

In short, in both Punjab and the Urdu-speaking areas of north India, the story of the spread of English is the story of the triumph of the desire for empowerment over the desire to keep adhering to a way of life which was once powerful: it was the triumph of the new arrangement of power relations over the old one.

**English in the North-West Frontier Province**

In the NWFP, which was part of the Punjab till the turn of the century (1901), there were English-teaching schools for British children and a few missionary schools. Before the Islamia College, for instance, the Edwardes High School, established in 1835 by Reverend Robert Clarke, taught English. The young Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan was admitted there with the encouragement of Clarke and another missionary called Hughes (Ahmed 1989: 15).

By 1881–82 the British were thinking of adding an English class in the Vernacular School of Peshawar. The Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawar, however, was against this initiative because he felt that the Muslim school was fulfilling this function. By 1886, however, English was introduced in the government aided schools (Ahmed 1989: 276–7). English was seen as a pacifying agent. For the Muslims, as Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum realized, it was the key to power. Thus he proposed the establishment of the Islamia College. Roos Keppel, the most powerful British decision-maker and Patron of Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum at that time, had the following comment on the proposed college:

If the college becomes a success, as there is little doubt that it will, I believe that the effect on the peace of the border will be very great eventually, as I shall get in all sons of tribal Maliks, the chiefs of the next generation, to attend the school and to learn that the ‘Firangi’, and his administration are not so black as they are painted (quoted from Ahmed 1989: 298).

In short, the college could serve the political interests of both the British and the Muslims of the NWFP—those of the former by making the Pashtuns less hostile to them while those of the latter by making them eligible for sharing power with the British through government employment. The
college became functional in April 1913 and Western education spread among the conservative Pashto and Hindko speaking people of the NWFP. Only the madrassas, as elsewhere, did not take to English.

**English for the Socialization of the Indian Elite**

Elitist schools, of course, were an extension of the policy of Anglicizing the Indian elite. After the revolt of 1857 the British made special efforts to teach English to the sons of the ruling princes, chiefs, and members of the aristocracy. As my previous book has described the establishment of the chiefs’ colleges in this context, the information given there need not be repeated here (see, Rahman 1996: 49–50, for details). However, it is worth repeating that the schools were first established after a report of 1869–70 by Captain F.K.M. Walter, the agent of the Bharatpur Agency. Even earlier, after the conquest of the Punjab, the British had taken a step in this direction by teaching the young Dalip Singh, son of Ranjit Singh, English and then sending him to England. When he lost his kingdom at the age of eleven in 1849, he studied English from Dr John Login, a Scottish doctor. In 1853 he went to England and settled down there learning German in addition to his English. His letters preserved in the India Office Collection are in excellent English (Singh MSS. 1864–86). Similarly, after the exile of the ex-King of Delhi, Bahadur Shah Zafar, to Rangoon in consequence of his presumed role in the events of 1857, similar ideas were mooted about his sons. Captain A.N. Davis, the officer who looked after the ex-King and his family, wrote that Jawan Bakht and Shah Abbas, the princes, ‘expressed the very earnest wish to acquire a knowledge of the English language in particular’ (in Burke and Quraishi 1995: 200). The princes were not, however, sent to England. Even so, they did learn a little English because another report by Davis dated 1 July 1861 states:

...both attend at my house pretty regularly and study a little English with Mr Finncane who was formerly Brigade Sergeant Major here; they are making remarkable progress and may require a superior teacher hereafter (Burke and Quraishi 1995: 201–2).

In the case of Mir Osman Ali Khan (1886-1967), the Seventh Nizam of Hyderabad, the British were keen that he should learn English. The Resident, J. C Plowden, wrote:

I don’t suppose there can be two opinions as to the absolute necessity for the coming generation of native princes to possess a thorough practical knowledge of the English language-to be able to speak, write and read it without the slightest difficulty (Durant 1892).

Mir Osman, educated by Brian Egerton, started speaking English soon (R 12/66/9010c). The Maharaja of Mysore too was taught by an English governor and a tutor till 1878 when he was fifteen (Ibid).

Apart from royalty and the aristocracy the chiefs’ colleges, missionary English schools, European schools, armed forces and railway English-medium schools, and private English-teaching schools did create what a number of writers facetiously describe as the ‘Brown Sahib’ (Vittachi 1987). The European schools were initially meant for poor European and Eurasian children from 1859 onwards. By 1873 there were eighty-nine boys and fifty girls schools all over India. Even at this early period ‘many native lads’ attended Martinere College, one of the best institutions of its kind, in Lucknow (Lawrence 1873). In 1938–39 there were 146 such boys’ schools and 216 girls’ schools in India where 5590 Indian boys and 6286 girls got educated (Edn.
I 1941: 110). As everything, except the vernacular languages, was taught through English and better teachers were employed, these elitist institutions became the major suppliers of Westernized Indians who found access to the Indian Civil Service, the officer corps of the armed forces, the upper echelons of the bar and other elitist institutions more easily than Indians educated in ordinary government schools which became vernacularized with time. The degree of Anglicization was such that the products of these schools started speaking in English to each other, though they would code-switch to indigenous languages too, even informally. The schools actually encouraged this and sometimes punished or rebuked pupils who would not do so. Aitchison College, Lahore, for instance reported in 1935–36:

English has been adopted as a compulsory medium of conversation for all boys. Although this measure may be subject to reasonable criticism on cultural grounds, it is believed that it will contribute materially to an improvement in the general standard of English in the college, and has been adopted for that reason alone (Aitchison 1936: 8).

Such people did serve the interests of the Raj, as Anglicists like Macaulay had wished; but, as some of the Orientalists had feared, some of them also opposed the Empire using ideas picked up from English texts and in the English language—the examples of Jawaharlal Nehru, educated at Harrow and Cambridge, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Bar-at-Law of Lincoln’s Inn, come to the mind (Wolpert 1996 and 1984). The policy of creating a faithful pro-colonial constituency by teaching English, therefore, met only with partial success. However, even these leaders who opposed the Empire, opposed it on assumptions learned from English sources. As Viswanathan and McDonald have pointed out, British cultural values were transmitted through English education in general, and the English literary classics in particular, to educated Indians (McDonald 1966). The diminished strictness in the segregation of women, one of the most visible outward manifestations of modernization among Indian Muslims also owed its genesis to English education in part. As Dushka Saiyid argues:

It is important to realize that the first generation of elite shurafa women who went to school, went to English-medium schools, and thus became open to western influence. This led to diminishing the hold of purdah (Saiyid 1998: 81).

Though this is not entirely accurate—women, even elitist ones, having gone to other than English-medium schools as well—the argument is essentially plausible in that the vehicle of the modern world view was largely modern education and English was an important part of it. Thus, though changes in behavioural patterns are brought about by many factors, it is true to say that the learning of English by Indian Muslims was one of them; even the most important one.

Spread of English and Vernacularization

Although the desire to learn English kept increasing, the ‘commencement of English, previously made in the fourth primary class, was postponed to the middle department’ so that, it was said, rural students would not be handicapped (Edn. I 1920: 8). The tide of English was thereafter stemmed in the non-elitist schools. These conflicting tendencies—increasing vernacularization vis à vis the persistent high demand for English—were seen by many observers as being instrumental in the last analysis. A report summed up the situation tellingly:

Both [the above mentioned tendencies] are expressions of a desire for opportunity, the latter for an
opportunity to a rural boy to share in the advantages which an English education offers to a town boy and to have an easy access to high school and college, and the former for an opportunity to those who proceed to the high school stage to acquire and to exhibit their knowledge in the most familiar vehicle of thought (Edn. P 1922: 74).

From 1925 onwards, vernacularization increased fast and schools started teaching and examining most subjects in the vernaculars. There were complaints, of course, that the standard of learning and teaching of English had deteriorated (Edn. I 1938). However, vernacularization was supported both by British policy and national sentiment. The policy, therefore, continued. Some Indians protested that this policy would harm Indians. In reply to this argument an Englishman wrote as follows:

It [English] has hitherto enjoyed a special pre-eminence in the syllabus and in the eyes of parents because it has been a *sine qua non* for Government employment. There is no reason whatever why this should continue (Edn. I 1947: 14).

This was written in early 1947 and India was about to be given independence. The English writer, therefore, may be excused for assuming that the government would no longer function in English. But, since it continued to do so in both India and Pakistan, vernacular school products kept suffering in the competition for jobs and power as compared to English-school ones. English came as the language of the elite and stayed in that role in both Pakistan and India after independence.

To sum up, it appears that the Muslims of India were not as antagonistic to English to begin with as they became later in the nineteenth century. However, this conjecture is based upon the evidence of elitist scholars and travellers secure in their world view or poor people who are indifferent to middle-class concerns of identity. What middle-class people thought about English, if they noticed it at all, cannot be determined. It seems, however, that the increased Muslim antagonism to English during the nineteenth century was a reaction to the now clearly established dominance of the British and their language. Such a reaction, however, could not but disempower the Muslim elite even more than it already had been because English was slowly replacing Persian as the language of elitist discourse and employment. Thus, when the Muslims felt that their attitude had deprived them of their share in the distribution of power under British rule, they reconciled themselves to the new political reality and started learning English. In a sense both attitudes reflected the desire of Muslims to survive as a community. The initial antagonism and mistrust was part of a deeply emotional (extra-rational) response to the domination, and especially the intellectual domination, of the alien British. The Muslims felt that such domination had deprived them of power and would continue to deprive them of their identity which, in many important ways, revolved around their religion and culture. This reaction, then, was a kind of defensive measure to preserve an endangered and besieged identity, an identity, moreover, which had been powerful and ascendant and therefore resented and resisted all changes because they were seen as concessions, defeats, and encroachments. This view eventually changed to one of acceptance. The change was, in a sense, a pragmatic or rational strategy for consolidating the Muslim identity by conceding victory to the British while trying to become their junior partners in wielding power. Since English could empower the Muslim elite, it started to learn it and so tried to obtain a share in the goods and services which the British colonial state distributed through elitist employment. Both strategies ultimately aimed at preserving the Muslim identity but the nature of that identity would not be the same. While those who did not learn English looked back to Muslim culture for core values and world view; those who did were influenced in varying degrees by Western ideas.
Another aspect of the learning of English was that it was a class-marker. It differentiated the Anglicized upper- and upper-middle-classes, both Muslim and Hindu, from the vernacular-educated lower-middle and working classes. Thus, ironically, the spread of nationalism increased vernacularization in the schools making it correspondingly more difficult for non-elitist children to enter the domains of power (where English still rules) than before. In short, the learning of English by the Muslims of India is part of the different strategies they used to empower themselves in British India.

NOTES

1. The meaning I have in mind is: ‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community’ (Kuhn 1962: 175). This ‘constellation’ of ‘beliefs, values, techniques’, etc. was influenced and changed, though not entirely of course, in the case of English-educated Indians.

2. This term was used much later by F.R. Leavis (1948), but the idea that there were great writers, like Shakespeare and Milton, was shared by those who introduced English literature in India. Thus in Delhi College in the 1830s, the curriculum of English studies comprised: Goldsmith’s ‘Traveller’ and ‘Deserted Village’; Pope’s ‘Essay on Man’; Milton’s ‘Paradise Lost’ and the plays of Shakespeare. In the prose section there were: Richardson’s Selections, Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, and Burke’s Essays and Speeches (Andrews 1929: 41–2).

3. The English translation given here is from Rizvi (1982: 200–201). The Urdu version is in Aziz (n.d.: 571–2) against which the English version has been compared.

4. For the dates and other details concerning Nazeer Ahmad I have relied on Ifthikhar Ahmad Siddiqui’s well researched study (see Siddiqui 1971: 18–22).

Annexure 5-A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year of the Establishment of an English Class</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vidayala (Anglo-Indian College) Calcutta</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>Milton and Shakespeare were taught.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John Tytler was appointed lecturer in English literature in 1828 at a salary of Rs 500 per month (Fisher: 67–8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooghly Imaumbarah</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>60 Muslim boys read English out of a total of 83 (ibid.: 105).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency School, Bombay</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Marhatta and Gujrat boys translated from their languages to English and studied English grammar (ibid.: 120).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeemaree School, Rangpore</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Garrow boys were taught to translate from Bengali to Garrow and the more intelligent of them were instructed in the English language (ibid.: 98).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agra College</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>An English class was introduced (ibid.: 63).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta Madrassah</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Other things being equal, the knowledge of English gave some advantage to students (ibid.: 63).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benares College</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Rs 700-800 per month were spent on creating a separate English school (ibid.: 63).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi College</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>It was decided to create a separate English college. (ibid.: 64).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta Sanskrit College</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>A separate English class was created (ibid.: 64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mynpoory College</td>
<td>1824–28</td>
<td>Persian, Hindustani and English were taught but the college was abolished in 1828 (ibid.: 74).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhowanipore &amp; Kidderpore Schools</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>These schools were established by ‘native gentlemen for the instruction of Hindoo lads in English’ (ibid.: 77).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meerut Free School</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>‘21 Europeans (18 boys and 3 girls), 16 Hindoo boys, and 34 Mussulman boys’ were studying English and Persian (ibid.: 94).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaugulpore School</td>
<td>1829–30</td>
<td>Hill boys were placed in the English class as a reward and learned it to get employment under the British (Fisher: 70–71).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cawnpore Free School</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>75 students studied English; 47 Sanskrit and 23 Persian and Arabic. Most of those who studied English were Hindus (ibid.: 72–3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinsurah Free School</td>
<td>Early 19th century</td>
<td>In 1829 English grammar was taught to 64 boys (30 to 40 being Hindus) and 6 girls (ibid.: 71).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh Madressah-tul-Islam (Karachi)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Pioneered English studies in Sindh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
URDU IN BRITISH INDIA

Urdu is so much associated with the Muslim identity in India and the Pakistani identity, as distinct from ethnic identities in Pakistan, that it is often forgotten that it was formally taught for the first time by the British. However, as it was informally learned earlier, let us look at the informal means of learning it before coming to its formal instruction in British India.

Informal Learning of Urdu

It cannot be ascertained as to when the Muslim elite started speaking Urdu, or rather its precursor which was often called Hindi, Hindavi or Hindui, at home. However, Shamsur Rahman Faruqi, an outstanding scholar of Urdu, traces the language back to the poet Masud Sa’ad Suleman (1046–1121) and calls Sheikh Bahauddin Bajan of Gujrat the first writer of Urdu whose work is extant (Faruqi 1999: 28). Unfortunately, Sa’ad Suleman’s ‘Hindi’ poetry is lost though there are words and idiomatic phrases which are recognizably from a language akin to Urdu-Hindi in his Persian works. As Sunil Sharma says: ‘There is no denying the fact that he was influenced by his Indian milieu, given the existence of such images as a pân-eating beloved and a monsoon cloud. However, these few significant features do no characterize the nature of the entire body of his poetry’ (Sharma 2000: 163). However, it is clear that writing in the ancestor of Urdu-Hindi (vernacularization) did exist even in this period. But vernacularization itself presents a problem which is described aptly by Sheldon Polhock as follows:

For those who did swim in the Indic sea the early literization of Hindavi may also have been hindered by the general disapproval with which noncosmopolitan literary inscription was regarded by traditional custodians of literacy in Hindu communities, a theme so prominent in tales of vernacular inauguration (chapter 8.2 [of Pollock]). Very different was the attitude to vernacular inscription that prevailed among Muslim literati; no doubt shaped initially by newly flourishing persianate literary practices, this attitude might then have been generalized across the wider literary culture (Pollock 2006: 393).

But among Muslims too Persian might have hindered the formal inceription of Hindavi. However, in the creative (poetry), informal (speech, jokes, riddles) and religious (especially mystical or sufi) domains Hindavi gained ground among the Muslims. Thus, spontaneou expression in what is reported as ‘Zaban-e-Hindi’—Sheikh Bajan of Gujrat (circa 1274-75); Baba Farid (c. 1335-1336); Sheikh Nizamuddin Auliya (c. 1324)—occur in the sayings (malfuzat) of the saints (see Shirani vol 1: 130-169).

Words which are recognizable today by both Urdu and Hindi-speakers are found in fragments from the twelfth century. Amrit Rai presents the following lines from the Ukti-Vyakati (circa. 12c):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ganga nhāe dharmu ho} \\
\text{Pāpu jā page} \\
\text{Duha gāvi dūdhu guāla} \\
\text{ānkō dekha; jībhē cākha} \\
\text{nākē sāngha; hāṭhē chuā;
\end{align*}
\]
This example from what the author describes as ‘eastern Hindi’ is not as remote for us as the ancestor of English of this period is for the English-speakers of today.

Abdul Jamil Khan traces the roots of Urdu/Hindi back to Munda and Dravidian languages. indeed, he called Mundravi ‘Proto-Urdu’ (Khan 2006: 107). However, having a pre-Aryan stratum in the form of words or sounds in one thing, and identifying a recognizable core of a language, quite another. While I do not have the expertise to comment on the linguistic claims of A. J Khan, it can be said that the ancestor of what became Urdu and Hindi was present in India when the Muslims arrived.

One problem is that the terms Hindi, Hindavi and Hindi are often used loosely for all indigenous languages of India (however, Gujri, Dakani, Indostan, Moors, Rekhta and Hindustani are used specifically for what came to be called Urdu). Hence when Badaoni tells us that Mullah Shoura or Hasan Khan, the latter a courtier of Sher Shah (d. 1545) and Islam Shah Suri (ruled 1545–53), are ‘Hindi poets’ (Badaoni 1995b: 58 & 77), it is difficult to know exactly which language they wrote in—some ancient form of the language we now call Hindi-Urdu or some other language. It is known on the historian Ferishta’s authority that Sultan Mahmood, king of Malwa (r. 1435–69), sent a poem ‘written in the Indian language, which he read’ to Babar’s grandfather, Abu Saeed who held court in Bukhara (Ferishta 1612, Vol. 4: 232). Ferishta also tells us that Sher Shah ‘caused letters in the Hindoo language to be addressed to himself, as if written by [the Rajput Prince Maldew’s generals]’ (Ferishta 1612, Vol. 2: 121). This language must have been akin to Rajputana Hindi and may have been the same Hindi which later developed into Urdu and Hindi. These examples show that north Indian Muslim kings knew, or had people in the courts who knew, the indigenous languages of (north) India. It does not prove that they spoke these languages. In South India, however, Ismail Adil Shah (r. 1511–34), ‘was fonder of the Turkish and Persian manners, music, and language, than the Deccany: he seldom made use of the latter tongue’ (Ferishta 1612, Vol. 3: 72). This implies that other kings did use ‘Deccany’. And, indeed, under Ibrahim Adil Shah (r. 1534–57), ‘the Public accounts, formerly kept in Persian, were now written in Hindvy’ (ibid.: 80).

The Deccan kings probably used more Hindvy than the rulers of north India. Hence, Father Botelho, a Jesuit priest, quotes on utterance of a ruler of Bijapur as follows: ‘such hai ke bara badshah Akbar Christ[a]n moea ke naheen’ [Is it true that the great king Akbar died a Christian or not?] (Quoted from Saksena 1943: 40). This is intelligible to any speaker of Hindi or Urdu today and suggests that the mother of Urdu, whatever its name, was used at the highest level among the Muslims of South India. Indeed, the early examples of Urdu literature, as histories of Urdu literature confirm, come from Deccan.

However, there are Hindvi words in all Persian historical works written in north India too. Among such works—the memoirs of Mughal kings, for instance—there are words which are used in Hindi-Urdu even now. Hafiz Shirani has made lists of these words beginning from Babar’s time onwards (1931). Some form of Urdu was probably spoken even earlier than the Mughals as Shirani opines on ‘the strength of fragments which are recognizably close to Urdu in pre-Mughal writings (Shirani 1929). And, indeed, since Babar got his Persian translated into what he calls ‘Hindustani’ for a Lodhi chief (Babar 1528: 459), it may be true that at least some chiefs serving the Lodhis did not know Persian. As mentioned earlier, we do not know which languages they did know for the term ‘Hindustani’ cannot be confidently related to any language we know. However, we can recognize some of the words Babar and Jahangir use in their memoirs. Sher Shah Suri divided the country into administrative units or parganas which had administrators under whom were two clerks, one writing in Persian and the other in ‘Hindi’ (Hai 1947, Vol. 4: 158).
Likewise, Islam Shah Suri, also maintained similar arrangements for the army both in the bureaucratic and the juridical domains (ibid.: 135). While nothing is known about Humayun’s proficiency in Hindvi, his sister Gulbadan Begum uses words of Hindvi in her Humayun Nama. Akbar also uses a Hindvi obscenity, one which is still in use, on one occasion.¹ As invectives are spontaneous forms of expression, it is possible that Muzaffar Alam may be right when he asserts that Akbar may have spoken Hindavi ‘at least in its Rajputana form’ (1998: 343). According to court historians both Shahjahan and Aurangzeb had full control over ‘Hindi’. There is also evidence that a language other than Persian was used for correspondence. Khafi Khan tells us that ‘a letter written by Shahjahan to Shuja in Hindi had also fallen into the hands of the Emperor’ (Khan 1733: 107). This language was probably the ancestor of modern Hindi and Urdu and it was probably written in the Persian script which was the most familiar script at the Mughal court. Shahjahan is said to have spoken ‘Hindi’ to Hindustanis (Kumboh 1660, Vol. 1: 218). Moreover, he was at such ease with it that he enjoyed listening to music and songs in it (ibid.: 229). There is evidence from Manucci, however, that during the war between Dara and Aurangzeb ‘the Mogals did nothing but shout “Boquose, boquose!” (Ba-kush, ba-kush!), and the Indians “Mar, Mar!”—this is to say, “kill, kill!”’ (Manucci 1701: 64). Dara is quoted as speaking in Persian to his commanders but Hindustani proverbs, said to be in common circulation, are in what we now call Urdu and Hindi (e.g. Thora khana, Banaras men rahna = Eat less but live in Benares (Varanasi)) (ibid.: 114). At other places Manucci speaks of ‘Moors’ and ‘Hindustan’ languages and specifically identifies ‘Moors’ as the language of the Mohammedans. Whether Manucci means Hindvi as do others when they refer to ‘Moors’, some Persianized form of it or Persian itself, is not immediately clear. The last is unlikely, however, because Manucci mentions Persian by name elsewhere. Thus, it is likely that some form of Hindvi, probably written in the Persian script, was seen to be the language of elitist Muslims. There is ample evidence to suggest that by Aurangzeb’s time the Mughal elite knew an earlier form of Urdu/Hindi though it generally used Persian officially and publically. Aurangzeb is known to have had control over ‘Hindi’ as mentioned by Kazim (1873: 1095). According to Muzaffar Alam, during Aurangzeb’s time, there was a ‘serious and organized effort to persuade the Mughal elite to learn the local language and script’ (Alam 1998: 345) in a bid to accommodate the regional challenge to the central elite identity (ibid.: 349). Although Alam offers no evidence for his claim except that some books about Hindi and the Indian sciences were written for the Mughal elite, it may be true that the ruling elite in the peripheries used the regional languages. Khafi Khan tells us that when Prince Shah Alam asked Mohammad Ibrahim, the commander of the Deccany ruler Abdul Hasan to surrender, his advisers said in the ‘Deccani language’ that they would fight for their forts (Khan 1733: 305). This ‘Deccani’ was probably none other than a variant of Urdu. However, whether regional elites were co-opted by the use of their languages is a proposition which needs further investigation.

Although Urdu was not taught formally in the Persian and Arabic schools, it was acquired by reading simple books, called chapbooks, explaining the rituals of Islam and stories about saints and prophets which were circulated from the eighteenth century onwards among semi-literate people. Among them are the Shahadat Namas, Nur Namas, Meraj Namas, Wafat Namas, and so on. Their themes were the martyrdom of Imam Hussain in the battle of Karbala, the ascension of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) to the heavens, the stories of death and so on. Also included among these were stories attributed to saints and other mythical characters (Shirani 1938: 247).

The British Library has manuscripts of such books in what is called ‘Hindustani’ from the early seventeenth century onwards (Blumhardt 1926, and Quraishi and Sims-Williams 1978). For instance, the Shariat Nama (1666–67) by Shah Mulk, in Deccany verse, is on religious observances. The Sad’si Mas’alah is also a short poem in Urdu nastaliq describing the rudiments
of Islam in 1115 AH (1703) as is Masa’il-i-Hindi written in 1233 AH (1818). Sheikh Khoob Muhammad’s (1539–1614) ‘Khoob Tarang’ is a Sufi Poem written in 1578 in Gujrati Urdu (Faruqi 1999: 94). Indeed, most of these early writings are meant to familiarize the common people with the rudiments of Islam. The same kinds of writings, as we shall see, are found in the other languages of South Asian Muslims. In short, early literacy in the vernaculars is connected with religious rather than mundane preoccupations. The tale in verse too makes an appearance with early renditions of stories such as the Qissa Saif ul Maluk which recounts the romance of Saif ul Maluk, son of the king of Egypt, and Badi al-Jamal, daughter of the king of China. The poet of this particular manuscript was at the court of Abdullah Qutab Shah of Golcanda (r. 1020–83 AH = 1611–1769).

Apart from these chapbooks, Hindvi (Urdu) was also acquired indirectly while learning Persian. Hindvi was also used as a facilitator—the auxiliary medium of instruction for common people in matters of religion and for children. In Tarikh-e-Gharibi, which is a versified history of prophets, the anonymous poet apologizes for writing in ‘Hindi’ as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hindi par na maro tana} \\
\text{Sabhi bataven Hindi mana} \\
\text{Ye jo hai Quran Khuda ka} \\
\text{Hindi karen bian sada ka}
\end{align*}
\]

Do not look down upon Hindi  
Everybody explains meanings in Hindi  
This Quran which is from God  
Everyone always explains in Hindi.

(From Shirani 1940: 207)

This poem was written between 1164–79 AH (1712–56), along with a number of other works of a religious nature, produced by the Mehdavis, believers in Syed Mehdii of Jaunpur.

Besides chapbooks, there were also works of a pedagogical nature—dictionaries, phrase books, translations—which were meant for teaching Persian through the familiar medium of Hindvi. The most well-known such book is the Khaliq Bari which has words in both Persian and Urdu. This particular book is said to have been written by Amir Khusrau. Shirani refutes that idea as well as the theory that its purpose was to teach Hindi to newcomers to India. He argues that it was written by Ziauddin Khusrau in the seventeenth century and that it was meant to teach Persian to Indian boys (Shirani n.d.). However, for whatever reason it was written, children did get acquainted with Urdu by their reading of books like Amad Nama and Khaliq Bari. As for writing it, they learnt it along with Persian because both were written in the same script. By the time of the later Mughals, and even earlier in the Deccan, Urdu had become the language of verse and aspiring poets learnt it informally from accomplished poets (the usataza = masters).

As in the case of Persian, many of them showed their Urdu poetic compositions to the usataza. For instance, the greatest poet of Urdu of his age, Mirza Asadullah Khan Ghalib (1797–1869), had many pupils of Urdu in addition to his Persian ones who were mentioned earlier. In a letter of 1866 to Bekhabar he tells us:

There are many—from Bareilly and Lucknow and Calcutta and Bombay and Surat—who regularly send their Persian and Urdu prose and verse for me to correct; I perform that service for them, and they accept the corrections I make (English translation from Urdu in Russell and Islam 1969: 337).

Even kings, noblemen and lesser gentry sent their verses to be corrected and often settled a regular sum of money upon their ustad as fees. For instance, the Nawab of Rampur, Yusuf Ali
Khan, sent a monthly stipend of Rs 100 to Ghalib. However, the service was essentially honorary and the ustad corrected verses of those who did not pay as well as those who did with equal diligence. For him (they were almost always men) it was a question of his worth being recognized. The ustad was necessary because poetry was socially significant. It was, indeed, the identity-marker of a gentleman (a sharif person); a hallmark of sharif culture. Indeed, one of the most powerful social institutions for the spread of Urdu as the language of the educated elite was the mushaira (recitation of poetry). The Urdu ghazal, having a formal rhyme and rhythm pattern, is especially conducive for recitation. It can even be sung and this led to the immense popularity of the mushaira. The Urdu poet Wali Deccani (1668–1744) discarded Persian for Urdu but the new language came into its own as a literary idiom in north India—especially in Delhi and Lucknow—in the nineteenth century. According to Ghalib mushairas were held at the palace twice a month. In a letter to Haqir written between 10 to 23 April 1853 he writes that: ‘The King has given instructions for a mushaira to be held at the Fort. It is held twice a month, on the 15th and the 29th. His Majesty prescribes one zamin [rhyme and rhythm pattern] for Persian and one for Urdu’ (Russell and Islam 1969: 83–4). Ghalib also describes a mushaira in detail which tells us what an important social function it was (ibid.: 86–8). Weekly mushairas were also held at the Ghaziuddin Madrassa (where Delhi College was located). They were also held at peoples’ houses—such as the house of the poet Mannun (Varma 1989: 52–3). One such mushaira is described by Intizam Ullah Shahabi. It was held in the Red Fort on 25 February 1845. The only poets to read out ghazals in Persian were Ameer Ali and Imam Baksh Sehbai. Ghalib, who used to read out ghazals in Persian earlier, switched over to Urdu. This mushaira is also described by Ghalib in a letter to Meer Mehdi Majrooh (Shahabi 1979: 19–22). The shifting of the language of poetry from Persian to Urdu is also described by Farhatullah Baig in a fictional account probably based on the 1845 mushaira mentioned above. In Baig’s account when the poet Sehbai recited a ghazal in Persian, it was praised as a matter of form—and possibly because it would be uncultivated not to affect to appreciate Persian—but not everyone really appreciated it and some did not even understand it (Baig n.d.: 115). This is supposed to have happened when Sehbai, Ghalib, and Momin, some of the greatest authorities on Persian in Delhi, flourished. By this time the snobbish value of Persian was intact though it was no longer as much in use as it was even in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

As we have seen already, Ghalib, perhaps the greatest authority on both Persian and Urdu of his age, had many students including the last Mughal king—Bahadur Shah whose nom de plume was Zafar and who was an Urdu poet of no mean status. From Ghalib’s letters to his students we learn that his view of Urdu, or at least poetic diction, was contingent upon a firmly hierarchical world view in which Persian was at the top, Persianized Urdu came next and conversational Urdu (of which he was a master stylist) was not appropriate for anything but informal conversation. Indeed, while Urdu written in the Persian script was used in the literary domain, it was not used in other domains. Reporting about Bengal, Adam writes that the Persian script ‘is very little used for writing Hindoostanee, which indeed is chiefly a colloquial language, and is seldom written even in the transaction of business’ (Adam 1835: 79). Even in the literary domain Urdu was but an upstart which had to be kept in its place by elitist connoisseurs like Ghalib. In keeping with this rigid view Ghalib’s regard for the standard, which in his case meant the best poets of Persian, applied to Urdu also. However, he was prepared to concede differences in usages on grammatical gender in Urdu. In this matter he was, indeed, surprisingly relativistic. He often wrote that some objects were masculine in the speech of some people and feminine in that of others and left the matter at that (Mehr 1982: 264).

Teaching of Urdu to the British
The formal teaching of Urdu, however, had begun long before the age of Ghalib. And, ironically enough, the British had started it. The British, and other Europeans, who started by calling the language ‘Moors’—see Hadley’s grammar of it published in 1772—eventually came to call it Hindustani. One of the reasons for establishing the Fort William College with professorships of Indian classical and vernacular languages was that the students destined to exercise high and important functions in India, should be able to speak the oriental languages with fluency and propriety (Fort William 1801: Regulation IX, 18). Teaching Urdu was considered politically significant because it was considered the ‘literary language of all Musulmans’ (Treasury 1909: Appendix XII, p. 111). Thus the British officers were formally taught Urdu, both in the Persian and the Devanagari scripts, at Fort William College in Calcutta. The college was not only a training academy for future rulers but also a symbol of the Raj itself. It was established by an order of 10 July 1800 but ‘by His Lordships special order bearing the date of 4th May 1800, being the first anniversary of the glorious and decisive victory obtained by the British arms at Seringapatam the capital of the kingdom of Maysoor’ (Fort William 1801: n.p.).

Professorships were established in the prestigious classical languages of India—Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit—but what was new was that the hitherto neglected vernaculars too were honoured. Among the vernacular-language professorships established in the college were Hindustani, Bengali, Telugu, Mahrathi, Tamil, and Canarese. This made the college an innovative institution. Indeed, so innovative was Fort William that, besides the usual Latin and Greek, the classics of English literature, which were not yet formally taught in England, were also introduced here. For the historian of Urdu and Hindi Fort William is important because prose in these languages, at least modern prose, was first written here and the man who got it written was John B. Gilchrist.

There are many accounts of Gilchrist, the physician-turned-professor of Hindustani, who presided over that momentous event—the birth of modern Urdu and Hindi prose (Kidwai 1972; Siddiqui 1979; Lelyveld 1993). As such I need not describe him and his venture. The two literary figures who created Urdu and Hindi prose, Meer Amman of Delhi (d. 1806?) (Akhtar 1992: 423–7) and Lalluji Lal Kavi (1763–1824) (Sherdadevi 1955; King 1994: 28–9), have also been described in as much detail as biographical material permits.

Meer Amman’s book Bagh-o-Bahar (The Garden and the Spring) was written sometime between 29 April 1801, when its author was appointed a ‘subordinate Moonshee’, and 31 August 1802 when the book was given an award by the college (Akhtar 1992: 405). Bagh-o-Bahar is not the first book of Urdu prose nor is it a translation of the Persian tale Qissa Chahar Darwesh. It is a rendition of Nau Tarz-e-Murassa, a tale probably completed in 1775 by a certain Meer Mohammad Ata Khan Tehseen, in highly Persianized, poetic and stylized Urdu (Akhtar: 433–6). However, it was the first book which became known and not only to a few people but to several generations of British officers and Indian students and is even now known to people in India and Pakistan. It became part of examinations, both for military and civilian officers, ever since such examinations were established. An Order of 31 May 1844 says:

Candidates shall be required to read and translate correctly the Bagh-o-Bahar and the Baital Pachisi, the former in the Persian and the latter in the Devanagari character; and further, to make an intelligible and accurate written translation into Hindustani, of an English passage in an easy narrative style (Akhtar 1992: 267).

Meer Amman’s Bagh-o-Bahar is described by Duncan Forbes, who edited it in 1846, as ‘the best work that has been yet composed in the Hindustani language’ (Forbes 1846). By then it had been used for nearly half a century for examining British officers, both civil and military, in India.
such it was the world view in this book, rather than the reality of India itself, which impinged upon the consciousness of the newly arrived English youths. English stereotypes about the Muslims—for the book was created by and placed in the Muslim world—must have been influenced by this book. Thus, the world view presented in this book is significant for understanding British attitudes towards Indian Muslims.

*Bagh-o-Bahar* is a collection of tales, like the medieval Arabic classic *Alf Laila*, within an overall narrative framework. The world view of the tales is contingent upon a pre-modern, oral world of enchantment. It is a world where the supernatural dominates the imagination; a world peopled with genies, fairies, magicians, princes and princesses. Power is accepted as given; it is an unquestionable factor. Kings and princes feel free to give orders to kill people arbitrarily. This must have appeared to the British as evidence for the view that Indians are childish, superstitious, and accustomed to despotic rule. Sex is another factor they must have found scandalizing. In *Bagh-o-Bahar* heroes and heroines get infatuated at first sight. Women are voluptuous. They drink wine and enjoy the company of men. Sexual desire is mentioned openly and at places, though not in an erotic context, tabooed words for the anatomy are used. As the writing of the book was probably supervised by Gilchrist, and in any case he must have read it before approving of it as a textbook (Siddiqui 1979: 130–32), he could not have disapproved of it. In all likelihood he must have regarded these characteristics as the ‘normal’ distinctive, part of ‘native’ literature. Later tastes, shaped by Victorian prudery, were, of course, scandalized. These later charges of salaciousness against all ‘oriental’, especially Muslim, literature may have gained strength from this early exposure to this compulsory text.

British officers learnt Urdu not only in India but even earlier in England where Haileybury and private institutions offered lessons in it. Indeed, a certain Saiyid Abdullah was a ‘teacher of Hindustani at Cambridge’ in 1860 (Saksena 1943: 46). Indeed, some of them became so competent in Urdu as to write elegant verse according to the prevalent fashion in it. Such verse has been collected by Ram Babu Saksena in his history of European poets of Urdu and Persian. Alexander Heatherly (1829–61), for instance, was a pupil of Zainul Abedin Arif who in turn was a pupil of Ghalib. He took the nom de plume of ‘Azad’ and his ghazals have been recorded by Saksena. Similarly General Joseph Bensley (1846–71), writing as ‘Fana’, has left behind a collection of Urdu verse. Benjamin David Montrose, (1855–1931) writing as ‘Muztar’, has left behind four collections of Urdu ghazals. The Urdu works of other Englishmen—and not just Englishmen but other Europeans as well—have been collected by Saksena in his scholarly study of this subject (1943).

But the British officers were not the only ones to learn ‘Hindustani’. Apart from the officers, English women and children also learnt it. The women were generally taught by tutors and learned just enough to command servants. The children, learning from their *ayahs*, sometimes became adept. Sometimes, however, arrangements were made to teach Urdu in schools. The Calcutta Free Society, for instance, allowed Rs 60 per month to teach ‘the native languages to the children’ (Fisher 1826, in Basu 1952: 11). Another such school was the Regimental school at Cawnpore where according to a report of 1830, students could ‘translate from English into Hindoostanee’ (Fisher: 73). While Fisher’s report does not tell us whether the children of English soldiers were educated in this school along with Indian children, it is probable that they were. It was at this school that Azimullah, who played a major role in the service of the Nana Sahib, known for having ordered the massacre of General Wheeler’s garrison at Cawnpore in 1857, studied. Azimullah entertained his employer Brigadier John Scott and his guests by performing ‘the parlor trick of reciting Shakespeare in Urdu’ (Ward 1996: 25). Other European schools were also supposed to teach Urdu though reports of different periods indicate that it was not taken seriously—possibly for snobbish reasons, being the language of the ‘natives’ (Lawrence 1873).
Teaching of Urdu to Indians

So far we have mentioned how Urdu was taught to the English. We have also mentioned that there is no evidence that it was taught formally to children earlier than the British period except as an auxiliary language to help them learn Persian. Adam, for instance, reports that in Dinajpur ‘although Mahomedans form the majority of the population, and the Hindoostanee is generally understood, yet it is not taught in any school nor spoken by the common people who have either adopted or never relinquished the dialect of Bengal’ (Adam 1835: 74). The British, however, started teaching it formally to Indians. According to ‘Fisher’s Memoir’ some schools in the Bombay Presidency taught the Marhatta language and ‘Hindoostanee (in the Persian character)’ in 1826. The Bible in Urdu was also taught here (Fisher, in Basu 1952: 101–102). In the Madras Presidency the Muslims were supposed to be taught ‘Hindoostanee’ in addition to the usual Persian and Arabic (Letter of H. Harkness, 24 June 1826, in Fisher: 112–13).

While this toying with the teaching of Urdu was not in earnest nor thorough, a more serious experiment of this nature began sometimes in the late 1840s in the heartland of Urdu—Hindi—the North-Western Provinces (in UP now). This experiment began in the 1840s and we find reports of 1844 about the Urdu and Hindi school books of the North-Western Provinces (Thornton 1844). Urdu was also taught in primary schools and several reports of the 1850s tell us that people were not attracted to schools where Persian was not taught; or where only Urdu was taught; or that it was impossible to learn good Urdu without being taught Persian first and so on (Reid 1853: 125–6). Urdu was so little valorized that a school teaching only Urdu was unpopular. A number of reports on the schools of UP sum up only one thing: ‘that Persian is popular, and Urdu is looked down upon. ‘Many will not come near our schools, who would gladly attend, were Persian also taught’ (Reid 1852: 113). In short the experiment of the complete exclusion of Persian failed because people were not attracted to the schools. The government, thereupon, put in some morsels of Persian depending upon the demand of the people as well as the idiosyncracies and opinions of government officials. About the Punjab, Arnold reported that ‘Urdu is as offensive to a learned Arabic scholar as vernacular English in connexion with learned subjects would have been to a scholar of the age of Erasmus’ (Richey 1922: 302). In 1849 Dr J.R. Ballantyne, Principal of the English department of Benares college, noted ‘that his students grudged the time spent in learning Urdu because they could expect praise at home for learning classical languages or English, but not for Urdu’ (quoted from King 1994: 91).

James Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the NWP, however, carried out the experiment by establishing rural primary schools in Urdu and Hindi rather than the prestigious Persian (Lelyveld 1978: 70). The reports on indigenous education by Henry Stewart Reid, visitor general of Schools N.W.P from 1850 to 1854 tell us how 3,000 schools with 25,000 children were selected to teach the unpopular Urdu. Out of these, in 1850, only 5 schools were classified as ‘Urdu Schools’ while there were 1259 Persain schools (Reid 1852: 12). By 1853-54 the number of schools which taught in Urdu along with other languages increased to 244 with 3,532 students (Reid 1854: 6). The British encouraged the teachers and the taught—the latter by making jobs available in it (such as Patwaris)—and publishing books in Urdu. Among the most disseminated books in the school going population were: Andhe Thunedar ka kissa, Bagh-o Bahar, Gul-i-bakaudi, Hakaik-ul-Maujudat, Kissah-i-Dharm Singh, Kissah-i-Surajpur, Kissah-i-Subuddhi, Nau Rutan, Sharah-ut-Talim and Maktub Namah (Reid 1854: 92). It was in order to encourage Urdu prose that Deputy Nazir Ahmed’s novels were given cashe prizes.

Higher Education in Urdu
Apart from the schools, the British also wanted to add Urdu to the curriculum of the Calcutta Madrassah, a stronghold of old fashioned Arabic and Persian studies. A report of 1854 on the Madrassah said:

The Oordoo language, which the Mussalmans of Bengal consider their vernacular, and which is indeed the only idiom which is spoken by the educated classes all over India, deserves particular attention, and it is the more necessary that it be taught in the Madrissa, because we cannot expect for many years to come that the natives will have sense enough to make it the basis of their private instruction. In Delhie and Agra, though the Oordoo is spoken with great purity, it is taught in the Government College, how much more is it necessary that it be studied in Calcutta where it is much degenerated (Presidency 1854: Appendix IV, p. xviii).

However, a report of 1886 about this institution tells us that Urdu was compulsory only in the eighth class but otherwise ‘Both Bengalee and Oordoo are not insisted on. One must be read, and the choice is left optional’ (Edn. M 1886: 32). As we have seen earlier, some British officers did, indeed, chafe at the necessity of having to give importance to Persian which they would fain deny. But, as a member of the consultative committee of the Calcutta Madrassah had pointed out, until this period (the 1850s) the Muslims had ‘a strong objection to receive instruction in Oordoo, which they regard as an unformed and un-philosophical language’ (Presidency 1854: Appendix V, p. xxx). Thus, in order to appease the Muslims if for no other reason (and, of course, there were other reasons too), Persian had to be cultivated along with the upstart Urdu.

Eventually, the British did introduce Urdu at the Madrassa. The texts comprised old favourites like Bagh-o-Bahar, Tarjuma Karima (an Urdu translation of Sa’adi’s work), and Gilchrist’s Hindustani grammar (Saleem 1980: 240–41).

Like the Calcutta Madrassah, the Delhi and Agra Colleges too were institutions of higher education for Muslims. The British founded one such institution at the Ghaziuddin Madrassa in 1792. Later on it became famous as the Delhi College. The college was meant, among other things, to teach ‘the languages of public business, and of common life, the Persian and Hindoo’ (Directors 1827). What exactly was ‘Hindoo’ is unclear. However, Urdu featured prominently later. According to C.F. Andrews:

…the Oriental Department…became very popular indeed. The classes taught through the medium of Urdu, were not deserted for the new English studies (Andrews 1929: 43).

Indeed, because modern subjects including scientific ones, were taught through the medium of Urdu, the Delhi College is praised in lyrical terms by Abdul Haq, called the father of Urdu, who believed that it set an example which should be followed now (Haq 1945: 181). The oriental section had Altaf Husain Hali, Nazeer Ahmad, and Muhammad Hussain Azad among others. Hali was an eminent poet of Urdu, Nazeer Ahmad a master of Urdu prose, and Azad a well-known critic. Abdul Haq also mentions Ram Chandar, who taught science through Urdu, and Dharam Narayan, translator of a book on economics from English to Urdu, among the brightest products of the Delhi College (Haq 1945: 167–78).

These teachers, translators and intellectuals, like Hali and Azad, were modernists. In the name of ‘nature’, ‘morality’ and ‘virtue’ Hali and Azad, among others, changed the nature of Urdu poetry, a point which has already been made by Pritchett (1995) and Majeed (1998: 10–37), and which will also be dealt with later in this book. In short, the Delhi College was also a seat of the most momentous change of ideas, a veritable Kuhnian ‘paradigm’ change, in Urdu literature and the culture of educated Indian Muslims.
Delhi College was also instrumental in initiating the use of Urdu for non-literary purposes. Not only were science and mathematics taught in Urdu but many people, notably Munshi Zaka Ullah, translated works from English into a new, lucid, readable style of Urdu. C.F. Andrews, his biographer, reports:

…he would show me rows of volumes which he had written. I have still with me many of his chief works which he presented to me. They are full of original information, written in a simple and fluent Urdu style. They cover a great variety of subjects. Their publication and their use in schools have done not a little to set a standard for Urdu literature; to make it lucid and clear and easy to follow for the ordinary reader, and to free it from an over-growth [sic] of Persian and Arabic words; which none but the learned understand (Andrews 1929: 92).

In 1857, when the University of Calcutta was established, Urdu was taught and examined for the matriculation and later for the BA examination. The other universities—Madras and Bombay—also followed this example.

Despite all these efforts, even till the 1870s, Urdu was unpopular. In 1864 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–99) said that many of his fellow Muslims ‘strongly disliked reading Urdu’ (quoted from King 1991: 17). This was strongly borne out by a report of the opinion of twenty-five essayists who tried to answer the question why the Muslims did not send their sons to government schools. Some of them said that Urdu lessons, given in these schools, were not needed though the schools should teach Arabic and Persian properly (in Malik 1989: 144). Other people, connected with education, also said that educated Indians did not want Urdu to be taught to their sons (quoted from King 1994: 91). Sir Syed himself changed his mind about Urdu several times. Originally his view appears to be that shifting education to Urdu would ‘effectively block’ off access to original sources of knowledge as well as to the languages of political power. Accordingly he set up a Persian school at Moradabad in 1860 where his sons, who learned English at home, also studied. However, although Persian was the focus of attention, translation from it to Urdu and vice versa was part of the course at the school (Lelyveld 1978: 72; for the curriculum of the school see Malik 1989: 11). Later, as we shall see, Sir Syed became more enthusiastic about Urdu before becoming a champion of English.

By the 1870s the government decided to supply Urdu according to the demand for it. One of the relevant orders was as follows:

Sanction has been given to the appointment of Orduo Assistant Masters and the teaching of Orduo to all lads who wish it or whose parents wish it, in selected localities; and the success of this experiment will tell to what extent a desire for this class of instruction really exists (Proceedings 1872–73: 7).

This prejudice against Urdu, which we find in the works of Ghalib as well, derived from the fact that it had never been the language of power. Earlier, that language was Persian but by the middle of the nineteenth century it was English. Thus both the utilitarian and the snob-value of Urdu, vis à vis Persian and English, always remained lower than that of the language of the higher domains of power (i.e. Persian and English). But Urdu was fast becoming the identity symbol of Indian Muslims. This would make Muslims demand instruction in it if only to spite Hindus; if only for symbolic reasons. In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, this was still far off.

**Spread of Urdu**

Besides introducing Urdu in schools, the British also created other forces and conditions which
helped spread it in India. Although we cannot go in details about these it may be mentioned, by way of example, that they trained ‘Native Doctors’ who were taught elementary modern medicine in ‘Hindustani’. A surgeon, called Breton, compiled a lexicon of medical terms in Roman, Persian, and Devanagari letters. Since no student was to be admitted ‘who cannot read and write the Hindoostanee language in the Nagree or the Persian character’ in the courses, the Indian medical assistant helped spread the use of Urdu and Hindi (Fisher, in Basu 1952: 85–7). The first Urdu newspaper started being published from Calcutta in 1822 and by 1848, out of the fourteen newspapers in the North-Western Provinces, only three were in Persian while all the rest were in Urdu (Selections NWP 1868: iv, 1–116). In 1897, by the end of the century, Urdu was leading in north India as the language of publication as the following figures suggest:

**Table 13 (1 of Chapter 6)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number of publications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NWP &amp; Oudh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindustani</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Besides books, newspapers like *Akhbar-e-Am* circulated in the Punjab in the 1890s. In short, Urdu became the leading language of publication in about half a century in the most influential areas of north India and present-day Pakistan.

In 1872 both Sir Syed and his son, Syed Mahmud, preferred an Urdu-medium education for Indian Muslims (Lelyveld 1978: 125–6). This was later abandoned for advanced Persian and elementary English with Arabic as an option (ibid.: 126). In 1874 the Mirza Rahmatullah Beg Committee report even allowed the students to choose Urdu as a medium of instruction in some subjects (ibid.: 128). Sir Syed himself suggested to the committees responsible for religious instruction in the college that Urdu and Persian, as well as Arabic, books be given as readings to students (ibid.: 144). The Urdu experiment continued in the Oriental department of the MAO College (the predecessor of the famous Muslim University, Aligarh) where Urdu was the language of history, geography, science, and mathematics. Although English was a second language here too, the department lost students to the English department. Finally, in 1885 it was finally abolished and only the English department, in which the medium of instruction was English for most subjects, remained (ibid.: 205–206). Urdu, however, was the informal language of Aligarh. It was, in most cases, either the mother tongue or at least a familiar second language of most of the students. After all, the course of instruction in UP had become so Urduized by the 1870s, that most students studied Urdu in schools. In a letter by the DPI (Oudh) of 6 September 1871, it is reported that whereas 17,009 students learn Urdu only 4836 learn Hindi. The number for other languages are: Persian, 4924; English, 2699; Arabic, 141; and Sanskrit, 123 (Edn. M 1886: 212). And indeed, given the social significance of poetry, cultured conversation required
the learning of some couplets of the Urdu ghazal and the availability of lower jobs in Urdu, there is little wonder that the demand for learning this language kept increasing at the expense of Persian after the middle of the nineteenth century. Then there was also the perceived threat from Hindi, at least in elitist Muslim consciousness. All these factors made Urdu a badge of identity, a mark of sophistication and refinement. Indeed, such was the emotional commitment to it that Urdu-speaking Muslims reacted with the snobbery and zeal of cultural fascists even to genuine differences of pronunciation and grammar of non-Urdu speakers in Pakistan for many years.

Some British officers also wanted to create an Urdu literature. The most well-known effort in this direction is that of Colonel Holroyd, officiating Director of Public Instruction, of the Punjab. The Anjuman-e-Punjab, a zealous advocate of oriental studies, became a platform of this major experiment of confronting medieval Urdu literature and sensibilities with Victorian modernity. The experiment has been described with great ability by Frances Pritchett who also argues that in this process the foundations of modern Urdu literature were laid: a transformation of world views, and hence poetic taste, came about as the old world of the pre-1857 days lay dying (Pritchett 1994: 31–45). Holroyd’s influence came through his control on school curricula. The Education Commission of 1882 tells us that: ‘The Urdu readers prescribed by the Department of Education and described by Colonel Holroyd are about familiar scenes, plants, animals etc.’ (Edn. Com. P 1884: 63). In short, school children were to be exposed to ‘neutral’ subjects rather than the conventional amorous and erotic themes and symbols of the old school of poetry alone.

But impatience with the old world was not confined to bringing about changes in Urdu literature or abandoning Persian. It was also a matter of embracing English. Testifying before the Education Commission of 1882 Sir Syed said:

as long as our community does not, by means of English education, become familiar with the exactness of thought and unlearn the looseness of expression, our language cannot be the means of high mental and moral training (Khan 1884: 291).

Urdu, said Sir Syed, was full of poetic exaggeration, metaphor, and elegance. It was not a fit medium for ‘scientific’ thought—in short, Sir Syed wanted nothing short of quick modernization and by the 1880s he doubted if Urdu could bring it about. However, by 1889 Urdu was an identity symbol of the Muslims of India and Aligarh, being itself such a symbol, began teaching it as language and literature (Lelyveld 1978: 245–6; also see Annexure 6-A).

The great figures of Aligarh, Thomas Arnold and Shibli Nomani, both contributed to its popularity at Aligarh. Arnold established a competition for the best poem in Urdu and a society called the Akhwan us-Safa where students’ essays were discussed. Shibli Nomani, a many-dimensional intellectual, cooperated with Arnold to publish an Urdu journal first called the Aligarh Institute Gazette and then the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College Magazine (Lelyveld 1978: 247). These were not mere students’ activities; these were the activities of the students of Aligarh ‘who became the pace-setters in behaviour and dress for the rest of Muslim India’ (Zaman 1977: 5) and part of this behaviour was the use of elegant Urdu. Thus their role in making Urdu the lingua franca of the Muslim elite cannot be exaggerated.

**Urdu as an Islamic Language**

Jahangir’s biography, the *Tuzk-e-Jahangiri* (Vol. 2) says:

I told him [Meer Sawayd Muhammad of Gujrat] to translate this Qoran [sic] into plain language without ornament, and that without occupying himself with explanations or fine language he should translate the
Quran in simple language (lughat-i-rikhta) word by word into Persian, and should not add one letter to its exact purport’ (Jahangir 1617, Vol. 2: 34–5).

In the Persian original the word *lughat-i-rikhta* (which means low or fallen down and which had come to be used for Persian mixed Hindi and finally for Urdu) has led some people, including Hafiz Mahmood Shirani, to suggest that Jahangir wanted the Quran to be translated into Urdu (Shirani 1931: 44). Unfortunately, Shirani fails to explain why ‘Persian’ is explicitly mentioned. Be that as it may, the passage does prove that the idea of translating the Quran existed before Shah Waliullah’s days.

Generally it is said that Shah Waliullah (1702–63) first translated the Holy Quran into Persian. However, an earlier translation has been seen by the present author in the personal collection of Dr Abdur Rahman Brahvi, a pioneer of research on the Balochistan High Court in 1999. This translation is by Maulana Sultan Mohamad Al-Haji Batuniani (Tunia is a place near Lehri in Balochistan). The Arabic text of the copy is in black ink and the Persian translation is in red. The date is 977 AH (1569–70). Although Dr Brahvi has mentioned this in his Ph.D thesis (Brahvi 1987: 71), most people are not aware of it and consider Shah Waliullah as the first translator of the Quran. It is true, however, that Shah Waliullah’s translation created much more furorere than the earlier one as we shall mention below. Shah Waliullah is also known to be the first prominent *alim* in India to show interest in Urdu. He encouraged his son Shah Abdul Aziz to attend the assemblies of the Urdu poet Khwaja Mir Dard (d. 1785) to listen to his idiomatic Urdu (Rizvi 1982: 77). But Shah Waliullah had suffered much when he had translated the Quran. According to M. Mujeeb, the well-known social historian of Indian Muslims, the translation was not well received. The orthodox ulama ‘accused him of innovation, strong opposition was aroused and once some people even went to the extent of hiring ruffians to beat him up’ (Mujeeb 1967: 277). Possibly because the British anticipated an unfavourable reaction to such a venture, the Governor-General, in a letter of 19 March 1807, prohibited the publication of an Urdu translation of the Quran which Gilchrist had ordered sometime before his departure in 1804. This translation had been made by Maulvi Amanat Ali, Mir Bahadur Ali Hussaini, Maulvi Fazal Ullah, and Kazim Ali Jawan before 1804. All copies of the translation were forfeited by the government and none is available now (Siddiqui 1979: 155–7). The first best known Urdu translation then is that of the sons of Shah Waliullah, Shah Abdul Qadir (1753–1827) and Shah Rafiuuddin (1749–1817). The former followed the text rather too literally while the latter paid more regard to the Urdu idiom (Rizvi 1982: 104–105). The ulema were not pleased by this ‘innovation’, especially because in their view no translation could be faithful to the original. However, it may be mentioned that *A‘in al Hidaya*, one of the most authentic books of Islamic law, mentions that if one writes the ‘Quranic words in Arabic and below them writes the translation of each one of them’, then it is allowed though most of the theologians do not agree that prayers could be said in any language other than Arabic (Ali n.d.: 349). Despite this permissibility of translation the ulema, as we have seen, had misgivings about it. Slowly, however, they came to accept Urdu as an ‘Islamic’ language. Indeed, one of the major changes in Muslim consciousness which occurred during British rule was because of the adoption of print by the Indian ulema. As Francis Robinson points out: ‘the ulema used the new technology of the printing press to compensate for the loss of political power’ (1996: 72). By the twentieth century Urdu was defended, against Hindi and other languages, as the quintessential language of Indian Islam. This change was speeded up in the nineteenth century when the Indian ulema took it up as the language of writing, lecturing, and religious debate.

At the Darul Uloom Deoband, Barbara Metcalf tells us, Urdu was used for translation into and from Arabic. The medium of instruction too was Urdu and, like Aligarh, most students were either mother-tongue speakers of Urdu or knew it as a second language. Thus, again like Aligarh,
‘Deoband was instrumental in establishing Urdu as a language of communication among the Muslims of India’ (Metcalf 1982: 102–103). Indeed, according to a dream narrated by Metcalf, God himself spoke Urdu having learnt it from the ulama as well as other Indian Muslims (ibid.: 198). Humayun Kabir, Minister of Culture and Scientific Research in independent India, said on his visit to Deoband in 1961, that Deoband had ‘made Urdu an international language’. Graduates from the seminary have often welcomed Indian delegations, including Jawaharlal Nehru himself, in Urdu first learned at Deoband (Rizvi 1980, Vol. 1: 279–80). Similarly, Maulana Akram, the Registrar of Jamia Ashrafia, a prestigious madrassa of Lahore, told me how an ex-graduate of the madrasa, serving as imam of a mosque in Shanghai, spoke to General Zia ul Haq in Urdu during one of his visits to China (Akram Int. 1999). In my visit to the Jamia I found students of fifteen countries and spoke to a black student from the United States who said he was learning Urdu as well as Islam in the madrasa.

Among others, Maulana Mohammad Ahsan, a teacher of Persian at Government College Bareilly, wrote reformist tracts in Urdu (Rizvi 1980, Vol. 1: 242–3). The ulama of the Nadwat-ul Ulema also wrote and spoke in Urdu (ibid.: 247). Indeed, the only ulama who continued to write in Persian and Arabic were those of the Ahl-e-Hadith. But even they took to writing Urdu, albeit highly Persianized and Arabized Urdu, in due course. To sum up in the words of Metcalf:

More and more Muslims shared a common language in Urdu: the language of the new schools, of the books and pamphlets and translations of religious classics, and of ever more popular public debate (1982: 359).

The madrasas, which gradually adopted Urdu as a medium of instruction even when the texts themselves were in Arabic or Persian, became ‘an instrument of the “Urduization” of Muslims from the non-Urdu-speaking areas of India’ (Krishna 1976: 377). Thus Urdu became associated with Islam and the Muslim community all over India.

Teaching of Urdu and the Hindi-Urdu Controversy

The Hindi-Urdu controversy has been dealt with from the point of view of group mobilization, ethnicity, identity construction, and Hindu-Muslim politics by several scholars (Brass 1974; Dittmer 1972; Gupta 1970; Rahman 1996: 59–78). One of the most competent studies of how the ‘Hindi movement—the movement to replace Urdu in the Persian script with Hindi in the Devanagari one—developed in nineteenth century India is by Christopher King. King argues that the Hindi movement strove to transform the existing equation of Urdu = Muslim + Hindu to Urdu = Muslim and Hindi = Hindu’ (King 1994: 15). Before the Sanskritization of Khari Boli, the base of both Urdu and Hindi, there was a Muslim-led movement of Persianizing it in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Amrit Rai, who has described it in detail, points out that it is this which led to the emergence of Urdu as an identity symbol of the elitist (sharif) Muslims of north India (Rai 1984). These movements need not be described here but they should be kept in mind in order to understand changes in the teaching of Urdu in the twentieth century.

In 1877 the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh prescribed the Middle Class Vernacular and the Middle Class Anglo-Vernacular Examinations as necessary for lower grades of government service (Malaviya 1897). From 1879 onwards all appointments carrying a salary of Rs 10 per month—a salary which brought one just on the fringes of respectability—could only go to people who could read and write Urdu. From this date onwards candidates who took Urdu in these examinations increased.
Table 14 (2 of Chapter 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Hindi-taking candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of Urdu-taking candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874–75</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879–80</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886–87</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895–96</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the Central Provinces and Bihar, however, the provincial government favoured Hindi. In UP, Punjab, and NWFP, however, the language of the domains of power (employment) was Urdu and in 1883 a contributor of Bharat Bandhu, an English-Hindi weekly of Aligarh, pointed out that there was a contradiction in opening schools teaching Hindi in villages while holding out jobs for those who knew Urdu (quoted from King 1994: 116).

The beginning of the Hindi movement in the late 1860s had little effect on the popularity of Urdu in north India and it was only in 1900, when Sir Antony Macdonnel, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, gave the Devanagari script the same status as the Urdu-Persian Nastaliq, that the Muslims started making serious and consistent efforts to defend Urdu. However, the evidence before the Education Commission of 1882 shows beyond doubt that even before that watershed Muslims did consider Urdu in the light of an identity symbol.

The Urdu-Hindi controversy affected schooling in various ways. First, since most of the jobs in the lower domains were contingent upon knowing Urdu, the Hindus were in the classical dilemma faced by all supporters of ghettoizing languages. If, out of group loyalty, they sent their children to Hindi-only schools the childrens’ future prospects would be negatively affected. If they sent them to Urdu ones, they appeared insincere and hypocritical to other Hindus and perhaps even to themselves.

By the 1930s the demand for schooling in Urdu (or Hindi) was part of Hindu-Muslim politics in India. Even in Gujrat and far off Burma, where the local Muslim population did not speak a word of Urdu, a report tells us:

The local vernacular is commonly used, especially in Gujrat, by many of the Muhammadans...have chosen that their children should be educated through the medium of Urdu ... In Burma there are similar difficulties. The mother tongue of the Muhammadan population in Burma is Burmese but Muhammadans have demanded instruction also in Urdu (Edn. I 1930: 42).

The Burmese Muslims, indeed, argued that ‘their religious books are written in Urdu’ (ibid.: 42), suppressing, for political reasons, the fact that the primary religious texts were in Arabic.

The Muslims also complained that the Congress ministries had introduced Hindi rather than ‘Hindustani’ in schools (Assembly 1939). The Pirpur Report gave details of such practices and the Congress denied them in several publications (Pirpur 1938). The Muslims made several other demands in favour of strengthening the teaching of Urdu: that Urdu night schools be maintained; a faculty of oriental learning be created at Nagpur University where there would also be a chair of Urdu in addition to those of Persian and Arabic, the Muslim classical languages; Urdu be recognized as a medium of instruction of Muslim students in government high and middle
schools, etc. (Proceedings of the Conference of the Muslim Members of the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly, 7 and 8 February 1939 in Assembly 1939: 4–61).

The agitation even spread to the princely states. In 1933, for instance, there was an agitation against Sankritized Hindi being used in the state of Jaipur at Alwar. The Muslims of the state requested the Maharajah to introduce Urdu in state schools ‘as an optional subject’. The Maharajah also allowed private Urdu schools to be opened at ten days’ notice (Alwar 1933). The Urdu-Hindi controversy did not end even after the partition of India which, however, is the subject of the next chapter.

Experiments in the Use of Urdu in Place of English

Both Sir Syed and the Anjuman-e-Punjab, the latter inspired largely by Dr Leitner, wanted to use Urdu as the medium of communicating modern knowledge to Indian students not only at the school but even at the university level. Sir Syed tried, failed, and came to prefer English for that purpose as has been described elsewhere (Rahman 1996: 43–4). The Anjuman-e-Punjab also failed but it did succeed in setting up a University College, and then a University, in Lahore which would disseminate European learning through the vernaculars and encourage Oriental classical literature while teaching and examining most subjects in English. The Osmania University in Hyderabad also tried to do the same. Let us look at the latter two experiments in some detail.

Punjab Experiment

The University College, created in 1869, became the University of the Punjab in 1882 but neither the college nor the university became vernacular-medium universities. Indeed, as time went by, the degrees of Bachelor and Master in Oriental Learning (B.O.L and M.O.L) fell into disuse and the regular BA and MA became popular.

To some extent, however, the Oriental department of the college and the university did contribute to promoting Urdu. In 1874, for instance, there were classes in proficiency in Urdu (Zulfiqar 1982: 40); a number of books were written and translated into Urdu (ibid.: 40–50); in the 1880s the proceedings of the senate were supposed ‘to be conducted as far as possible in the vernacular’ (ibid.: 79); and in 1914 the Syndicate agreed that a lectureship in Urdu would be created (ibid.: 139). The position was not, however, filled till 1928 when Hafiz Mahmood Shirani—the famous author of the thesis that Urdu was born in the Punjab (1928)—was appointed lecturer in Urdu. After Shirani, in 1940, another well-known man, Syed Abdullah, occupied that post. Abdullah contributed much towards replacing English by Urdu in Pakistan as his book on the subject illustrates (Abdullah 1976). In 1945 the Urdu lectureship was upgraded to a readership and a Board of Study to supervise its study was created (Zulfiqar 1982: 217). However, it was only in 1948, one year after the creation of Pakistan, that the university started teaching Urdu literature at the masters level (ibid.: 240). In short, the experiment of using Urdu to teach all subjects in universities controlled by the state did not succeed. It did, however, succeed in Hyderabad which was outside the direct control of the British.

Hyderabad Experiment

The state of Hyderabad, in Deccan, was ruled by a Muslim ruler since 1724. In the time of Mir
Osman Ali Khan (1886–1967) the seventh Nizam (Bawa 1992), it became the laboratory for a very unique and ambitious experiment—that of using Urdu in the higher domains of power: the administration, courts, education, finance and so on. The inhabitants of the state, who were mostly Hindus, spoke different languages. According to the Census of 1921 the religious and language-wise distribution of the population was as follows:

**Table 15** (3 of Chapter 6)
Language-wise Distribution (Main Languages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>6,015,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>3,296,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanarese</td>
<td>1,536,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>1,290,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,139,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 16** (4 of Chapter 6)
Religion-wise Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>10,656,453</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>298,277</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animists</td>
<td>430,748</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>62,656</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census-I 1921: 172.

The main languages given above were spoken by 97 per cent of the population. The rest 3 per cent spoke either small tribal languages Lambadi, Gondi, and Yerukala, etc., or foreign languages (Census-I 1921: 185).

One major step in making Urdu the vehicle of thought and culture in Hyderabad was the creation of the Osmania University in 1917 (Bawa 1992: 78–80). This University was the brainchild of Sir Akbar Hyderi [also spelled Hydari], the prime minister of the Nizam, who is also known for promoting Urdu in other domains of power. To the Muslims of Hyderabad, Urdu must have appeared as an anti-colonial symbol, or at least a way of asserting pride in their own, or even pan-Islamic, culture. Even Jamal Uddin Afghani, the famous pan-Islamist figure, was in favour of using it as a medium of instruction in the University (Bawa 1992: 79). The University granted intermediate certificates from 1919 and Urdu was introduced at the BA and the MA levels soon (see Annexure 6-A). It taught all subjects, except English, through Urdu and for this purpose it translated texts from English. Its bureau of translation became its most important body for the creation of new terms for expressing modern concepts. By 1937, 40,724 technical terms had been made and 176 books had been translated from other languages into Urdu (Osmania 1937). Despite occasional protest by students—such as the protest of the sixty students of the medical faculty in 1926 who were all thrown out—even medicine was taught in Urdu (Resident 15 Oct.
The Osmania University, being the first Urdu-medium university for learning of the European kind in India, became a symbol of pride for Indian Muslims. As the Urdu-Hindi controversy had raised Muslim consciousness about the symbolic significance of Urdu, Osmania stood for success. It meant, above all, that Muslims could manage their own affairs in the intellectual realm in their own language. Exactly because of these reasons, the British felt that the University was a threat for them. According to one report ‘many of the translating staff and students are developing objectionable views’. In the elections to the syndicate, the report went on to say, ‘the party that is advocating German education for those Hyderabad students who go to Europe got a footing’ (Resident 30 April 1932).

The main point at issue was whether the vernacular languages of India could be vehicles for higher learning? Testifying before the Blatter Commission in Bombay on 4 October 1924 Sir Ross Masood, Minister of Education in the Hyderabad state, vehemently asserted that they could. He said he would create a university for each linguistic group in India if funds permitted (Masood 1924: 21 & 29). However, he also maintained that in Hyderabad even those whose mother tongue was not Urdu knew it very well because of exposure to it. Indeed, he remarked:

> Even if you got to a village in the jungles, which is 150 miles from the nearest railway station, and which has a population of, say, about 300 people, you will find Marathi boys speaking Urdu, …(Masood 1924: 20).

Thus, Masood supported two disparate policies—apparently that of the vernacularization of higher education but actually that of its Urduization. The former he defended on economic grounds (…)if there were more funds it was ideal) and the latter on political ones. A closer reading of his interview, and that of Hyderabad’s policy on the whole, suggests that Hyderabad’s Muslims, themselves Urdu-speaking, wanted their language to dominate in all domains. Masood said that ‘Urdu is spoken from Peshawar to Patna’ (Masood 1924: 29)—a sentiment echoed by Muslim leaders during the Pakistan movement in which Urdu was an identity symbol of the Muslims.

That is why Hyderabad did not stop at Osmania. It went on to implement a policy of Urduization over the whole state. Part of this policy was making the use of Urdu compulsory in all secondary schools. Upto 1941 there were 363 out of 444 High schools which used the mother tongue as the medium of instruction. Among them were also sixty-one schools for Europeans which were exempted from teaching Indian languages. These English-medium schools, in common with the rest of British India, also catered for 33.5 per cent Indians—Indians from rich and powerful families. There was also a college, the Nizamiyyah College, which allowed students to take the Madras University examinations in English.

In 1941, however, the Nizam’s government ordered that there would be a common examination for all pupils from 1944 onwards. The Madras University system, then, would be replaced by the Osmania University one (i.e. in Urdu) in five years. All secondary schools then would be Urdu-medium ones and Urdu would be the only language of higher education, culture, and employment in the state. However, at the primary level ‘recognised mother tongues’ would be allowed (Jang 1944).

The resistance to this policy came from the English-medium schools, especially those at Secundarabad, and from the Hindus. The English schools requested that they should be allowed to continue as before but the highest British officials decided to take no action against the Nizam’s policy (Resident 14 Feb. 1942). The Hindus resisted much more vehemently. The Maharashtra Prashad, the Hindu Praja Mandal and Hindus in general protested through letters to the British officials, requests to the Nizam’s government and public airing of their views. The Hindu Praja Mandal wrote on 9 November 1941 to the Viceroy that:
The Osmania University, that guides the educational policy of the State, instead of extending equal help to the different provincial languages of this State, viz, Telugu, Marathi and Canarese—caters only for the desires and aspirations of Urdu, which is not the language of the 89 per cent of the State population—the Hindus (Appendix ‘C’ in Resident 14 Feb. 1942).

The policy was termed a ‘death blow [sic] to Hindu culture’ (loc. cit) and Urdu was called an instrument of coercion. The Nizam’s government explained that the mother tongues could be studied both at the primary and at MA levels but that the medium of instruction would be uniform as educated people needed one language for communication and employment (Jang, in Resident 18 Jan. 1944). The Maharashtra Parishad countered that the mother tongues were marginalized and the lip service paid to them in theory was merely propaganda (Resident 2 Oct. 1944).

Some British officers suspected that Hyderi’s championing of Urdu might have an anti-British bias. However, Sir Arthur Lothian, the Resident at the Nizam’s court concludes:

…that the predominating motive of Sir Akbar Hydari, the original protagonist of the policy, was to enforce a Muslim culture throughout the state and so strengthen the Muslim hold on Hyderabad in the event of Federation or independence for India in any other form (File 1944).

The British, however, did not interfere and the Nizam’s policy continued till the Hyderabad state was absorbed by India in 1948. Whatever the injustice of Hyderabad’s language policy—and like all political policies it was meant to increase and consolidate the power of the Muslim ruling elite of Hyderabad—it did serve to leave behind a symbol of pride in Urdu for the future among Indian Muslims. This symbol was Osmania.

The pride in Osmania was political in nature. Osmania was a symbol of autonomy, even of defiance of the dictates of the Raj which insisted that higher knowledge could only be given in English. Indeed, A.C. Lothian did say as much when he wrote in one of his reports to Sir Kenneth Fitze, Secretary to the Crown Representative:

A genuine Muslim patriotism also no doubt had its part, as their Government is very conscious of the fact that the Hyderabad State is the last surviving fragment of the great Mogul Empire (Resident 14 Dec. 1943: 6).

It was partly because of these political motivations that a number of universities in Pakistan passed resolutions in favour of using more Urdu, like Osmania, for teaching at higher levels before the partition (Rahman 1996: 56–7). In Pakistan too the Urdu lobby—which became associated with Islam and right wing policies—argued in favour of teaching in Urdu at all levels quoting Osmania by way of example (ibid.: 234–40). Osmania, as before, was always their inspiration and exemplar. The question is not the practical one of which language is best for teaching at which level? The question is much deeper; much more basic. It is: ‘what identity, what cultural values, what ideology should one support?’

The idea of a Muslim university teaching modern subjects through Urdu did not die out among North Indian Muslims even when Sir Syed, who had initially favoured it, turned away from it. One of Sir Syed’s colleagues, Mushtaq Husain (1891–1917) (popularly known as Wiqarul Mulk), suggested the establishment of such a university called Jamia Islamia. The Jamia came into existence during the days of the Khilafat Movement being inaugurated by Maulana Mahmood Hasan of Deoband on 29 October 1920. Among its founders were eminent nationalist Muslims like Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Zakir Hussain. Urdu was the medium of instruction for most subjects but the founders desired students to be thoroughly conversant with English and possess
basic skills in Hindi as well. The Jamia, which was initially established at Aligarh, moved to Delhi in 1925 and is still located there (Hashmi 1989: 147–90). The Jamia, however, is not as well-known as an example of the use of Urdu as a medium of instruction at the higher level as Osmania University is. Osmania lives on in the imagination of north Indian and Pakistani Muslims as a symbol of the potential of Urdu to take the place of English.

Urdu was symbolic of Muslim identity and its teaching supported a world view in which the ‘other’ was either Hindu or British. It was the language of the mobilization of Muslims for the demand for Pakistan and hence it constructed a ‘Muslim’ identity focusing on the similarities between Muslims and their differences from Hindus. Such a point of view, based as it was on Islam as the major identity marker, had the potential of becoming overwhelmingly religious. It also had the potential of being anti-ethnic. Thus, in Pakistan, Urdu was to become the symbol of an Islamic Pakistani identity. A corollary of insistence upon this identity entailed the negation, or at least the downplaying, of Pakistan’s other ethnic and linguistic identities. The politics of Urdu in Pakistan, then, is closely connected with the power of the ruling elite of the centre, which is mostly Punjabi, over the other ethnic groups of the country. In north India, however, Urdu is a symbol for preserving the identity of a dominated group, the Muslims, in the Hindu-dominated Hindi-Urdu heartland. This is the theme of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. When Akbar was about to kill Adham Khan he said, in Abul Fazl’s words: ‘Hazrat ba zaban Hindustani farmudand ke ai kandu (i.e. gandu’) [gandu = catamite]. (Translation: ‘Akbar said in the language of India: “O! catamite”’) (Fazl Vol. 2, 1595: f.n. 3, p. 271).
2. Tabooed words for the vagina (=kus) and the buttocks (=koon) are used but the context is not erotic.
3. However, people must have started using English for the most part because on 21 February 1947 Dr Khan A. Rahman moved a resolution in the senate that ‘henceforth members of this house should have the option to express themselves in Urdu’ (Zulfiqar 1982: 198).
4. The figure of 89 per cent is derived by adding the animists to the Hindus.

Annexure 6-A

Urdu in the Universities of British India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year Urdu was Introduced</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Osmania</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Urdu was the medium of instruction. BA examination held in 1923; MA in 1925.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hyderabad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deccan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Allahabad</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>BA in 1922; MA in 1926.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lucknow</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>BA in 1922; MA in 1948.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agra</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>BA &amp; MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Calcutta</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Madras</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Urdu was an additional subject in MA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chennai)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aligarh</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>MA Urdu was used to teach history, geography and mathematics in the oriental department since 1881.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Delhi</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>BA &amp; MA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Punjab       1869     Urdu was the medium of instruction in some subjects in the Oriental section. A proficiency examination was also given in it from the 1870s. It became an optional subject in BA in 1927 and its MA was established in 1948 (Zulfiqar 1982: 101, 163, 240).

According to the census of India in 1981, 5.34 per cent people were mother tongue speakers of Urdu. But, since this number amounted to 35,323,481 in that year, the number alone suggests how significant a language it is. The latest census available to the author, that of 1991, tells us that the total population of India is 846,302,688 of which 11.67 per cent are Muslims (Census-I 1991: p. lxxrii). The estimated figure for speakers of Urdu was 65 million in the early nineties (Zaidi 1993). Not all Muslims speak Urdu, of course, but its significance, especially its political significance, lies in the fact that it is associated with the Muslim community and was associated with Muslim separatism till 1947 when Pakistan was created. The most detailed study of Urdu in India, entitled *Redefining Urdu Politics in India*, argues that Urdu must be considered an Indian language and be given the same rights as other languages. It should not be considered only a Muslim preserve (Farouqui 2006: 30). Indeed, as Omar Khalidi in a recent study puts it, ‘few topics among Indian Muslims invite such emotional outpouring as does Urdu’ (Khalidi 1995: 131). And the basis of this emotional reaction is that Indian Muslims believe that ‘Urdu is dying in the land of its birth’, as Syed Shahabuddin, the editor of *Muslim India* put it in an article which suggested, on the strength of population figures, that the numbers of Urdu speakers are going down in most states of India (Shahabuddin 1988: 158). Moreover it is not seen as a natural death but murder—murder being committed by politically motivated, communal minded Hindus who associate Urdu with the Pakistan Movement and the vivisection of India. Others, like Ralph Russell, argue that the champions of Urdu (the *Urduwallas*) are at fault since they do not teach it to their children themselves (Russell 1999; Naim 1999: 103). Still others have pointed out that ‘Urdu qualification is not a marketable commodity’ (Shahabuddin 1999: 566), so Muslims do not teach it to their children. In short, Urdu is not being murdered but it is committing suicide. But whether murder or suicide (or both), the phenomena of the decrease in the teaching and use of a language is associated with the quest for power and goods and services. This chapter, then, looks at the position of Urdu in India from these perspectives.

According to Paul Brass, who studied the role of Urdu in the context of Hindu-Muslim politics in UP and Bihar in independent India:

> Urdu, once the dominant language of north India and the official and court language of both UP and Bihar, has been practically eliminated as a language of administration in both states. Large numbers of Urdu-speakers have been denied their constitutional right to receive primary education through the medium of their mother tongue. The state governments have attempted to integrate and assimilate the unmobilized Muslim population into a homogeneous culture through an educational system based upon Sanskritized Hindi and infused with symbols of Hinduism (Brass 1974: 233).

Brass came to these conclusions after having looked at the politics of the central government and the state governments of Bihar and UP from 1947 till 1972.

Since then a number of changes have taken place in the position of Urdu. At the upper level the central Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu (Hind) appears to have become more effective. It has branches in every state and publishes a number of Urdu books as well as a magazine called *Hamari Zaban* which is one of the best sources for finding out the opinions of the pro-Urdu, mostly Muslim, community of India. There is the Ghalib Institute, Ghalib Academy, Bureau for the promotion of
Urdu, Tairaqqi-e-Urdu Board, Delhi Urdu Academy, and departments of Urdu at several major universities of India (Sabireen 1988). It is because of this activity at the higher level, patronized as it is by the state, that some people—like Naseer Ahmad Khan, a Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University—deny that Urdu is dead or dying (N. Khan Int. 1998). The state patronizes Urdu at this high, easily visible level, in order to give credence to its unbiased, pluralistic and tolerant image. At the lower level, however, almost everybody concedes that the Urdu script is less well known to children than it used to be while most Muslims assert that Urdu is dying in India—especially in UP where it was so dominant before the partition.

**Political Legacy**

The fact that it was dominant in a country which never had more than a minority of Muslims, however, provides clues to the factors we should keep in mind when we try to understand the position of Urdu in India nowadays. These factors are historical, political, and economic. In the last analysis they boil down to the contest for power between the Indian Muslims and Hindus. But before we go on to consider this aspect, let us see whether it is justified to equate Urdu with Muslims.

The government of India, for one, denies this explicitly as does the UP government. In an important report on Urdu, popularly known as the *Kripalani Committee Report*, it was stated explicitly that ‘Urdu is the language of a minority of people’ living in UP but its speakers do not constitute either ‘a particular community or religious group’ (Kripalani 1963: 7). The Indian Muslims too have articulated two mutually contradictory claims. The first is that Urdu is a symbol of the Hindu-Muslim composite culture which the secular constitution of India wishes to promote and, therefore, deserves to be strengthened to create Indian, rather than only Muslim, nationalism. Ather Farouqui mentions that he met ‘200 well-known Urdu scholars’ and most of them ‘were not prepared to accept that Urdu is the language of only Muslims. On the contrary they said that Urdu had a secular history. Urdu and Hindi are sister languages, and both are languages of India, and so on’ (Farouqui 1992: 103). Farouqui’s own view is that Urdu is ‘associated with Muslims’ (ibid.: 107). This second position, stated in different ways, boils down to the perception that Urdu is the identity symbol of the Muslims who should be allowed to preserve it because the Constitution allows them to do so (Article 30). In a forceful pro-Urdu pamphlet of 1966, A.J. Faridi conceded that Urdu is spoken by ‘tens of millions of Non-Muslims’ but he made the point that it is, nevertheless, ‘a special heritage of the Indian Muslims’ (Faridi 1966: 32). Khalidi gives several reasons why Muslims associate with it in India. Among them are that some of its ‘loan phonemes’ come from Arabic and Persian; learned words and idioms too come from the same sources; its development ‘has always been in Muslim hands’; it is ‘rich in literature on Islam and Muslims’; and, above all, its script comes from Arabic (Khalidi 1995: 132–4). Even now, when most young Muslims read the Devanagari script better than the Urdu one in India, religious organizations use Urdu. By 1981 the Jamaat-e-Islami, the leading Islamic fundamentalist-revivalist political party in South Asia, had sponsored 491 books in Urdu; seventy-eight in English and only seventy-one in Hindi (Hasan 1997: 208). A pamphlet of Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu (Bihar), called *Two Words from Well-Wishers of Urdu*, explains the Muslims’ attachment to the Perso-Arabic script of Urdu (in Brass 1974: 186). This attachment, reports Brass, extends to Muslims who are neither elitist nor religious revivalists (ibid.: 187). The Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu had asked the Muslims to declare their mother tongue as Urdu and their second language as Arabic before the 1981 census (Ghani 1991: 4). In 1991 an issue of the *Hamari Zaban* doubted the census figures contending that, since in UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh Muslims declare only Urdu as their mother tongue, the number of Urdu-
speakers should be as many as the total number of Muslims in these states. In general too, the Anjuman and most Muslims say that all census figures are wrong because the number of Muslims is always much higher than the number of Urdu-speakers (HZ, 15 February 1991: 3 and other issues; conversation with Indian Muslims in February 1998 and sources cited by Brass 1974). Ather Farouqui, in a thesis and several articles on Urdu, states categorically that in UP it is impossible that a Muslim should give his language as any but Urdu (Farouqui 1990: 1–3). Not only individual Muslims but even official reports such as the Report of the Group on Minorities Education (1991), agree that in public perception, Urdu is identified with the Muslims and there is prejudice against it (Minorities 1991: 17–18).

Those who protest against the marginalization of Urdu from the standpoint of Urdu being a symbol of the Indian composite culture lament that now they have to fight both against revivalist Hindu nationalists and identity-conscious (or communal) Muslims:

Upto now the pro-Urdu people had to struggle against those who were non-Muslims and called Urdu the language of Muslims. Now they would have to fight against those who are Muslims and believe it to be the language of Muslims (Siddiqui 1998: 25—my translation from Urdu).

But Muslims like Siddiqui, though they are correct that many rural Muslims actually speak the same dialects as their Hindu compatriots, and that Hindus educated in Urdu still speak it, are in the minority. Ironically, both the Hindu and Muslim nationalists do perceive Urdu as a Muslim identity marker. The Persianized diction of literary Urdu, and especially its script and literary tradition, still carry the mark of the once ascendant Muslim culture in north India. Thus, Urdu did shape

the

Muslim identity as it diverged from Hindvi, the lingua franca of north India, in the late eighteenth century (Rai 1984). By Persianization of its diction it did take the place of Persian as an identity marker of the elite of north India. Being taught in schools and patronized by the British government, it was used by almost all educated Hindus. The Hindi movement—the movement to Sankritize Hindi and write it in the Devanagari script—sought to change this power equation. Gradually, as we have noted in the previous chapters and as Christopher King argues, multi-symbol congruence took place and Urdu became a symbol of Muslim identity while Hindi became a symbol of Hindu identity (King 1994).

The promotion of Hindi (by which is meant Sanskritized Hindi written in the Devanagari script) was consciously undertaken by the UP literati and the leaders of the Arya and Brahmo Samaj to create and reinforce a revivalist, Hindu identity. Among those who promoted Hindi are Mahavir Prasad Dwivedi (1864–1938), Ramchandra Shukla, and Bhartendu Harischandra 1850–85. Their contribution to the making of Hindi as a symbol of Hindu identity has been described by Krishna Kumar (1991: 125–46). Kumar’s approach to the subject is relevant for our purposes here because, among other things, he has given attention to the teaching of Hindi for the creation of the new identity mentioned above. Bhartendu, one of the first to associate Hindi with Hindus, himself used many Urdu words in his writings. By 1924, however, Hindi was an optional subject in the intermediate examination in UP and, according to Kumar, ‘it had already become a language different from the one Bhartendu had used’ (Kumar 1991: 141). Dwivedi, as editor of Saraswati, contributed to the ‘self-image of the upper-caste literati of the United Provinces…preparing itself for a culturally hegemonic role in the destined future of the new nation’ (ibid.: 127; also see King 1994: 35). Shukla wrote a famous literary history of Hindi called Hindi Sahitya Ka Itihas (1929) which ignored major Urdu poets and his school textbook, Hindi Sahitya (1932), focuses upon Hindus as the ‘nation’. Though Hindi is ‘never labelled as a language of Hindus, its symbolic association with the religion and traditions of the community makes up for such a label’ (Kumar 1991: 133). Bhartendu, though he called himself a poet of
Hindi, Sanskrit, and Urdu, made efforts to standardize Hindi and associate it with the Hindi identity (Dalmia 1997: Chapter 4). Because of the language of the textbooks themselves, in addition to their symbolic content, a large community of Hindu readers who were earlier acquainted with the Urdu script and familiar with symbols created among Muslim elitist groups, now became conscious of their new revivalist Hindu identity. According to Kumar:

Another implication of the Hindi taught at school had to do with the perception of Urdu and Muslims. Words of Urdu origin were labelled as ‘foreign’ in the classification taught as part of Hindi in secondary classes. This kind of labelling impelled the student to perceive the Muslim population as a ‘foreign’ and separate group (Kumar 1991: 142).

Indeed, at the popular or informal level, people sometimes went to the extent of labelling Urdu as Pakistani. This position was expressed in Balsakha of February 1948 which exhorts children to give up Urdu. A line from the poem, written in Devanagari, is reproduced below in the Roman script:

Pakistan Urdu choro; Hindustani Hindi seekho

In short, as Kumar rightly concludes, education did not only secularize people. It also created—or helped to ‘imagine’ or ‘construct’—identities (for the idea see Anderson 1983). This process of creating social reality helps us understand the construction of communal identities in India. Hindi school literature, therefore, ‘became a “secular” tool which would be used to deepen the religious and cultural consciousness of this [i.e. the Hindi region’s] community’ (Kumar 1991: 145).

A similar process of differentiation can be identified for Urdu. Its choice as the medium of instruction at the Osmania University at Hyderabad ignoring the claims of Telugu and other languages of the people; its appropriation by the Muslim League and the manner in which its textbooks concentrated on Muslim and Iranian cultural symbols and themes rather than Hindu or Indian ones made it a device for the mobilization of the Muslim community. Indeed, as we have seen, the Urdu-Hindi controversy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in India was not so much a struggle for languages or scripts but a struggle for power. The Muslims, privileged in north India, were losing power and one response to that was mobilization as a separatist nationality. Thus, Islam and Urdu (in that order), led to the strengthening of separatist Muslim nationalism. The Hindi-Urdu controversy, however, has been mentioned earlier and this is not the place to discuss it. It has been mentioned in passing only in order to explain why, in the perception of both many Muslims and Hindus, Urdu was a Muslim preserve even before 1947 when India was partitioned.

It should be added that, while north Indian Muslims identify much more with Urdu and Persian than those of South India, many Muslims of Carnatic, Tamil Nadu, and Sri Lanka too have identified with linguistic identity markers. In 1949, for instance, a Tamil-speaking member of the Muslim League from Chennai, called Poker Sahib, insisted upon the inclusion of Urdu in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India because the question of Urdu was a political rather than a purely linguistic matter and even Tamil speakers identified with it (Khalidi 1995: 135). Mohammad Raza Khan, a Muslim Leaguer from South India, tells us that Urdu is spoken by many Muslims in Hyderabad, Bangalore, and other cities. And even when it is not a mother-tongue, it was an identity symbol (Khan 1969: 531). As mentioned earlier, Tamil-speaking
Muslims, however, claim their language to be Arwi which is Tamil with a few words of Arabic but written in the Arabic script. Thus they have demanded that primary schools and kindergartens should be established using Arwi as a medium of instruction (Alim 1993: 125). Muslims of the south, because of their association with Arabic, Persian, and to a lesser extent with Urdu claim that their ancestors have produced literature in these languages (Koken 1974; Alim 1993). But why should a minority’s desire to preserve its language and culture be denied? Why should it be so much a part of the struggle for power; the desire to dominate the minority?

Two Rival Perspectives

One answer is that the exercise of power creates its own reaction. Muslim conquests, especially the destruction of Somnath, created a trauma in the collective memory of the Hindus which manifested itself in the form of Hindu revivalism during the British era. This revivalist movement was dismissed, as was Muslim nationalism, as being communal by the Congress which wanted to create a united, integrated, modern India. So far all governments of India have had these aims and have, therefore, disseminated what Krishna Kumar calls the ‘received’ perspective about Indian history (Kumar 1996: 16–20).

The ‘received’ perspective, argues Kumar, ‘insists on viewing Hindu-Muslim relations against the background of broader issues pertaining to peoples’ yearning and struggles for happiness and justice’. Basically it argues that the Hindus and Muslims of India share a composite culture and the use of religion as an identity symbol is a communalist political strategy. As such this perspective ignores both Muslim and Hindu identities; plays down the development of separatist nationalism among both and, in order to do so, glosses over the embarrassing facts of Muslim conquests and domination. The ‘rival’ perspective, on the other hand, ‘starts with the plunder of the Somnath temple and extends to current happenings in Kashmir’ (Kumar 1996: 16). The ‘rival’ perspective has become stronger in the past and the parties allied to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have become politically stronger as a consequence. Urdu, then, stands for an identity which is associated with Muslim rule—a rule which, like most medieval rules, abounds in tales of cruelty and oppression against all opponents of the monarch be they Hindus or Muslims. Moreover, because the medieval ages were ages of faith, the idiom of religion is used for the ‘other’ in the books of history written in Persian. Thus one reads of Hindus ‘perishing’ or ‘going to hell’ and Muslims ‘drinking the cup of martyrdom’; Hindu temples being broken and ‘razed to the ground’ while mosques are built; Hindus being called ‘kafirs’ (infidels) and followers of ‘false’ faiths in all books of medieval history written mostly by Muslims. Theodore Beck, the Aligarh Principal we mentioned earlier, wrote in his diary (on 22 Feb. 1885) that it was the reading of history which enraged Hindus. Although ‘religious consciousness is lessened by secular education, but the differences between’ them (Hindus and Muslims) increase (Beck MSS. 1885: 17). This language still makes Hindus indignant while it embarrasses decent Muslims nowadays. Thus, especially because of the rise of Hindu nationalism, the anti-Hindu acts and attitude of the Muslim rulers of the past have come to be resented and there are demands that they should be mentioned in books of history though they do not yet find explicit mention in the official textbooks written for students so far. To deny them, as the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) textbooks of the past have been doing, serves little purpose. Not to deny them opens up old wounds. In short, the ghost of Somnath has come to haunt Hindu-Muslim relations in India and Urdu, being a symbol of Muslim identity, suffers as a consequence. It is in the light of this background that the Urdu movement can be understood in post-partition India.
Urdu Movement till the Early Seventies

Jyotirindra Das Gupta and Paul Brass provide information on the historical role and status of Urdu in India after independence (Gupta 1970: 127–50; Brass 1974: 182–234). The purpose of this section, therefore, is not to provide a detailed historical narrative of the movement at this period. However, in order to place the movement in perspective, some repetition is inevitable.

After the Partition, M.K. Gandhi reiterated his view that ‘Hindustani’—by which he meant both Hindi and Urdu written in their respective scripts—should be the national language of India. His words are worth quoting yet again:

…the national language of India could be none but the one that was spoken in the north by the Hindus and Muslims and was written in the Nagri and Urdu scripts. It was the language of Tulsidas. The poet saint had not disdained to use Arabic and Persian words even in his time. That language which had undergone the evolution was the inter provincial speech written in two scripts… Hindustani was a happy blend of the two (Hindi and Urdu) with the grammatical structure unaffected by Arabic and Persian (Gandhi 18 December 1947).

Gandhi’s stance was in line with the Congress policy of rejecting Muslim separatism and creating nationalistic unity. However, the Hindu nationalists saw it as appeasement of the Muslims while separatist Muslims, most of whom were now in Pakistan, saw it as part of the overall policy of not accepting them as a nation. The Indian Muslims, now a vulnerable minority, were prepared to listen to his moderate advice but the bitterness of the partition was not conducive to the appreciation of moderate policies in practice. That language was seen as part of nationalism is also suggested by M. A. Jinnah’s advice to the Indian Muslims to ‘learn Hindi if that was the lingua franca just as they learnt English’ (The Eastern Express, 31 July 1947, in Zaidi 1999: 143). This, indeed, is what Indian Muslims actually did for pragmatic reasons but for reasons of identity and past associations, they cherished Urdu—an attitude which played a major role in the power struggle between Hindus and Muslims in independent India.

In north India, especially in UP and Bihar, Urdu was regarded with hostility as has already been indicated (Hasan 1997: 158–9). Indeed, an intense battle between Urdu and Hindi led to the defeat and overthrow of the former in the years immediately after the partition. Whatever the official position of the Congress and Nehru’s own sympathetic attitude towards Urdu (R. King 1997: 88; Hasan 1997: 156; HT, 9 Dec. 1955, see Nehru’s statement in NH, 17 January 1958), important Congress politicians—Purshottamdas Tandon (the Congress President), Seth Govind Das, Sampurnanand (UP’s chief minister from 1954–60), Kamalapathi Tripathi, Ravi Shankar Shukla, K.M. Munshi, G.B. Pant (also UP’s chief minister) among them—opposed Urdu openly (Gupta 1970: 131–3). Sampurnanand stated that Urdu or Hindustani were anti-national (HT, 14 November 1947). Tandon declared in Sultanpur that it ‘symbolises a foreign culture’ (NH, 15 June 1948: 7). The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, of which Govind Das was the president, ‘organized public pressure campaigns to influence the Assembly’s opinion on Hindi’ (Gupta 1970: 135). Nehru, who favoured Hindustani (in the sense used by Gandhi) and ‘ordinarily stated that Urdu was his native language’ (R. King 1997: 79), gave statements in favour of Urdu which Shukla refuted (Shukla 1949) and Tripathi told him [Nehru] clearly: ‘Maharaj, I am for Hindi’ (Tripathi 1969: 69). K.M. Munshi reveals his anti-Urdu feelings in several places (Munshi 1956) and even the official policy of the Congress could not prevent such people from opposing Urdu. In the event the Hindi block won by 78 votes against 77 cast in favour of Hindustani (Retzlaff 1960: 404–5)—even Nehru’s personal prestige could not save Urdu; not even in the form of the ambiguous ‘Hindustani’.
Predictably, among those who protested against these attempts at marginalizing Urdu were members of the Muslim League. Z.H. Lari walked out in protest when the UP Legislative Assembly, under the chairmanship of Tandon, decided to conduct its business in Hindi to the exclusion of Urdu. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, too, resigned from the Constituent Assembly though in his case this may have been an excuse to migrate to Pakistan (HT, 5 November 1947). And not only north Indian Muslims, who were mother-tongue speakers of Urdu, but also South Indian ones protested against this discriminatory treatment as has been mentioned earlier. Indeed, a Muslim religious and political organization called the Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Muslimeen, which had been established in the old Hyderabad state in 1929 in order to keep Muslim rule intact in the Nizam’s dominion, now became a champion of Urdu. It asked for Urdu being accepted as a second language in UP, Rajasthan, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh. It also demanded teachers of Urdu in schools; the establishment of Urdu-medium universities and the inclusion of Urdu in the three-language formula, etc. (Reddy 1979: 125). But, of course, for the Majlis Urdu was a symbol to focus Muslim grievances around a demand which touched upon both identity and jobs. For some others, especially some Hindus, the support of Urdu was either for political reconciliation with the Muslims or out of sheer love for Urdu and care for norms of justice and fairplay. In this context it must be mentioned that Lala Raj Kanwal from Punjab, supported Urdu as a second language because not doing so, he said, was part of the politics of ‘anger, vengeance or retribution’ (LAD-I Vol. 7, 6 November 1948: 281).

Despite these protests, as we have seen, Urdu lost against Hindi in the centre as well as in the states. The UP government’s administrative order of 8 October 1947 and the UP Official Language Act of 1951 made Hindi in the Devanagari script the official language of the areas where Urdu was once used by both educated Hindus and Muslims. The law now precluded any pretence of equality between Urdu and Hindi. Urdu was not a rival any more. It was, however, a minority language. And here the law was, or could be interpreted to be, not only just but even generous. As such, without referring specifically to Urdu, the Congress allowed the development of minority languages.

The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 5 August 1949 stating that if the languages spoken in the states ‘are rich and have valuable literatures of their own’, they should ‘not only be preserved but further developed and enriched’ (Resolution 1949). Such languages could also be used as media of instruction for children. In the same year the Provincial Education Ministers’ conference also declared that linguistic minorities had the right to be educated through their mother tongues. Indeed, if there were forty students in a school or ten in a class, the school would arrange for them to be so educated (Ministers Conference 1949). This 40:10 formula, as it was called, was a good safeguard had it been correctly applied. The Constitution of India provided even better safeguards. According to its Article 350-A every state shall endeavour ‘to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups’. It even went so far as to guarantee that ‘the president may issue such directions to any state as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities’. The Indian Muslims kept asking for the implementation of these provisions but the states found ways of getting around them (Azeem 1980; Khalidi 1995; several issues of HZ, etc).

The year 1949, indeed, proved to be a watershed in the fortunes of Urdu. UP, which was the cultural centre of the Urdu-speaking elite, now became the laboratory for state-enforced language shift. Before 1949 both Urdu and Hindi had been used as the media of instruction in primary schools. Indeed, even those whose mother tongue was Hindi were taught elementary Urdu. In May 1949 this changed. The UP Board of High School and Intermediate Education declared that only Hindi would be used for answering examination questions from 1953 onwards (HT, 4 March 1949). From now onwards Hindi became the sole medium of
instruction in government schools. In April 1954 the Congress Working Committee recommended that Hindi be a compulsory subject at various levels in schools and colleges. Following these legal measures the UP and Bihar governments even suspended aid to Urdu-medium schools and, despite the fact that Nehru rebuked Pant for such anti-Urdu policies, the position of Urdu became weaker and weaker in north India (Gopal 1979: 27).

The UP government did, however, agree to providing safeguards for Urdu-speaking children. From the point of view of the Hindi-speakers this was only fair. After all, till the beginning of the twentieth century their language—Hindi in the Devanagari script—had been disallowed by the government. Even till 1949 it was accepted only as an equal of Urdu despite the fact that the number of Hindi-speakers was much higher than that of Urdu-speakers. So now democratic logic demanded that this be reversed and Urdu be treated as a minority language. From the point of view of the Urdu-speakers, however, this reversal symbolized defeat, marginalization and humiliation. The pain of seeing their language become a minority language in its own homeland was excruciating. The feelings of the Muslims of north India are summed up in Z.A. Lari’s words. While stating that a Muslim ‘has no objection to the prevalence of Hindi’, he pointed out that ‘he’ [a Muslim]:

definitely resents the exclusion of Urdu as it affects not only his self respect but jeopardises his culture and educational progress. How can a child receive primary education in a language other than his own. This is lost sight of by the majority in their present revengeful mood. But to injure a limb is to injure the body (Lari 1957).

Three-language Formula

The teaching of Urdu became a major political issue in India after 1949. Muslims have been complaining that it has not been taught to their children despite governmental formulas assuring them that it would (Ahmad 1970; Arshad 1988; Sherwani 1984). Apart from the 40:10 formula, the Nehru government came up with the Three-language Formula which too could have safeguarded the interest of Urdu. Initially the formula was that children should be taught:

(a) Their mother tongue or the regional language or a composite course of both.
(b) Hindi or English.
(c) A modern Indian or European language.

However, the formula was modified several times and official educational policy documents declare that in the Hindi-speaking areas it should consist of Hindi, English and a modern Indian language while in the non-Hindi-speaking areas the three languages of schooling should be Hindi, English and the regional language. Despite this formula, not all states taught Urdu nor was it used for official purposes. A detailed study of the variations in the three-language formula is tedious and confusing. It may be best to sum up the conclusions of the Gujral Committee which indicate how the formula was applied in the sixties:

It will be seen that the states like Bihar, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and the Union Territory of Delhi have included Sanskrit in the Three Language Formula. In Madhya Pradesh, English is being offered as an additional subject. In states like Punjab and Himachal Pradesh all the three languages are compulsory—in the former, Punjabi, Hindi and English and in the latter, Hindi, Urdu and English. No other option or alternative is provided. Tamil Nadu, Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland have not accepted the formula in its entirety. In most of the states, the alternative of a modern Indian language
was available on paper but there was no arrangement for the teaching of such language in schools. In Gujrat and Karnataka, as we have seen, the formula becomes a four language formula in practice (Gujral 1975: 57).

The report adds that, the formula sometimes ‘made the study of Urdu under it almost impossible’ at places (ibid.: 36). The Deeni Talimi Council observed that ‘Sanskrit has come to assume the position of a compulsory subject in UP instead of an optional one’ (Council 1966: 20). A number of other writers have also complained with much bitterness and indignation how Sanskrit was used to ‘kill’ Urdu in UP (Noorani 1984; Articles in Muslim India 1984; 1985a & b). To put it bluntly, says Paul Brass, in UP ‘the effective choice is between Urdu and Sanskrit, which means that in most secondary schools in Uttar Pradesh, Hindus and Muslims alike are practically required to learn Sanskrit as their third language’ (Brass 1974: 210).

Other Grievances of Urdu-speakers

_Hamari Zaban_, which has been mentioned before as the main source for the grievances of Muslims about Urdu, gives a list of such grievances in almost all its issues. Among other complaints were: the withdrawal of facilities for teaching Urdu; the absence of Urdu teachers and text books and refusal to teach the language even when there were more than forty pupils who wanted to study it in a school (various issues of HZ; Azeem 1980; Farouqui 1994; Khalidi 1995, etc.). A number of witnesses reiterated similar complaints before the Gujral Committee at Lucknow:

They all complained that the facilities for the teaching of Urdu were being progressively withdrawn and students were left with no option but to adopt the medium offered by the schools. Lucknow was held out as an example where it was alleged that predominantly Urdu speaking areas like the vast complex of Wazirganj, Nishatganj and Chowk wards had only one Urdu medium primary school out of ten run by the Municipal Corporation. In the Nishatganj area, as many as 250 students offered to study through the Urdu medium but no arrangements were made (Gujral 1975: 43).

Ram Parshad, President of the Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu (UP), told the committee that he had to seek legal redress to have his daughter taught through the Urdu medium at Varanasi (ibid.: 43). But the authorities had only one answer to all these complaints—that they did not find the required number of students at one time to warrant making the necessary arrangements to teach them Urdu or, sometimes, that teachers and books were not available.

Other grievances pertained to textbooks. The Deeni Taleemi Council of UP complained that Muslim children were denied the opportunity to understand their culture and history through Urdu books which would reinforce their own values. Instead, they had to study the prescribed textbooks which alienated them from their past and identity (Council 1966). Other grievances related to the closing down of Urdu-medium schools. The number of Urdu-medium primary schools were said to be between 40 to 50,000 in 1947 while in 1992 their number had decreased, though what exactly the new figure was is in dispute (see Annexure 7-A). Urdu publications are often polemical and sub-standard following outdated processes (Farouqui 1995). The circulation of Urdu newspapers, linked as it is with the number of people who can read the script, has also declined—much to the dismay of the Muslim community (see Annexure 7-B). The teachers of Urdu are shockingly sub-standard because, as C.M. Naim puts it, those who take up Urdu ‘have no other choice’ or, if it is compulsory, it is treated as a joke (Naim 1999: 101).
Yet another grievance was the non-recognition of Urdu as a second official language in UP and Bihar. On 15 February 1954, for instance, Dr Zakir Husain submitted a petition on behalf of the Anjuman Taraqqi Urdu signed by 2.5 million people demanding that Urdu should be the second official language of UP. This petition was submitted to the President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, but to no effect (HT, 16 February 1954). The Anjuman also celebrated an Urdu Day on 25 August 1957 and the Jamiatul Ulema sent a representation to the Commission for linguistic minorities to apprise him of the problems of Urdu-speakers (Gupta 1970: 144). On 29 April 1958 the Anjuman sent a deputation comprising, among others, H.N. Kunzru, Aruna Asaf Ali, and Tara Chand, to meet the President of India, requesting him to issue a directive under Article 347 of the Constitution to several state governments to use Urdu in such domains as education, administration, and the judiciary (Gupta 1970: 144). But such efforts did not bear fruit and it was after much tension and even violence that Urdu was accepted as a second official language in Bihar and then in UP. Apart from state policies, minor bureaucrats in their individual capacities created hurdles in the way of teaching Urdu. It was also true that the language of the lower domains of power; even that of shops, official forms, railway stations, and minor jobs was Hindi. Thus Urdu-speaking parents often thought it expedient to teach their children Hindi at school so that they could compete for employment with their Hindi-knowing counterparts. A long time back in medieval India the use of Persian in official business by Muslim kings had forced educated Hindus to learn it neglecting Sanskrit and the Devanagari script. The wheel had now come full circle. But this was modern, democratic India where Muslim vote counted and, even apart from political considerations, liberal-humanist values did inspire many people. Thus the state kept making efforts, mostly to keep up appearances, but sometimes quite genuinely, to redress the linguistic grievances of Urdu speakers.

Kripalani Committee Report

The Kripalani Committee, which has been mentioned in another context earlier, was appointed in 1961 to look into these grievances. The report of this committee emphasized composite culture and unity to the extent of denying that Urdu could be identified with ‘the language of a particular minority community or religious group’ (Kripalani 1963: 7). In any case, since Kripalani was not known to be sympathetic to minorities, there were misgivings about his being chosen for the chairmanship of the committee at all. Kripalani assumed that the society of UP was homogenous and would not permit the state to become bilingual. Chief Minister Gupta assured his voters that providing safeguards to Urdu ‘should in no way be taken to imply the acceptance of the wholly untenable proposition that Urdu should be equated with the language of the state of Uttar Pradesh’ (NH, 22 July 1961). Indeed, the idea that Urdu would again become an official language of any state in the Hindi belt was especially distasteful to many Hindus. Thus the Raghubar Dayal Commission reports that the Ranchi riot of August 1967 in which 184 people, mostly Muslims, were killed was preceded by demonstrations for and against the declaration of Urdu as the second language of Bihar (Dayal 1968: 48). Indeed, so bitter became the controversy over Urdu between the Congress and the non-Congress coalitions that those who identified with Urdu ran the risk of becoming electorally weaker (Carras 1979: 124–35).

The same story was repeated when the UP government finally decided to accept Urdu as its second official language on 29 September 1989. The BJP’s members raised anti-Urdu slogans like ‘Urdu Bill murdabad’ (Death to the Urdu Bill) and ‘Aik Rajya, aik Bhasha; nahi chahiye doosri bhasha’ (one state, one language; we do not want another language) (Shourie 1993: 96). The Akhil Bhartiya Viddyan protested on the streets and raised the following slogan at Badaon:
Urdu thopi larkon par

to khun bahe ga sarkon par

If you impose Urdu on the boys
blood will flow on the streets.

But, of course, the decision did not imply that everyone would have to study Urdu as in the pre-1949 days. It only gave Urdu symbolic, and in some cases also real, significance (Farouqui 1990: 10). However, in October 1994 a ten-minute Urdu television news bulletin in Bangalore led to rioting in which thirty people died. According to Mushirul Hasan: ‘in just a few hours a somnolent city became a hive of tensions, with daggers, petrol-bombs and stones breaking out from gullies and balconies’ (Hasan 1997: 160). The Kannada-speaking people apparently resented the news bulletin because it cut into the Kannada time slot. As there was a Kannada movement going on in the area and the activists of this movement were resentful of other linguistic groups (Mattoo 1994), I believe that such kind of hostility would have been shown to other languages too. However, Indian Muslims perceived this reaction as being anti-Urdu and anti-Muslim.

The Muslims of UP complain that in their state, more than any other, Urdu was denied its legal rights. On the basis of these complaints the Gujral Report states that:

There were, however, allegations that implementation was half hearted and the denial of facilities became a continuing cause of widespread complaints. At one stage the available figures suggested that the total number of students in some other states where the percentage of Urdu speakers was much lower than in Uttar Pradesh, was much larger than the number of Urdu students on rolls in Uttar Pradesh (Gujral 1975: 42).

In short, all the available evidence suggests that Urdu had not only lost its dominance in UP, which would only have been fair, but even its cultural influence in the Muslim community. Most observers, even the writers of official reports, to say nothing of Muslim spokespersons, noted this phenomenon:

The result of the policies referred to above has been virtual elimination of Urdu from Uttar Pradesh and its steep decline from states like Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Passions were so worked up against Urdu that the issue sparked off riots in some of the states from time to time (Minorities 1991: 31).

The defence of Urdu was so prominent an issue in Muslim politics from the beginning that Nawab Mohammad Ismail gave it as one of the rationales for reviving the Muslim League. He said that the Muslims had demanded ‘religious training and Urdu as medium of expression in primary schools’ and, since the existing organizations ignored this demand, a revival of the Muslim League was necessary (HT, 27 May 1949). The Gujral Report, which came later, confirmed that the use and teaching of Urdu had decreased. Other observers, like Paul Brass, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith also agreed (Smith 1959: 267). To sum up, the late sixties and early seventies found Urdu as great a grievance of the Indian Muslims as it had been before the Kripalani Report in the 1960s.

Gujral Committee Report
Seeing this the government again appointed a new commission to investigate the role and position of Urdu in India. The committee, comprising fifteen members besides the chairman, was appointed in 1972 to:

advise the Government on the measures to be adopted for the promotion of Urdu language and the steps required to be taken to provide adequate facilities for Urdu-speaking people in educational, cultural and administrative matters (Gujral 1975: 1).

The committee held twenty-six meetings, examined 289 witnesses and 125 memoranda and submitted its report in 1975. It looked at the teaching of Urdu in schools, especially the interpretation of the three-language formula, in all the states of India. It also examined how other impediments—lack of schools, textbooks and teachers; non-implementation of the various formulas for allowing students to study Urdu, etc.—had adversely affected the teaching (and use) of Urdu in India. In the end the Report listed a number of proposals which would redress the grievances of Muslims at least as far as the teaching of Urdu was concerned.

**Recommendations of the Gujral Committee**

The recommendations of the Committee do not cover only language-teaching but extend to the role of Urdu in government service, media, creation of institutions for the promotion of Urdu and its use in several domains (railway stations, post and telegraph department, for petitions to the government, etc.). The major ones relating to teaching are as follows:

1. If Urdu-speakers are 10 per cent of the population in any area, at least one Urdu-medium primary school should be set up.
2. If they are less than 10 per cent an Urdu teacher may be provided if a school is likely to get 10 Urdu-speaking students.
3. One Urdu-medium higher secondary school should be opened for every group of 8–10 primary schools.
4. The Three-language formula may be modified in the Hindi-speaking states to include (a) Hindi (with Sanskrit) (b) Urdu or any other modern Indian language (c) English or any other modern European language. In the non-Hindi-speaking states the regional language would come first followed by Hindi. Urdu could take the third place and English the fourth. In short, in such states the three-language formula would actually become a four-language formula for students desirous to learn Urdu.
5. Departments of Urdu, research institutes and offices to promote it would be established. The present facilities for Urdu-medium higher education at the Jamia Millia Islamia, two colleges in Hyderabad and one in Maharashtra too would be strengthened (Gujral 1975: 142–62).

**Implementation of the Gujral Report Recommendations**

The recommendations of the Gujral Committee created a stir among the Muslims of India. They were praised as being fair; even generous—but sceptics doubted that they would be implemented in full. In the event the sceptics were proved right. The recommendations were not always implemented in the liberal spirit in which they were conceived. Khaliq Anjum, the chairman of the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-e-Urdu (Hind), has written a book summing up the main points of all the reports of the committees which were appointed to monitor the implementation of the Gujral Report. These reports have long official titles but they are popularly known by the names of their
Improvements in the Position of Urdu

One thing which is clear is that, while not all recommendations have been implemented, the position of Urdu has improved. Among the improvements the reports include the following:

1. Names of railway stations in some states are written in Urdu.
2. Two organizations have been set up to train teachers of Urdu.
3. Urdu Academies have been established in UP, Bihar, Delhi, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Hariana, Gujrat, Orissa, Maharashatra, Karnatika, and West Bengal.
4. The Taraqqi-e-Urdu Board has become an autonomous body.
5. Urdu is used in the Bihar and Andhra Pradesh legislative assemblies.
6. In 1981 Bihar, and in 1989 UP accepted Urdu as their second official language. In Bihar, at least, job opportunities for Muslims ‘have steadily increased’ in some districts because of its new status (Hasan 1997: 288). In UP, however, the letter of the law was yet to be implemented in 1999 and even the official status is in legal dispute (Latifi 1999: 46).
7. An Urdu University, recommended by Aziz Qureshi, has started working in Hyderabad.
8. Urdu news are relayed from Patna and Lucknow and names of Urdu writers are displayed in Urdu on the TV when they appear on it (Anjum, forthcoming).

The teaching of Urdu, however, is still not satisfactory, at least in UP and Delhi (for Delhi see Farouqui 1990; 1994). However, it is not for lack of teachers or textbooks in UP (Commissioner 1992: 14–15) that there are problems. The letter of the law, even in UP, is fair. The orders are to provide one Urdu teacher if five pupils want to study Urdu. In Delhi the orders are that if there are ten students in class I and II and six in III and V then instruction can be given in Urdu (Commissioner 1992: 13). The problems are because the educational authorities in these areas still remain indifferent to Urdu despite the improvements mentioned earlier. The law is not at fault now but its implementation is. In my own visit to certain towns of UP near Lucknow I was told by Muslims that they despaired of teaching Urdu to their children. In some cases small schools have also sprung up. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Research and Educational Foundation, express dissatisfaction with all official organizations and avoid official funding or patronage themselves. Ralph Russell quoted at length from the letters (dated 14 May and 2 August 1996) of Amanullah Khalid, the Vice-President of the Maulana Azad Foundation mentioned above, that his NGO, registered in 1989 at Sikandarabad (District Bulandshahr in UP), had been running two Urdu-medium schools in the city. Apart from these schools, he wrote Russell, only the Aligarh Muslim University runs two Urdu-medium schools but even these are moribund because parents choose to send their children to the English-medium sections of the same schools (Russell 1999: 46). However, the religious madrassas teach in many places in Urdu. That is why people expressed the hope that they would help to revive, or at least preserve, Urdu (Farouqui 1992; 1992: 107). Others believe that madrassas, having their own specific religious objectives, would not be able to do any such thing (Russell 1999: 46).

The year 1989 was one of great hopes for the future of Urdu as the India-Pakistan relations thawed temporarily after the meeting of Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi. The World Urdu Conference organized in New Delhi from 10 to 12 February raised slogans that Urdu would be the bridge between India and Pakistan (Gasior 1991). These hopes, however, remain elusive because the relations between the two countries remain uncertain. As long as Urdu is associated
with Pakistan, as it is in the minds of some Indians, it will remain at the mercy of international politics which knows no constancy.

The re-election of the Hindu nationalist BJP in 1999 seems to indicate that the hope of the full implementation of the Gujral Committee’s recommendations is slim. Informal conversations with both Hindu and Muslim intellectuals in February 1998 gave me the impression that they generally expected that the exigencies of real politics will prevent the BJP or its allies from pursuing anti-Urdu, and anti-Muslim, policies. The supporters of Urdu met on 16 April 1999 in New Delhi to demand the rights which had so far been denied. The supporters included the ex-Chief Justice of India, M.N. Venkatchalliah, who gave an emotional speech in its favour on that date (Latifi 1999: 46). Danial Latifi, a left-leaning activist who has been referred to earlier in this chapter, also supports Urdu as part of resistance to Hindu fundamentalism and the general left wing policy of strengthening oppressed groups.

Other voices in support of Urdu are organizations like the Zakir Husain Study Circle which wanted to organize an Urdu Conference in Delhi between 8–10 February 2001 (in the event the conference was postponed at the eleventh hour). The organizer of this conference, Salman Khurshid, is a former Foreign Minister of India. The conference was held between 21–23 March 2003 and one of its conclusion is worth mentioning. It was pointed out that Urdu is taught in the madrassas. This means that, in wake of 9/11, Muslims in India who are already a poor and marginalized minority, may be being exposed to extremist religious propaganda. Commenting upon this one contributor says:

But the popularity of madrassas has little to do with any enduring or necessary features of the Muslim community. It simply happens to be the easy option available. If other, more palatable, institutions that catered to some of the concerns of the Muslim parents were easily available, the madrassas would begin to diminish in popularity. It is for this reason that secular Urdu education schools are vital (Mehta 2006: 24).

This connection between religion and language was pointed out by several Indian delegates in the International conference on Urdu arranged by the department of Urdu of the University of Mumbai in March 2007 in which the present author also presented a paper. A number of the students of the department were from the madrassa background and were averse to the amorous and erotic aspects of Urdu literature. In short, Urdu may be losing its secular and liberal message in India, and for entirely reasons, in Pakistan also.

To sum up, the supporters of Urdu invoke their constitutional rights which support Urdu (Tyagi 2006: 268-287). However, what Krishan Kumar calls the ‘rival perspective’, became stronger in the wake of the BJP’s election at the centre, the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan and the Kargil episode. However, the ongoing peace process may dilute it somewhat. It should be emphasized, however, as I have argued in this book, the demand for learning Urdu will not increase as long as it does not lead to empowerment. If it is seen as a ghettoizing language, as it is now, people will not learn it. In short, mere laws and a better supply of Urdu (through schools and other institutions) will not help. What will help is providing jobs leading to empowerment. This is a point which has been largely ignored by the supporters of Urdu in India. All this makes it difficult to believe that the future of Urdu will be better in India than its past since independence.
1. Anad Narayan Mulla, an Urdu poet, wrote the following verse about this ‘murder’ of Urdu:

Yeh hadisa sal-i-chahel wa nau main hua  
Hindi ki churi thi aur Urdu ka gala  
Urdu ke rafiqon main jo maqtool hae  
Suna hai ke Mulla nami shair bhi tha

This accident occurred in the year 1949  
It was Hindi’s knife and Urdu’s throat,  
Among those friends of Urdu murdered that day,  
One hears there was a poet named Mulla.
## Annexure 7-A

**Number of Urdu-medium Schools in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Urdu-speakers (in 100,000s)</th>
<th>Number of state run schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Andhra</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>1135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>5500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat</td>
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<td>Himachal</td>
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<td>W.Bengal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Except for UP all other figures are taken from Khalidi 1995: 144. However, Khalidi gives the figures of zero for UP which is substantiated by Siddiqi (1993). Siddiqi as well as other sources do, however, tell us about two high schools run by the Muslim University, Aligarh. Ather Farouqui mentions three junior high schools but even here Hindi is used more than Urdu (Farouqui 1994). The Aziz Qureshi Committee Report gives two figures for schools in UP, both from the Education Department of the state, which are 422 and 1375 (Anjum, forthcoming: n.p.). The S.A. Jafri Report, to which Khalidi refers for the above figures, says that in 1983–84 the schools decreased from 1778 to 1375. However, 4453 schools do teach Urdu as a subject (Jafri 1990: 89).
### Annexure 7-B

**Circulation of Newspapers by Language**  
(Expressed in Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hindi%</th>
<th>Urdu%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19.97</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 (only dailies)</td>
<td>27.91</td>
<td>10.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 <em>(all publications)</em></td>
<td>35.19</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abstracted from Brass 1991: 122.  
*Figures for 1993 are from *India 1993* (Delhi: Publications Division, 1994: 261). The total number of dailies is 3229 of which 1381 are in Hindi and 344 in Urdu. The total number of all publications (weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies, annuals, etc.) is 30,214 out of which 10,633 are in Hindi and 2003 are in Urdu.

### Annexure 7-C

**Advertisement Money to Newspapers (in Indian Rupees)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Amount of Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>88,284,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>66,508,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>9,778,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annexure supplied in response to Rajya Sabha’s unstarred Question No. 4305, 22 December 1992. Figures for other Indian language publications have been left out but, out of nineteen language publications, Urdu has the fifth position. Quoted from Farouqui 1995: 100.
## Annexure 7-D

### Language-wise Publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>Dailies</th>
<th>Tri/bi Weeklies</th>
<th>Weeklies</th>
<th>Fort-nightlies</th>
<th>Quarterlies</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Monthlies</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Periodicals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>7118</td>
<td>2277</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2496</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>634</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Registrar of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting.


*NB:* Publications in the other languages have been left out of this table.
As Urdu was a symbol of Muslim identity during the Urdu-Hindi controversy period in pre-partition India, it had an established political significance in the eyes of the Muslim League which started ruling Pakistan in 1947. Moreover, since the Bengalis constituted more than half (55.6 per cent) of the population of Pakistan, the ruling elite—Muslim League politicians, the bureaucracy, and the military—which was dominated by a Punjabi-Mohajir coalition felt threatened by the mere fact of Bengali majority. To neutralize this threat of possible domination by East Bengal, it might have made sense to the ruling elite to fall back on Urdu as a unifying symbol of the state. However, whatever the underlying political motives of the West Pakistani elite might be, there is no doubt that most people in West Pakistan, especially the dominant intelligentsia, sincerely felt that it would be in the national interest to integrate the new nation and that Urdu could do that job better than any other language. With this in mind the teaching of Urdu was promoted as part of the overall political imperative of national integration.

The first educational conference held at Karachi (27 November to 1 December 1947) laid the foundations of a language-teaching policy which the state still follows. The cardinal points of this policy were to make Urdu ‘the lingua franca of Pakistan’ and to teach it ‘as a compulsory language’ (PEC 1948: 39). While the conference did not make it a medium of instruction in schools, the situation was that it was being used as such in the Punjab, the NWFP, Balochistan, and parts of Kashmir. In Sindh alone, out of the provinces of present-day Pakistan, Sindhi was the medium of instruction for most schools. But even here the cities were changing fast in their demographic composition. The predominantly Urdu-speaking mohajirs were migrating in large numbers from north India and settling down in the cities (Census 1951: Statements 2.E & F). Having more urban, educated people among them than the Sindhis (Census 1951: Tables 9B), they wanted more and more schools—Urdu and English-medium schools—in the cities of Sindh. Thus, when Karachi became a federal area separate from Sindh on 23 July 1948 the number of schools was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium of instruction</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu-medium</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi-medium</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati-medium</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABE 1954: 53

The figures for both Sindhi and Gujrati-medium schools decreased even further in the years to come.

The policy of using Urdu for national integration backfired, however, because of the resistance to it. According to ethnic nationalists this policy helped the Punjabi and Mohajir elites to consolidate their power in all the provinces of Pakistan and was, therefore, part of an overall policy of internal colonialism (for an excellent exposition of their views, see Shah 1997). In reality, since it was English not Urdu which was used at the elitist level in all central services, the
rule of English-knowing people was ensured and Urdu was, if anything, only a threat to the domination of the English-using elite. However, this policy did favour the Mohajirs and Punjabis at the lower levels of power. Moreover it elevated the status of Urdu vis-à-vis the other languages of Pakistan. This created the valorization of the urban, Urdu-using culture and a corresponding devaluation of indigenous vernacular-using rural cultures. This was the psychological dimension—the valuation of one symbolic system (language, code of conduct, dress, values, and a way of structuring and categorization of reality) rather than the many symbolic systems based on the indigenous languages and ways of life. Psychologically speaking, then, the valuation of Urdu vis-à-vis the indigenous languages created a situation which can only be described in terms of cultural imperialism. An imperialism which, as Paulo Freire points out, is not only acquiesced into but actively supported by those who are subjected to it—the ‘invaded’. Indeed, everyone—‘invader’ and ‘invaded’—accept, internalize and act according to the same values (Freire 1989: 151).

As anyone who knows Pakistan will observe, this is true for most middle class people in the Punjab. They believe that Urdu, and the values which go with urban Mughal culture (the culture of the Urdu-speaking elite), are superior to Punjabi and rural values. However, in the NWFP, Sindh, and tribal Balochistan people are proud of their indigenous culture. The language movements of various parts of Pakistan—including the Hindko, Siraiki, Punjabi, Balochi and other language movements—are trying to make urban Urdu-using people take pride in their indigenous language and culture (Rahman 1996). In short then, the policy of favouring Urdu explicitly has devalued the other indigenous languages of Pakistan while English, about which more will be said later, has devalued all Pakistani languages.

Policy about Urdu in the 1950s

In the 1950s a number of committees were appointed to look at the role of Urdu in Pakistan. These Urdu committees kept emphasizing Urdu despite the opposition to it in East Bengal. In Dhaka, one year after the first phase of the Bengali language movement in 1948, the Advisory Board of Education set up an Urdu committee under the chairmanship of Abdul Haq, the father of Urdu (Baba-e-Urdu). Among its terms of reference was the possible replacement of English by Urdu as a medium of instruction at the university level. While this was only a future possibility, the committee decided in 1950 that Urdu shall be the medium of instruction in non-elitist government schools in Punjab, NWFP, centrally administered areas of Karachi and Balochistan to begin with (ABE 1954: Annexure B, p. 72). From 1952 it also became the optional medium of instruction at the intermediate level (twelve years of education) at the colleges affiliated with the Punjab, Peshawar, and Karachi universities (ibid.: 65).

Indeed, so soon was Karachi converted into an Urdu-using city that a report of 11 May 1949 tells us that the Municipal Corporation of Karachi adopted a resolution recommending the immediate adoption of Urdu in all of its proceedings. All the roads, for instance, would then be named in Urdu and other languages would cease to be used. This, however, was ‘felt to be too precipitate’ and the decision-makers contented themselves by making Urdu the official language of the Corporation (Review 1949).

Part of the drive for creating a Pakistani-Muslim identity was the marginalization of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. As already mentioned, Bengali posed the greatest threat being the language of most Pakistanis according to the census of 1951 (Statement 4-B: 71). The state did this through several language-planning policies (LP). We are primarily concerned with ‘acquisition planning’—attempts at spreading a language by teaching it and other means. However, in order to understand this better, let us look at other forms of LP in passing first.
First, then, was status planning, which has been explained in Chapter 2. English had the status of the official language and Urdu, it was declared, would be the sole national language. Second was Corpus Planning—activities like standardizing a language, creating new terms in it to express modern concepts (neologism)—and spreading its use through dictionaries and books of grammar, i.e. corpus planning. All these forms of LP were undertaken by the state.

**Urdu in East Bengal**

Among the corpus planning activities undertaken by the state was the Islamization of Bengali. The East Bengal government set up a language committee on 7 December 1950 and it recommended the use of non-Sanskritized Bengali. But after 1948 the East Bengalis mistrusted such changes. Above all they feared that the script of their language, being very close to the Devanagari script of Hindi, would be changed to the Nastaliq Perso-Arabic script of Urdu. Such apprehensions were expressed in the legislative assembly, the press and by the students of Dhaka University (LAD-B 1 Mar. 1951: 61; *Pakistan Observer*, 10 April 1949 and Umar 1970: 204). The government, thereupon, took no action but the apprehensions were not entirely ill-founded. Even as late as 21 January 1952, exactly a month before the language crisis led to riots in Dhaka (21 February), the fourth meeting of the Urdu Committee with Abdul Haq as chairman recommended that a uniform script be adopted for the national and ‘regional’ languages. Bengali, the major language of Pakistan at that time was classified as a ‘regional’ language and the idea that its script should be changed was mooted at various levels (ABE 1954: Annexure D, p. 79).

A small experiment, mentioned earlier in the chapter on the teaching of Arabic, was, indeed, conducted in this regard. The central government established ‘twenty adult education centres in different parts of East Pakistan to teach primary Bengali through Arabic script’ (Islam 1986: 152; *Pakistan Observer*, 4 October 1950). However, since 1940, the medium of instruction in high schools had been Bengali in the Devanagari-based script (Edn. B 1951: 19) so this experiment proved a failure. Apart from this Urdu was ‘introduced as an additional compulsory subject from class V’ in 1950–51 (Edn. B 1956: 14). Surprisingly, however, the East Bengal Report on Public Instruction 1952–53 was curiously silent about the greatest upheaval of its time—the Bengali language movement of 1952. Indeed, it confined itself to the following laconic, and under the circumstances rather perverse, statement:

Urdu, then the proposed only state Language of Pakistan was introduced in Middle classes as a compulsory subject. English was, however, abolished up to class V which was now merged into the primary stage (Edn. B 1958: 17).

The report of 1953–54 also unrepentantly reported that Urdu had been added ‘from class IV to upward as a compulsory subject [in some areas] and as an optional subject in [certain other areas]’ (Edn. B 1959a: 12). Thus, Bengali-speaking students had to learn Urdu even after their own language, Bengali, had become the other national language of Pakistan. While official documents equitably declared that Urdu was compulsory for Bengalis just as Bengali was compulsory for ‘Urdu-speaking pupils’ (Edn. B 1959b: 12), the fact was that state support made Urdu much more ubiquitous in Pakistani cities, especially in the official domains, than any other Pakistani language. Thus, anyone with any social ambition found it necessary to learn Urdu. This meant that, while pragmatic people, even if they were Bengali language activists, had to learn Urdu they also felt that their language, and so their identity, were unjustly marginalized because of an iniquitous language teaching policy.

The Bengali language movement led to no fundamental change in the centrist policies of the
ruling elite. Indeed, the very worse took place. The consolidation of the provinces of the western wing into one-unit, the province of West Pakistan, in 1955 (WPO 1955) presented a united front to East Pakistan. While confronting ethnicity in this manner, this policy provoked the nationalists in West Pakistan—the Sindhi, Pakhtun and Balochi-Brahvi ethno-nationalists—to confront the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated centre even more aggressively than before. The rise of ethnicity in Pakistan has, however, been described by a number of scholars and need not concern us here (see Amin 1988; Rahman 1996; Ahmed 1998). What needs to be described now is how the state made language-teaching policies, especially those concerning Urdu, in the light of the increased emphasis on centrisism.

Ayub Khan’s Language Policy

In 1958 when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law he declared that ‘a strong central government’ was ‘an absolute MUST’ (Gauhar 1993: 163). This was quite expected considering that in his ‘appreciation’ of 1954 he had written:

…West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from the North or South, must be welded into one unit and all artificial provincial boundaries removed, regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real (Khan 1967: 187).

However, Ayub had genuflected to what he called the ‘prejudices’ of the people. Thus he had conceded that West Pakistan should ‘be so sub-divided that each sub-unit embraces a racial group or groups with common economy, communications and potentiality for development, and administration decentralized in them to the maximum possible’ (ibid.: 187). In practice, of course, this was a contradiction in terms. The disappearance of symbolic names—such as Sindh, Punjab, etc.—and the devaluation of the indigenous languages of different areas were calculated to strengthen the cultural and political domination of the centre which, in practice, meant the symbolic domination of Urdu and the urban culture of the Urdu-speaking ashraf.

Ayub Khan’s Commission on National Education (appointed 30 December 1958 and submitted report on 26 August 1959) made its centrist language policy quite clear. Strengthening the position of ‘national’ languages—which were Bengali and Urdu now—the report said:

We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national language, Urdu, to the fullest extent. In the areas of the former Panjab, Bahawalpur and Baluchistan, Urdu is already the medium of instruction at the primary stage, and this arrangement should continue. Urdu in this way will eventually become the common popular language of all the people in this area. (Edn. Com. 1959: Chapter 21, para 14, p. 292).

As Urdu was to be introduced from 1963 as the medium of instruction in Sindhi-medium schools from class VI, the only language which would really be affected was Sindhi. Pashto too was not being used as the medium of instruction after class V, but it was used only in a few rural schools anyway while Sindhi was used in many more schools, especially in rural Sindh. Thus the Sindhis reacted aggressively to the proposed changes and succeeded in having some of them blocked (for details see Rahman 1996: 116).

Ayub Khan’s own stance, and that of the officer corps of the army, was modernist and westernized. It was not that they accepted the liberal humanist values of the West and really believed in democracy but they did disapprove of values, traditions and attitudes of the past. Thus, for them, orthodox and revivalist interpretations of Islam; indigenous culture and language-
based ethnicity were reactionary throwbacks to the past. English, on the other hand, was the language of modernization and progressive values. To combat the *mullahs* (as the ulama were pejoratively labelled) the army and the bureaucracy supported English-medium instruction. To combat ethnicity, which was stigmatized as ‘provincialism’, the regime had to fall back upon Urdu in West Pakistan and even had to recruit Islam in the nationalist cause.

In the 1960s some universities had started replacing English by Urdu or other languages as a medium of instruction and examination. Karachi University had declared early in 1963 that by 1967–68 all teaching and examinations in post-graduate, technical and professional subjects will be in Urdu. It had set up an implementation committee to see that this change took place efficiently. Since 1957 a Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation too had been functioning in the University and technical terms were said to exist to facilitate the changeover. However, the university did not suddenly abandon Urdu. Its relevant statute reads as under:

Statute 28: Medium of Instruction and Examination: The medium of instruction and examination shall be English or Urdu.

The university also decided ‘to strengthen teaching of English (whenever necessary) to enable Pakistani students to use the language with greater facility’. Also, ‘knowledge of English Scientific and Technical Terms, along with their Urdu equivalents, has been made compulsory for all students’ (emphasis in the original Karachi University 1963 in Abdullah 1976: 77–8).

But what the Ayub Khan government objected to was the spirit of the change. Karachi University had begun teaching in Urdu from 1963; it intended to introduce it at the highest examining and teaching levels; it proposed using the 400 books of Osmania University; it wanted to work with other pro-Urdu organizations such as the Markazi Majlis-e-Taraqqi Adab (Lahore) and produce glossaries of technical terms and, most defiantly of all, even teach Urdu to foreign students on the grounds that ‘every foreign university presupposes adequate knowledge of that country’s language’ (in Abdullah 1976: 78). Other universities too had moved away from English in various degrees. The Punjab University gave the option of answering questions in Urdu and English to BA students in 1964 and MA students in 1967. Sindh University had allowed not only Urdu but also Sindhi both for answering questions in BA but also for teaching. Peshawar University retained English but taught and examined Islamic studies, Arabic and Urdu through the medium of Urdu (CSPW 1966: 111).

The *Report of the Commission on Students’ Welfare and Problems* (1966) was highly critical of these changes. It charged Karachi with discrimination and disobedience. The first because Bengali students were denied their right to study in Bengali and the second because the central government had directed universities not to change the medium of instruction in technical and scientific subjects. The University of Sindh was castigated in terms which stung the Sindhi nationalists to the quick. The report said:

Sind University has gone to the extent of permitting the use of Sindhi for answering pass and honours examination papers, thus equating a regional language in this respect with the national language (CSPW 1966: 114).

The report also mentioned that such a change would be unfair to the English-medium students but this, perhaps the major reason for the highly critical stance adopted in the report, was camouflaged by the plea of the rights of the Bengalis and ‘a heterogeneous multilingual population’ in Karachi (CSPW 1966: 116). In the end the gloves come off and the report recommends that ‘no university should be permitted to’ change the medium of instruction till a committee of a minister and a secretary—i.e. high state-functionaries—do not advise such a step
In short, the Pakistani ruling elite had done what the British did when Sir Syed and the Anjuman-i-Punjab wanted vernacular-medium universities to be established in the nineteenth century—it put its foot firmly down (Rahman 1996: 43–6).

During the sixties Urdu became more and more closely associated with Islam, Pakistani nationalism and support of the military. The middle class Urdu press, especially Nawa-i-Waqt, the textbooks of social studies and those of Urdu concentrated upon these themes in order to create a strongly nationalistic Pakistani who would support militarization with religious fervour. Thus, when in 1988 the Ministry of Education took the citizens’ views about educational policies, most of those who replied (mostly middle-class people), supported Urdu-medium schooling and the abolition of elitist English schools. However, along with this, they also supported restricting women’s freedom; witch hunting of free thinkers; compulsory military training and even more Islamic and nationalistic emphasis in the curricula than the state already provided (Sheikh et al. 1989). Fifty-five school teachers, whose opinion was polled by a sampling procedure in 1981–82, agreed that the English curriculum reflected the ideology of Pakistan (Curriculum 1982: 31). These school teachers were themselves the products of state Urdu-medium schools. In short, those who supported Urdu were not liberal-democrats while those who supported English and liberal values mostly were from Westernized and elitist backgrounds. In an opinion survey of school students in 1999–2000 the present author found that students of Urdu-medium schools were far more right-wing in most of their opinions than those from the elitist English-medium ones.

**Table 18 (2 of Chapter 8)**

Opinions of Urdu and English School Students
Towards Ideological Issues

Question. 13. What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urdu-medium schools (N=520)</th>
<th>Elitist English-medium schools (N=97)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Conquer Kashmir</td>
<td>Agree 95.58 62.89</td>
<td>Disagree 02.12 31.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t care 02.31 05.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Develop nuclear</td>
<td>Agree 79.81 64.95</td>
<td>Disagree 13.65 26.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapons</td>
<td>Don’t care 06.54 08.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Reduce army budget</td>
<td>Agree 55.58 69.07</td>
<td>Disagree 32.50 17.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t care 11.73 13.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Implement Shari’ah</td>
<td>Agree 95.58 52.58</td>
<td>Disagree 01.73 23.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Don’t care 02.69 23.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Make press free</td>
<td>Agree 58.65 62.89</td>
<td>Disagree 26.35 19.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t care 15.00 17.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Make TV free</td>
<td>Agree 36.92 67.01</td>
<td>Disagree 32.50 17.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t care 11.73 13.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>46.92</td>
<td>18.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t care</td>
<td>16.15</td>
<td>14.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Establish democracy</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>75.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>08.46</td>
<td>14.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t care</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>20.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Give equal rights to Ahmedis</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>44.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33.85</td>
<td>22.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t care</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>23.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are some of the responses to ideological questions given in the survey (for the questions, see Appendix 14 and for comparison of all responses, see Appendix 14.7). These responses indicate clearly that students of Urdu-medium schools favour opinions associated with right-wing ideologies in Pakistan. However, the attitude of these students towards the establishment of democracy is inconsistent with the rest of their views being more ‘liberal’ than other students. No explanation for this surprising inconsistency comes to the mind.

**PPP’s Language-teaching Policy**

No significant change occured in this policy during the PPP government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Despite his own socialist and liberal rhetoric Bhutto did not want to alienate the military or the other members of the establishment. Further, he too found Islam and Urdu useful as integrative symbols against the threat of ethnic breakup.

The general objectives of the education policy of 1972–1980 were:

(i) Ensuring the preservation, promotion and practise of the basic ideology of Pakistan and making it a code of individual and national life.

(ii) Building up national cohesion through education and by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology (English 1976: 2–3).

The textbooks on Urdu state emphatically that the teachers should ensure that the ideology of Pakistan should never be made to appear controversial and further:

In the teaching material no discrimination should be made between the religious and the mundane, but that material be presented from the Islamic point of view [original in Urdu] (Urdu 1974: 12).

Thus, the Bhutto regime, despite the fact that Bhutto himself opposed the ulema both politically and intellectually, also used the same pedagogic political strategies as the previous regimes. In short, the basic policies of the state—in the teaching of languages, especially Urdu—remained the same in Bhutto’s socialism as in the martial law regimes it had replaced.

**Ziaul Haq’s Language-teaching Policy**

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite his use of Islam as an integrative symbol and to appease the Islamic lobby, had been opposed by the Pakistan National Alliance which was deeply influenced by the Islamists. When General Ziaul Haq imposed martial law on Pakistan on 5 July 1977 he legitimized himself in the name of Islam. Besides, General Zia did genuinely hold middle-class views and a certain somewhat strict understanding of Islam is very often a part of middle- and lower-middle-class world view in Pakistan. Thus, it may not be true to suggest that Ziaul Haq
merely used Islam cynically as a political strategy as Bhutto did. That his use of Islam, for whatever reasons, did help him politically cannot be denied. Further, it cannot also be denied that Ziaul Haq was a product of the colonial sector—secular schooling, training as an army officer, socialization as an officer of the elitist armoured corps—and nationalism, efficiency and modernization were very much part of his world view. This means that there are continuities between Ziaul Haq’s policies of Islamizing education and the policies of earlier regimes. The difference, indeed, is that of degree not of kind. This is evident in the following stated aim of the education policy of 1979:

To foster in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity thereby strengthening unity of the outlook of the people of Pakistan on the basis of justice and fairplay (Edn. Pol. 1979: 1).

In keeping with this overall objective Urdu is to be used as a medium of instruction ‘to strengthen ideological foundations of the nation and to foster unity of thought, brotherhood and patriotism’ (ibid.: 2).

While this was merely rhetorical, there was at first a policy departure from previous eras. Starting ‘April, 1979 all students admitted to class 1 in all English medium schools will undergo instruction through the medium of Urdu or an approved provincial language’ (Edn. Pol. 1979: 72)—and, to top it all, ‘the nomenclature “English medium schools” will be abolished’ (ibid.: 70). This was the greatest boost the status of Urdu had ever received. Indeed, the boost came in two ways. First, against the other indigenous languages of Pakistan on the grounds that:

Urdu became a great repository of Muslim culture and acquired the status of a lingua franca most extensively employed as a common link language by people speaking various languages and dialects from Torkhum to Karachi (Edn. Pol. 1979: 70).

Even now it was conceded that primary education could be in an approved provincial language but the ‘switch over to the National language as medium of instruction is the ultimate aim’ (ibid.: 71). This was a departure from previous language-teaching policies in that even Ayub Khan had not stated so forthrightly that the ‘provincial’ languages would be supplanted at all levels by Urdu. Second, the policy about replacing English by Urdu was a major deviation.

It was, however, conceded that five years would be given to replace books in English by Urdu ones at the intermediate and degree level and that during the interval the teachers could learn to teach in Urdu instead of English. These, however, were mere details. The basic policy seemed to have changed. The state was to retain English ‘to keep in touch with modern knowledge’ (ibid.: 71) but it would abolish the dual media of instruction. Presumably, then, English would no longer be required for seeking jobs in the state sector in Pakistan and the social symbolic significance of English would be appreciably reduced.

Such a policy was a deviation from the past and, of course, it was opposed. The opposition to Zia’s policies and the abandonment of this policy are given in detail elsewhere and will not be dwelt upon here (Rahman 1996: 242). Suffice it to say that Ziaul Haq eventually settled for a language-teaching policy not essentially different from that of his predecessors. His Islamization drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses, including language-teaching ones, but this was not a case of a radically new policy but of ‘more of the same’.

It is difficult to prove that Ziaul Haq’s eleven years made Pakistanis more Islamic or nationalist. Empirical evidence in such cases is generally inconclusive. However, the articulate sections of the middle class did express right wing views more forcefully and more often during
and after his rule. As mentioned earlier, in 1988 the Ministry of Education elicited the opinions of citizens about the changes to be made in educational policies. A large number of people suggested more Islamization, more inculcation of nationalism and some advocated military training. Among the more radical views are:

1. Music should not be taught in schools as a subject.
2. Only Muslim teachers should be appointed at least upto secondary level.
3. Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges.
4. Lady teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut.
5. Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economic [sic] and military training should be compulsory subjects at college level.
6. The concept of ‘Jihad’ should be given more emphasis in books of Islamiyat.
7. Teachers should be disallowed to speak against Pakistan ideology in the classroom (Sheikh et al. 1989).

In short, an articulate section of the middle class, probably brought up on ideological school courses, supported an ideology which used religion to create nationalism and militarism in the society. Such opinion had always existed, of course, but it was more vocal now and other people pretended to defer to it for pragmatic reasons.

**Language-teaching after Ziaul Haq**

Ziaul Haq died in August 1988 and the country has seen two governments by Benazir Bhutto, two by Nawaz Sharif and a military government (not counting the caretaker interludes) in the last twelve years. A number of documents pertaining to education policy have been issued from time to time. On close scrutiny, however, one discovers that they are curiously alike. The Nawaz Sharif education policy of 1998, for instance, reads like a document from Ziaul Haq’s time and Benazir Bhutto could well be mistaken for Nawaz Sharif.

The 1995 preface to Teacher Education, for instance, says that the aim of teacher education is ‘to inculcate the spirit of Islam and develop the qualities of tolerance, universal brotherhood and justice’ (ETE 1995: 1). This was presumably written during Benazir Bhutto’s second term in office (1993–96). But the Nawaz Sharif education policy too mentions Islam and Urdu in similar terms. So, despite apparent repudiation of the previous governments’ policies, the basic language policy remains the same. It is, indeed, a policy so interlinked with the distribution of power in Pakistan that it cannot change without bringing about unprecedented changes in the power structure.

**Urdu as an Ideological Language**

According to Khalid Ahmed, a respected journalist from Lahore, Urdu lends itself more easily to right-wing views. He points out that Urdu newspapers, especially the *Nawa-i-Waqt*, have always favoured Islamization, the military and an extreme form of Pakistani nationalism. The same has been pointed out about Hindi newspapers in India which have been anti-Muslim and aggressive (Ahmed 1998). This is true in so far as it relates to the content of newspapers, the pronouncements of religious leaders, and a number of popular books on Kashmir, Islam, and women. However, it has nothing to do with the structure and linguistic features of Urdu. Some terms—such as *shaheed* (martyr), *la diniyat* (lack of religion and also secularism), and *imandar*
(one having faith and also honest)—do, however, have an ideological load. They were made in a religious milieu and cannot but reflect their history. This, however, does not mean that their meaning cannot change by different usage. The point is that Urdu does not necessarily condemn us to any point of view. It is only because, at the moment, it is used more by people who lean to the religious right and gives easier access to texts of that point of view that it is associated with the right wing (religious and nationalistic) point of view.

In this context it should be noted that most Urdu textbooks taught to children have a large number of lessons relating in one way or the other to Islam, war or the military, and Pakistani nationalism. Indeed, I counted the number of ideological lessons out of the total number of lessons in Urdu textbooks from class I to X and found that 44 per cent were on these three major thematic categories. In the context of Urdu it should be mentioned that Iqbal, called the ideological founder of Pakistan, is an important focus of Urdu studies. Lessons about him in school textbooks have been subsumed under Pakistani nationalism but they may form a category by themselves. Indeed, S.I. Kamran has analyzed all Urdu textbooks in Pakistan with reference to Iqbal. His conclusion is that although Iqbal is part of many lessons, he is not being taught with a view to strengthening the ideology of Pakistan (Kamran 1993). That, however, is a controversial point which need not concern us here. The following chart gives an indication of the percentage of ideological lessons in the textbooks of the four provinces of Pakistan:

**Table 19 (3 of Chapter 8)**

Number of Ideological Lessons in School Textbooks Expressed in Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>B‘Tan</th>
<th>Percentage according to level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IX</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class X</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 %</td>
<td>35.1 %</td>
<td>49.5 %</td>
<td>38.6 %</td>
<td>44.3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work by the present author on the language textbooks used in Government schools in Pakistan in 1999.

As Urdu is read throughout the school years and even beyond, it is the major ideology-carrying language in Pakistan. Moreover, it is used not only in the non-elitist schools but also in the elitist ones.

However, in the elitist English medium schools, textbooks from classes I to VIII are not necessarily those prescribed by the textbook boards. At places books published by private publishing houses are used. According to one textbook writer children are not keen to learn Urdu, whereas they show no aversion to English because the textbooks of Urdu are not colourful and interesting. Accordingly, a very colourful series of textbooks have also been produced recently, generally by the Oxford University Press, Pakistan. There are also series of story books, featuring
pillow fights and concern about animal life, to supplement the main texts. None of these books have Islamic or nationalistic lessons. However, the Nardban-e-Urdu series, do contain essays on Islamic historical personages, Pakistani nationalism, and the 1965 war. As this series is used in a number of schools the students are introduced to the dominant official ideology of Pakistan through language-teaching though, of course, not to the extent their government school counterparts are. However, the project of using Islam to create Pakistani nationalism of the kind which supports increased militarization, is not confined to non-elitist institutions alone. Islamic Studies, Pakistan Studies, and Urdu are compulsory in all schools in Pakistan and they all contain such lessons. Perhaps, the dose is less intensive in the elitist English-medium institutions because foreign textbooks, English literature, and outside influences counteract it.

**Urdu in the Madrassas**

Urdu is generally the medium of instruction and examination in Pakistani madrassas. Even if the other Pakistani languages such as Pashto, Sindhi, and to a lesser extent Brahvi and Balochi are used as the real media of instruction for speakers of these languages, they are not used for examinations which central degree-awarding organizations administer to madrassa students. Urdu, therefore, is generally the language in which madrassa students become most competent.

During Ayub Khan’s period suggestions were made by an official committee to modernize the madrassas by changing, among other things, the teaching of Urdu. Urdu was to remain compulsory at the primary level but at the higher one it would be replaced by English and/or Arabic as the medium of instruction. At the secondary level, classes IX and X, Urdu was a preferred option whereas English was compulsory even at higher levels (J. Malik 1996: 126–7). During Ziaul Haq’s rule the Halepota Report, as the report by the National Committee for Dini Madaris of 1979 came to be called, also gave suggestions for increasing the state’s role and integrating the madrassas in the general system of education. Urdu was proposed as a compulsory subject at the primary level as well as the medium of instruction (Report Madrassas 1979: Annexure 5). According to the printed curricula of the madrassas, Urdu is taught by the Deobandis from class I to VIII from textbooks published by the textbooks boards.

However, despite the resistance to reform among the orthodox ulema, some aspects of the modern world view have crept in through modern texts. As we have seen, in those schools where Urdu is taught, government textbooks are in use. This means that the messages of Pakistani nationalism, glorification of war and the military, and some cognizance of the modern world become part of the students’ world view. Sometimes, Urdu is taught indirectly through exercises in translation from Arabic and vice versa. In the equivalent of class XII the Muallim ul Insha, written by an Indian alim, is used for teaching Arabic but uses Urdu for this purpose. This book, by its very emphases and choice of topics, reveals itself to be a response, however reactionary, to modernity. Being a response, it is in dialogue with modernity and does not live in a world which simply ignores it. For instance, whereas the ancient books never felt it necessary to prescribe an Islamic form of behaviour as it was not in dispute or under threat, this one does. Typical sentences from Muallim ul Insha (3 vols.) are as follows:

1. These girls have been ordered to put on the veil and they have been stopped from going to the bazaar.

2. You women are really ungrateful to your husbands (Nadwi 1951–52 Vol. 1: 1), (my translation from Urdu).

There is also some emphasis on militarism, also missing in the medieval texts. The choice of sentences was, according to the author, meant for those who would later be ‘soldiers of Islam’
Some sentences promote glorification of conquest while others are anti-British:
(3) Tariq Bin Ziyad conquered Andalusia.
(4) The English were always the enemies of Islam (my translation from Urdu).

Egypt is often presented as a corrupt, licentious country where men and women meet freely and wine is imbibed (Nadwi 1954–55, Vol. 2: 126). All these trends are in keeping with the madrassas having taken up a more active role after the 1950s than before in the Islamic revivalist movement. Upto the middle of the twentieth century, as mentioned earlier, the madrassas were mostly concerned with the preservation of the past. Having a besieged mentality they buried themselves in the past and shunned change as the source of the greatest danger. After that, especially because of the rise of revivalist Islamic movements in Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and above all in Afghanistan, the madrassas have started incorporating some aspects of revivalism—strict adherence to the shari’ah and glorification of militarism (jihad) in their curricula.

Thus, although the state has been trying to teach Urdu so as to make the ulema support its own policies of nationalism and militarism, what has happened is that the ulema have used it to disseminate their worldview which discredits the ruling elite and wants to replace democracy by their own rule. This is yet another association of Urdu with the religious, and militant, right in Pakistan.

**Urdu in the University**

Urdu is compulsory as part of Ziaul Haq’s Islamization policy in all schools, even those sending their students for the British ‘O’ level examinations, upto the intermediate (XII class) level. It can be taken as an option in the CSS examination and traditional universities offer MA and higher research courses in it. Some universities and the NUML offer courses in it for foreigners. The state spends much money on Urdu. The National Language Authority (Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban) publishes books in it so as to create enough literature to enable it to function as a medium of instruction at the highest level. The Allama Iqbal Open University runs a Daftari Urdu course to enable government officials and others learn how to correspond and perform official functions in Urdu. Scientific terms have been made by several institutions, including the Urdu Science Board at Lahore (for details see Rahman 1999: 265–7). Indeed, the budgets allocated to institutions for the promotion of Urdu are quite high.

**Table 20 (4 of Chapter 8)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Budget (1999–2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urdu Science Board (Lahore)</td>
<td>4,535,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu Dictionary Board (Karachi)</td>
<td>5,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Govt. Urdu Arts College, Karachi</td>
<td>27,474,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.G. Urdu Science College, Karachi</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iqbal Academy (Lahore)</td>
<td>3,380,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iqbal Foundation Europe</td>
<td>473,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The state also set up chairs of Urdu in a number of foreign countries but most of these chairs are filled by social scientists rather than scholars of Urdu. Urdu is also a school subject for Pakistani
children in some foreign countries. Indeed, the Pakistani diaspora keeps Urdu alive more by watching Hindi films, dramas and attending functions where great Urdu literary people are invited than by investing in teaching Urdu to their children (Javed 1996). In some universities of the USA and Britain, Urdu is taught at the university level. The Berkeley Urdu programme running at Lahore enables American graduates and researchers to stay in Pakistan and learn Urdu. In Pakistan most of the major universities and many colleges offer MA in Urdu. At the MA level the traditional MA in Urdu is focused more on classical Urdu literature than the contemporary literary scene. At Karachi University, however, an MA in Urdu linguistics is also offered. This MA is of one year and it is available only to those with an MA in Literature. Although the MA course is comprehensive, it is somewhat puritanical. Thus it glosses over the erotic aspects or genres of Urdu literature (vasokht, sarapa sukhan, rekhti, etc.). Courses on Iqbal have been added in some universities for ideological reasons and at the Allama Iqbal Open University an MA degree is offered in the new subject of ‘Iqbaliat’ (studies on Iqbal). Iqbal is also a much repeated them in all textbooks of Urdu from class I onwards as has been analysed by Kamran (1993). However, believing in the ideological significance of Iqbal as he does, Kamran argues that Iqbal is being neglected at the MA level in all but the Open University (ibid.: 192–3). People less preoccupied with the ideological objectives of teaching Urdu could use Kamran’s own research to argue that Iqbal has been over represented for ideological, rather than literary, reasons.

On the whole, notwithstanding the ideological overtones of Urdu studies, it is by far the best learned language in Pakistani universities. Indeed, students who come to the colleges and universities are already competent in reading, writing, and speaking Urdu. Indeed, most educated Pakistanis, except perhaps in parts of Sindh, are more competent in writing Urdu than their own mother tongues. It is the second language of educated Pakistanis and the lingua franca of the urban areas. This is so because of the fact that it is taught so widely; and learnt by students because it empowers them by giving them the skills to obtain jobs and prestige even when they may resent the hegemony of Urdu for reasons of ethnic resistance or fear of losing their identity. The MA in Urdu is quite popular and is seen as being easier than the MA in English or the social sciences but it is not considered as easy as MA in languages like Persian, Arabic, and the indigenous languages of Pakistan.

The demand for it owes itself to the fact that Urdu is used in the lower domains of power in most areas of Pakistan. It is, next only to English, the language of employment and formal conversation, at least in the urban areas. It is also the major language of the media, business, and education. Hence people generally support its teaching on the assumption that if they do not know it they will not have access to power. That is why in the 1986 survey by the US Aid, 68 per cent people wanted Urdu to be used all day in grades I to III; 30 per cent suggested that it should be taught for one period a day and hardly anybody was of the opinion that it should not be taught at all. Even in Sindh, where the ethnic antagonism to Urdu is strong, 53 per cent people still agreed that it should be taught all day while 43 per cent people said it should be taught for one period a day in grades I to III (Appendix 11). In my own survey of the opinion of matriculation students, the students responded to Urdu as follows:
In other words, despite some ethnic resistance to Urdu (as in Sindh), ordinary people do want to acquire it and even students from English-medium schools want to study it as a subject. Such responses indicate that, quite apart from the symbolic significance of a language, people acquire it because of its market value.

Urdu, then, is very much at the centre of three highly explosive issues in Pakistani politics: ethnicity, militant Islam, and class conflict. The state teaches Urdu to counter ethnicity but this has two contradictory effects: first, it strengthens ethnic resistance because it keeps the grievance of suppressing ethnic languages alive; second, it strengthens the religious right because Urdu is associated with, and is used by, the religious right in Pakistan. But the religious right does not represent religion alone. It also represents the class-wise distribution of power (and resources which are a consequence of it). Over the years the poor and powerless masses of Pakistan, disillusioned with the ruling centrist establishment and the splintered left, have joined the forces of both ethnic nationalism and religious revivalism. Indeed, in the most populous province of Punjab as well as the NWFP, a large number of young militant madrassa students are people who are taking to the politics of the militant religious right because they feel they have been cheated of their rights. The upper echelons of liberals and the leftists, who should have favoured Urdu and the indigenous languages of the people, have generally favoured English. While this keeps the religious lobby at bay for the present, it creates grounds for a future struggle for power. The masses, deprived of elitist jobs for which English is required, deprived of respect which comes from being educated, deprived of their rights, deprived of power may rise in revolt to wrest power out of the hands of the English-using elite! It is a nightmare the ruling elite of Pakistan prefers not to contemplate. Much of the indignation against the Westernized lifestyles of the elite, though couched in the idiom of religion, is really an expression of the anger of the dispossessed. As Urdu (vis-à-vis English) is one of the symbols of the dispossessed in most of the urban centres of the country, it is intimately connected with class politics as well as ethnic politics in Pakistan.
9

ENGLISH IN PAKISTAN

English is taught as a subject and is the medium of instruction in elitist schools in Pakistan. Under the rubric of English a number of courses are offered: literary courses, pedagogical grammar taught through traditional methods of memorizing rules and newer methods popularized by the new emphasis on English language teaching (ELT). As we have noted before, English is in demand by students, their parents and aspiring members of the salariat because it is the language of the elitist domains of power not only in Pakistan but also internationally. David Crystal brings evidence that English is used in most of the domains of power and high culture all over the world. A summary of his findings may be useful in illustrating this fact:

Table 22 (1 of Chapter 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Per cent using English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>424 out of a sample of 500, i.e. 85 per cent. Top 5 newspapers of the world are in English. One-third of the world’s newspapers are published in English dominant countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>80 per cent electronically stored information is in English. The CNN and BBC are in English. Advertising is in English. Most top advertising agencies are US-owned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion Pictures</td>
<td>Between 80–85 per cent films are in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Music</td>
<td>In 1990 out of 557 pop groups, 549 (99 per cent) worked in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel (international)</td>
<td>The USA attracted 50,000 million dollars worth of tourism in 1992. Moreover, Americans spent 40,000 million dollars in travel internationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying</td>
<td>180 nations have adopted the recommendations of the Civil Aviation Organization about English terminology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language-teaching</td>
<td>In 1996 the British Council had a network of offices in 109 countries. Over 400,000 candidates sat in English language examinations. There are probably 1000 million people learning English now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Nearly 90 per cent of the 1500 papers listed in the Linguistic Abstracts in 1995 were in English. It is also the language of publication in most other subjects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crystal 1997.

The 1986 report by US Aid reported that out of the people surveyed only 7 per cent opposed the teaching of English for classes VI to VIII; 27 per cent people wanted it to be taught all day in high school while the rest wanted one period a day, (Appendices 11, 12 & 13). The Society of the Pakistani English Language Teachers (SPELT) also carried out a survey on a sample of teachers of English in 1985 in which to the question why English should be taught, approximately 90 per cent replied that it should be taught because it is an international language. The only difference among the teachers was as to when it should begin: 73 per cent suggested from class I whereas 32 per cent preferred class III (SPELT 1986: 23). The survey I carried out on the opinion of students of matriculation also indicates that most students, except madrassa ones, want to be taught English at least as one language if not as the only language or as a medium of instruction. The demand for English is not incompatible with the fact that many people resent English. They resent it for various reasons: anti-colonial sentiment; feeling that the quest for English is
servile and hence against national prestige; or because they do not know it, cannot afford to buy it, and feel cheated. At the same time most people actually want to learn it because they feel sure that the system will not change and if they, or their children, do not know English they will always stay, as it were,

Table 3 (2 of Chapter 9)
Students’ Desire to Learn English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.2 Desired as medium of instruction?</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>13.65</td>
<td>79.38</td>
<td>67.44</td>
<td>47.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.3(a) Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>12.31</td>
<td>19.59</td>
<td>17.44</td>
<td>15.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.3(b) Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?</td>
<td>25.29</td>
<td>41.68</td>
<td>37.69</td>
<td>55.65</td>
<td>75.58</td>
<td>38.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 14.7. All figures, except those in brackets, are percentages. Because of overlaps figures do not add up to 100. Question 3, given in full in Appendix 14, has been broken up in two parts here.

in the ghetto. Languages other than English are, in various degrees, ghettoizing; hence the demand for it. This demand leads to a large supply of institutions for teaching the language. One way of approaching the teaching of English, then, is to focus on the institutions which use it as a medium of instruction or teach it otherwise. These are (a) English-medium schools (b) vernacular-medium schools (c) madrassas (d) English-language-teaching institutions (e) institutions of higher education.

**English-medium Schools**

All over the cities of Pakistan one can see boards advertising institutions which claim to be English-medium schools or tuition ‘centres’ claiming to teach spoken English and English for passing all kinds of examinations and interviews. They are in areas ranging from the most affluent to slums and even in the rural areas. Indeed, going by numbers alone, more of them are located in middle-class, lower-middle-class and even in working-class areas than in the most expensive localities of the cities. Except by the claim made by the boards, they share little else in common. It is a far cry from the rolling green grounds of Aitchison College in Lahore to a two-room house in a slum which advertises itself as the ‘Oxford and Cambridge Islamic English-medium school’. Indeed, if there is anything which links such diverse establishments together it is that they cater to the persistent public demand for English education. English is still the key for a good future—a future with human dignity if not public deference; a future with material comfort if not prosperity; a future with that modicum of security, human rights and recognition which all
human beings desire. So, irrespective of what the state provides, parents are willing to part with scarce cash to buy their children such a future.

The English-medium schools are of three major types: (a) state-influenced elitist public schools (b) private elitist schools (c) non-elitist schools. Within each category are sub-categories. Indeed, the non-elitist English-medium schools are so varied that they defy classification. Let us, however, focus only on the major categories in order to understand what type of language-teaching is carried out in them. The state-influenced institutions are the top public schools, the federal government model schools, and the armed forces schools. While most of the cadet colleges and public schools are elitist institutions, some of the federal government and other schools of state institutions are not elitist. For the purposes of classification, I have included institutions charging a tuition fees of Rs 1500 per month and above as elitist institutions. Ordinary government schools have tuition fees ranging between Rs 2 to Rs 25 per month while private and state-controlled non-elitist English schools, or ordinary English-medium schools as they have been called in this survey, charge tuition ranging between Rs 50 to Rs 1499 per month. There is, however, another complication. In the schools run by institutions—the armed forces, customs, PIA, telephone and telegraph, universities—the tuition fees is less for children of the employees or beneficiaries and more for other peoples’ children. In such cases the fees paid by non-beneficiaries has been taken as the criterion in the survey of opinion of students conducted by me (Survey 2000: Appendix 14). The top public schools, like the famous Aitchison College in Lahore, were based upon the aristocratic model of the English public schools. Their function was to produce a loyal, Anglicized, elitist Indian who would understand, sympathize with and support the British Raj in India (for details see Rahman 1996: 48–53). When Pakistan was established the elitist Mohajir children coming from English-medium schools in India were enrolled in similar institutions in Pakistan. For instance, a government report tells us that seventy-three students from such institutions (out of which thirteen were in their O’level classes) were admitted in ‘the European Schools in Karachi’ (Zaidi 1999: 56). In short, the parallel system of elitist schooling did not change because of the establishment of Pakistan. Indeed, as the military and the higher bureaucracy both came from this elite, these schools multiplied in Pakistan as the professional middle-class started expanding in the sixties. The state now invested in creating cadet colleges and public schools. The armed forces were generally involved in the cadet colleges, either as members of the Board of Governors or as administrators and instructors, so that the education, and hence the world view, of the officer corps of the future as well as other upper-middle-class functionaries would be under the influence of the state and, more specifically, of the military. Thus the Military College at Jhelum; the Cadet Colleges at Petaro, Kohat, Razmak, Hasanabdal; the Army Burn Hall Colleges (Abbottabad); Public School Sargodha and Lower Topa, and the Lawrence College at Ghora Gali are all influenced, in varying degrees, by the armed forces. In addition to that the PAF has its model schools, the navy has its Bahria colleges, and the army has a variety of institutions ranging from schools run by brigades to colleges run by the Fauji Foundation and even universities. In the case of the Military College (Jhelum) and Army Burn Hall, the principals are serving army officers. The navy controls Petaro while the air force runs Sargodha. In the other institutions either the Chairman of the Board of Governors is a senior serving officer or adjutants from the army are posted in the school. In some cases retired military officers are principals or administrators. In short, elitist public schools of Pakistan are as much influenced by the military as their counterparts in England were by the Anglican Church upto the nineteenth century. The federal government has its own model schools, some controlled or influenced by the army at the highest level, and there are elitist public schools under boards of governors such as the Boys Public School and College in Abbottabad and the Sadiq Public School in Bahawalpur. Other state-controlled bodies such as the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the Customs Department, the Pakistan Railways, the Telephone
Foundation, and the Police also run English-medium schools. As mentioned earlier, they provide schooling in English, though of varying quality, for an affordable fees from their own employees while charging much higher fees from the ordinary public. The armed forces, besides controlling many English-medium schools, also get subsidized education for their dependents from some elitist English-medium schools located in garrisons and cantonments. This means that English-medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of wealth or that of power. And this has not happened through market forces but has been brought about by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself. Indeed, the state has invested heavily in creating a parallel system of education for the elite, especially the elite which would presumably run elitist state institutions in future. This leads to the conclusion that the state does not trust its own system of education and spends public funds to create and maintain the parallel, elitist system of schooling. This strategy of private subversion of publicly stated policies is not peculiar to Pakistan. David D. Laitin, for instance, tells us that in Kazakhstan laws for the learning and use of the Kazakh language were enacted in 1989 but there are ‘ardent nationalists who vote to promote “their” language, yet send their children to more cosmopolitan schools, where the national language is given at best symbolic support’ (Laitin 1998: 137). This kind of strategy is observable in all situations where a more empowering language is in clash with a less empowering one. The less empowering one is generally allowed to become the language of the masses while the more empowering one is the preserve of the elite. Such an unjust policy can be reversed but it is generally not. In Pakistan, for instance, it is still in place after more than half a century of the country’s existence. The non-elitist system of education, fully dependent upon the state, functions for the most part in Urdu (or in Sindhi and Pashto at places) and gets step-motherly treatment in the allocation of funds, maintenance of buildings, quality of teachers, provision of qualities, and so on. Most significantly, the non-elitist stream of public education functions in the vernacular rather than in English which means, prima facie, that its products would have greater difficulty in the competition for lucrative and powerful jobs and participation in the elitist domains of power than their English-educated counterparts.

Because of this obvious injustice, the English schools have always been criticized. Ayub Khan, as General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan, was so insensitive to public criticism that he makes the following observation concerning Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin’s reluctance to establish them. Remarks Ayub:

I never quite understood what they were afraid of. Perhaps they thought that general reaction to the establishment of public schools would not be favourable (A. Khan 1967: 25).

That it was not a question of ‘perhaps’ was brought home to Ayub Khan when he did establish a number of such schools and resentment was clearly articulated against them.

Despite the fact that the state used the vocabulary of social justice about the schools, nobody was taken in. For instance, the Report of the Commission on National Education (1959) says:

The former Punjab Government, at the initiative of the army, established a pre-cadet college at Hasan Abdal. This provides education of five years from classes VIII to XII with a particular bias towards a career in the defence services. Nearly 33% of the seats are reserved for free students and 33% at half fees, based on a means test. The school is thus able to draw on the best talent from the poorer classes and it has been extremely successful (Edn. Com. 1959: 142).

The Commission was much impressed with Hasan Abdal and recommended the establishment of more institutions of its kind. However, the students who rose in revolt against Ayub Khan’s education policies, did not think that these schools were meant to serve the poor. Thus, the
students of East Pakistan went on a massive strike on 17 September 1962 and in Peshawar there were student-led disturbances on 10 and 11 December 1964 (CSPW 1966: 6). Among other things the students demanded that Pakistani languages should be used as media of instruction; that missionary schools be banned; and that all schools should be brought at par (CSPW 1966: Appendix C). In short, what the students really wanted was to protest against the injustice of making some people proficient in a language giving access to the best jobs while neglecting most other people. The more radical ones wanted such an iniquitous system to be abolished.

The Commission on Students Problems and Welfare, appointed to investigate into these demands, flatly refused to make any changes. About the state-influenced English schools the Commission said:

As regards institutions of this type run by the government the general complaint is that the government spends much more on them than the ordinary type of institutions maintained by it. There is some justification for this complaint. Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defence service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations. They have not been in existence long enough to enable us to judge the quality of their end products, but we cannot help observing that we are unable to appreciate the principle upon which such a discrimination is sought to be made by the government, particularly in view of the constitutional assurance given in paragraph 15 under Right No. VI to the effect that “all citizens are equal before law” (CSPW 1966: 18).

But such pieties had no effect on the state which kept on investing in such elitist institutions in the name of defence, modernization and efficiency. Even General Ziaul Haq, dictator though he might be, had to reverse his policy which would have abolished the elitist English schools. As we have seen in the last chapter, his government’s educational policy of 1979 proposing to abolish the English-medium schools had to be abandoned in 1987. Even now, the cost of building and running an English school (a cadet college, armed forces school or federal model school), is far more than a vernacular-medium state school. The present costs of the establishment of some cadet colleges and ordinary, non-elitist schools are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Cost in 1998–99 (in Pakistani rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadet College Palandri</td>
<td>8,181,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet College Razmak</td>
<td>11,887,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet College Sanghar</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet College Larkana</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Federal Model School for Boys G-10/4 Islamabad</td>
<td>6,517,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular-medium High</td>
<td>3,580,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The cost of setting up four new primary schools in a developed sector of Islamabad is reported to be merely Rs 2,656,000 in the same year (*Expenditure* Vol. 2, 1999: 1676). Islamabad is more
expensive than other cities and even the Urdu-medium schools of the federal government are much better than the same type of schools in the rural areas. In short, the state spends much more of the taxpayer’s money on the schooling of the elite through English than of the masses through the vernaculars.

Private Elitist Schools

In the sixties when the students protested against Ayub Khan’s policies, the private elitist schools were generally run by the missionaries. They were the famous convents of the Pakistani cities—Saint Mary’s (Rawalpindi); Presentation Convent (Murree); Burn Hall (Abbottabad)—which created an atmosphere where students not only studied English in the classroom but spoke it informally to each other. These students were perceived by vernacular-educated people as being glib-tongued, ultra modern, snobbish, European-attired boys and forward young misses. They were at once the envy and despair of their vernacular-educated counterparts. No wonder, the vernacular-educated students, in their protest against the superior airs of their English-school counterparts, called them ‘snobs’. The Commission on Students Welfare tried to refute the angry students observing that:

We have no evidence that these schools have really produced any such snobs as suggested by the students, nor have we any evidence that their students usually secure better positions in public examinations. We are not, therefore, in a position to say that the continuance of these schools is harmful to the community and that as such, they should be stopped (CSPW 1966: 18).

In fact, there is a lot of evidence that the products of such schools came from richer and more powerful families than their vernacular-educated counterparts and did consider themselves superior to them even without reference to their privileged schooling. Schooling, however, gave them an obvious marker of elitist identity: the spontaneous and natural use of Pakistani English in an accent nearer to the British pronunciation than that of other Pakistanis. Moreover, what increased their self-esteem was the fact that they did, indeed, fare better in the Inter Services Selection Board (ISSB); the armed forces academies; the superior civil services examinations, and other elitist jobs in the sixties. Moreover, they felt that no drawing room, however posh; no club, however exclusive; no organization, however elitist—both in Pakistan and abroad—was closed to them. English was much more than a language; it was a badge of status; a marker of elitist upbringing. It gave confidence and even without wishing to sound snobbish, the fluent speakers of English from the English-medium schools (especially from the elitist missionary schools who spoke even better English than their counterparts from the cadet colleges) appeared snobbish to others.

The novelist Nasir Ahmad Farooqi describes the English-school types of the fifties very well. In his novels they study English literature, or at least the Romantic poets; abbreviate their names to sound like English names; drink in clubs; read The Times and the English press. ‘Young men go to Oxford, and return to work for the Government or British companies’ (Farooqi 1968: 9). Their tastes are English and they think it no disgrace not to be able to write their mother tongue better than English. Indeed, if that mother tongue is Punjabi, it is often considered not respectable enough to be used on any formal occasion and, in some cases, even at home. This being so, Vittachi’s perception that such people are Brown Sahibs is not very far from the truth (Vittachi 1987). And, of course, Brown Sahibs did appear as stuck-up and snobbish to the common people. Thus the students did have a point, which the representatives of the state did not accept, when they complained that elite schools created snobs. This point was, however, accepted by a later
government report—the one which was presided over by Air Marshal Nur Khan—when it conceded that there was ‘almost a caste-like distinction between those who feel at ease in expressing themselves in English and those who do not’ (Edn. Pro. 1969: 14). This ‘ease’ was a matter of style, mannerism, and world view. As mentioned above the English-school students talked in English, very often in slang borrowed from comic books, informally with each other. Their body-language was different from that of other students. For instance, the boys did not shake hands in the manner of ordinary Pakistani boys. While the latter put in much warmth in hand shakes and shook every males’ hand, English-school products shook hands much more casually and often merely waved at people standing away. They (the English-school people) never did the double hand-shake nor did they bend their body as a gesture of humility when they shook hands. Other aspects of the body language—the gait, the way one sits down, drinks, eats, etc.—of both type of people are also different though some differences can only be perceived by continued interaction and cannot be described easily. What is most important is that the products of English-schools thought differently from their vernacular-school products; that there was a difference in world view between them. To this difference, as it is relevant for us, we will come later.

Before ending this section it must be pointed out that the convents are no longer seen as the most elitist of the English-medium private schools. Their place has now been taken over by private Pakistani schools. Among the most well-known school chains of this kind are the Beaconhouse and the City School systems. Other such schools in Islamabad are Roots, Froebels, Arts and Science Academy, Khaldunia School, and so on. These schools first came up in the seventies and eighties and are multiplying even now. Their tuition fees ranges from between Rs 1500 to over Rs 7500 per month. They also charge a high admission fees ranging between Rs 15,000 to 30,000. Moreover there are incidental expenses, examination fees and high expenses for textbooks, stationery and uniform. These expenses exclude not only the poor but even the middle-class from these schools. In some places there are concessions for the armed forces because the schools are built in the fashionable part of the city which happens to be the cantonment because that was the part of the city which the British developed along European, suburban lines and which still gets funds and good administrative attention. In short, English, always an elite preserve in South Asia, is still available to the elite of money and power. The common people find difficulty in having access to it.

Products of English schools either go abroad to join multinational corporations and the international bureaucracy or drift back home to fashionable NGOs and foreign banks. Not as many join either the civil bureaucracy or the officer corps of the armed forces as before (in the fifties and sixties). Those who do appear in the armed forces and civil service competitive examinations do better than their vernacular-educated counterparts. As the armed forces release no figures, one can only conjecture by personal observation that those who are most fluent in English are at a great advantage in their career. For the bureaucracy, however, figures are available to confirm that products of English schools stand better chances of passing in the public service examination.
Table 25 (4 of Chapter 9)

Results of Civil Service Examinations Expressed in Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared %</th>
<th>Passed %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular-medium (including pseudo-English-medium)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Those classified here as pseudo-English-medium institutions are not given as such in the reports. They are such Federal Government and private schools which claim to be English-medium. They are described in more detail below. Here it is sufficient to note that they are included among the vernacular-medium schools because their students are only marginally more competent in English than the students of vernacular-medium schools.

Private Non-elitist Schools

By far the largest number of the so-called English-medium schools are English-medium only in name. According to a 1987 survey of Rawalpindi-Islamabad there were sixty English-medium schools in Islamabad and 250 in Rawalpindi. Out of these 250 only thirty-nine were recognized schools (Awan 1987). In the matriculation examinations of 1999, a total of 119,673 candidates appeared from the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore. Out of these, according to the records in the Boards’ office, 6923 (5.8 per cent) were from English-medium schools. Most of these candidates (6448) were from the city itself. The recent survey conducted by the government has given a total of 33,893 institutions of general education in the private sector. Though the medium of instruction is not given most of them profess to be English-medium schools (Census Private 2001: 12). And, indeed, one can see such schools concentrated in the cities though they are fast appearing even in small towns now all over the country. Their fees ranges between Rs 50 to Rs 1500 per month which is far higher than the average state vernacular school but lower than that of the elitist private English school. In these schools a pretence is made of teaching most subjects in English. In general teachers write answers of all subjects on the board which students faithfully copy, memorize and reproduce in the examination.

The Principal of the Federal Government Girls High Secondary Model School in Islamabad said that her school was only a ‘so-called’ English school. Only mathematics and science subjects were taught in English while all the other subjects were taught in Urdu. And yet, so high is the demand for English, that there are about 3000 students half of whom attend the evening classes (Iffat Naqvi Int. 1999).

The Federal Government Model schools, cadet colleges, elitist public schools, and armed forces schools do, however, teach English at a higher standard than the vernacular-medium schools. Especially the public schools, mindful of their elitist reputation, try to supplement the Textbook Board’s prescribed books with others. From IX, however, they adhere to the prescribed
syllabi which are meant to promote Pakistani nationalism as has been mentioned earlier and will be touched upon again.

Recently, chains of non-elitist English-medium schools run by organized bodies have sprung up in Pakistan. One such organization is Language Enhancement and Achievement Programme (LEAP) run by the Aga Khan Education Service in the Northern Areas and Chitral. LEAP courses ‘attempt to impart teacher-specific language and to improve teachers’ command of classroom language’. The teachers are taught English for three months in courses. The programme started in May 1996 and focussed on D.H. Howe’s Active English which is taught in English-medium schools in Pakistan. In 1997 the programme was also extended to Chitral. It was expected to train eighty-eight teachers in Chitral and 132 in the Northern Areas by the end of 1997. By the end of 1997 there were over twenty English-medium schools in the Gilgit and Ghizer districts which sent their teachers to the LEAP courses. In short, LEAP is increasing competence in English at the school level in a hitherto neglected area of Pakistan (this information is from LEAP 1997 & field research).

Another chain of schools goes by the name of Hira English-medium schools. It has been created by the Hira Educational Project which is based in Lahore. The aim of this project is to educate students along both Islamic and modern lines. Thus Arabic and Islamic moral lessons are taught from class I but the books of science and mathematics are in English. Social studies is in Urdu and Urdu is compulsory. Since the children are from modest backgrounds, as are the teachers, interaction is generally in Urdu or the local language. The author found class I children mostly speaking in Kalam Kohistani in Hira School Matiltan, nine kilometers from Kalam (Swat), though the teachers spoke to them in Urdu (Nabi Int. 1998).

Yet another chain of the Islamic schools, both Urdu- and English-medium, is the Siqara school system. A girls’ school in a lower-middle-class locality in Lahore makes both students and teachers wear the hijab (scarf covering the head and breasts) while books are checked for their anti-Islamic content. Indeed, the principal of one of the boy’s schools of the Siqara system told me that he had changed the pictures of women by drawing full sleeves and head scarves by his own pen in English books for use in their schools.

Indeed, it seems that the Islamic revivalist thinkers have realized how empowering English is and want to attract lower income groups through it. Thus, Khalid Ahmed has a point when he says that ‘90 per cent’ of the English-medium institutions—not only schools, of course—are middle-class ‘Islamist institutions’ (Ahmed 1999: 5). While the figure of the percentage may be contested, there is no doubt that Islamists, especially those who are politically oriented, teach English because it enables students to enter the mainstream for positions of power in the salariat. This policy has also been endorsed by the Jamaat-e-Islami which, while being against English-medium elitist schools, does not deny either secular education or English to the students who study in its institutions.

The products of these schools are, in any case, less Westernized than those of the elitist English schools—especially schools with students from Westernized families. They are also not as fluent in English as the students of missionary schools used to be and the private elitist schools are even now. In Senior Army Burn Hall, where the author was a student between 1960–65, students used to speak English with each other and with the teachers. Now, however, they do not. The principal, however, said that he still used English with the students (Arshad Int. 1997). This is more or less the situation in other similar schools.

The products of these schools, especially those which are run or influenced by the armed forces, are more nationalistic and militaristic than their counterparts from the private elitist English schools. This is not, however, the consequence of the texts they read but also because their teachers, families, and peers come from professional, middle-class backgrounds whose world view has been shaped by urban, state-created intellectual forces rather than foreign ones.
Even upto class IX the students of state-influenced English schools are exposed to the Pakistani world view through texts, interaction with teachers, family and peers. From class IX onwards all the books they study are prescribed by textbook boards. They do study subjects in English—in some schools, however, Pakistan Studies is in Urdu—but their books are saturated with state-sponsored ideology.

The main Urdu textbook is Muraqqa-e-Urdu which has a number of essays on Islamic personalities, historical personages from the Pakistan movement, and war heroes. There is a slim section on poetry but amorous verse—which constitutes the best ghazals—is conspicuous by its absence. The English texts are of a similar kind. Apart from the usual essays on the historical personalities there are essays on the low intensity conflict going on between India and Pakistan on the Siachin glacier, the highest battlefield in the world. This war is represented as a triumph of heroism. In short, the ideological content of English texts is not much different from Urdu ones.

There may, however, be some difference in the way different teachers indoctrinate their students. The common perception of a large number of students and teachers is that the teachers of Urdu are more orthodox, supportive of middle-class, Islamic, and nationalist values than teachers of English. The teachers’ values and attitudes, however, generally reflect his or her class background, socialization, education, and personality. Since puritanical Islam, chauvinism, and militarism are supported by the middle-classes, especially the educated lower-middle-class, teachers from this background tend to incorporate their class world view into their teaching.

Curricula of Elitist English-medium Schools

The curricula of the elitist English-medium schools and the other English-medium schools is different. Let us first take the curricula of elitist schools like Beaconhouse, City School, Froebels, and so on. The books on English and Urdu—the only languages taught in these schools—are generally not of the Pakistani Textbook Boards till class IX and then only if the student wants to appear in the Pakistani matriculation (class X) examination. Some schools, like Froebels, do not even permit their students to appear in the matriculation examination. All students take the British ordinary and advanced level school certificate examinations. Thus, most students study books originally written for Western school children. Some books have been especially reprinted for Pakistan but the changes made in them are minor—the clothes of women are Pakistani and characters sometimes have Pakistani names—while other books are still meant for a Western readership. These texts socialize a child into English-speaking Western culture. Children read about such classics as Lorna Doone, Little Women, Wuthering Heights, and Tom Brown’s School Days and famous figures like Florence Nightingale and so on. The world portrayed here is Western, middle-class, and successful. It is a secular world of nuclear families where the household chores are generally performed by women though they are sometimes seen as doing other work too. The overwhelming message of the texts is liberal and secular. Concepts like the segregation or veiling of women, ubiquitous religiosity, sectarianism or ethnicity get no support.

Even the Urdu textbooks, as mentioned in the previous chapter, are published by private publishers and are less supportive of state ideology than those of the textbook boards. However, all Pakistani children have to study Urdu, Pakistan Studies, and Islamic Studies which expose them to official state ideology in varying degrees. In the 1950s and the early 60s elitist English-medium school children did not study such subjects at all and may have been more Westernized than even elitist children are today.

As for the schools in the third, as it were lumpen category, they are more or less close to the vernacular-medium schools than the English schools which they claim to be. This is because their fee structure and lack of facilities attract students from socio-economic backgrounds where
English is hardly used. Similarly, their salary structure only attracts teachers who are not fluent—indeed not even tolerably competent—in English at all. Curricula and examinations are in English. However, they are only one aspect of teaching English. The other aspect is the quality of teaching and the third, and most important, is the frequency of informal interaction with English-using people. Formal training of teachers appears to me to be far less important than their command of the language. The salaries of schools, even of elitist schools, are not attractive enough for men from elitist English-using backgrounds. Women, especially women from affluent families, are, however, attracted by these salaries because they do not have to support the whole family only on their income. If these women are from English-using backgrounds, they speak to their students both within the class-room and outside it in a natural manner in English. This provides the students the key component of interaction with English-using people—something which less Anglicized schools lack.

But even more important than the teachers are students’ playmates and members of the family as far as informal interaction is concerned. If they are from English-using backgrounds the child gets exposure to English not only in the classroom but also outside it. Indeed, it is this exposure which makes the crucial difference between a child from a good English-medium school and a mediocre one. The former learns to interact in English in an informal way, a point I mentioned earlier in the context of the alleged snobbery of English-school students. It bears repetition that the English of elitist school products is spontaneous and is pronounced differently from the English of other Pakistanis (I have described it in my book *Pakistani English* [1990] earlier).

Thus fluency and spontaneity in the use of English is not so much a product of courses of study, techniques of teaching, and examinations. It is, above all, a product of exposure to English in the informal domain. But this exposure cannot be provided in the school alone no matter how hard the teachers work and whichever books are prescribed. It is, in the last analysis, a byproduct of power—of Anglicization which is the preserve of powerful and affluent people. They use English at home and their children are exposed to it even before joining school. Women from these families, educated in elitist English schools themselves, become English-using teachers and provide role models for their pupils. The whole atmosphere of school, playground, and home is English-using. Even the leisure hours of the children expose them to English. They watch English cartoons; read English comic books; English children’s fiction; English popular fiction, and are constantly exposed to CNN, BBC and TV programmes in English. Thus, children in rich and expensive English schools, but not in English schools in less affluent or less Anglicized areas, become fluent and spontaneous in English. In short, command over English is related to power and its corollaries—Anglicization of culture, possession of wealth, and so on. Thus, command over English is highest in the elitist schools followed by the state-influenced English schools, the non-elitist English schools and is least in the vernacular-medium schools.

To conclude, the children of English schools can be roughly divided into two kinds. The products of the elitist private schools, especially those which have a large majority of children from Westernized elitist homes; and those of the state-influenced schools. There are, of course, shades between these rough categories nor is any category definable in a precise way. Very roughly, then, the former are more Westernized than other Pakistani children. The negative consequence of this is that they are alienated from Pakistan, especially from its indigenous languages and cultures. This makes some of them look down upon most things indigenous. While such people are neither aware nor in sympathy with the values, feelings and aspirations of their countrymen they are generally believers in liberal-humanist and democratic values. Thus they are less susceptible to sectarian prejudices or the persecution of Hindus, Ahmedis and non-Muslims in Pakistan. Being less exposed to nationalistic and militaristic propaganda they are also less prone than others to India-bashing and undue glorification of war and the military.

The products of the state-influenced English schools have more in common with middle-class
urban Pakistanis than the ones we have just described. However, like them, they too are alienated from villagers and have little understanding of the indigenous cultures of the country. They are not susceptible to sectarian prejudices but, being nationalistic and militaristic, they are quite anti-India and supportive of the military. The views of matriculation students from the relevant types of schools is as follows:

Table 26 (of Chapter 9)

Students’ Views about Sensitive Political Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 13. What should be Pakistan’s priorities?</th>
<th>Cadet Colleges (N=86)</th>
<th>Elitist English-medium (N=97)</th>
<th>Ordinary English-medium (N=119)</th>
<th>Urdu-medium (N=520)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conquer Kashmir?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>88.37</td>
<td>62.89</td>
<td>88.24</td>
<td>95.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>06.98</td>
<td>31.96</td>
<td>06.72</td>
<td>02.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Care</td>
<td>04.65</td>
<td>05.15</td>
<td>05.04</td>
<td>02.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Nuclear Weapons?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>64.95</td>
<td>73.11</td>
<td>79.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>18.49</td>
<td>13.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Care</td>
<td>05.81</td>
<td>08.25</td>
<td>08.40</td>
<td>06.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Sharia’h?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>52.58</td>
<td>86.55</td>
<td>95.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>05.81</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>01.68</td>
<td>01.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Care</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>02.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Ahmedis equal rights?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>33.72</td>
<td>53.61</td>
<td>47.90</td>
<td>44.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>39.54</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>33.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Care</td>
<td>26.74</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>22.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Hindus/Christians equal rights?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>41.86</td>
<td>57.73</td>
<td>51.26</td>
<td>56.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36.05</td>
<td>20.62</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>23.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Care</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>21.65</td>
<td>21.01</td>
<td>19.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 14.7. All numbers, except those in brackets, are percentages.

As we can see in the chart above, the students of the ordinary English-medium schools are similar in their responses to those of Urdu-medium ones. The students of the elitist English-medium schools are notably less prone to an aggressive policy on Kashmir and are most liberal towards Ahmedis.

All the products of English schools, even those which are English-medium only in name, agree in regarding themselves as an elite—not of money and power, which they are, but that of talent and knowledge. They hold the products of the government vernacular-medium schools in open contempt. Indeed, to be ‘Urdu-medium’ or ‘Paendo’ [rustic], is a term of derision among them. The English schools, then, produce snobs with only one redeeming feature—some of these snobs, because of their liberal-humanist values, support human rights, democracy and freedom.

Vernacular-medium Schools

In most of the vernacular-medium schools—Urdu and Sindhi ones—English is not a second language (that is generally Urdu) but a foreign language. It is alien and intimidating both for teachers, who are not competent in it, and students.

The way English is taught leaves much to be desired. According to a report of 1982, which
evaluated the teaching of English in twenty Urdu-medium high schools in Lahore district, it was found that the students could not speak or understand English nor could they read it for pleasure or write anything creative in it. They could, however, read their lessons and simple sentences in it. Even at this girls were better than boys and schools in cities were better than those in villages and small towns (Curriculum 1982). As mentioned before, this state of affairs can be explained by the fact that one learns languages both by formal teaching and informal exposure to them. English is hardly ever used outside the class and even within it, it is explained for the most part through the vernaculars. In the nursery classes, which I visited in some areas of Pakistan, the English book is read out by the teacher and explained word by word and line by line in the vernacular. After that a pupil stands before the class and reads out the lesson in a sing-song voice. After every line he or she stops and the whole class repeats the line in chorus. Exercises are written out on the blackboard as are letters and paragraphs in senior classes and the pupils simply copy the specimens. The pupils, coming from humble backgrounds, do not encounter English outside the classroom. They do not listen to English songs, nor do they read English books or comics nor even do they watch English movies. Thus, apart from the textbooks and classrooms, they are not exposed to English till they pass high school. No wonder, the students of vernacular schools do not learn English very well.

One anomaly in the vernacular-medium government schools is that there are two systems of teaching English in them. According to the older system English began to be taught from class VI. According to the new one English begins in class I. It was in 1989 that the first Benazir Bhutto’s PPP government decided to introduce English as an additional subject from class I. The decision was implemented in selected schools in Sindh and NWFP in 1990. The other provinces too accepted the proposal in principle. In NWFP the hurriedly prepared textbooks were used only for one year and then had to be withdrawn. Later on the National English Language Institute (NELI), established in 1987, submitted a new curriculum for English Language Teaching (ELT) for classes I to XII. However, as the NELI report had predicted, the experiment was not successful. Indeed, NELI itself was abolished and even now all schools do not teach English from class I. The new system, therefore, runs parallel with the old one in Pakistan. In general, however, English still begins from class VI. Thus, not all children are taught English for the same number of years in the government vernacular-medium schools. Also, because the books for teaching English up to class VI are less ideologically burdened, not all children in the same system of education are exposed to the same number or degree of ideological messages. Those who take up English from class VI onwards are exposed to higher, though not as high as in the case of Urdu, ideological doses.

This last point, about ideological biases which tend to create or reinforce a certain world view, will be dealt with in detail later. The percentage of ideological lessons (8 per cent) in the textbooks of English from class I to X is quite low. Hence English is the least ideologically-burdened language. Moreover, the ability to read it gives access to the liberal humanist and democratic world view. Thus, from the point of view of influences on one’s world view, the students of the vernacular schools are less exposed to liberal values than those of elitist English ones.

**Madressas**

As mentioned earlier, the madrassas were meant to conserve the traditional, Islamic world view. Thus English, which was associated with modernity, was resisted by them. The state, however, wanted to integrate the madrassas or, as Jamal Malik (1996) argues, ‘colonialize’ them. For this purpose it tried to teach the ulema English, Urdu, and Social Studies.
As mentioned earlier, Ayub Khan’s Commission on National Education emphasized Urdu and English. At the secondary level, indeed, English was recommended as the alternative medium of instruction (the other being Arabic). The relevant changes proposed by the Commission are as follows:

Table 27 (6 of Chapter 9)

|ヒッテデヤウラ | タタノウ | タンサビ | ファウクニ | アラ/'ラ |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 5 years | 3 years | 2 years | 2 years | 3 years |
| 1–5 class | 6–8 class | 9–10 class | 11–12 class | 13–15 class |
| Language texts used in government schools | Modern Arabic Literature, English | Modern English (Urdu as optional) | Additional subject | English as an additional subject |


If the madrassa students read the textbooks written by the textbook boards they would be exposed, like the other students, to nationalism as the major ideological motive of these books is to create a modern citizen and a Pakistani nationalist. Moreover, if the ulema learnt to read English, arguably some of them would encounter alien ideologies such as socialism, human rights, feminism, and liberal democracy on their own rather than through the polemical refutations of these ideas taught to them in their final year. In short, as the ulema realized, changes in language-teaching threatened their world view. Moreover, at least some of the ulema seem to regard English as a symbol of the West, i.e. the most powerful non-Muslim powers upon earth. Thus a senior teacher of a Barelvi madrassa said recently that ‘today Muslims are using language of non-Muslims (English) for communication’ (Amin 1998: 61). In other words, English was symbolic of an alien, non- (and anti-) Muslim identity and therefore to be suspected. Not surprisingly, then, they opposed the reformers strongly and they ‘were translated into action in a limited way’ (Report 1962, in J. Malik 1996: 128)—so ‘limited’ indeed that the average madrassa student has a medieval perception of the world: that it is divided into believers and non-believers and that the latter are enemies.

Table 28 (7 of Chapter 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Institutions Teaching English</th>
<th>Students Learning English</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (8 class)</td>
<td>Matric (10 class)</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>206,778</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>88,147</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>71,639</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B’tan</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>40,390</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43,447</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7,858</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Areas</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12,150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2862</td>
<td>470,409</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gradually, however, the madrassas gained more confidence and became inclined to revivalism in place of conservatism. The Islamic revolution of Iran and the rise of the Taliban increased the confidence of the religious lobby and they felt that they could appropriate some power-giving aspects of the modern age without compromising the essence of their commitment to an Islamic form of government and society. One of the results of this appears to be the teaching of English to students. All the avowedly revivalist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami-I-Islami and the Dawat-i-Islami (green turbans) teach English. The International Islamic University, which has a revivalist agenda, not only teaches it to all students but even allows an MA course to be run in it though an attempt is made to Islamize this MA by teaching Arabic and Islamic ideology in it (Khwaja Int. 1999 and Prospectus of MA English: 114). Even the traditional madrassas have started teaching English though the change is slow here. Table 29 indicates how slow it is.

Some sub-sects emphasize more upon English than others. The sub-sect-wise teaching of English is as follows:

**Table 29 (8 of Chapter 9)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Sect</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Textbooks used</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deobandis</td>
<td>Published by the Central organization.</td>
<td>The printed syllabus does not mention English. Some madrassas do, however, teach it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barelvis</td>
<td></td>
<td>The printed syllabus mentions no book but some madrassas teach it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl-e-Hadith</td>
<td>9th to BA</td>
<td>Textbook Board’s.</td>
<td>English is one of the two books options (out of Pakistan Studies, General Mathematics, English and General Science). At the higher level Political Science and Economics are the options in place of General Science and Mathematics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td></td>
<td>The printed syllabus mentions no book but some madrassas teach it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Jamaat-e-Islami-I-Islami schools, as mentioned earlier, teach English up to the BA level. They mostly use the textbooks of the government schools but these are supplemented by their own English textbooks at places (Amiruddin Int. 1999). As mentioned earlier the syllabi of the Deobandi madrassas do not mention English but it is taught in some institutions. In some *maktabs* (class I to V), the textbooks of the Boards of Education are used. In some madrassas textbooks written by the Wafaq ul Madaris are used. The present author saw Wafaq ul Madaris’ class VIII textbook which had seventeen lessons out of which ten were on Islamic personalities and themes while the remaining seven were on the continents of the world. In some madrassas arrangements are made to teach English by hiring a teacher. The teacher uses his own material and often examines the students himself (Saeedi Int. 1999). The Dawat-i-Islami (green turbans) also claim to teach English using the textbooks of the Textbook Boards. Some institutions which claim to
teach English merely make their students memorize a few lessons. A small boy was produced before me at Madrassa Faizan-e-Madina (Hyderabad) as one who knew English. The boy began with the customary verses of the Quran and at one point, exactly in the same tone he had used for Arabic, he started reciting a speech in English. After the speech when I questioned him in English he stood quiet. It was then that the head of the madrassa told me that the boy had only memorized the English speech but knew no English (Raza Int. 1999). In other madrassas the students could read out of English books though none of those whom I met could sustain a conversation in English.

Since the time of Ziaul Haq, madrassa degrees have been placed at par with the degrees given by universities provided a candidate passes in English as a subject. This may be an incentive to more ambitious madrassa students. However, whether it has made the ulema more liberal is open to dispute.

**English Language-teaching Institutions**

Vernacular-medium schools used the grammar translation method in teaching English while the English-medium schools emphasized less on grammar exercises and had no translation at all. At the higher level the courses were literary with no emphasis on the use of language, no awareness of linguistics and its relevance to English, and no reference to post-colonial or contemporary literature in English. It is somewhat surprising to note that a report of 1902–07 tells us that there was a feeling that ‘English literature need not bulk so largely as a subject of study’ (Edn. I 1907: 27), but the change came so slowly that even now the courses are predominantly literary and old-fashioned. However, a change towards emphasizing language did take place. The British Council took the initiative in bringing about the change. Ronald Muckin was Education Officer of the Council from 1958 to 1962. He prepared new books emphasizing what was called the ‘structural direct’ method. This was introduced in class IX and X in 1976 (Curriculum 1982). After that the emphasis on language led to the birth of the discipline which came to be called English Language Teaching (ELT) or the Teaching of English as a Foreign Language (TEFL) or English as a Second Language (ESL). The Allama Iqbal Open University and the University Grants Commission took a lead in giving in-service training to teachers of English leading to a diploma in TEFL. The UGC held two international conferences in 1983 and 1984 which gave much boost to English language studies. TEFL was taught to the batch of 1985. Since then a number of teachers of English have been trained, mostly in Pakistan but some abroad. The British Council and Overseas Development Association have been giving scholarships to train teachers and ELT has entered the vocabulary, if not the classroom practice, of many teachers of English.

A private body called the Society of Pakistan English Language Teachers (SPELT) was established by some teachers from Karachi with the special initiative of Zakia Sarwar, an associate professor of English at a Government College in Karachi, in May 1984 at Islamabad. The objectives of the society were to provide a forum for discussion of analysis and evaluation of courses, and offering alternative suggestions after a realistic appraisal of the teaching and learning situation in different areas of Pakistan (SPELT Brochure 1985). SPELT organized workshops and courses for the teachers of English and its annual conferences are known events in the field of English teaching. Among other things SPELT reviewed the English courses from class six till the BA level in 1985. The conclusions of this survey were that the school textbooks were subject-centred rather than being pupil-centred and tested memory, not understanding. The textbooks at the higher secondary level (class XI and XII) had not been revised for nearly twenty years and students merely memorized the usual questions set upon them. The BA textbooks too encouraged rote learning with no development of the skills of speaking and analysis (SPELT 1987).
Another SPELT report is about the proficiency of students in a test of English at some selected schools and colleges. The results of the test were:

- The Matric (X class) students scored 15.21% marks
- The Intermediate (XII class) scored 42.00% "
- The BA students scored 26.00% "
- The University students scored 34.96% " (SPELT 1986: 24)

All students were from the humanities group but the university students were not those who were studying English at the MA level. Even so, it is surprising that in BA the percentage of scoring should go down. The explanation offered in the report is that 'at BA level the students lack the motivation to learn English as the marks of the compulsory English are not added to the division’ (ibid.: 24).

Since the 1990s both the American Centre and the British Council have started withdrawing from the ELT field in Pakistan. The last English Language Officer of the American Centre was Lisa Washburn and when she left in 1995 nobody was posted in her place. The Pakistan American Cultural Center (PACC) does, however, teach English to students in Karachi.

Apart from helping in teaching English in Pakistan, the United States as well as Britain finance the training of Pakistanis in English studies in their countries. In Pakistan the US Educational Foundation administers the Fulbright grants. Their two reports Thirty Years of Fulbright (1982) and Fulbright in Pakistan (1994) give us an idea as to how many Pakistanis have benefited from Fulbright grants. According to the first, 1180 Pakistanis and 400 Americans had ‘participated in one or another of the half-dozen programs which it has been the Foundation’s pleasure to supervise’ (Introduction). The second lists 213 Pakistani alumni out of whom 120 held Fulbrights between 1982–94; 116 Americans are also listed. The first book tells us that the number of grantees associated with language or literary studies are as follows: thirty-eight (English and American literature); twenty-seven (English); eight (English language) and seven (Linguistics). Out of these fifty-three are Pakistanis and thirty-six Americans. The grantees involved in pursuing languages other than English (Arabic & Urdu mostly) are nine. This brings up the total to seventy-three for English in some way or the other.

The British Council has been promoting English for the last fifty years in Pakistan. Since the 1970s, according to Chris Nelson, English Language Officer of the British Council in Islamabad in 1997, the emphasis started shifting from literature to language. Students used to be sent to England to get higher degrees but this is not being done any more. Students are, however, being taught at Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Peshawar (Nelson Int. 1997). The 1998 figures of students studying at these centres are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Karachi</th>
<th>Lahore</th>
<th>Islamabad</th>
<th>Peshawar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–96</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>2117</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–97</td>
<td>2184</td>
<td>2268</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–98</td>
<td>2744</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7196</td>
<td>6299</td>
<td>2821</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The British Council, Islamabad.
In short, over 17,000 students have benefitted from the British Council’s courses. As the tuition fees is Rs 4000 for a course of thirty hours of 5–7 weeks of part time study, one can conclude that the desire to learn English is really high among Pakistani students.

The United States and Britain both promote English but, according to a British Council officer, the teaching of the British Council is of a higher standard than that of the US centres (Nelson Int. 1997). Be that as it may, the fact is that although Britain still dominates the universities (through British literature and faculty qualified in Britain) and the ELT industry (again because of faculty qualified in Britain) it is because of American power over the media, world economy, and the new social order that English is used as much in the world as it is.

Institutions of Higher Education

Most traditional universities offer English at the masters level. Universities of Sindh also have BA (Honours) courses in English but other Pakistani universities merely examine students for the BA degree while the actual teaching is carried on in the colleges. Some colleges too offer the MA degree but their courses are determined by the university with which they are affiliated. The MA in English in Pakistan used to mean a two-year general course in the canonical classics of British English literature from Chaucer till T.S. Eliot till the 1980s. After that Linguistics, ELT and American literature have been added to the courses, mostly as options, in most universities. In 1987, when I was appointed professor and chairman of the Department of English at the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Muzaffarabad, I took the initiative of designing a new syllabus for the MA in Linguistics and English Language Teaching. This was the first time that the literary courses were eliminated and Linguistics came to dominate the syllabus. This course, however, was modified to include literary courses once again when I left that university in 1990.

At present, however, Linguistics, ELT and American literature are options in the courses of the Punjab, Karachi, and Bahauddin Zakariya universities. Karachi University, however, is the only one which offers a one-year MA in linguistics to those who have qualified in its literary MA of the usual two years. Post-colonial literatures in English are not taught at the undergraduate level anywhere. However, at the Punjab University it was introduced by Shaista Sirajuddin in 1998 in the M.Phil course and is still being taught (Sirajuddin Int. 1999). Professor Rafat Karim of the University of Karachi also said that it might be offered as an option later (Karim Int. 1999). There are people who have worked on Pakistani literature in English in some universities, but no university has so far offered it as a course in the MA. On the whole, the MA in English is conservative and out of touch with contemporary trends and developments. The only change from the 1960s is that there is more awareness of Linguistics and ELT than before.

Another change is that there are several institutions, both private and governmental, for the teaching of functional, especially spoken, English. Among the best-known such institutions are those run by the British Council, the Pakistan American Cultural Center, and the NUML. The armed forces academies also teach spoken English by making it mandatory for the trainees to speak English and by making them deliver speeches, lectures, and talks in English. The NUML and a number of private institutions also follow the same approach. According to several administrators of private institutions, fortnightly exercises in public speaking are held. Tests include speaking, role playing, and interview skills. However, as in the case of the English-medium private schools, these institutions for grownups are of very uneven quality. There are fairly well-equipped institutions in fashionable parts of the cities and there are small, dark-looking rooms in congested localities of the bazaar advertising themselves as institutions for teaching spoken English. Seeing the recent trend of Americanization, some institutions claim to teach ‘American English’. As far as I could make out after visiting some of these institutions,
they have the same kind of teachers as other institutions. These teachers speak and teach Pakistani English but, because of the low prestige of this variety of English or lack of awareness of their real practice, they either pretend or really believe that what they teach is either British or American English.

English is still a very popular subject at all levels. It is popular as a medium of instruction and as a skill which an enterprising, upwardly mobile, young adult should possess. It is the most empowering language in Pakistan both because it gives privileged access to the most lucrative and powerful jobs both in Pakistan and abroad, and because it gives social prestige to one who can speak it fluently and write it correctly. In this role, it empowers the elite and keeps this power within it. It is also the biggest hurdle in the way of the vernacular-educated student, especially one from rural areas, to positions of power. The examiners of the candidates who appeared for the civil service examinations of 1997, said:

[the] majority of the candidates lack command over the English language and the medium of expression is the main cause of their failure. English language as a medium of expression in the CSS examination is depriving students of Urdu-medium institutions to compete on an even field with those from English medium institutions (FPSC 1998: 36).

English is also a hurdle in the very process of getting higher education at all. The rate of failure in the matriculation, intermediate and BA examinations is highest in English. Indeed, most candidates who take English as a subject in MA, do not manage to pass in the examination (Appendix 3). A number of dissertations on the causes of the abysmal failure of students in English point out that the subject is taught inefficiently and students carry out no conversation in it (Sarwat and Khursheed 1994: 130–32). This, it appears, is related to class and power once again. The teacher of the ordinary vernacular-medium school is neither a fluent speaker of English, nor are the pupils exposed to an environment where English occurs naturally. Thus English remains a device to close the ranks of the elite in Pakistan. It gives power which is why people are so desperate to acquire it and also why they resent it so much. They resent it because they know that they are not placed in an advantageous position while their elitist counterparts are. English, therefore, serves to maintain the present power structure which disempowers most of our people. However, students do not desire that English-medium schools should be abolished, but they do want that higher jobs should no longer be available to those who know English as they are now. The following figures from the survey I carried out of the opinions of matriculation students suggests that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Madrassas (N=131)</th>
<th>Sindhi-medium (N=132)</th>
<th>Urdu-medium (N=520)</th>
<th>English-medium Elitist (N=97)</th>
<th>Cadet Colleges (N=86)</th>
<th>Ordinary (N=119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.7 Desire abolition of English schools?</td>
<td>Yes 49.62</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>20.19</td>
<td>02.06</td>
<td>12.79</td>
<td>05.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No 49.62</td>
<td>84.09</td>
<td>79.04</td>
<td>97.94</td>
<td>86.05</td>
<td>93.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NR 0.76</td>
<td>02.27</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>01.16</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.5 Desire higher jobs in English</td>
<td>Yes 10.69</td>
<td>30.30</td>
<td>27.69</td>
<td>72.16</td>
<td>70.93</td>
<td>45.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No 89.31</td>
<td>63.64</td>
<td>71.15</td>
<td>27.84</td>
<td>29.07</td>
<td>53.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NR Nil</td>
<td>06.06</td>
<td>01.15</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31 (10 of Chapter 9)
Students’ Views about English Schools and Elitism
These sets of figures appear to be contradictory at first sight but they can be reconciled easily. While people do find it unjust that they should be barred from higher jobs only because they do not know good English, they feel that English-medium schools should be there so that they too can benefit from them. In short, deep down they believe that no revolutionary change in language-teaching policies will occur during their lifetime. This, however, does not prevent them from registering protest against an unjust policy which empowers only those who know an alien and elitist language at the expense of others.

However, since English allows access to the Western, liberal-humanist, and cosmopolitan world view, it resists the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. In this role, it empowers the Westernized elite and the West too but, ironically enough, this offers some support to democracy, human and women’s rights and tolerance in Pakistan.

NOTES

1. Interview with Mr Hasan Badruddin Khan, Principal Public School and College, Abbottabad, 4 July 1997. This is confirmed by interviewing, talking to, and observing the behaviour of students in Burn Hall, Aitchison College, Cadet College Hasanabad, Military College Jhelum, and Lawrence College, Ghora Gali. A student of Burn Hall Miss Zahra Jafri said, (4 July 1997):

   Students consider speaking English mere show-off. The teachers of English, however, are better than those of Urdu. The Urdu ones are strict and old-fashioned. I speak English with my father at home who also encourages me to read books in it.
10
SINDHI

Sindhi is one of the most ancient languages of India. Indeed, the first language Muslims (Arabs) came in contact with when they entered India in large numbers was Sindhi. Thus several Arab writers mention that Sindhi was the language of people in al-Mansura, the capital of Sindh. Indeed, Mahrog, the Rajah of Alvra, whose kingdom was situated between Kashmir and Punjab, requested Amir Abdullah bin Umar, the ruler of al-Mansura, to send him someone to translate the Quran into his language around AD 882. The language is called ‘Hindi’ by Arab historians (in this case, Buzurg bin Shahryar, the author of Ajaib ul Hind) but, since these historians often failed to distinguish between the different languages of India and put them all under the generic name of ‘Hindi’, the language in this case could have been Sindhi. That is why, Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, who calls this the first translation of the Quran into any Indian language believes that this language was Sindhi (Nadwi 1972: 241–2). G.A. Allana, an eminent scholar of Sindhi, mentions in his book Sindhi Sooratkhati (1964) that Sindhi was used in trade and even in official business in the early part of Islamic rule over Sindh. In support of his contention he quotes from Arab writers who have left accounts of Sindh in the ninth and tenth centuries (Allana 1964: 30). Later, between 1020–30, al-Beruni visited India and wrote a book on it called Kitab Ma-li al Hind which was translated by Edward C. Sachau as Alberuni’s India (1888). In this several alphabets of the Hindus are mentioned. Going on with his list al-Beruni says:

Other alphabets are the Malwari, used in Malwashau, in Southern Sind, towards the seacoast; the Saindhava, used in Bahamanwa or Alamnsura (Sachau Vol. 1, 1888: 232).

Nabi Baksh Baloch, the famous Pakistani Sindhologist, opines that Saindhava was Sindhi. In his words:

This was the Arabic-Sindhi script, the ‘Sindhized Arabic script’ or the truly Sindhi script. On the basis of indirect evidence, it may be presumed that the graphemes for the more typical Sindhi phonemes were devised by adding dots to the corresponding Arabic letters (Baloch 1992: vi).

But al-Beruni’s text, or at least its English translation, concerns itself only with the ‘Hindu alphabet’. The very first thing which is said about it is that ‘the Hindus write from the left to the right like Greeks’ (Sachau 1888: 231). After this the general characteristics of the Brahmi script, characteristics which all its derivatives share in common, are described. Then comes the list in which the word Saindhava occurs. As such, it is difficult to believe that al-Beruni was talking about a script which, being based upon Arabic, ran from right to left. It is more likely that this particular script was a derivative of the Hindu family of scripts running from left to right.

This does not mean, however, that Sindhi was not written in the Arabic script even earlier than al-Beruni’s visit to Sindh. Annemarie Schimmel mentions that ‘one “Sindhi” verse, recited by a visitor at the Abbasid Court, has been preserved, although so distorted as to render its grammatical analysis and deciphering impossible’ (1974: 3). This probably happened in the days of Yahya Barmaki (d. 808/9) in Baghdad. This poem, according to Allana, was written in the Arabic form of the Sindhi script which suggests that this script was used in the ninth century (Baloch 1962: 60; Allana 1964: 54). Allana also mentions the appearance of the Sindhi script in AD 864 when an Arab traveller Jahiz wrote his book Risala Fakhr ul Soodan Al’il Beezan (Allana: 88). There is also other evidence that there was a ‘Sindhized Arabic script’ in Sindh in
1020–30 when al-Beruni was in India. This comes from Kitab al Fihrist, a book of lists compiled by an Arab writer al-Nadim (d. 990). In this list a script using both single and double dots is recorded in Sindhi. Since this is older than even al-Beruni’s days, there must have been an Arabic Sindhi script during his time too (specimens of ancient scripts are available in Baloch 1992: iv). In any case, even if dots and other diacritical marks were used to show the distinctive pronunciation of Sindhi sounds, these could not have been used in a uniform standardized manner. Thus different people, generally Muslim poets and men of letters, must have used slightly different versions of the same Arabic script. The Hindus, especially business people, kept using derivatives of the Brahmi script.

In the sixteenth century, by which time much had been written in Sindhi, Makhdum Jafar of Dadu published an Arabic work called Nahj al-Ta'allum. It was on education and its Persian abridgement, or digest, called Hasil al-Nahj was also prepared by the author in 1568. Nabi Bakhsh Baloch has edited the Hasil al-Nahj in 1969. According to this digest Makhdum Jafar emphasized the pupil rather than the teacher and the text. One can hardly call this a precursor of the modern pupil-centred teaching methodologies but, if Baloch is right, it did lead to teaching in the mother-tongue which the pupil could understand. In those days teaching was in Persian though teachers could hardly not have used Sindhi to explain the Persian alphabet and vocabulary to small children. The basic difference probably is that Sindhi became the recognized auxiliary medium of instruction. Because of this a number of textbooks, generally of a religious character, were written in Sindhi during the last days of the Mughal period and the rule of the Kalhoras and Talpurs (1680–1843).

An important book in this category was Abdur Rahman’s Qawaid ul Quran which is said to have been written in the thirteenth century of the Hijra (which begins from October 1786) to guide students to read the Quran correctly. Muslims have always been concerned with the correct pronunciation of the Quran because, in their view, the meanings of words change if they are pronounced incorrectly. The purpose of the book, therefore, was to preserve the standardized pronunciation of classical Arabic for religious reasons. However, the book is also a treatise, albeit unscientific, on orthoepy and phonetics. The writer is concerned with the place and manner of articulation of Arabic phonemes not found in Sindhi. This makes the book one of the first, possibly even the first, treatise on phonetics in Sindhi.

The Catalogue of the Panjabi and Sindhi Manuscripts in the India Office Library, compiled by Christopher Shackle (1977), records sixteen items in Sindhi. Out of them the most well-known ones are by Abul Hasan of Thatta (1616–88). One of them is also mentioned as Abul Hasan Ji Sindhi by Ellis in his report on education in Sindh at the time of the British conquest in 1843 (Baloch 1971: vii). This book has been recently edited by Khadija Baloch and reprinted (K. Baloch 1993). The book, like many others, was meant to explain the basic beliefs, principles and rituals of Islam. Another such book was by Makhdum Zia Uddin. Like that of his predecessor, this too is known by his name—Makhdum Ziauddin Ji Sindhi. It was written in the eighteenth century and it explains how prayers are to be said. Since it is meant to guide children it focuses on rituals of cleanliness, times of congregational and other prayers and other such practical matters. Incidentally, it reveals the state of astronomical beliefs of pre-modern Sindhi Muslims. References to planets, stars and their place in heavens is, indeed, still part of the idiom and the world view of astrologers and palmists who ply their trade of telling the future in the cities of Pakistan, and those who visit them in order to avert coming crises. The purpose of the book, however, is religious so that most of the space is taken up by lessons on rituals.

There are other such books scattered about in various libraries and personal collections in Sindh and abroad. Among them are versions of the Nur Nama, Meraj Nama, Munajat Nama, Hashar Nama, Qiamat Nama, and so on. Some of them have been mentioned by Blumhardt (1893). A number of such works of this kind have also been collected together recently in Sindhi
Boli Jo Agatho Manzoom Zakheero by Nabi Baksh Baloch (1993). These books are all religious and didactic. All the versions of the Nur Nama, not only in Sindhi but also in other languages, are about spiritual radiance and enlightenment which follow from faith. Other books refer to prevalent beliefs about the day of judgement, salvation, and other such doctrines. The important point, in our context, is the fact that these works were in Sindhi and that they were taught systematically. Richard Burton (1821–90), the famous English orientalist, translator, and explorer who wrote a report on education in Sindh (for his biography, see Mc Lynn 1990), says:

He [a boy pupil] probably is nine years old before he proceeds to the next step – the systematic study of his mother tongue, the Sindhi. The course is as follows:

1st. The Nur-namo, a short and easy religious treatise upon the history of things in general, before the creation of man. The work was composed by one Abdel Rehman, and appears to be borrowed from the different Ahadis, or traditional sayings of the Prophet…

2nd. The works of Makhdum Hashem, beginning with the Tafsir.

3rd. Tales in verse and prose, such as the adventures of Saiful, Laili-Majano, & c. The most popular works are the Hikayat-el-Salihin, a translation from the Arabic by a Sindhi Mulla, Abd el Hakim; the subjects are the lives, adventures, and remarkable sayings of the most celebrated saints, male and female, of the golden age of Islam. The Ladano is an account of the Prophet’s death, borrowed from the Habib-el-Siyar, by Miyan Abdullah. The Miraj-Namo is an account of Mohammed’s night excursion to heaven… The Sau-Masala, or Hundred Problems, is a short work by one Ismail, showing how Abd-el-Halim, a Fakir, married the daughter of the Sultan of Rum, after answering the hundred queries with which this accomplished lady used to perplex her numerous lovers (Burton 1851 in Baloch 1971: 47–8).

From the age of nine till the age of twelve or thirteen, roughly about four years, the student read these works in his mother tongue. It was only then that he started studying Persian. In the rest of India, as we know already, Persian began from infancy though there too the teachers had to explain the basic vocabulary and the art of spelling and writing informally through the mother tongue. Indeed, although Burton calls the study of certain books in Sindhi the study of the Sindhi language itself, it appears more probable that the objective was not the teaching of the language as such but that of religion. The idea was that the child would understand religion better in the mother tongue. Although this idea produced works of this nature, which we have called chapbooks, in other languages spoken by the Muslims of north India they were not taught as systematically as they were in Sindhi.

The place of honour was, of course, reserved for Persian which was a symbol of good breeding, refinement, and learning. In addition to its social significance, it had tremendous utilitarian importance being the language of the domains of power. Thus, besides the Muslims, the Hindu Amils who aspired to bureaucratic jobs under the rulers of Sindh, also learned Persian. This state of affairs changed when the British took Persian down from its high pedestal and put English in its place. But for lower jobs in the domains of power, the British chose Sindhi in the Arabic script (for details of this change, see Rahman 1996: 103–108 and Khuhro 1978: Chapter 6). Sindhi now was much in demand not only by the British officers, who always learned and were examined in the languages of the areas they served in, but by Sindhis desirous of employment with the British. For teaching Sindhi, books were required.

The first book which was published under British auspices was Hikayat-us-Sualehin (Lives of Saints). Lieutenant Arthur, who published it, also published a list of idiomatic sentences, originally written by Dossabhoy, in Sindhi (Ellis 1856, in Baloch 1971: 14). Hikayat-us-Sualehin, also mentioned by Burton, was recommended by the British, among them Burton, as ‘a work which may be recommended to the European scholar when beginning to read Sindhi. The Arabic and Persian vocables in which it abounds will facilitate the study; the style is pure, copious, and not too much laboured’ (Burton 1851, in Baloch 1971: note 10, p. 65). However, Ellis did not
approve of this book. In his report he wrote:

    Even this would hardly be the work to choose as a text-book for the rising generation; and in the utter want of all elementary works, it was necessary to translate, from the English and other languages, a series adapted for school instruction (Ellis 1856: 20–21).

The government, therefore, got a number of books, including *Aesop’s Fables*, translated from different languages into Sindhi. Among these were books on arithmetic, geography, drawing, and history (for the list see Ellis 1856: 21).

Ground was now laid for adopting Sindhi as a medium of instruction in schools. The break from the past, when Persian and Arabic were the focus of linguistic and literary studies was decisive, but to soften the blow the British decided not to eliminate Persian and Arabic at once. However, Sindhi was to be encouraged as follows. In the words of Ellis:

    Although tuition in English, Arabic, or Persian, is to be paid for by fees, instruction in Sindhi is to be gratuitous; and I would with all deference submit that, although not in accordance with the rule laid down by the Court, this arrangement be allowed to hold good (Ellis 1856: para 92, p. 26).

For the Sindhi Hindus, whom Ellis did not want to alienate from the British Raj either, schools were established in which Hindu Sindhi—Sindhi written in the khudawadi script—was taught. But this script did not prosper because jobs came only by the knowledge of the Arabic Sindhi script. In short, the new language-teaching policy was to disseminate the knowledge of Arabic-Sindhi script; to make English available only for a tiny elite and to appease the Hindus by keeping up the illusion that their script too was taught. For this purpose Ellis requested funds for the establishment of schools as follows:

1. The establishment of ‘District schools, where Sindhi will be the chief study; but where Persian will also be taught for a fee; and, if required, Arabic’.
2. ‘The establishment of an English school at the head quarters of each Collectorate.’
3. ‘Hindoo-Sindie schools, for instruction in an improved uniform character, founded on the Khudawadee’ (Ellis 1856: 29–30).

This policy continued undisturbed throughout the nineteenth century and a modern literature as well as journalism started flourishing in Sindhi (Also see Khuhro 1978: Chapter 6).

**Urdu-Sindhi Controversy before the Partition**

The Sindhi Muslims, especially the children of the feudal lords (*zamindars*), were backward in education. To suggest measures to change this, a committee was appointed by the Bombay government. These were the days of the Urdu-Hindi controversy all over British India because of which Urdu had become associated with Muslims. Thus, to the members of the Commission, the teaching of Urdu was one way of satisfying Muslims. Thus the members of the Commission decided upon promoting the study of Urdu in Sindh. Among these members Syed Shamsuddin Kadri was the only one who signed subject to his minute of dissent. The other five members, of whom there was no Sindhi Muslim, reached a consensus on the necessity of encouraging Urdu in Sindh.

The Committee, appointed in June 1913, recommended that (Resolution No. 1788, 23 June 1913):
The Committee is in favour of the experiment already initiated by Government of having all teaching in Urdu schools given through the medium of Urdu, the vernacular of the district being taught to those who wish to study it. The Committee thinks that this should apply to the whole presidency, the different Urdu standards being started simultaneously (Report 1913: para 6).

The experiment alluded to in the report must have resulted in the printing of a large number of textbooks in Urdu because the report goes on to state:

The Committee is advised that adequate text-books in Urdu exist, and that all the subjects can be taught through this medium at once, except the geography of the province, for which special translations may be required (ibid.: para 7).

The Committee emphasized Urdu in other ways too: it provided grants to encourage the production of literature in Urdu and suggested that statistics about the number of Urdu schools should be provided annually to the government of India.

W.H. Sharp, the Director of Public Instruction, who sent the report onwards to the Bombay authorities, noted that he was not convinced that it was either the desire of Muslims or in their interest to teach them only in Urdu. However, some of their representatives had urgently requested that texts should be prepared in Urdu and he had agreed to countenance the experiment. The report was then circulated to the district officers of Sindh who further asked prominent Muslims for their opinion. Among others the Wazir of Khairpur state, Mahomed Ebrahim Shaikh Ismail, commented as follows:

…it to adopt Urdu as the vernacular of the Mahomedan Community in this Province, in my opinion, is not only unnecessary, but may be positively harmful.

The conditions prevailing in this Province are vastly different from those obtaining in the Presidency Proper. The Sindhi language is as much the Vernacular of the Moslem Community as that of the Hindus of Sind; besides the Court language is also Sindhi. If Urdu is to be taught to them as compulsory language, instead of Sindhi, which is the language of the Province and the mother tongue of the Mahomedan Community, in the Primary and the Anglo Vernacular Schools, the Community will be forced to impart to their children education in two foreign languages, which to an ordinary scholar will appear a troublesome task to accomplish (Ismail 1915: 2).

Khan Bahadur Allahando Shah of Nawabshah also said the same (Letter of K.B. Syed Allahando Shah to the Collector of Nawabshah, 11 Feb. 1915. English translation of the Sindhi letter in the Collector’s Letter to the Commissioner-in-Sind, 11 Feb. 1915, No. 292). The district officers themselves also held similar views. At last the Commissioner sent the following views to the authorities in Bombay:

On one point there is entire unanimity of opinion, amongst officials and non-officials, namely on the necessity for the encouragement of Urdu in Sindh; as Government are doubtless aware Urdu is not the mother tongue of the Sind Mahomedans; his vernacular is Sindhi and he would be much embarrassed if Urdu were forced upon him. (Commissioner 1915).

The Commissioner also suggested that another committee—this time consisting mostly of Sindhi Muslims and Englishmen working in Sindh—should be appointed to suggest ‘to consider for Sind the whole question of Mahomadan education’ (ibid.).

This committee was appointed in 1915 and submitted its report a year later. Among other
things it recommended that the teaching of Persian and to a lesser extent Arabic, be encouraged but it did not take up the vexed question of Urdu again (Committee 1916). As such Sindhi continued to be the medium of instruction at the school level as before.

**Sindhi-teaching in Pakistan**

In independent Pakistan the only provinces in which the indigenous languages were the media of instruction in the non-elitist state schools were Bengal and Sindh. In both, therefore, the resistance against perceived domination by the centre came to be expressed primarily through linguistic and cultural symbols. In Sindh the feeling for Sindhi was high because it had already been part of the struggle against the administrative domination of Bombay. Although an administrative matter on the surface, the issue had the overtones (and hence the stridency) of a Hindu-Muslim conflict. The Muslim leaders wanted Sindh to be separated from the Bombay Presidency on grounds of it being a separate entity, a cultural and linguistic whole with its distinct identity. The Hindus felt that this would create a Muslim majority province and, therefore, have the effect of increasing Muslim power at their expense. Sindhi was very much part of the struggle, the Muslims claiming that it gave Sindh an identity distinct from Bombay while the Hindus felt that this argument would further sub-divide Bombay along other linguistic lines as well (Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sind, 14 January 1931, in Khuhro 1982: 416). At last the Muslims won and Sindh became a separate province in 1936 (see Khuhro 1982 and 1998: 87–110).

One of the consequences of this separation was the establishment of the University of Sindh. Although the medium of instruction at the proposed university was not to be Sindhi, it was mentioned as an entity in need of development which only a university could do. Dr Gurbaxani wrote a note arguing:

> Sind…is an old province, perhaps the most ancient in India. It has a history, traditions and a culture of its own. Its soil and stones could be compelled to reveal movements and geological formations of the hoary past. Its races and its language possesses a distinct Oriental bias. All this remains unexplored and no attention paid to the systematic study of Arabic, Persian or Sindhi with all its philological wealth (in Khuhro 1998: 116).

The University was established in 1947 in Karachi, only months before the creation of Pakistan. Thus, on the eve of partition, the position of Sindhi was strong. It was the medium of instruction in state schools; it was to be promoted by the university; it was a subject of study at various levels in educational institutions. Above all, and what made it popular, was the fact that at the lower level of the administration and the judiciary as well as in journalism, it was in demand. Thus someone who had acquired it could get jobs. This position was not enjoyed by any other language of (West) Pakistan at that time because neither Punjabi nor Pashto nor Balochi, the major languages of this area, were used in the domains of power at any level.

The coming in of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs from India challenged this privileged position of Sindhi. According to the 1951 Census the Mohajirs constituted about 57 per cent of the population of Karachi and dominated other Sindhi cities too: Hyderabad (66.08 per cent) Sukkur (54.26); Mirpurkhas (68.42), and Nawabshah (54.79 per cent) (Census 1951: Vol. 1, Table 2, Section 2 & 3 and District Census Reports). The consequences of this in linguistic, cultural, and educational terms were profound. Above all, in practice, it meant that Sindh was a divided province. Its cities were predominantly Urdu-speaking while its villages were Sindhi-speaking. This, in turn, implied that the Sindhis would be disadvantaged not only culturally and socially but
also educationally and economically because they would have to compete with mother-tongue speakers of Urdu for jobs in the cities which would now be available at the lower level in Urdu and at the higher in English. The psychological trauma of this cannot be adequately comprehended by non-Sindhis. But the feeling that one has become disadvantaged, and what is worse, one’s self-esteem has been lowered in one’s own country must have been very galling for the emerging Sindhi middle-class. Language and culture are intimately linked not only with jobs and power but even more importantly with self-esteem. To feel that one’s language is regarded as a rustic tongue; an uncouth jargon; is to feel humiliated. The dominance of Urdu, which was seen as the language of sophistication and civilized intercourse, was in itself a source of humiliation for the Sindhis. Moreover, the Mohajirs made little effort to conceal the fact that they looked at Sindhi culture as a rustic, and hence less sophisticated, culture. Thus, they felt no psychological need to assimilate with this culture and learn Sindhi.

Looking at this issue from the Mohajir point of view one finds an alternative version of reality. Urdu, as we know, had replaced Persian as a symbol of elitist, educated Muslim identity in North India during the nineteenth century. The Hindi-Urdu controversy hardened attitudes both among Muslims and Hindus so that Urdu became more closely associated with Muslim identity, and Hindi with the Hindu one, than ever before. So, the Mohajirs assumed that Pakistan would be a place to preserve and promote Urdu. The idea of reducing its importance for the sake of the indigenous languages went against everything they had heard for more than a century in favour of Urdu being the language of all Indian Muslims. Even more importantly, the Mohajirs were mostly urban people and were now living in urban areas again. Urban people do look down upon rural people not only in Sindh but the whole of South Asia, indeed almost everywhere in the world. Thus, the Mohajirs had a prejudice against Sindhis which made them resistant to learning the language.

Above all, the state’s policies did not pressurize or even encourage the Mohajirs to transcend or suppress their preconceived attitudes and learn Sindhi. At least in the cities, where most Mohajirs lived, the business of life could be carried on in Urdu. Cultural life, as Feroz Ahmed (1998: 77–8) and many other Sindhis pointed out, was so dominated by Urdu that one did not feel that the cities of (West) Pakistan used any language in the streets other than Urdu. The music, the films, the popular magazines, the newspapers, the conversation—all were in Urdu in the cities of Sindh. In the villages and towns Mohajirs did learn Sindhi even if they never stopped believing in the superiority of Urdu, but most of them lived in the cities. They did not feel inclined nor did they need to learn Sindhi. Indeed, they could not even if they wanted to because all business formal and informal was carried out in Urdu and not in Sindhi. Governmental policies were such that the 2180 Mohajir children from Urdu-medium schools coming from Delhi at one time were placed in separate schools although the Sindh Government had proposed that they ‘should be absorbed in the existing schools of Karachi which could either be expanded or worked on a double shift to cope with the extra number of students’ (Zaidi 1999: 55). What was done was that the Sindh Government was asked to open twelve primary (for 1259 students), two middle (617 students) and two high schools (304 students) for the Mohajir children and, further, ‘The D.P.I, Sind’, was ‘informed that the teachers in the proposed schools should possess a good command of the Urdu language along with other qualifications required for such teachers’. Such teachers could even be selected from Delhi if they were not locally available (ibid.: 56). Admittedly, the children would have learnt Urdu and not Sindhi, even if they had been placed in existing Urdu-medium schools. However, if they had been given the chance to study with Sindhis and Gujratis, they might have assimilated more readily with them. Being sealed off in Urdu-speaking enclaves both at school and home, they were bound not to assimilate with the non-Mohajirs. Thus the Mohajirs remained a non-assimilationist, urban and privileged minority in Sindh—a fact which made the teaching of Sindhi part of the ethnic politics of the province.
As I have referred to the role of language teaching in the ethnic politics of Sindh with special reference to the Sindhi language movement (Rahman 1996: Chapter 7), there is no need to repeat the details. However, some repetition is inevitable considering that the teaching of Sindhi is so closely linked with the struggle for power between the Mohajirs (and centrist forces) and the Sindhis.

Briefly, then the first shock for the Sindhis was the forced removal of the Sindh University from Karachi to Hyderabad. Writing on this issue Feroz Ahmed says:

The creation of Pakistan coincided with the decision to set up Sindh University in Karachi. The Pakistan government packed off the new university to Hyderabad to vacate the room for Karachi University, which was supposed to be an Urdu-speaking refugee university in which there was no room for even a department of the Sindhi language. While Karachi University remained a more or less exclusive preserve for the Urdu-speaking intelligentsia, no such exclusive policy was adopted in the hiring of faculty at Sindh University (Ahmed 1998: 78).

Other Sindhi intellectuals, such as Ibrahim Joyo, Nabi Baksh Baloch, G.A. Allana, Hamida Khuhro, Salim Memon, and Mehtab Ali Shah point out that the removal of the university from Karachi was a traumatic experience which seems to have left deep wounds in the psyche of Sindhis.

As Karachi was declared the federal area, the new university was not even part of Sindh in name and was seen to be antagonistic to Sindhi. Thus, when in 1957–58 the University of Karachi forbade students from taking examinations in Sindhi, the Sindhi nationalists protested strongly. Among others, Hyder Baksh Jatoi, president of the Sindh Hari Committee, said that the new order was a signal to Sindhi students to: ‘leave Karachi, go to Sind if you want to retain Sindhi, Karachi is none of yours’ (Jatoi 1957: 13).

In 1954 Sindh became part of the one-unit (of West Pakistan). Ayub Khuhro, the then premier of Sindh, argued that Sindhi language and culture would be preserved as follows:

So far as culture and language is concerned, Sind has done its bit. Our Legislature has passed an Act appointing a statutory body which goes by the name of Sind Cultural Advancement Board to look after the development of Sind Culture. Sind Government has made an endowment of 25 lakhs for the purpose of progress of culture and language of Sind. Another 25 lakhs we have given for the library, art and art gallery and the development of oriental and Sindhi literature and its preservation. It is hoped that in the future set-up, Sind’s interests regarding its culture are fully preserved (quoted from Khuhro 1998: 422).

But, in fact, such puny efforts were of no avail. In the one-unit Sindhi was relegated to a regional, hence peripheral, language. In 1957 the Sindhi Adabi Sangat, one of the several bodies which had sprung up to defend the interests of Sindhi and Sindhis, said that the Sindhi-speaking people would be handicapped as far as the race for jobs is concerned if Sindhi is not ‘made to serve as an official language at least for Sind and its adjoining areas’ (Sangat n.d.: 7). Even worse, in 1958 one-unit came to be backed by Ayub Khan’s martial law. The tide was now even more against the teaching of Sindhi.

In the late fifties, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Sindh, Dr I. I. Kazi, had encouraged the teaching of Sindhi for non-Sindhi-speaking children also. Dr Baloch, who had made the course, says that he himself had made an easy course for non-Sindhi-speakers and the experiment was proving quite successful when the martial law was imposed in October 1958 (Baloch Int. 1999). There are anecdotes about how General Tikka Khan, then part of the martial law machinery in Sindh, stopped the teaching of Sindhi in parts of the former province. Almost everybody I interviewed had anecdotes about how the general (then probably a colonel) had sent
orders to the Vice Chancellor that non-Sindhis should not be taught and examined in Sindhi (see Annexure 10-A). Dr Baloch said that an officer in uniform came to the Registrar of the University and passed him the orders of his superior, Tikka Khan (Baloch Int. 1999). Such stories are difficult to confirm because written records have not been located so far. Unfortunately, they could not also be confirmed by General Tikka Khan himself as he died before I could interview him. There is no doubt, however, that the military, being centrist and highly distrustful of ethnic movements, did want to suppress the teaching of Sindhi. This is borne out by the Education Commission which submitted its report in 1959. After having said that Bengali and Urdu, the national languages, would be encouraged the report points out that in West Pakistan Urdu is, indeed, the medium of instruction from class VI onwards. Indeed, even up to class IV, it was the medium of instruction in the Punjab, most parts of the NWFP, Balochistan, and Azad Kashmir. In Sindh alone was Sindhi, rather than Urdu, the medium of instruction even after this level. To the centrist members of the commission this could prevent the Sindhis from being ‘nationalised’. Hence, they suggested, that ‘Urdu should be taught from class VI, so that it can be employed effectively as the medium of instruction from class VI onwards’ (Edn. Com. 1959: 292).

But such a radical change in the position of Sindhi could not be accepted by the Sindhi nationalists. Hence, despite the repressive nature of the state, the Sindhis took out processions throughout the province and finally Ayub Khan decided to let Sindhi alone (Rahman 1996: 116). However, Urdu was encouraged and Sindhi discouraged during the Ayub Khan era—a fact which led to much resentment among the Sindhis.

Although Sindh was still the medium of instruction in schools (rural schools generally), Urdu was taught as a subject. Sindhi nationalists sometimes objected even to this arrangement. One of them (probably Ibrahim Joyo?) wrote as follows:

In Sind, Sindhi-medium children read Urdu compulsorily from class IV to class XII. The Urdu medium children have not to read Sindhi correspondingly. This imposes inequality of burdens, inequality of opportunity, and social and cultural inferiority on the Sindhi-speaking children, and is the grossest discrimination against a free people in a free country (Publicist 1967: 19).

A number of Sindhi-medium schools closed down in the urban areas probably because urban people were either non-Sindhis or people who wanted their children to acquire Urdu for utilitarian reasons (see LAD-S 29 May 1974: 30, for a statement about the schools which had closed down). The anonymous ‘publicist’, whose article has been referred to above, reported the establishment of Urdu-medium schools in Mirpur Khas and Khairpur Mirs in order to seduce Sindhi-medium students away from their own schools (Publicist 1967: 3).

When Ayub’s rule ended, the Sindhis felt relieved. Although martial law was imposed once again by General Yahya Khan, the one-unit was abolished and the Sindhi nationalists felt that their language would be given the importance it used to have before the one-unit days. However, the Yahya government’s educational policy, issued under the chairmanship of Air Marshal Nur Khan, laid as much emphasis on the national languages—Bengali and Urdu—as the Ayub Khan government had. Once again the indigenous languages of the people of Pakistan, called the ‘regional languages’, were to be marginalized (Edn. Pro. 1969: 3–4). Again the Sindhi nationalists protested saying that they desired that Sindhi should be taught more widely (Talpur 1969: 8). For them the teaching of Sindhi was part of Sindhi identity and ethnic assertion.

**Language Riots and Sindhi-teaching**

Ethnic assertion, as my previous book suggests (Rahman 1996: 121–2), is a consequence of many
factors. In the case of Sindh instrumental factors—lack of jobs, lack of access to power commensurate with the rise of the population and historical position of the Sindhis, growth of the middle-class wanting a role in the salariat—contributed to the ethnic assertion and language was the symbol which expressed it. However, the actors in language movements—the educated young men and members of the intelligentsia—are not motivated by such factors alone. In the heat of the moment they feel as if they are striking a blow for their language, i.e. their heritage, their identity, the very essence of their nationality. The Sindhis felt alienated from the Punjab-dominated centre, mistrusting its policies. Not only domestic policies but even the foreign policy is seen as being only in the interest of the Punjabi elite as Mehtab Ali Shah has ably shown (Shah 1997: Chapter 2). The Mohajirs, meanwhile, felt insecure, rootless and deprived, despite their dominance in middle-class jobs, because they felt they deserved more jobs because they were better educated than Sindhis. Thus, one has to take the sentimental reasons of both Sindhis and Mohajirs into account to understand language riots. The riots, however, have been explained earlier. Let us see what role language-teaching played in it.

In the January-February 1971 riots, an attempt at language-teaching led to riots because it was resisted. One reason why the situation became explosive was because the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE), Hyderabad, resolved on 21 December 1970 that Mohajir students be examined in Sindhi in the Secondary School Certificate examination of the year 1972 (Resolution No. 21, BISE). Nawab Muzaffar Hussain, leader of the Mohajirs at that time, decided to resist this decision and brought out processions in Hyderabad. Soon other cities became influenced and the Mohajirs clashed with the Sindhis in Nawabshah, Mirpur Khas, Hyderabad, and even in Karachi. Indeed, in Karachi the situation became very violent by the end of January and the army had to be called out.

In July 1972 there was a replay of this bloody drama once again. This time it was the ‘Sindh (Teaching, Promotion and use of Sindhi Language) Bill of 1972’ passed on 7 July 1972 by the Sindh Legislative Assembly, which created the problem. Although what caused extreme apprehension among the Mohajirs was clause 6 of the Bill according to which Sindhi could be used in the domains of power (offices, courts, legislature, etc.), the language-teaching provisions too were controversial. The language-teaching provisions provided for the teaching of both Urdu and Sindhi as compulsory subjects from class IV to class XII. On the face of it this was only fair but in 1972, when a PPP government was in power both in Sindh and the centre, the Mohajirs of Sindh (especially those of Karachi) felt completely alienated. They had voted against the PPP and they felt disillusioned with the loss of East Pakistan. They felt that they too, like the Urdu-speaking Biharis of East Pakistan, would be ‘thrown out into the sea’ if Sindhis came to dominate Sindh. The Sindhis, including Mumtaz Bhutto and later Z.A. Bhutto himself, explained reasonably that Urdu was the national language of Pakistan and that the purpose of the bill was merely to secure the position of Sindhi which one-unit and martial law had harmed. But the question was really one of power in Sindh, and language was only the apparent bone of contention. The Mohajirs, as non-assimilationist as ever, had converted Sindh into a bilingual province. They wanted the Sindhis to recognize this reality. The Sindhis did not. Indeed, they could not without also recognizing that Sindhi had, indeed, been partitioned. As such there was a compromise but only after the bloodiest language riots in Pakistan’s history took place in the fateful summer of 1972. The extent of the loss, as reported in the National Assembly, was staggering (LAD-P 28 August 1972: 506). But, more ominously, the bitterness of the conflict led to the rise of militant ethnicity among the Mohajirs (later called the MQM) which in turn led to Karachi becoming a battlefield from 1985 onwards.

The compromise solution, presented by the Governor of Sindh on 16 July, gave a twelve-year reprieve to the Mohajirs but, in fact, no government dared make only Sindhi the language of state employment in Sindh. After the 1971 riots, however, Sindhi was supposed to be taught to
Mohajirs (and other non-Sindhis) all over Sindh including the Mohajir stronghold of Karachi. In 1973 the teaching of Sindhi did start from class IV but when this batch reached class IX in 1979, the Mohajirs protested that their children were not yet competent enough to be examined in Sindhi. As a consequence the government formed an Implementation Committee which surveyed 100 schools and found that many of them lacked teachers of Sindhi. Finally, the Board of Education (Karachi) did examine the students but the examination paper for Sindhi was written in Urdu and was so easy as to enable students to pass easily (Memon Int. 1999). Moreover, informal conversation with Mohajir children suggests that they are aware that they would not need Sindhi. Some of them are also prejudiced against it because of assumed cultural superiority and the antagonism between the Mohajirs and Sindhis. Thus, for a variety of reasons, children from Urdu-medium schools in Sindh do not learn Sindhi efficiently. English-medium schools, especially if they prepare students for O’level examination of Britain, neglect it for their matriculation students and do not teach it at all to the O’level ones. This means that, like before, urban Mohajirs get away without learning much Sindhi while Sindhis have to learn Urdu so as to prevent being locked out of the domains of power in Sindh.

Another consequence of the new act was that government employees became keen to learn Sindhi in the first few years after the riots. In 1973–74 when the Department of Sindhi at Karachi University began teaching Sindhi at the certificate and diploma level (both of one year), over 900 students got enrolled in the programme. This was probably because non-teaching members of the Karachi University got two advanced increments in their salaries if they got certificates in Sindhi (Memon Int. 1999). The law has not changed but the number of students who join these courses has come down to only ten to twelve a year because people believe they can get by without learning Sindhi. Moreover, the antagonism between the Sindhi and Urdu speakers has increased since the rise of the MQM and there is more resistance to the learning of Sindhi among the Urdu-speakers of Karachi.

However, the fact that Sindhi is more convenient for those whose mother tongue it is, is borne out by the following statistics of the preference of school students in the 1981 matriculation examination.

**Table 32 (1 of Chapter 10)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Percentage of Urdu as Medium of Examination</th>
<th>Percentage of Sindhi as Medium of Examination</th>
<th>Percentage of English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi Board</td>
<td>97.90</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukkur Board</td>
<td>21.13</td>
<td>78.62</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad Board</td>
<td>50.80</td>
<td>45.23</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BISE Gazettes.

Moreover, since the Sindhi language is an identity marker for Sindhis, most Sindhi-speaking students do develop more competence in it than their Urdu-speaking counterparts even if they live in Karachi. In the more Sindhi-dominated parts of Sindh, of course, students learn Sindhi as a matter of course. It is also the informal medium of instruction in the madrassas of Sindh. However, to my knowledge the madrassas do not include books in Sindhi in their course any more though books on Islamic subjects in Sindhi are available for supplementary reading in some of them. Such books are still being written also. For instance, Abdul Waheed Jan Sirhindi

**Teaching of Sindhi at Present**

After the rise of the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad in 1984, language has become a secondary issue in Sindh. It was, in a sense, a secondary issue even earlier because the primary issues even then were share in power, in goods and services, and employment. But language, being an ethnic symbol, stood for the Sindhi and Mohajir community’s consolidated power as a pressure group. Moreover, language was seen as a repository of culture and, therefore, worthwhile in its own right and not only as a symbol of identity. This gave language far more prominence than it enjoys today.

This decrease in the significance of language is the direct consequence of the rise of militancy, chaotic conditions and a sense of emergency in Sindh—especially in Karachi. Even so, the Sindhi nationalists do emphasize their language and insist that its teaching should be improved. Out of the nine prominent members of the Sindhi intelligentsia whose opinions were sought through a questionnaire in 1998, seven agreed that the Mohajirs and Sindhis could integrate if Sindhi was taught more effectively to all of them. However, two out of those who agreed did point out that integration would require other inputs as well (Annexure 10-A).

During the Ziaul Haq era (1977–88), Urdu was encouraged as a centrist symbol. Although no ostensibly anti-Sindhi steps were taken, the emphasis on Urdu and Islam discouraged the expression of ethnic nationalist (and, hence, pro-Sindhi) views. Moreover, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) became so powerful in Sindh that it almost took on the semblance of a civil war (Mahmood 1989). In February 1988, however, a Sindhi Adabi Conference was held at Jamshoro. Among the resolutions it passed, one was that Sindhi should be taught in the cities (Kamal 1988: 27–8; also see FP, 5 February 1988). Later, the Sindhi Boli Sath and other organizations worked to get Sindhi adopted as the sole official language, and hence a major instructional language, of Sindh (Sath 1990).

Speaking at a conference of the Sindhi Adabi Sangat on 17 August 1996 at Hyderabad, Ibrahim Joyo blamed all state functionaries, including those who were Sindhis but collaborated with the centre, for neglecting Sindhi. Among other things, a resolution was passed to ensure the publication of Sindhi books for the Urdu-speaking students of class XI as agreed upon earlier in the 1972 language agreement. Moreover, it was also resolved that Sindhi be introduced in all the English-medium schools of the province (*D*, 18 August 1996). Thus, the idea was to expand the domain of Sindhi-language teaching. A US Report on primary schools, however, pointed to an interesting fact: that the educational professionals dealing with education, who were probably not Sindhi-speaking, were opposed to its teaching. However, parents and community leaders wanted it to be taught for at least one period a day (Appendix 11).

Apart from the Sath and the Sangat, other bodies (such as the Servants of Sind Society [SSS] and Sind Graduates Association [SGA]) also kept urging a wider dissemination of Sindhi. The president of SSS, Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah, who was a well-known Sindhi nationalist intellectual, said:

> Those who do not speak Sindhi and have no pride in being Sindhis, have no right to be included in the population of Sindh (*D*, 26 August 1997).

This statement was issued in the context of the census which was held in January 1998, and committed Sindhi nationalists still keep lamenting the State’s alleged apathy towards Sindhi. The
SGA has established a number of Roshan Tara schools to give quality education in Sindhi and English (Roshan Tara School Prospectus).

**Higher Studies in Sindhi**

Sindhi is the most developed of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. There was some teaching of Sindhi even in the University of Bombay but in the University of Sindh, which was initially established in Karachi, there was no department of Sindhi at first. The first to start the MA course in Sindhi was the Sindh Madressah College. There, the MA classes started in 1947 and continued till 1971. After 1971 the University of Karachi began its MA programme which continues till now. At present three universities—Karachi, Sindh (at Jamshoro), and Shah Abdul Latif (Khairpur)—offer masters and higher degrees in Sindhi language and literature.

The establishment of a separate department of Sindhi in the universities of Sindh was considered an achievement by the Sindhi intellectuals in general and the Sindhi nationalists in particular. After the removal of the University of Sindh from Karachi to Hyderabad there was a feeling of deprivation which the department went some way towards fulfilling. The first department of Sindhi was established by the efforts of Dr Nabi Baksh Baloch in 1953. The Vice Chancellor, Dr I.I. Kazi was supportive of his initiative but there was no money for it. Dr Baloch, who was in the Department of Education, however, set up the department on an honourary basis. Later, paid members of the faculty were recruited and a budget was set aside for the department (Baloch Int. 1999). Among the faculty were Mahbub Ali Channa, Ali Nawaz Jatoi and, of course, Dr Nabi Baksh Baloch himself (Allana Int. 1999). Among the students of the first batch were G.A. Allana, Mrs Shams Abbasi, Aziz Ahsan Ali Shah, etc. At present the department offers the usual BA (Hons), MA and M.Phil. courses. Besides classical literature, it also teaches linguistics and modern Sindhi literature.

In Karachi University the Sindhi Adabi Sangat kept striving to establish a department of Sindhi. During the one-unit days, and especially during the vice chancellorship of Dr I. H. Qureshi, Sindhi was discouraged as the West Pakistani establishment considered it as a centripetal force. After the dissolution of the one-unit, the Sindhi nationalists got their chance. According to the legend, Captain Usmani, who was the secretary of the Ministry of Education in the Sindh government, was sympathetic towards their demands. He contributed towards the establishment of the department and is said to have influenced General Rahman Gul, the Governor, to help create the department and this was done in 1971. In 1972, however, the frenzy created by the language riots harmed this new department just as it harmed the Department of Urdu in Jamshoro. The department was burnt by the students union and the chairman, Dr Ayaz Qadri, escaped with difficulty (Memon Int. 1999). At present the department is offering the usual BA (Honours), MA and higher research courses. The third masters level university Department of Sindhi is in the Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai University at Khairpur. It too runs on the lines of the other departments but is comparatively new.

Besides these university departments, the colleges of Sindh teach Sindhi upto the BA level. It is available as an option, also at the BA level, for students studying scientific, technological and commercial subjects and, of course, in schools. The University of Karachi also has the Shah Abdul Latif Chair which conducts research and arranges seminars and conferences on Sindhi language and literature. The federal government transferred Rs 1,415,000 in 1999–2000 to support this chair (Expenditure Vol.1, 1999: 305) The Sindhi Language Authority, set up to promote Sindhi in 1992, also arranges classes for teaching the language and has created audio cassettes for teaching it to those who want to acquire the native speakers’ pronunciation without having a teacher.
Outside Sindh, Sindhi language and literature are taught as part of the masters course in Pakistan Studies at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. The Allama Iqbal Open University, also in Islamabad, has a new department of Pakistani languages which has made basic courses in Sindhi—as part of their facility of teaching Pakistani languages—which will be launched soon (Javed Int. 1999). The Department of Urdu offers a certificate course with a book called Rozmarru Mukalme featuring conversation in Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, and Punjabi. It also offers Sindhi at the matriculation (X) and the intermediate (XII) class levels as well as a history of Sindhi literature in Urdu. Being part of other degrees, these courses in Sindhi are not of a high standard but are useful for introducing the language.

To conclude, the teaching of Sindhi has two kinds of significance for Sindhi-speaking people. First, it has utilitarian value as a language of the lower salariat. In this capacity it has been used since British days and, despite the domination of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in the cities of Sindh, continues to be useful for Sindhis even now. Secondly, it has symbolic value as a marker of Sindhi ethnic identity. In this capacity it has become the most important icon of Sindhi identity since the nineteen fifties when the Sindhis first started feeling alienated in their own homeland because of the domination of non-Sindhis in the cities; the high handedness of the central ruling elite (which was mostly Punjabi); and policies which reduced their power as an ethnic group. For both reasons, but especially because of the second, the Sindhi intelligentsia responded by making efforts to promote the use and teaching of Sindhi. The idea was to preserve, or create, the consciousness of the Sindhi identity among the Sindhis and bring about the assimilation of the non-Sindhis. In this process a large body of creative and academic writing was produced which has made Sindhi one of the richest languages of Pakistan. However, Sindhi is far from being the major language of instruction for all the inhabitants of Sindh for both utilitarian and political reasons. The non-Sindhis (Mohajirs, Punjabis, and Pashtuns) resist it because they can get jobs by learning Urdu and English and, for them, there are few utilitarian incentives to learn Sindhi. This is probably because for them Sindhi is the major symbol of an identity they do not wish to adopt. In the case of Mohajirs, indeed, it is an identity they have often struggled not to assimilate into (at least in the urban areas). Though both Sindhi and Mohajir students show more desire for being taught in their mother tongue in reply to Q.4, they opt for other languages, probably for pragmatic or practical reasons, when questioned (Q.2) as to which language(s) should be the medium of instruction in Pakistani schools? (Appendices 14.14 and 14.16) It is also because of pragmatic pressure that Sindhis are desirous of learning Urdu while Mohajirs are not keen on learning Sindhi. English takes the lead except in the case of Mohajir students who appear to give preference to Urdu possibly because that is the language of their newly asserted identity.

Table 33 (2 of Chapter 10)
Linguistic Demands of Sindhi Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sindhi-speaking</th>
<th>Mohajirs of Sindh</th>
<th>Other Urdu-speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=152)</td>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All numbers quoted are percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.4 Desire MT as medium of instruction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.97</td>
<td>19.74</td>
<td>03.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.47</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.33</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>02.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.2 Desired as medium of instruction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>42.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.63</td>
<td>15.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>44.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus the teaching of Sindhi remains a politicized issue — politicized because it is so deeply connected with power and identity.

NOTE

1. A number of Sindhi nationalists pointed to Captain Isani’s special role in the opening of this department. However, in an interview with me Captain Isani stated that he only did what his duty as Education Secretary required. He also said that the Government of Sindh felt at that time that the teaching of Sindhi in Karachi would enable the Mohajirs to study it (Usmani Int. 1999).

Annexure 10-A

Sindhi Intellectuals’ Response to Sindhi

This annexure comprises answers to a questionnaire filled in by the respondents whose names are given below. All of them are intellectuals or administrators concerned with Sindhi. The questionnaire was distributed by my research assistant, Ashfaq Sadiq, in April 1998. The questionnaire had eight questions but the other six are about information which has not been used in the book.

In what way has the teaching of Sindhi suffered? Will Mohajir children assimilate with Sindhis if they are taught Sindhi?

1. Abdul Hameed Sindhi, Chairman Sindhi Language Authority, Hyderabad.
   More than 500 primary schools of Sindhi-medium were forcibly closed during one-unit days. General Tikka Khan stopped the teaching of Sindhi.
   Yes. Definitely.

   During one-unit days the teaching of Sindhi suffered.
   Yes. If the ‘Establishment’ does not divide them as was done in the Zia years.

3. Dr Hidayatullah Akhund, Associate Professor, Dept. of Sindhi, University of Sindh.
   Sindhi was taught till 1954 to non-Sindhis before one-unit. This changed to class VIII only in one-unit days.
   It will take time but they will.
4. **Syed Sher Shah, Principal, Govt. Elementary College of Education, Hyderabad.**
   - The official status of Sindhi was changed in the one-unit days.
   - Yes. It is one source of assimilation.

5. **Muhammad Ismail Sheikh, Sindhi Dictionary Office, Sindh University.**
   - After Urdu being made the national language, Sindhi’s teaching decreased.
   - No.

6. **Taj Joyo, Secretary, Sindhi Language Authority, Hyderabad.**
   - Since one-unit and especially during Ayub’s martial law, Tikka Khan stopped the teaching of Sindhi.
   - Yes. If they also adopt Sindhi cultural traditions.

7. **Dr Nabi Baksh Baloch.**
   - During Ayub’s regime when the integrated curriculum was abandoned.
   - Yes.

8. **Dr Shamsuddin Ursani.**
   - It suffered during the 1950s and 1970s.
   - Yes. Surely.

9. **Jam Saqi.**
   - General Tikka stopped the teaching of Sindhi. Sindhi-medium schools were closed, especially in Las Bela.
   - No.

10. **Dr G.A. Allana,* Chairman SLA, 1999.**
    - General Tikka stopped the teaching of Sindhi.
    - Yes, with other current policies.

* Dr Allana was interviewed by me.
There is no evidence that Pashto was ever used in the domains of power or formally taught by any of the Muslim rulers of India. However, Sher Khan (r. 1540–45) spoke it and had much affection for it. Abbas Khan Sarwani, the author of Tarikh-i-Sher Khani (Sarwani c. 1586) writes that when his grandfather Shaykh Bayazid came to Sher Khan, the latter said in the Afghan language “Shaykha Nazgah Bughu (O Shaykh embrace me)” (p. 124). He also used to put questions to newly recruited Afghans in their native tongue and whoever replied in chaste language was asked to draw a bow and if he did it properly, he was given a higher salary than the rest. He said: “The Afghan tongue is dear to me” (Sarwani: 163). Afghans often seem to have used Pashto as a private language. For instance, Sher Khan was told by an Afghan in battle: ‘Mount, for the infidels are routing your army’ (ibid.: 151). Later, a certain Murad Sher Khan asked Sikandar Khan in Pashto whether he should fall on the governor at once (Khan 1789, Vol. 2: 31). The translator of Siyyar-e-Muta’akhereen, from which this information has been taken, says that Pashto has gained some currency in north India so that even in Lucknow the sovereign ‘speaks a few words of Peshto; and where even the women of the seraglio made it a point to mix some words of it in their speech’ (Khan 1789, Vol. 2: 356). This assertion, however, is not corroborated by other sources though Zalme Hewadmal mentions a number of poets in Pashto who lived in India. Among them the names of Qasim Ali Khan Afridi, Mehbub Ali Khan Rampuri, Kazim Ali Khan Shaidea, Abdul Kasim Yusufzai, and Afzal Khan are well-known. The famous Urdu poet, Insha Allah Khan Insha, has written Urdu verses with a few Pashto words and explanations of the distinctive Pashto graphemes. Indeed, the first grammar of Pashto, that by Mohabbat Khan, was written in India as we shall see later. In short, some Pashto-speakers did retain interest in Pashto, the language of their ancestors, in India (Hewadmal 1994). Raverty also tells us that Pashto was spoken in the domains of the Nawab of Rampur, whose ancestors were Pashtuns, till the nineteenth century (Raverty 1860: ix). However, Raverty provides no proof for this assertion. Most people of Pashtun origin in India seem to have lost the ability to speak Pashto because it was not officially used or taught.

Books of Pashto probably became available from the sixteenth century onwards in the Pashto-speaking areas. The author has had access to a number of manuscripts of Pashto in the British Library (see catalogues: Blumhardt 1893; Blumhardt and Mackenzie 1965), the Pashto Academy, and other libraries in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the manuscripts in India (see Hewadmal 1994: 19–20) and other parts of the world remained inaccessible to me. The following brief outline is based on the manuscripts which became available in different archives and libraries. There are 170 manuscripts in the libraries of the British Isles out of which sixty-nine are in the British Museum and sixty in the Oriental and India Office Collection of the British Library. This is the largest collection seen by the present author—far exceeding the one held by the Pashto Academy and the National Institute of Folk Heritage libraries in Pakistan. Some of the books which were studied by individuals on their own or possibly even taught in the madrassas are as follows:

1) The first book of Pashto which is extant is Bayazid Ansari’s (1526–74) Khair ul Bayan. Bayazid Ansari is also known as Pir Roshan (the radiant or illuminating guide) by his followers. According to Nizamuddin Ahmed Bakhsi, the author of Tabakat-i-Akbari, he was not born in Pashto-speaking areas. This is how he describes Pir Roshan:

In former times a Hindustani soldier had come among the Afghans, and set up an heretical sect. He
induced many foolish people to become his disciples, and he gave himself the title of *Pir Roshanai* (Bakhshi n.d.: 119).

The Pir’s book, however is written in the *Nastaliq* script which itself ‘began to be recognized as an independent form in the second half of the fourteenth century’ (Hanaway and Spooner 1995: 3). It has been called a textbook by recent writers (Haq 1986: 143; Guide 1990: 8). It does, indeed, have passages about the rudiments of Islam which may be understood by ordinary people. Thus, there is a strong likelihood that it was part of the curricula of madrassas. However, Bayazid Ansari’s opinions were considered objectionable, and some even outrightly heretical, by Akhund Darweeza (1533–1615) who countered them in his own book *Makhzan ul Islam.*

2) The *Makhzan* (or treasure) is a collection of famous Arabic religious texts in Pashto translation. Moreover, the language of explication is also Pashto. The preface, however, is in Persian and the author says that he intends to explain the beliefs of Islam for the Afghans. He further claims that Bayazid Ansari had misled the public and that he was not a ‘Pir Roshan’ but a ‘Pir Tareek’ (*Roshan* = light and *Tareek* = dark). After some philosophical discussion pertaining to the reality of the phenomenal world he goes on to discuss Islamic doctrines. This book is said to have been taught both in the madrassas and at homes. It was also read out to those who could not read it themselves. It starts in Arabic, switches to Persian and then to Pashto.

3) Another book which is said to be part of the curricula, especially for women, is Mulla Abdur Rashid’s *Rashid-ul-Bayan*. This was written in AH 1124 (1712). Rashid’s ancestors are said to have come from Multan and he lived at Langarkot. It was read by women in their homes and was a kind of sermon in verse. The following lines from it will serve as illustration of the whole. The nature of the deity, for instance, is described as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Na e naqs shta pa zat ke} \\
\text{Na e aeb shta pa sifat ke}
\end{align*}
\]

Neither has He any defect in His Being
nor has He any fault in His qualities.

4) Yet another manuscript is entitled *Fawaid-ul-Shariat*. It was written by Akhund Mohammad Kasim in AH 1125 (1713) who was a follower of Akhund Darweeza and lavishes fulsome praise upon him in the first two pages. The subtitles are in red ink in Persian but the text is in Pashto *naskh*. The special graphemes of Pashto have been used but not consistently. The book is about Islamic fundamentals and rituals: beliefs, religious law, menstruation, ritual purity, prayers, and so on. At places the writing becomes more close and curved and the book ends with verses in Arabic. This suggests that the writer was a person with knowledge of Arabic as well as Persian.


6) *Jannat ul-Firdaus*. A book by Hafiz Abdul Kabir on the virtues of religious exercises written in *nastaliq*. It was written sometime in the eighteenth century. A copy in the British Museum is dated AH 1224 (1809).

7) *Nafi ul-Muslimin*. A sufi treatise in the *masnavi* form. It contains injunctions relating to asceticism, religious observances, and moral control. The author, Sheikh Gada, considered himself a successor of Abdul Rahman Baba. He was alive in AH 1173 (1759–60) but the
manuscript in the British Museum is dated AH 1294 (1877).

8) Rabqat ul Islam by Maulana Moiz ud Din enjoins upon all readers to begin everything with *bismillah* (in the name of Allah) as follows:

Har sa kar che momin kandi  
Bismillah beea pare bandi

Everything the Muslim does  
In the Name of Allah he says first.

9) The Majmua tul Khutab must have been really popular. It is a collection of versified sermons. It is said to have been read out at occasions such as the Eid ul Fitr (celebrated at the end of Ramzan). Some of the lines commemorating the departed Ramzan are:

Ajab daur voo da Ramzan  
La mung teer sho pa yovan  
Ae momina har zaman  
Ghuara fazal da Subhan

Strange and wonderful were the days of Ramzan which we passed together  
O good Muslims everywhere always desire the grace and blessings [of God].

This book is said to have been especially significant as a textbook in the Pashto-speaking areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Guide 1990: 11).

The purpose of these books seems to have been a practical one: to make people behave in a recognizably Islamic way or, at least, to make them aware of such a code of behaviour. They were written in Pashto rather than the elitist Persian in order to spread the message of Islam among the common people. For instance the *Rashid-ul-Bayan* says:

Pa Pakhto mi deen bayan kar  
Sta da para mee asan kar

I have explained the Faith in Pashto  
Thus I have made it easy for you.

Besides these religious books, which were read at various levels, there were also stories, romances and poetry which were enjoyed informally. One of the most famous romances was the story of Adam Khan and Durkhani. The story of this tragic love affair was written by several poets but the earliest version is probably by Sadr Khan Khattak, a younger son of the great poet Khushal Khan Khattak. This was written in AH 1117 (1705–06).

Besides these there are a large number of booklets called *Nur Nama, Jang Nama, and Lahad Nama*. The latter are about the well-known stories of Imam Hussain’s martyrdom at Karbala, common beliefs about the questioning in the grave, and so on. As mentioned at several places in this book, such booklets were common in all the languages of South Asian Muslims and common people’s beliefs about religion must have been greatly influenced by them.

The poetic collections of Rahman Baba (1653–1709) and Khushal Khan (1613–89), both of whom appeal even now to Pashto-speaking people, were also available for general readers. However, even if couplets from these poets were quoted by educated people, there is no evidence
to suggest that their works were formally taught anywhere. Moreover, the well-known Persian book of tales, *Anwar Suhaili*, is said to have been taught in Pashto translation also. While on the subject of translations, it may be worth noting that Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi’s *Bahishti Zewar* [The Jewellery of Paradise], perhaps the most famous Urdu book on the rules and regulations of Sunni Hanafi Islam, had also been translated in parts by Syed Tasneem ul Haq as *Da Jamati Kale*. Later another translation, this time a complete one, was made by Gulbar Khan under the same title. These translations, it is said, were read by both men and women like textbooks (Guide 1990: 11).

According to some researchers, such as Sayedul Abrar, there were ‘two classes of readers who read Pashto books: Village women and story tellers in *Hujras*’ (Abrar 1979: 90). Moreover, students from the madrassas, where Pashto was a medium of instruction, also read them. The village women were not formally educated. They were, however, taught the Quran and some of the rudiments of religion by an older woman known respectfully as *Bibi* (lady). The *Bibi* sometimes used a Pashto textbook, often a versified one for interest, to teach the basics of Islam. From their exposure to the Arabic script of the Quran some of the *Bibis* also picked up literacy in the Pashto script which, being in *naskh* after the initial stages, was more similar to Arabic than to Persian. The women did not, however, confine themselves to religious texts. They also read story books, also in verse, which they bought from vendors. These were inevitably romances, notably of Adam/Durkhani, Jalat/Mehbooba, Musa Khan/Gul Makai, and so on, and were already part of the oral folklore since time immemorial. Professional story-tellers sang them in the *hujras* (men’s common rooms) in Pashtun villages and they too purchased the same books to which the women found access (Abrar 1979: 91). These popular books were very cheap. They had to be—after all, neither village women, madrassa students or story-tellers had much income. As Abrar says:

> The value of the books was always in pennies. The books generally used to be very short for the same reason. The very sight of these books was such that any person with a taste for beauty and get-up would not like to look at them or keep them with himself. Taste for study of Pashto books was almost at zero point among the educated class (Abrar 1979: 91).

When Samandar Khan Samandar, a Pashto poet, spent his own money on printing his book *Da Quran Jara* on good paper he found that the books were not sold anyway (ibid.: 92). The reason for this is not far to seek. The British had made Urdu, not Pashto, the medium of instruction in non-elitist schools while the elitist ones used English. Jobs too were available in the lower domains of power in Urdu and in the higher ones in English. Thus neither money nor time were invested on Pashto by educated Pashtuns.

**British Teaching of Pashto**

The importance of Pashto in British eyes can be gauged from the report on it which states that, in addition to being spoken in Afghanistan it is also spoken by 1,200,000 people in India. The report then goes on to say:

> Pashto is all important as the *lingua franca* on the Indian North-West Frontier. If there is any trouble there, a knowledge of Pashto is indispensable. Its political importance can be gauged from the fact that it is studied in both German and Russian Universities.

> It is also the language of our Pathan troops (Treasury 1909: Appendix XIII: para xxi, p.117).

This being its importance in British eyes, it was supposed to be learned by Englishmen. The order
about this clearly states:

All the Indian Frontier Officers and Missionaries on the frontier must know Pashto. These are many in number. At present they have to learn the language on the spot, and some who are good linguists know a good deal about it, but once they leave their duty their accumulated knowledge is lost. The arrangements for teaching on the frontier are necessarily imperfect (ibid.: 117).

These arrangements were private ones. Englishmen generally hired private tutors, crammed grammars and lists of words written by English authors or took lessons from tutors hired by their organizations.

Among the linguists, there were many who wrote grammars and dictionaries. The most well-known among these are Captain H.G. Raverty; H.W. Bellew; George Morgenstierne and, of course, George Grierson. Raverty’s dictionary, completed in July 1860, must have been written before the British government had started showing much interest in teaching Pashto to its officers for political reasons. Thus, in his ‘Preface’ Raverty refers almost entirely to the military, and political, significance of the language. Among other things he says that Indian Pathans, or go-betweens of Afghan origin from India, should not be sent to Afghanistan to mediate between the Afghans and the government. ‘But we can only free ourselves from dependence upon them, by sending as agents into the country men practically acquainted with the language spoken by the people, or, at least, with the language in general use at the Court of the ruler to which they may be accredited’ (Raverty 1860: iii–iv). After that he says that the Pashtuns sided with the British during the upheaval of 1857 and, ‘henceforth we should enlist Afghans, as well as Sikhs and Gurkhas, into every regiment’ or, even better, create regiments of each ethnic group (ibid.: iv). Another reason is that the Russians, who teach Pashto at St. Petersburg, would be advantaged by their knowledge of the language whereas the British, who actually rule over the Pashtuns, would not be able to influence them (ibid.: vi). Thus, argues Raverty, schools should be established ‘for the express study of Pushto’ and the government must make it compulsory for its officers (ibid.: vii). His own dictionary; textbook called Gulshan-i-Roh; and grammar; he says, are meant to facilitate the learning of this important language.

Raverty’s complaint about British indifference to Pashto gains support from the fact that a German scholar, H. Ewald, rather than an English one, pioneered the study of Pashto. His article appeared in 1839, i.e. during the British-Afghan wars and ten years before the British had annexed the Punjab. Dorn’s Chrestomathy of the Pushtu or Afghan Language was published in 1847 from St. Petersburg and was known to both Raverty and Trumpp. Indeed, Ernest Trumpp, the great German linguist, whose grammar of Pashto appeared in 1873, dedicated his work to Dr B. Von Dorn ‘the Ingenious Pioneer of Pashto Studies in Europe’ (Trumpp 1873: Dedication page). Wilhelm Greiger, another German linguist with interest in Pashto, also wrote articles on the sound system and a grammar of Pashto from 1893 onwards. Indeed, as Annemarie Schimmel in her extremely useful study of the German linguists who have studied Pakistani languages puts it, ‘Geiger’s contribution gave the study of Pashto a new, firm ground on which the coming generations could work’ (Schimmel 1981: 154). The work of these ‘coming generations’, which has been described by Schimmel, is not relevant here (for details see, Schimmel 1981: 154).

These German works provided material for the study of Pashto to British officers. However, since they were meant for linguistic study, they had less specifically pedagogical material than the works of British linguists. Likewise George Morgenstierne’s work on Pashto, as well as the other languages of Pakistan, is more for scholarly than pedagogical use (Morgenstierne 1932). The works which were used for the actual acquisition of the language, both by teachers and learners, were primers by both the British and the Indians. Indian tutors too wrote primers to help their British pupils learn Pashto. Indeed, the very first linguistic study of Pashto, entitled Riyaz ul-mohabbat was written by Mohabbat Khan, son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan Rohila (d. 1774), in 1806–
7. This is both a grammar and a dictionary compiled for Sir George Barlow, Acting Governor-General of the North-Western Provinces (Blumhardt and Mackenzie 1965: 53). There is also evidence to suggest that it was encouraged by the District Officer, Malcolm, who recommended a cash prize for him on the ground that it was well for ‘natives of high family’ to take a literary turn since this would divert them from ‘barbarous habits and martial spirit’ (Malcolm 1806). However, Ghulam Husain Khan, who probably knew Mohabbat Khan, says that he ‘was suffered to linger upon a small pension, quite inadequate to his rank in life’ (Khan 1789, Vol. 4: 57).

Allahyar Khan, another son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, also compiled a Hindustani-Persian-Pashto dictionary called Ajaib ul Lughat in AH 1234 (1819), (Blumhardt and Mackenzie 1965; Hewadmal 1994: 405). In the preface of his book he writes in Persian that Afghan used to come ot his father to learn Pashto, especially the differences between the Afghan and the Indian varieties of the language, from his father. When he and is younger brother came to Bareilly, the latter did not know Pashto. Nor indeed, did the children of the family. The book was written, therefore, to facilitate the learning of the language by posterity (ke jastan lughat-e-Afghani mard-e-Hindustani ra asan bashud= to make it easy for Indians to learn the Afghan language). The book employs Persian as the language of explanation throughout (Khan, A. n.d). Another Pashto-Persian-Urdu dictionary, entitled Farhang Irtizai, was completed by Muhammad Irtiza Khan in AH 1225 (1810). The author was the son of Nawab Aman Khan and he prepared the dictionary for Archibald Seton, Resident of Delhi, from 1807 to 1811. The dictionary is also called the Amad Namah-i-Afghani. A certain Pir Muazzam Shah from a village in Peshawar district, who was in the service of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, made an abridgement of the Tarikh-i-Afghania in Pashto (Blumhardt and Mackenzie 1965: 49). In the Pashto-speaking areas among the first books written for the British was Tutor to Pushto published in 1896 by Moulvi Ismail Khan as ‘a perfect help to the lower and higher standard Pashto examination’ (Khan 1896). Some of the tutors of Pashto (or Munshis), such as Qazi Najamuddin Khan and Qazi Behram Khan, both father and son made this into a family profession. Behram’s son Qazi Abdul Khaliq too became an ‘officers language teacher’ in Peshawar and wrote Fifty Lessons to Learn Pashto in 1970.

**Pashto for the Pashtuns**

Despite Raverty’s recommendation about teaching Pashto to the Pashtuns, the British authorities did not do so—at least, not on a grand scale nor as a general rule. They did not because they believed that it was politically more expedient for the Pashtuns to become Indianized. Thus, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Cis-Sutlej states wrote that he had introduced Pashto because of ‘the political advantage of hastening the amalgamation of our provinces’ (Letter of 17 June 1862 to the Secretary of the Punjab Government, in Chaudhry 1977: 43) and the Director of Public Instruction confirmed that ‘political motives’ had ‘a great share in giving the superiority to Urdu over Persian’ (Letter of 22 July 1862 to the Secretary of the Punjab Government, in Chaudhry 1977: 38). However, Pashto was tolerated in the primary schools as the unofficial medium of instruction and was even used for translation. Thus the Education Report of 1861–62 tells us:

> At present, in many of the border schools, all that the best scholar can do is to translate the Goolistan into Pushtoo after his own fashion; but the teachers are being gradually brought under training in the Derajat and Peshawar Normal Schools, where they soon pick up a knowledge of Urdu, which they will, on their return communicate to their pupils (Edn. P 1864a: 3).

Sometime later in the 1860s, however, the education authorities of the Frontier Circle did
initiate an experiment to teach Pashto for schools in the Pashto-speaking areas of the Frontier circle (roughly what came to be known as the NWFP). In the lowest class, the letters and numerals of Pashto were taught through a textbook known as Nisab-i-Afghani. This book contained both Persian and Pashto words and H.B. Beckett, the officiating Inspector of Schools, wrote to the DPI in Lahore:

This will enable the pupils to gain a gradual knowledge of Persian; as the book is a vocabulary of both languages in verse, compiled on the same principle as the Khalik-bari (Letter to Major Fuller, DPI, dated 3 October 1866 in Extract November 1866: 343).

After this Saadat Nama and Qawaid-i-Afghani were used. The former was said to be a collection of stories and the latter is an elementary grammar of Pashto. In the next class the Pashto translation of Kaleela wa Damnah or Anwar-e-Suhaili was taught. This translation, by Afzal Khan, son of the poet Khushal Khan Khattak, seems to have been part of popular Pashto reading. In class V, however, Pashto was dispensed with and the students would learn only Persian and Urdu (ibid. 1866: 343–4). The education department had already prepared and circulated the Tasheeloo-Tahleem da Pukhto and Nisab-i-Afghani by 1866. The other books were in preparation. This experiment was to be carried out only in the Pashto-speaking areas which were mentioned.

The fate of this experiment, modest as it was, is not clear. However, individual British officers did initiate such experiments time and again. For instance, the political Agent of the Kurram Agency in the late 1920s, introduced Pashto for children. An education report of 1922–27 tells us:

An interesting feature of the Kurram schools is the prominence given to Pushtu, which forms part of the school course for primary classes. The subject is said to be well taught (Edn. F 1927: 89).

The schoolboys here seem to have learned Pashto well enough to write articles in it for the Urdu-Pashto magazine called the Frontier Boy Scout. Indeed, they even brought out a Pashto newspaper, the Kurram Times in the late 1930s. All this was possible, as were most things in colonial India, by bureaucratic blessing—in this case that of the political agents of the agency (Edn. F 1939: 107).

It appears that, despite the fact that Urdu and English were in demand because jobs were available in them, some Pashtun intellectuals did initiate a language movement—or, rather, the precursor of one—by the end of the nineteenth century. Such movements, as we know, are started by educated members of the intelligentsia who feel that their mother tongue should be promoted. One such person was Meer Ahmad Rizwani (1866–1934). Among other works in Urdu, Persian, and Arabic, he also wrote Baharistan-e-Afghani (1898) and Da Shakaristan-e-Afghani (1905). According to Humayun Huma, writing in an issue of the monthly Pashto devoted to Rizwani, the two books mentioned above were written to teach Pashto as a subject. They contain poetry and prose texts from ancient till modern times and Rizwani has added his own simple Pashto prose to the book also. His own prose is modern in that it deviates from the established pattern of highly ornate, formal, and ostentatious prose which was written earlier. His emotional commitment to the promotion of literacy in Pashto suggests that he had the kind of interest in the language which activists have and not merely the pragmatic attitude of a teacher or a minor official (for details see, Pashto 1996).

While in British India Pashto was patronized only by private enthusiasts among the British or in fits and starts; it was given the status of a written language, used in the domains of power, in the Swat state. This state existed from 1915 but the British recognized it in 1926. Earlier, Persian was the language of the state but Miangul Abdul Wadud, the ruler or Wali of Swat, changed it to
Pashto (Husain 1962: 117). Since Pashto was now taught in schools, the Wali ordered the printing of books in Pashto (like the Anwar-e-Suhaili) and the translation of new books. Even after the state was taken over by the government of Pakistan in 1969, Pashto continued to be taught in schools better and more thoroughly than even the Pashto-speaking parts of the NWFP (Mashal 1971). A report of 1991 about Swat tells us that out of the six government schools which were visited by the researchers, all used Pashto as the medium of instruction. The report tells us that ‘about 80% of the students were able to read fluently from Pashto textbooks’ and could also do mathematics in it (Report 1991).

**Teaching Pashto and Ethnicity: British India**

With the advent of British colonialism, Pashto became a marker of Pashtun identity in a process which has already been described earlier (Rahman 1996: 137–8). Thus, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of Pashtun nationalists in British India, promoted its teaching as part of defying the British policy of teaching Urdu to the Pashtuns. This resistance (or ethnic) language-teaching was restricted to a few nationalist circles. Thus Ghaffar Khan was reported to have reopened ‘the old schools in the tribal areas’ which were called ‘Azad’ (free) schools since they accepted neither state aid nor the prescribed curricula (Ghaffar 1969: 57). In these schools, according to Ghani Khan, Pashto was the medium of instruction (Ghani Int. 1993).

Ordinary Pashtuns, going through the process of formal education mostly because it led to jobs, did not think it made pragmatic sense for them to burden their children with Pashto. Thus, when Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan (1864–1937), whose role as the founder of the Islamia College at Peshawar has been discussed in Chapter 5, carried out a survey of Pashtun opinion about medium of instruction in 1929–30, he found that:

> The Pushto-speaking population was practically unanimous in favour of instruction throughout in Urdu. Accounts and everyday conversations are usually in Urdu and never in Pushto (LAD-F 12 October 1932: 132).

The real opposition to Pashto came, however, from the speakers of Hindko. Since a large number of Sikhs and Hindus, all speaking Hindko, lived in the cities of the NWFP and had a voice in the legislative assembly, this was often perceived as the non-Muslim opposition to Pashto. In 1935, however, Qayyum Khan tried to please everyone by adopting a policy which was reported in the Khyber Mail, the only English newspaper from the NWFP, as follows:

> Pushto is henceforth to be the medium of instruction in primary schools in the N.W.F.P but only in the 1st and second classes—and in the Pushto speaking areas only. In Hindko speaking areas Urdu will continue to be the medium of instruction.

> Even in areas where Pushto will be enforced as the new medium in the 1st and 2nd classes, Urdu alone will be the sole medium of instruction in the 3rd and 4th primary classes (Khyber Mail, 15 Sept. 1935).

This was, as the newspaper commented, an attempt to conciliate both the pro- and the anti-Pashto lobbies. However, the anti-Pashto lobby was not conciliated. The Hindu and Sikh members observed a ‘Black Day’ on 7 August 1936 and the teaching of Pashto became a political issue. Although Dr Khan Sahib, the elder brother of Ghaffar Khan and Congress candidate, was not against Pashto but political expediency made him promise that the circular would be repealed (LAD-F 28 Sept. 1937: 674). Both his Congress and Qayyum Khan’s Muslim League
government did not insist on teaching Pashto till 1938 when Dr Khan Sahib’s government did manage to make it a medium of instruction only for Pashto-speaking pupils (LAD-F 25 March 1939: 582). Even this order seems to have been observed more in the breach than otherwise in most schools. There are reports, however, that Pashto was taught to adults in several places in the Pashto-speaking areas of the NWFP in the 1940s (Edn-F 1942: 82–3).

**Teaching Pashto and Ethnicity: Pakistan**

If Pashto was associated with Pashtun identity in British times, this was seen as an anti-British and anti-non-Muslim tendency. It was anti-British because the British official policy was to favour the teaching of Urdu. It was anti-non-Muslim, at least in the eyes of Hindus and Sikhs, because they felt that their language and culture would be under threat. This was the gist of the arguments given by Lala Ladha Ram, Rai Bahadur Ishar Dass, and Rai Mihr Chand Khanna in their speeches in the legislative assembly (LAD-F 28 Sept. 1937: 674; 610–14). After the birth of Pakistan, however, Pashto came to be associated with Pashtun ethnic identity. Since this came sharply into focus through the Pakhtunistan issue—Ghaffar Khan’s demand for an independent or autonomous Pashto-speaking area—the government of Pakistan was highly suspicious of Pashto and all demands for teaching it. The story of this suspicion, and Afghanistan’s activities on behalf of Pakhtunistan, are given in police reports, legislative assembly debates and newspapers of the 1950s and 60s (see Rahman 1996: 145–6). The gist of the matter is that Pashto was not taught much by the state for political reasons, nor was it demanded except by the ethnic nationalists like Wali Khan’s National Awami Party (NAP), in Pakistan. By the 1970s, however, Pashtun ethnicity had declined in stridency. In 1972 the NAP did not insist on Pashto being made the official language of the NWFP even while it was briefly in power. Indeed, quite pragmatically it accepted Urdu as the official language of the NWFP. For pragmatic reasons, too, as Feroz Ahmed tells us, separation from Pakistan is not an attractive option for the Pashtuns. Indeed, according to Feroz Ahmed:

> The integration of Pakistan, therefore, has definite advantages to the Pushtoon working class which derives its sustenance in other provinces. Since their peasant relatives in the Pushtoon areas depend upon this income, they can also be considered to be directly economically integrated with the rest of Pakistan (Ahmed 1998: 206).

Moreover, the Pashtuns had also been co-opted in the state machinery. Both in civil bureaucracy and the military, but more in the latter, they got a fair share of jobs (Amin 1988: 141–2). Thus Pashto became less threatening for the ruling elite. Instead of being a separatist ethnic symbol it merely remained an ethnic identity-marker. Possibly for these reasons the state promoted its teaching, though only in name, in 1984. However, even in 1984 it required much pressure by identity-conscious Pashtuns, notably the writer Qalander Mohmand and Khawaja Sail, Director of Pashto Translation Project, to get Pashto adopted as a medium of instruction (Khattak 1998: 69).

Even so, Pashto was introduced as the medium of instruction in some schools in the Pashto-speaking areas of the NWFP and only at the primary level (Mohmand and others wanted it to be used till class VIII). The Primary Text-Book Pashto Translation Project, which was not meant only for translating textbooks in Pashto as its name would suggest, also supervised the process of the introduction of Pashto in schools. The project ran for four years and an Evaluation Committee was appointed in 1988 to report on its performance.

The gist of the report of this Committee was that Pashto had not been introduced simultaneously in all schools. Of course, nobody ever contemplated introducing it in the English-
medium schools run by the armed forces, the missionaries, and rich private entrepreneurs. Nor was it supposed to be introduced in the areas where Hindko, Khowar, or a language other than Pashto was spoken by most people. But, what came to light was that it had not even been introduced in all Pashto-speaking areas, such as Bannu and the other big cities. In general, the area which proved to be most positive towards Pashto was Swat where, as mentioned earlier, ‘about 80% of the students were able to read fluently from Pashto textbooks’ and almost all teachers and students were in favour of Pashto as a medium of instruction (Report 1991). The report goes on to say that ‘even in Kalam where the local language of the inhabitants is Kohistani’ Pashto is the medium of instruction in schools (Report 1991: 2). As the author discovered after field work in Kalam in June 1998, the Kalami-speaking people identify with Pashto because it is a dominant language of the area and the Pashtuns favour it more than in other areas of the NWFP because they are more used to it since the time when it was the language of official work. However, in primary schools in Kalam very small children are often taught at the informal level in Kalami as the present author noticed and the teachers conceded after some probing.

In Bannu, the evaluators visited seven schools and found that Pashto was taught as a subject in all schools except one but was not the medium of instruction in even one of them. Only 65 per cent students could read from Pashto textbooks and were of the opinion, along with their teachers, that Pashto need not be used as a medium of instruction. In Mardan too the feeling for retaining Pashto was weak though most teachers complained against the new orthography rather than the language as such. In Kohat, out of all the six schools visited, the medium of instruction was Urdu and only 50 per cent students could read Pashto fluently. In boys’ schools Pashto was taught as a subject but in girls’ school even this was not done. Most teachers were against using Pashto as a medium of instruction (Report 1991). However, it should be noted that this is not true about the tribal areas where teachers, parents, and Afghan refugees ‘overwhelmingly chose to have Pashto used by students and teachers all day in the early grades’ (Jones et al. 1986: 38, Appendices 11, 12 and 13). The above opinion was elicited in a survey nearly fourteen years ago. It appears that there is a feeling even in these areas that, although Pashto should be taught, it need not be a medium of instruction. Thus Shabana Gul Khattak, who interviewed students and teachers in the same areas in 1997 claimed that most ‘of the teachers of Primary Schools…were not in favour of Pashtu as medium of instruction’ (Khattak 1998: 50). However, both students and teachers ‘favoured Pushto to be taught as a compulsory subject upto class 10th’ (ibid.: 52).

In pedagogical terms Pashto was not a failure because achievement tests showed an improvement in Pashto-medium schools as compared to Urdu-medium ones (Edn. Dept. F 1991: 1–4). However, even the USAID reports about the tribal areas, which are totally Pashto-speaking, show that Urdu tended to be taught rather more than Pashto. In the Kurram and South Waziristan agencies, for instance, the medium of instruction remained Urdu (USAID 1991: 82; and 1990: 69). Reasons given for this reluctance to use Pashto are many: there are two major dialects of the language and official textbooks are in the northern dialect which the speakers of the southern dialect find alienating; many teachers are not Pashto-speakers; teachers themselves were educated in Urdu, and so on. The real reason, however, is that Pashto is not used in the domains of power. Thus, no jobs are available in it. Parents know that after a few years their children will have to learn Urdu and will lag behind those who have been taught that language from the beginning. Thus they are reluctant to overburden their children in the matter of language-learning. Simply put, the tension is between investing on the language of utilitarian value and the language of identity. Not surprisingly, most people opt for the former while hankering for the latter.
Informal Learning of Pashto

Although the state has never provided facilities for the teaching of Pashto the language is acquired, much as it was since the eighteenth century at least, through informal means. Even now hundreds of chapbooks—pertaining to religious, romantic, and utilitarian themes—are available in Peshawar, Quetta, and other cities of Pashto-speakers (for a list see, Hanaway and Nasir 1996). The present author has seen a large number of these chapbooks published between the 1920s and the present.

Many of these books are on religious subjects. Like the religious books in manuscript form mentioned earlier, they too are called Nur Nama, Jang Nama, and so on. Moreover, their themes are also the same. It is difficult to say, however, that they are reprints of the originals mentioned earlier. The similarity of themes does suggest, however, that popular views about Islam, basically the emphasis on the miraculous aspects of it, have not changed much in the last hundred years or so.

Other books are romances which too have been mentioned earlier—the stories of Musa Jan and Gulmakai; Sher Alam and Memonai; Momin Khan and Sher Bano; Talat Khan and Shumaila; Qutab Khan and Nazi; Adam Khan and Durkhani; and Dali and Shabo, etc. They are in simple Pashto verse and are quite short—between twenty to sixty pages. The romances celebrate heroism and male values of bravery, violence, chivalry, and chastity. The lovers almost never achieve union in this world. They die after many adventures involving war, abduction, and deception.

Other stories which are rewritten time and again are in the fairy tale tradition of the Alf Laila though they are written by contemporaries. Thus a contemporary, born in 1972, as he tells us in the preface, wrote the story of the Caliph Harun ul Rashid’s son—a story about the magic world of princes, princesses, and the supernatural (Hian n.d.). Similarly, the stories about prince Saif ul Malook and other such mythical persons abound in the small bookshops in the narrow streets of markets like Qissa Khawani in Peshawar and in Quetta and Kohat where chapbooks are sold.

The utilitarian chapbooks are about magic, astrology, amulets, medicines, sexology, language-learning and letter writing, etc. To read them with credulity one would belong to a pre-modern world view in which the supernatural is a force to reckon with. Science, with its disenchantment of the world, does not seem to be part of this world view. A book called Tor Jadu (Black Magic) prescribes spells for hurting one’s enemies and invoking supernatural power in aid of one’s enterprises. Books on astrology, medicine, and sexology refer to the pre-Ptolemaic views about the universe, Greek theories of medicine, and ancient folklore about sex. There are techniques of making conquests of beautiful women and boys though initially the author of the chapbook says in passing that the spell would not work for illicit desires. There are, however, books giving model letters to the beloved which cannot pretend to be addressed to wedded wives. Herbs for achieving or maintaining sexual prowess are mentioned and eternal youth is promised. The modern world does, however, stand only on the periphery and is sometimes invoked—as when a medicine is advertised as being a scientifically proven remedy for a disease. In such utilitarian books as those on language-learning and letter writing we see the pre-modern in contact with the modern—both being skills one picks up to get along in a world where power is in the hands of those who require that letters be written in Urdu or English. However, in general the reader of the chapbook is a person who is most at home in the pre-modern world of his ancestors where magic rather than rationality ruled.

Pashto and Islam

In the madrassas situated in the Pashto-speaking parts of the NWFP, the ulema deliver lectures,
sitting on the floor which is covered with mats, rugs or carpets, to their students in Pashto. All explanations of religious texts are also in Pashto. In a few textbooks, whether they are in Arabic or Persian, the explanation and the translation is also in Pashto. Books containing such explanations and commentaries exist since many years. Thus Maulvi Salih Mohammad Sahibzada wrote *Mira‘h al-Nahw* and *Tuhfah-i-Rashidiya’h* sometime around 1939 (Naeem 1986: 27). A certain Kamra Baba wrote a commentary on *Nahw-i-Meer*, the famous work on grammar taught in every madrassa, sometime in the late 1970s (Naeem 1986: 279). Another recent work, by a *mullah* from Kohistan called Mohammad Suleman is *Fawaid Faizania* (2 vols.). This is a commentary on the famous *Kafiya*. Works on the principles of the correct pronunciation of Arabic were written earlier. One such work, *Da Amir da Tajwid Risalah* (c. 1614) is mentioned by Naeem (1986: 27). Such books suggest that Pashto was the real medium of instruction, even if the official one was some other, in the madrassas of the Pashto-speaking areas since the beginning of recorded history. The present author visited madrassas in Mingora (Swat) and Peshawar but found very few books in Pashto being used nowadays. This is because the central certificate awarding authorities of the madrassas make it mandatory for students to write examination papers in Urdu or Arabic. Maulana Mahbub Ilahi of the Madrassa Mazharul Uloom (Mingora) told me that the *Wafaq ul Madaris*, to which his institution was affiliated, allows only Urdu and Arabic as languages of examination. This was confirmed by a number of ulema of all schools of thought, interviewed in Peshawar (Interviews: Aziz; Shakeri; Ahmad—1999). Hence, students must learn these languages, which are taught to them anyway, in addition to Pashto (Ilahi Int. 1998). Although Pashto has been the language of the madrassas even before Pakistan was created, it has been associated in Pakistani public opinion with Pakhtun ethnicity rather than with Islam. This is somewhat ironic because there is a vast literature of a religious kind in Pashto. The manuscript sources have been mentioned earlier in the chapter and the printed ones are given in detail by Hidayat Ullah Naeem (1986). However, in recent history Pashto came to be linked with the secular lobby in the politics of the Pashto-speaking areas of Pakistan. The reason is that in Pakistan Urdu and Islam have always been presented as the symbols of Pakistani nationalism and national integration.

This image may, however, be changing. The main reason for this change is the Islamic resistance to the Soviet Union and the rise of Islamic movements among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan (the Taliban) and Pakistan (madrassa students and Sufi Mohammad of Swat). Although a number of books of Abul Ala Maudoodi, the pioneer of revivalist Islam in Pakistan, existed in Pashto even earlier (Naeem 1986: 256), it is only now that popular Islamic tracts are easily available in it. The reasons for this go back to the Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance to socialism in the eighties. The Afghan military resistance to the Soviets brought a large number of Pashto-speaking Afghans to Pakistan. They settled down in camps, mostly in the NWFP, and started a number of activities which increased the use of Pashto in several domains. For instance, they initiated a number of publications giving news of the Afghan war in Pashto. A number of pamphlets such as *Soor Khamar, Da Rom Muzalim*, and *Khoonre Toofan*, etc. were written for such purposes. Since this resistance was justified as a holy war (*jihad*), revivalist Islamic literature was referred to in order to provide a theoretical base to it (Naeem 1986: 149). Thus the Jamaat-e-Islami-i-Islami’s founder, Maudoodi’s *Tafheem ul Quran* was translated from Urdu to Pashto. Other works from revivalist sources, such as the *Akhwon ul Muslimeen*, were also made available in Pashto translation. Apart from such religious works, a number of literary works on the theme of *jihad*; Soviet outrages against innocent people; and the necessity of supporting the Afghan struggle against oppression; were published and distributed in Peshawar in the 1980s. Among such works the monthly *Qalam* and the novel *Da Dor Boran, Saughat*, and *Barood o Iman* may be mentioned. In short, the Afghan wars made more reading material of a religious and nationalistic kind available to readers of Pashto than ever before in modern times. Moreover,
Pashto was also the medium of instruction and a subject of study in the camp schools for Afghans (Taj 1989 and personal observation). One such experiment, witnessed by the author, is being administered by the Save the Children Fund among the Afghan refugees. The General Manager of the Quetta office, Nayyar Iqbal, told me how girls meet the teacher in her house for 4 to 6 hours a week. They are given basic literacy in Pashto. Child-bearing women are especially targeted and they are taught the basics of hygiene as well as some awareness of their rights. The Fund also administers schools where Afghan refugee children are taught in Pashto and Darri. The textbooks, published by a German donor organization in Peshawar (GTZ), are beautiful and highly imaginative. In the Quetta region there were 13,055 students in 1999 while in the Peshawar region there were over 30,000. The idea is to disseminate liberal values—gender equality, rights of women, necessity of peace—among Afghan children so that there should be an alternative to the present Taliban leadership in some future set-up in Afghanistan (Nayyar Int. 1999).

In Afghanistan, with the military victories of the Pashto-speaking Taliban, Pashto rather than Persian became the dominant language at least in Taliban-controlled areas. In short, the process of the Islamization of Afghanistan coincides with the process of the Pashtunization of the country. What effect this will have on Pakistan is not clear yet. However, the mere fact that a large number of religious, especially revivalist and revolutionary, texts are available in Pashto in Pakistan and many madrassa students, either having the experience of the Afghan jihad or having been inspired by it, are present in Pakistan helps to link Pashto with Islam. This link will remain weak in Pakistan but will get strengthened in nearby Afghanistan as the Taliban consolidate their hold on that country.

### Teaching by the State

Apart from the Pashto-medium primary schools mentioned earlier, Pashto is taught as an optional subject in non-elitist schools also. The textbooks of Pashto, in common with the textbooks of other Pakistani languages, are written by textbook boards. Probably to counteract ethnic feelings, they include a large number of ideological lessons. Table 35 shows the percentage of ideological lessons found in the books of 1999 prescribed by the NWFP Textbook Board. Pashto is also an elective subject at the intermediate and at the BA level. The level of examinations is easy and the syllabus prescribed by the Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>22 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>39 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>44 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>66 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>37 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>46 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>50 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII</td>
<td>36 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Research.

says that ‘adequate choice will be provided in the question paper’: Indeed, one can pass by simply memorizing short answers and an essay. This impression is given by a number of students and
teachers in informal conversation and by the high percentage of students who pass in Pashto at these levels as compared to English and Urdu. Indeed, a large number of students who pass in Pashto in the competitive examinations for the civil service have never studied it earlier (Appendix 9). This impression is shared by other researchers including Shabana Khattak (1998: 143).

Since 1958 an MA course has been running at the University of Peshawar. It was established by the efforts of Maulana Abdul Qadir. According to anecdotal accounts there was outside pressure by identity-conscious intellectuals such as Rasul Rasa, Abdul Khaliq Khaleeq, Hamza Shinwari, Khial Bukhari, Ghani Khan, and Mian Takweem ul Haq Kakakhel. The creation of the department was seen as a symbol of ethnic pride. However, any writer whose work was banned by the government—and Ghani Khan, Ajmal Khattak, Qalander Mohmand, and Hamza Shinwari have all been in this list at one time or the other—was excluded from the MA course. Moreover, Islamic literature has always been part of the course. In short, although the government allowed MA in Pashto, it remained vigilant and apprehensive about the possibility of its becoming an organ of ethnic Pashtun propaganda and took steps to counteract it (Jehan Int.; Khattak Int. 1999). Another MA started in the University of Balochistan at Quetta, where it was also seen as part of the maintenance of the Pashtun identity. Both universities also offer research degrees, including Ph.D., in Pashto studies. Thus, a number of graduates, qualified in Pashto, come into the job market every year. These are employed in schools and other educational institutions but many remain unemployed because Pashto is not used as much in the domains of power as are Urdu and Sindhi.

The teaching of Pashto, therefore, remains a part of the political imperative of Pashtun ethnic political parties and identity-conscious Pashtuns. Students, however, either do not learn it in great numbers because of its non-use in the domains of power or take it as an easy option for seeking jobs or in the civil service examination (Appendix 9). The response of matriculation students towards Pashto in the survey I carried out in 1999–2000 is presented in Table 36.

Although the Pashto-speaking students did not respond as well to Pashto as the general feeling for Pashtun identity might lead one to expect, 53.06 per cent desired that they would like their mother tongue to be used as a medium of instruction for them (in response to Q. 4). However, only 13.27 per cent wanted jobs in their province to be given in Pashto (i.e. Pashto as an official language for jobs). (Appendix 14.12).

Informally, however, it is the medium of instruction at the lower level in non-elitist schools in Pashto-speaking parts of the NWFP and Balochistan even where they claim to be Urdu and English-medium institutions. It is also the language of popular chapbooks and other popular reading material. Above all, the Islamic madrassas use it for teaching and sermonizing and it is developing a closer connection with revivalist Islam than it has had in recent times.

NOTES

1. The only manuscript dated 1611, MS. 4093 is at the University of Tubingen Library, Germany.
2. The manuscript of 1592 is in the Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar.
Table 35 (2 of Chapter 11)
Demand for Pashto by Pashto-Speaking and Other Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashto-speaking students (N=98)</th>
<th>Madrassas (Total 131)</th>
<th>Sindhi-medium (132)</th>
<th>Urdu-medium (520)</th>
<th>Elitist (97)</th>
<th>English-medium Cadet Colleges (86)</th>
<th>Ordinary (119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?</td>
<td>40.82</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>07.12</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendices 14.12 and 14.7. All the figures given above, except those in brackets, are percentages. As numbers overlap, figures do not add up to 100. Q.3, given in Appendix 14, has been broken into two parts here.
Punjabi has never been used in the official domains of power or taught at a high level, or in its own right, before the coming of the British. However, there is evidence that at the primary level children were taught some books in Punjabi. Moreover, it was informally learned by a number of people, Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims. Let us first take the evidence about it being taught at some level. This evidence comes from Heer Ranjha, the famous tale of two lovers in verse narrated by Waris Shah among others, and has been mentioned by many people including G.M.D. Sufi (1941: 109). The lines from Heer are as follows:

Parhan fazil dars durvesh mufti khoob kadh alhan parkaria neen
Taleel, Meezan te Sarf Bahai, Sarf-e-Meer bhi yad pukaria neen
Qazi, Qutab te kanz, Anwa Baran, Masoodian jald savaria neen.

The learned ascetics and judges learned the art of correct pronunciation. They read books on Arabic grammar by heart. Books on logic and Islamic law were compared with manuscripts for correction.

A number of other books are mentioned and then come two lines which mention the following books:

Ik nazam de Dars Harkaran Parhde Nam-e-Haq a te Khaliq Barian neen
Gulist, Bustan nal Bahar Danish, Tooti Nama te Raziq Barian neen
Minsha'at Nisab te Abul Fazlan, Shahnamion, Wahid Barian neen
(Sabir 1986: 16)

Most of the books mentioned in these lines were the standard texts in Arabic and Persian taught in the madrassas. Indeed, some of them are taught even now in Pakistan’s madrassas.

Out of these Muhammad Shafi, the informant of Sufi, places only Anwa Baran (or Baran Anwa) among the Punjabi books (Sufi 1941: 109). Both Shafi and Sabir place Raziq Bari, Wahid Bari, and Nam-e-Haq among Persian books (Sabir 1986: 620–21; Sufi 1941: 109). But there is a copy of a certain Wahid Bari, the name of whose author is lost, in the British Library. It was probably written in 1621–22 in order to teach Persian to students on the pattern of the well-known Khaliq Bari. The meanings of Persian words were conveyed through their Punjabi equivalents. The difference was that in Khaliq Bari the lexicon was in Hindvi (old Urdu), Persian, and Arabic while in Wahid Bari the facilitating language is Punjabi. An example from it makes this clear:

Madar, mau; biradar, bhai
Pidar, bap; eenga, parjai

The meanings of Persian words explained through Punjabi ones are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punjabi</th>
<th>Persian</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mau</td>
<td>madar</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhai</td>
<td>biradar</td>
<td>brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bap</td>
<td>pidar</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
parjai  eenga  brother’s wife

In short, Punjabi was not taught for itself but facilitated the learning of Persian. It was the means to an educational end—the learning of Persian.

Shirani mentions the Wahid Bari though the date of the manuscript available to him was AH 1034 (1663–64). He also mentions a number of other such books:

- **Raziq Bari** by Ismail AH 1071 (1660–61)
- **Raziq Bari** by Mustafa AH 1085 (1674–74)
- **Izad Bari** by Kharimal AH 1105 (1693–94)
- **Allah Bari** by Ummeed AH 1196 (1782)
- **Nasir Bari** by Mufti Shamsuddin AH 1208 (1793–94)
- **San’at Bari** by Ganesh Das Budhra AH 1220 (1805)
- **Qadir Bari** by Muzaffar AH 1223 (1808)
- **Wase’ Bari** by Yakdil AH 1231 (1815–16)
- **Rahmat Bari** by Maulvi Rahmat Ullah AH 1232 (1816–17)
- **Farsi Nama** by Abdur Rahman Qasuri (n.d.)
- **Nisab-e-Zaroori** by Khuda Baksh (n.d.)
- **Bad Sahel** (n.d.)
- **Azam Bari** (n.d.)
- **Sadiq Bari** (n.d.)
- **Azam Bari** (n.d.) and
- **Farsi Nama** by Sheikh Mohammad (Shirani 1934: 119; Shirani 1933: 85-99)

Although these books were meant to teach Persian or the rudiments of Islam, they used Punjabi as the language of explanation. This tradition had been established by Abu Nasr Farahi when he wrote his Nisab ul Sabiyan in AH 617 (8 January 1660–27 January 1661) in Persian to teach Arabic to Afghan children. A number of such nisabs, including one by Amir Khusrau, were written upto the tenth century. Hindi nisabs came to be written ‘probably from 10th century Hijri’ [15th century] (Shirani 1933:16; also Shirani n.d.). A certain Hakeem Yusufi, who migrated from Hirat (Iran) to India wrote Insha-i-Yusufi. He gives Hindi equivalents for parts of the human anatomy. The famous Khaliq Bari is part of this tradition but, according to Shirani, it was written by Ziauddin Khusro, not the famous Amir Khusrau, in 1621–22. Khaliq Bari is in the mixed language of Hindi, Persian, and Arabic. It was meant to teach Persian, to the children of north India (Shirani 1933: 16). As such, one wonders whether books like the Wahid Bari could not have been placed among Punjabi books by Shafi and Sabir? A major complication, however, is that there were several books of the same title so that we can never be sure exactly which book Waris Shah had in mind. However, the fact that Persian was taught through both Punjabi and old Urdu (Hindvi) to Punjabi children, cannot be denied.

Other older books of Punjabi, out of which the Pakki Roti is part of the MA course in Pakistan and therefore well-known, were meant to explain the rudiments of Islam to students in their mother tongue. Pakki Roti is in the form of questions and answers. For instance, the question is ‘If somebody asks you as to when to perform ablutions you reply as follows’. The reply is the accepted Sunni teaching on the subject. Complications and controversial matters are avoided and the answers would probably be acceptable to most Punjabi Muslims. A number of other such books in manuscript form are given in various catalogues in the British Library (Blumhardt 1893; Haq 1993; Quraishi 1990; Shackel 1977). The manuscripts located in Pakistani libraries, however, are not catalogued. Among the thirty-four manuscripts catalogued by Christopher Shackel (1977), Muhammad Yar has authored eleven. He lived in Kotkala in Shahpur (Sargodha district). He calls his language ‘Jhangi’ at places. It is, as to be expected, a mixture of what are called Siraiki and Punjabi nowadays. This is one of the other early manuscripts from the present-day Punjab which can be classified as Siraiki or Punjabi. That is why the present work does not
attempt to list Siraiki manuscripts separately though a brief section on Siraiki is given separately in order to provide a historical background for later writings in that language.

The earliest works of Muhammad Yar seems to have been written in AH 1196 (1782) while the latest is dated around AH 1244 (1828–29). The books were copied by his grandson Faiz Mohammad in AH 1271 (1854–55). The Pand Nama; Afrinash Nama; Tuhfat al-Fiqh and Bina al-Mominin are treatises on Islamic rituals and fundamental beliefs while the Nafi al-Salat is on the benefits of prayers. Among the hagiographical works are those on saints (Siharfi Hazrat Pir and Nafi al-Kaunain) and the Prophet of Islam (Tuhfat al-Saluk, Tarvij Nama, Siharfi Hazrat Rusul-i-Maqbul). These, as well as other works, are all religious.

Another major writer was Maulvi Abdullah Abidi (d. 1664) who was born in village Malka Hans of the Sahiwal district but lived and died in Lahore. His language too has Multani (now called Siraiki) forms and it is his work Baran Anwa which is referred to in Heer mentioned earlier. The importance of Abdullah for students is thus described by Shackle:

The comprehensive character of Abidi’s [sic] writings has, however ensured them a uniquely important and influential position as manuals of instruction; and they have been frequently published, usually in collections of twelve treatises entitled Baran Anwa (Shackle 1977: 39).

Let us now describe Baran Anwa and other works of a religious kind which were read both by students and other Punjabi Muslims. The following manuscripts, seen by the author, are being mentioned very briefly by way of illustrating this genre of Punjabi writing.

1)  *Baran Anwa* by Abdullah Abidi Lahori. This is a handwritten manuscript in nastaliq in Punjabi verse. It begins, as usual, with hamd and naat and goes on to describe Islamic rituals: ablutions, prayers, fasting, giving alms, and so on. It also discusses the rituals and regulations concerning purity with special reference to women. Thus there are long sections on pregnancy, menstruation, divorce, etc. The second part is full of historical anecdotes with reference to authorities like Masoodi. It is a voluminous book and is definitely the one mentioned in *Heer Ranjah* by Waris Shah.

2)  *Fiqqa Asghar* by Faqir Habib Darzi bin Tayyab from Gujrat. This is a handwritten manuscript in naskh. It is written in black ink and there are about twelve lines per page. The author explains Islamic rituals and other matters pertaining to faith in Punjabi verse. The sub-titles are in Persian.

3)  *Muqaddimat ul Anwar* by Abdul Faqir. This is also a handwritten manuscript in naskh. Islamic injunctions pertaining to marriage, inheritance, sartorial propriety, etc. are explained in Punjabi verse while the sub-titles are in Persian. The point of view is very stringent and puritanical. Women, for instance, are forbidden even to use the *dandasa*—a bark of a tree which cleans the teeth and makes the lips red.

4)  *Zibah Nama* is a handwritten manuscript in naskh probably written during King Muhammad Shah’s reign (1719–48) as a couplet in it suggests. It was probably copied in 1860–61 as it contains the date AH 1277. It explains Islamic injunctions pertaining to the sacrifice of animals, hunting, and lays down rules about which meats are *halaal* (kosher) and which are not.

5)  *Anwa-i-Faqir*. This too is a handwritten manuscript in naskh probably by Faqir Habib. The sub-headings are in Persian and it has been copied by someone called Karm Uddin from Jhelum.
The date on it is Ziqad 1277 (May–June 1861). This too is on faith and the tone is puritanical and reformist.

6) **Intikhab ul Kutab: Punjabi Nazm.** The name of the author is probably Kamal ud Din but this particular manuscript was copied by Nur Ahmed of Kolia in 1261 (21 January 1806–10 January 1807). It too is handwritten in Punjabi naskh and the sub-headings are in Persian. It presents Islamic teachings in verse on bathing, funeral prayers, burial, congregational prayers, marriage, sacrifice of animals and as to which meat is halaal.

7) **Mitthi Roti: Punjabi** by Qadir Baksh. This is a printed copy in Punjabi nastaliq dated 1883. It too describes Islamic injunctions about all aspects of life including coitus. There are many references to Islamic works which suggest that it might have been intended for the use of learned people.

8) **Nijat al-Mominin.** A religious treatise written in AH 1086 (1675) by Maulana Abd al-Karim (1657–1707) of Jhang district.

9) **Kissa Kumad.** Written by Ashraf in nastaliq. This is an allegorical poem on a sugarcane which describes itself as being cut and ground.

10) **Kissa Umar Khattab.** An account in verse of the war of Caliph Umar with the infidel King Tal written by Hafiz Muizuddin of Takht Hazara in AH 1176 (1762–63).

11) **Raushan Dil.** Written by Fard Faqir of Gujrat, Christopher Shackle calls it ‘one of the best-known of all the many basic treatises on Islam to have been composed in Panjabi verse’ (Shackle 1977: 46).

12) **Raddulmubtadin.** This is an anonymous treatise in Punjabi verse against disbelief, polytheism and heresy written in AH 1788 (1814).

13) **Anwa Barak Allah** by Hafiz Barak Allah (d. 1871). It is a book in Punjabi verse on the Sunni law of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It was probably written in AH 1254 (1838) and printed several times later (for biographical note see Bhatti 1982: 119–38).

Besides the religious works mentioned above, there are the classical romantic tales of famous lovers (Yusuf-Zulaikha, Heer-Ranjha, Laila-Majnun, etc.). A somewhat unusual story is about King Akbar who wants to test the chastity of the Begum of Hyderabad. The Begum, dressed as a boy, is brought to the King but successfully resists him. The manuscript, in Punjabi verse, is written in the nastaliq script but the heading and all other details are lost. Another story uses characters from a tale which must have originated before Islam.

**Qissa Raja Kam Roop O Rani Luttan** by Maulvi Ahmed Yar. This is a handwritten manuscript in nastaliq in Punjabi verse. The sub-headings are in Persian. It is like other romantic love legends with beautiful women and handsome men in a supernatural, pre-modern setting. The copy seen by me was incomplete and ends at page 120 because it was originally bound with some other book. The author starts with a supplication to Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani who will presumably bless love affairs as passionate as the one narrated here.

Apart from the above manuscripts personally inspected by the author, there are many other such manuscripts mentioned by different people scattered in South Asia and other parts of the
world. A number of printed books, some of them based on the above mentioned manuscripts, are also in circulation. These are the ‘chapbooks’ mentioned in the introduction. Shahbaz Malik, a research scholar on Punjabi, has mentioned them in his bibliography called Punjabi Kitabiat (1991). They are also listed in several bibliographies of printed books in the British Library.

These books appear to fall into two major categories: those which are meant to make Muslims conscious of or knowledgeable about the rudiments of their faith and those which are about romantic love. Those in the first category have probably been written by maulvis because they present a very strict and highly puritanical view of the sharia'h. Some, such as one version of the Pakki Roti, prohibits music calling it a great sin just as it prohibits sodomy with boys and women. Those in the second category are tales in which romantic love and sometimes making love and drinking are shown without disapproval. These represent a more tolerant, more worldly or realistic world view which existed side by side with the stricter one, and is much in evidence in both Persian and Arabic tales. None of these books are meant to teach Punjabi as such. Punjabi serves as the means to an end—the end being socialization of Muslim children in this case or, simply, the pleasure of listening to a good story.

In short, although activists of the Punjabi movement make much of the teaching of Punjabi, they ignore the fact that it was not taught for itself in pre-British times. Moreover, although some of them refer to Hafiz Mahmood Shirani’s article mentioned earlier, they generally fail to mention the fact that Shirani was trying to prove that Urdu, and not only Punjabi, were taught in the Punjab at this period (see references to the teaching of Punjabi in Yameen 1969: 10–11).

Shirani mentions not only the Khaliq Bari but also the Zauq ul Sabyan written in circa AH 1207 (1792–93) by Hafiz Ahsan Ullah of Lahore. The language of this book is the same Urdu (or Hindvi) which is used in the Khaliq Bari. Again, like the Khaliq Bari, it too was meant to acquaint students with the vocabulary of Persian through Urdu. According to its author, who was a teacher, the Punjabi boys for whom it was intended understood it without any difficulty which, says Shirani, suggests that Urdu was not unfamiliar for Punjabis (Shirani 1934: 125).

If the students did understand Urdu it would not be surprising. Punjabi and Urdu share many core vocabulary items; the teaching of Persian through books like the Khaliq Bari must have familiarized Punjabi students with Urdu words and even before the British period there was communication between Punjab and north India where Urdu literature was coming into its own. In short, the situation in the Punjab on the eve of the British arrival was that Persian was the court language of the Sikhs. It was taught through Punjabi and Urdu at the primary level but those languages were facilitators at best and were not valued in their own right.

**Punjabi on the Eve of British Rule**

When the British arrived the schools in the Punjab could be divided, following Leitner, into maktabs, madrassas, patshalas, Gurmukhi, and Mahajani schools. The maktab was a Persian school while the madrassa was an Arabic one. The patshalas were Sanskrit schools while the Gurmukhi schools taught Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script. In the Mahajani schools the Landi or Sarifi script was taught to commercial people (Leitner 1882: 10).

The Sikhs considered it a religious duty to learn Gurmukhi enough to be able to read the Sikh holy books. Those following an advanced course studied, among other things, Gurmukhi grammar and prosody (ibid.: 32). The child began his studies at the age of six. He, or she, then proceeded to learn the Gurmukhi alphabet of which Guru Angat himself wrote a primer. The primer, being written by such an eminent spiritual leader, was in itself religious. It was, however, the means to an even more religious end—to enable the child to read the Adi Granth, a sacred
book of the Sikhs. After this other works, such as the *Hanuman Natak*, a Punjabi adaptation of a Hindi drama, were taught. Other subjects, such as elementary medicine and rhetoric, were also taught in Gurmukhi to Sikh children. According to Leitner, there were many people who knew Gurmukhi when he was collecting information for his report (1880s). Urdu, however, had been brought in and was being established slowly by the government (Leitner 1882: 35–7).

Some educational reports, such as that of 1857, tell us that students were first taught to read books in Persian without knowing their meaning. Later, they would ‘translate them literally word by word, into the vernacular, but there was no attempt at explanation’ (Leitner 1882: 60). This ‘vernacular’ was Punjabi which was not taught but was used, as we have seen, as a medium of instruction at least at the lower level before the British conquest. This practice continued even after the conquest and Leitner mentions that in ‘most kor’an schools’ some ‘elementary religious books in Urdu, Persian or Panjabi are taught’ (1882: 68). The Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur also reported that books on the rituals of Islam, which have been mentioned earlier, were taught in some of the Persian Quran schools (Edn. P 1883: 10). However, none of these informants has specified which out of the books listed were in Punjabi.

Female education is generally said to have always been neglected among Muslims but, according to Leitner, ‘Among Muhammadans nearly all girls were taught the Koran; nor could a Sikh woman claim the title and privileges of a “learner” unless she was able to read the Granth’ (1882: 98). He also gives a Punjabi song which the women had made (loc. cit.). Girls were also taught ‘the Koran together with little boys, and Urdu or Perso-Punjabi religious books, stories of prophets, etc. ‘The Sikh girls read the Granth and other books in Gurmukhi’ (Leitner 1882: 107). For the Sikhs even Nazeer Ahmad’s *Mirat ul Urus* had been translated into Gurmukhi. Leitner suggests that there had been a decline in female teaching since the British conquest because ‘formerly the mother could teach the child Panjabi. Now, wherever the child learns Urdu, the teaching power of the mother is lost’ (Leitner 1882: 108).

Some British officers, besides the enthusiastic Leitner, has suggested that Punjabi should be taught first to children and only after that should they proceed to other languages (Leitner 1882: 110–12). Leitner, of course, defended this proposition with much fervour because the thesis he argues in his report is that, because of British rule:

> the true education of the Panjab was crippled, checked, and is nearly destroyed...(and) our system stands convicted of worse than official failure (Leitner 1882: i).

The removal of Persian from its position of honour and the introduction of Urdu, argues Leitner, are language-teaching policies which have alienated Punjabis both from their traditional high culture as well as the prevalent popular culture. Among other things Leitner provides a brief history of the traditional schools in the Punjab.

Besides ordinary mosque, or Quran schools, there were some well-known schools both of Sikhs and Muslims. For instance there was Mian Sahib Qadri’s school at Batala which was supported by a landed estate which was withdrawn by the British. Another such school which also closed down for the same reason was Maulvi Sheikh Ahmed’s school in Sialkot. Then there were: Mian Faiz’s school at Gujranwala famous for Persian; Bara Mian’s school at Lahore; Khwaja Suleman’s school at Dera Ghazi Khan; Mian Abdul Hakim’s school at Gujranwala, and so on. All these schools are advertised as great centres of Persian and Arabic studies (Leitner 1882: 151), but Punjabi books like *Pakki Roti* might also have been taught there.
Punjabi and the British Conquest

Immediately after the annexation court circulars and notices were published in Punjabi. The missionaries, true to their conviction that the Bible should be available in a reader’s mother-tongue, distributed bibles in Punjabi (A. Singh 1877: 479). Moreover, the government realized that Punjabi could not be ignored since it was the language of 17,000,000 people. In a note about its importance for the functionaries of the state it was written:

Panjabi is of special importance as being the language of our Sikh soldiers. It is of the greatest importance that the officers in Sikh regiments should be able to converse freely in Panjabi. Too many of them employ Hindustani.

There is a great deal of tea grown in the Northern Panjab. The European [sic] employed there must be able to speak Panjabi (Treasury 1909: Appendix XIII, para xx, p. 116).

However, the official vernacular which the British adopted in the Punjab was Urdu. Reasons for doing this have been given earlier (Rahman 1996: 192–4). Let us go over them briefly, however, to put things in a historical perspective.

Since the British had done away with Persian in 1836 they did not allow it to continue as an official language in the Punjab where it had that status both in the Mughal and the Sikh courts. They, therefore, asked the advice of their field officers about the language to be used in the lower domains of power. Very few among them favoured the teaching of Punjabi. Most officers, indeed, were prejudiced against it. Their views, spread over a copious correspondence, can be summed up as follows: that Punjabi is a rustic dialect not fit for serious business; that Urdu is an advanced and more sophisticated form of Punjabi and that simple Urdu is easily understood in the Punjab (for the original letters expressing these views, see Chaudhry 1977).

In addition to this prejudice there was some apprehension, though it is expressed at very few places and then only in passing, that the British feared the symbolic power (and hence the political potential) of the Gurmukhi script. Thus the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Delhi Division wrote in a letter to the Secretary of the Punjab Government on 16 June 1862:

it will be a stultification of our whole educational system to adopt Punjabee as our Court language. Here we are teaching the population to read and write Oordoo…Besides, I think that any measure which would revive the Goormukhee, which is the written Punjabee tongue would be a political error (Chaudhry 1977: 66–7).

This occurs among the opinions sought from commissioners of the Punjab in the 1860s, about three years after the Punjabis had shown their loyalty to the British in the events of 1857.

However, as noted earlier, not all the British officers agreed with this neglect of Punjabi. Some of them—J. Wilson, Deputy Commissioner of Shahpur (in 1894); Robert Cust (in a letter of 2 June 1862)—advocated the cause of Punjabi but to no avail (for details see Rahman 1996: 194–6). The officers who refused to accept their point of view, and who were in a majority, were implacable in their prejudice against Punjabi. During this period both Muslims and Hindus developed consciousness about their identity. Religion, language, script, vocabulary, and literary tradition were all seen as belonging to one or the other identity. Especially relevant for our purposes is the way Hindi and the Hindu identity converged in a process mentioned at various places in this book and very competently described by Christopher King (1994). Simultaneously, Urdu too became a part, and symbol, of the Indian Muslim identity. Thus the Punjabi Muslims
began to identify with Urdu rather than Punjabi during the Hindi-Urdu controversy which began in the 1860s and went on in one way or the other till the partition of India in 1947.

Besides British officers, mostly Sikhs and Hindus kept insisting that Punjabi should be taught in the Punjab. In 1867, for instance, Jumna Dass, a tutor to some Sardars (chiefs) suggested that the teaching of Gurmukhi, being a sacred obligation, should be established by the British at Amballa (Dass 1867: 39). Later Hukum Singh, Pundit Rikhi Kesh, and Bhai Chiranjeet Singh wrote a memorandum with a view to persuading the Punjab University Senate to introduce Punjabi as a language of examinations. Among other things they argued that books on grammar, composition, and poetry existed in Punjabi and that Sikhs, Khatris, and Hindus would welcome the introduction of their mother tongue as a school subject. It is significant that they did not mention the Punjabi Muslims whose mother tongue too was Punjabi but who had begun to identify with Urdu, which was becoming a Muslim religious identity symbol, by this date. Reminiscent of later debates about the teaching of Punjabi in Pakistan, they said that they only wanted Punjabi to be ‘taught up to the middle school examination in Government schools, like other languages. It is, however, by no means contemplated that Urdu should be supplanted by the Punjabi in the Province’ (Singh et al. 1877: 473). Similar reasons were advanced by Sardar Attar Singh for the teaching of Punjabi. But the Sardar added a political reason to persuade the British to teach it. He wrote:

The Sikhs who form the most important class of the inhabitants, after whom the Province is called (the land of Sikhs, and not Hindus or Muhammadans), and who are the most faithful subjects, have got the Gurmukhi characters and Punjabi language for their religious and worldly affairs. To reject this language, therefore, would be to dishearten those people (Singh 1877: 478–9).

At that time Punjabi was taught in the Normal Female School at Lahore, in the Sat Sabha of the Punjab, and several private schools. However, the government did not examine candidates in the language except, of course, its own civil and military officers. The members of the University Senate who debated proposal XI—about allowing Punjabi to be a subject of examinations—were mostly British officers. General Maclagan, Major Holroyd, and Perkins opposed Punjabi while Dr Leitner, Brandreth, Pandit Manphul, and Sodi Hukum Singh supported it. Hukum Singh even asserted that the ‘books usually taught in Government schools exist in the Punjabi language’ while Brandreth pointed out that ‘there were many well-known and popular books in Punjabi before the English came’. However, the opponents considered it below the dignity of a university to teach what they called a ‘rustic’ tongue. Moreover, they felt that if Punjabi was allowed the flood gates of languages would burst open and Balochi, Pashto, Jatki, etc., would all clamour for admission. The debate, therefore, ended in a defeat for the pro-Punjabi lobby (PUC 1877: 445–54).

Although the Muslims in general showed little enthusiasm for owning Punjabi, some of their representatives did not oppose it either. Indeed, Nawab Abdul Majid Khan and Fakir Sayad Kamar ud Din, both members of the senate of the Punjab University College, submitted memorandums recommending that the vernacular languages, including Punjabi, should not be excluded from the examination list nor should they be completely neglected (Native Members 1879: 943).

Meanwhile, a number of private bodies, such as the Singh Sabha, promoted the teaching of Punjabi but mainly among the Sikhs. The Singh Sabha too petitioned the Punjab University College to associate its members in a sub-committee to be set up for the teaching of Punjabi and that the entrance examination (an examination necessary for entering the university), which was in Urdu and Hindi, should also be given in Punjabi (Singh Sabha 1881: 223).
This was conceded and Punjabi became one of the options for school examinations. Sikh children could also study Gurmukhi if they wanted to, but employment was only available in Urdu in the lower and English in the higher domains of power. The report of 1901 tells us that ‘Gurmukhi is taught in the Oriental College’ (Edn. P 1901: 16). However, because a major motivation for all formal education, including the learning of languages, was employment by the state, the Gurmukhi classes did not become popular (Edn. P 1906: 15).

Those who desired to give Punjabi a more pronounced role in the education of Punjabis suggested changes. J.C. Goldsby, the Officiating Director of Public Instruction of the Punjab, wrote to the senior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner in this context as follows:

It is a question between Punjabi and Urdu, and if the question is decided by the districts or divisions, there is no doubt that Urdu will invariably be chosen because of its practical utility. But Punjabi has a strong claim to be the language of the elementary school, since it is the language of the home in most cases; and more might perhaps be done to encourage the use of it, or at any rate to remove the impression that it is being purposely neglected (Goldsby 1908).

However, the report on education of 1907–8 does say that Hindu and Sikh girls were learning Gurmukhi in greater proportion than boys while Muslims, both girls and boys did not learn it (Edn.P 1908: 22). The report of 1910–11 remarks that the demand for Gurmukhi has increased even among the boys in the Lahore and Multan divisions, mostly in Lyallpur (Edn. P 1911: 5). Such yearly fluctuations, however, did not change the general pattern which the report of 1916 sums up as follows:

Urdu continues to be in favour as the school vernacular for boys. Gurmukhi or Punjabi schools for boys and girls numbered 446 with 20,347 scholars, but three-quarters of the latter were girls (Edn. P 1916: 16).

Punjabi Muslims generally spoke Punjabi at home and in informal domains—among friends, in the bazaar, etc.—but they wrote in Urdu (or English) and they used Urdu for political speech-making, serious discussions and other formal domains. Mohammad Iqbal, the national poet of Pakistan, is said to have spoken the Sialkoti variety of Punjabi but he wrote only in Urdu, Persian, and English throughout his life. In the only interview he gave in Punjabi in December 1930 to the editor of the Punjabi magazine Sarang, Iqbal made it clear that he did not write in Punjabi because his intellectual training had not opened up that option for him. He did, however, enjoy the language and appreciated the mystic content of its best poetic literature.

Of course, ordinary Punjabis too enjoy listening to Punjabi jokes, songs and poetry. Indeed, that is why poets like Imam Din and Ustad Daman (1911–84) were and remain so immensely popular. According to Son Anand, an inhabitant of old Lahore, Daman ‘is still a household name for all those who lived in the crowded “mohallas” and frequented the Punjab “mushairas”.’ He held audiences spellbound and was often in trouble for making fun of the authorities. Daman was anti-establishment, irreverent, and humorous. These, and the fact that he used words which had an immediate appeal being those of the mother tongue, made him a great success with Punjabi audiences (Anand 1998: 38–41). This association of Punjabi with pleasure is connected with a certain kind of Punjabi identity. In this context the work of Farina Mir (2002), who connects the language with the key concepts of locality, kinship and piety, is insightful. She argues that these concepts lead to Punjabi self understanding and that the colonial intervention brought them to the margins of state discourse. She tell us that Punjabi was also used during the urs celebrations of saints (p. 106); by professional jesters, singers and entertainers—Mirasis (pp. 113-119); dums (pp
Some of these people also remembered genealogies and told stories in Punjabi. It was also the language of ‘Sang’ (theatre) and, of course, stories in verse (such as Heer Ranja) were sung in it (Mir 2002: 127-133). This nexus with pleasure and some subtle but inexpressible aspect of the essential Punjabi identity exists even now and explains why Pakistani, or Muslim, Punjabis relegate their language to a marginal status in the formal domains while enjoying it and retaining it, especially for male bonding, in the informal and oral domains.

That is probably why pleasure is one thing and politics another. The Urdu-Punjabi controversy was an extension of the Urdu-Hindi controversy. The political need of the time, as perceived by Muslim leaders in the heat of the Pakistan movement, was to insist on a common Muslim identity and of this identity Urdu became a part for Punjabi Muslims. Moreover, having studied Urdu at school, the Punjabi intellectuals had complete command over its written form and literary tradition. Like Iqbal, all the great intellectuals of the Punjab—Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Sa’adat Hasan Manto—wrote in Urdu. Urdu was also the language of journalism—the Paisa Akhbar, the Zamindar of the irrepressible Zafar Ali Khan, and the Nawa-i-Waqi of Hameed Nizami being household names—which, like literature, was concentrated in Lahore. Indeed, Zafar Ali Khan modernized the Urdu language and became immensely popular as did Chiragh Hasan Hasrat whose witty columns were enjoyed by all those who read Urdu (Anand 1998: 173–7). Urdu was not only the adopted language of the intelligentsia of the Punjab. It was the symbol of their Muslim identity. That is why they opposed those who advocated the teaching of Punjabi.

Such was the anti-Punjabi fervour of the leading Punjabi Muslims that when Dr P.L. Chatterjee, the Bengali Vice Chancellor of Punjab University, declared in his convocation address at the University in 1908, that Punjabi, the real vernacular language of the Punjab, should replace Urdu, the Muslims condemned him vehemently. The Muslim League held a meeting at Amritsar to condemn him in December. The newspapers carried the controversy for several months. The Paisa Akhbar, a popular Urdu newspaper of Lahore, wrote articles not only about Chatterji’s ideas but also on the subject of the medium of instruction. Most writers, following editorial policy, said that Punjabi was not capable of being used as a medium of instruction even at the primary level (see file of Paisa Akhbar, December 1908 till April 1909). One contributor wrote that the educated Sikhs and Hindus, who used to speak Urdu earlier, had started speaking Punjabi out of prejudice against Urdu. However, he added, working class people—porters, cooks, gardeners, etc.—still spoke Urdu (Paisa Akhbar 16 July 1909). Another argument against Punjabi was that it consisted of dialects which changed after every few miles and had no standard form (Paisa Akhbar, 7 June 1909). Most people, however, felt that the promotion of Punjabi was a conspiracy to weaken Urdu and, by implication, Muslims (for a detailed defence of Urdu in pre-partition days, see M.R.T. 1942; for the controversy of 1908, see Khawaja 1982).

In short, most of the arguments were the same which were used by the functionaries of the state and right-wing intellectuals in Pakistan later. The difference was that in pre-partition India almost all notable Punjabi Muslims united to oppose their own mother tongue in support of Urdu. In Pakistan, on the other hand, identity-conscious Punjabis and their left-leaning sympathizers supported Punjabi much as the Sikhs and Hindus had done earlier, while establishment and right-wing people supported Urdu. The question was one of the politics of identity in both cases: before the partition almost all Punjabi Muslim leaders and intellectuals insisted on their Muslim identity so as to give a united front to the Hindus and Sikhs; in Pakistan some Punjabi intellectuals felt that the cost of renouncing their Punjabi identity was excessive while the others felt that it was necessary to prevent the rise of ethnicity which, in their view, would break up Pakistan. On the eve of the partition, then, Punjabi was not owned by the Muslims.
Punjabi in Pakistan—the Work of Faqir Mohammad Faqir

Although most educated Punjabis supported Urdu for political reasons and took pride in it, there were some who felt that the loss of Punjabi was too dear a price to pay for these attitudes. One such person was Faqir Mohammad, who later took the poetic nom de plume of Faqir, thus becoming Faqir Mohammad Faqir. He was born on 5 June 1900 at Gujranwala. His ancestors had migrated from Kashmir and practised oriental medicine. Faqir was only fifteen years old when his father, Mian Lal Deen, died. It was then that the young Faqir wrote his first couplet in Punjabi.

He then got his Punjabi verse corrected, as was the custom of the times, from Imam Din and Ibrahim Adil in Gujranwala. He also started reciting his Punjabi verse in the meetings of the Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam where great poets—Altaf Hussain Hali, Zafar Ali Khan, and Mohammad Iqbal among them—read out inspiring nationalistic poems in Urdu. For a living Faqir earned a diploma from the King Edward Medical College and practiced medicine—even performing operations of the eye according to witnesses (Akram 1992: 16). In 1920 he left both Gujranwala and medicine and became first a government contractor and then the owner of a construction business, in Lahore. But the honourary title of doctor which had been bestowed upon him by his admirers is still a part of his legendary name—Dr Faqir Mohammad Faqir.

It was this man who first became a champion of Punjabi. He was an established Punjabi poet by the 1950s, the first collection of his verse having been published in 1941, but more than that he had the dedication, the energy and the confidence to initiate movements and keep them going. Faqir supported Punjabi even before the partition and later, when the Sikh-Muslim riots had made it a tabooed subject in Pakistan because of its associations with the Sikhs, he still supported it. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan he decided to initiate a movement for the promotion of Punjabi. Initially he met with refusals. Even those who sympathized with his ideas, such as Sir Shahabuddin, an eminent politician and member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, declined to join him in this politically suspect venture. Eventually, however, he managed to persuade Abid Ali Abid, a noted intellectual and Principal of Dayal Singh College in Lahore, to hold a meeting of pro-Punjabi intellectuals. Faqir himself did all the hard work. In one of his articles he writes:

I myself went to distribute the invitations to all the invitees…Except in one or two houses. I had to spend at least half the day in just delivering the invitations…(My translation from Punjabi in Akram 1992: 20).

At last Faqir’s efforts bore fruit. In the first week of July 1951 the first Punjabi meeting was held. The invitees were distinguished men of letters—distinguished, of course, in Urdu. Among them were Maulana Abdul Majeed Salik, Feroze Uddin, Dr Mohammad Din Taseer, Abdul Majeed Bhatti, Ustad Karam Amritsari, Sufi Ghulam Mustafa Tabassum, Mian Alias, and others. Abid Ali Abid, the host, was also among the participants and Faqir, the indefatigable activist of the Punjabi language, listened keenly as Maulana Salik, the president, gave his speech. He says he was surprised that Salik fully agreed with him but this was hardly surprising because opponents of the idea would hardly have bothered to participate in the meeting. At the end of the deliberations the participants agreed to establish the Pak Punjabi League with Salik as president and Faqir as secretary. Both of them were also entrusted with the task of the publication of a monthly called Punjabi which first saw the light of day in September 1951. The purpose of this magazine was to induce the Urdu-using intellectuals of the Punjab to write in Punjabi. And, indeed, to a certain extent the magazine did succeed in making eminent literary figures—Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Zafar Ali Khan, Shorish Kashmiri, Hameed Nizami, Sufi Ghulam Mustafa
Tabussum, Waqar Ambalvi, Qateel Shifai, Syed Murtaza Jilani, Dr Mohammad Baqar, Dr Abdus Salam Khurshid—write in Punjabi.

Faqir Mohammad Faqir, however, did not rest content with this achievement. He also organized the first Punjabi conference at Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) in 1952. In this, among other things, it was resolved that Punjabi should be taught from class I up to the MA level. Since then every conference, every Punjabi language activist, every Punjabi newspaper or magazine has reiterated this demand.

Another major achievement of this conference was that it created an organization to provide reading material in Punjabi. This organization was called the Punjabi Adabi Akadmi (Punjabi Literary Academy). It too was headed by a committed activist, Mohammad Baqir, who worked on the lines of Faqir Mohammad Faqir. According to the latter:

Dr Mohammad Baqir started working with full power as soon as he took charge of the Academy. The result of this was that after a few months of running around he succeeded in obtaining a grant of Rs. 20,000 from the central government. During this time the Academy also made Rs. 7,900 from the sale of books (Quoted in Akram 1992: 23–4. My translation from Punjabi).

The books which were sold were the Academy’s own publications—classics of Punjabi literature like the poetic works of Bulleh Shah; the Heer of Waris Shah; Mirza Sahiban of Peeloo and Hafiz Barkhurdar; Bol Fareedi, the poetic works of the poet-saint Fariduddin Masood Ganj Shakar (1175–1265); the poetic works of Ali Haider; Kakare, the collection of the poems of Syed Hashim Shah; the Saif ul Mulook of Mian Mohammad Baksh, and several epic poems (vars) as well as different versions of rhymed folk tales. In addition to these literary classics the Academy also published textbooks for class I and II as well as a textbook for BA in Punjabi. This book was entitled Lahran, a title which was used later for a well-known periodical of Punjabi.

For some time Mian Bashir Ahmad, Vice Chancellor of the Punjab University, appeared to have been converted to Punjabi. This was a feather in the cap for Faqir who wrote that the Vice Chancellor’s statement, that the progress of Punjabi would not harm Urdu, was very welcome. He pointed out that the pro-Punjabi press had requested the University to re-start the Honours, High Proficiency and Proficiency in Punjabi classes which it had stopped earlier. Moreover, the government was also requested to make Punjabi the medium of instruction at the primary level. But, lamented the writer, the University’s decision-makers had not taken any concrete steps in favour of Punjabi despite its Vice Chancellor’s statement in support of it (Faqir 1953b: 2–3).

The contributors of Punjabi, being eminent writers of Urdu and Pakistani nationalists, insisted and reiterated that the domains of Urdu would not be intruded upon. For them Urdu deserved the honour of being a national language (the other being Bengali after 1954); and it also deserved to be the medium of instruction in senior classes; and the language of national communication. Their only concern was that Punjabi should not be completely ignored and devalued. That is why, even when they demanded the use of Punjabi in certain domains, they distanced themselves from the Punjabi of the Sikhs. Indeed, some of them used the term ‘Pak Punjabi’ for the variety of Punjabi they wanted to promote (Ambalvi 1955: 9). Hence, one finds that Hameed Nizami, the founding editor of the Nawa-i-Waqt, an Urdu newspaper known for its aggressive nationalism and right-wing views, advocated the teaching of Punjabi to little children. Recounting his personal experience, he said that his own children expressed themselves more fluently in Punjabi than in Urdu, whereas he and his wife had always used Urdu earlier (Nizami 1951: 11–12).

The effort to teach Punjabi floundered on the rock of cultural shame and prejudice. As there are many sources indicating that the Punjabis have some sort of affectionate contempt or cultural shame about their language (see Mobbs 1991: 245; Mansoor 1993: 119, for surveys of opinions about it), there is no need to labour that point. What is relevant here is to relate this cultural shame to the teaching of the language here. The first point to note is that this cultural shame gives
rise to, and is in turn fed by, myths of various kinds. The most common ones are that Punjabi is a dialect not a language; that it is so full of invectives and dirty words that it cannot be used for serious matters; that it is a rustic language and its vocabulary is so limited that it cannot be used for intellectual expression; that it lends itself to jokes and is essentially non-serious and therefore unsuitable for serious matters; and that it has no literature, or at least no modern prose literature, in it, etc., etc. Most of these prejudices, as we have seen earlier, were also part of the British attitude towards Punjabi. Whether they were internalized by Punjabi Muslims because of Persianization during Mughal rule; the privileging of English and Urdu during British rule; contact with Urdu speakers; or the fact that Urdu was the language of creative literature and lower level jobs in the Punjab; cannot be determined. What is known is that, at least since the nineteenth century, Punjabi Muslims have held and still hold such prejudiced myths about their mother tongue Punjabi.

Most Punjabi activists have spent a lot of time and effort to refute these myths. The early articles in Punjabi in the nineteen fifties began these efforts and even today, after nearly half a century, the same arguments and counter-arguments are being exchanged. Sardar Mohammad Khan, writing in 1957, argued that Punjabi cannot be a ‘dialect’ in isolation. It must be the dialect of some language (Khan 1957: 26). But by ‘dialect’ the opponents of Punjabi mean that it has not been standardized. The answer to this is that standardization, which is part of language planning (corpus planning to be precise), is an activity which needs not only linguistic knowhow but also a definite policy, money and administrative power. It can only be accomplished by powerful agencies, such as governments, which privilege one variety of the language; print its grammar and dictionaries and, above all, use it in the domains of power beginning with schools (Cooper 1989: 131–44). So, the fact that there was no standardized norm of Punjabi in the fifties did not mean that there was anything intrinsically deficient about the language. What it meant was that the government had been indifferent to it which brings one back to what the activists advocated all along—begin by teaching Punjabi. The printing of the school texts would by itself begin the process of creating a standard norm.

The other arguments are also part of the non-use of the language in the domains of education, administration, commerce, judiciary, and the media. All languages are adequate for the expression of the social reality of the societies in which they are born. However, it is only when they are used in other domains—domains which modernity has brought in—that their vocabulary expands. To some extent it expands by borrowing from other languages spontaneously but, for the most part, language planners create new terms. This process, called modernization or neologism, is necessary when ‘a language is extended for new functions and topics’ and takes place even in developed, modern societies though not to the extent it occurs in developing ones (Cooper 1989: 149). But this too is done by powerful language-planning institutions, generally state supported ones. In the case of Punjabi the state did nothing of the kind. Hence, if Punjabi is deficient in modern terms (technical, administrative, philosophical, legal, etc.), it is not an inherent limitation but merely lack of language planning. Once again, the fault is that of the state and not that of Punjabi.

The absence of books is also the consequence of lack of state patronage and non-use in any of the domains where books are required. In short, the use (or intent to use) the language comes first. Language-planning activities follow as a consequence and the language gets standardized and modernized later. This sequence was not always adequately comprehended either by the supporters or by the opponents of Punjabi. Thus they talked, generally in emotional terms, about the merits and demerits of the language rather than about the role of the state and the modernization of pre-modern languages through language planning.

One myth which is somewhat baffling at first sight is that of the alleged vulgarity of Punjabi. The typical refutation of the charge—a charge levelled again and again and once by no less a
person than Mian Tufail Mohammad, the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami-i-Islami in 1992—is that all languages have ‘dirty words’ (Khan 1957: 29). Mian Tufail was condemned by a large number of Punjabi activists (M. Baloch 1992), but the fact remains that he said what many Punjabis believe about their language. What requires explanation is that such an absurd myth should exist at all. It probably came to exist, and still exists, because Punjabi is not used in the formal domains—the domains of impersonal interaction. The norms of interaction in the formal domains preclude personal, egalitarian, give and take. Thus one does not use the invectives which one uses with one’s companions and friends. Moreover, since the abstract and learned terms used in the domains of formal learning and law are generally borrowed from a foreign language, they do not strike one as earthy and vulgar. Since Punjabi has never been used in these domains, it lacks these words. Thus, when the familiar Punjabi words for the body and its functions are used, they strike the listener as vulgar and unsophisticated. The classical poets of Punjabi solved this problem, like Urdu and English poets, by borrowing words from Persian just as the English poets borrowed from Latin and Greek. For instance Waris Shah, describing the beauty of Heer’s body, said:

\[ \text{Kafoor shana suraen banke, saq husn o sutoon pahar vichhon} \]

Fair and rounded like swollen water bags were her beautiful buttocks
Her legs were as if sculptors had carved them out of the mountain (in which Farhad had carved out a canal for his beloved Sheereen i.e., mountain famous for love).

The term \textit{suraen} for buttocks is from Persian and is also used in classical Urdu poetry. The commonly used terms, both in Punjabi and Urdu, would be considered far too obscene to be used in literature (also see Muhammad n.d.: 162–9). Similarly Hafiz Barkhurdar and Waris Shah both use the term ‘\textit{chati}’ (breast, chest) for their heroine’s breasts. The term \textit{chati} is a neutral term which can be used for men, women, children, and animals for the upper, front portion of the anatomy. To express the feminine beauty of this part of the heroine’s figure, the poet resorts to metaphorical language. The use of the Punjabi term would have been considered coarse and unseemly. This literary strategy, the use of terms from another language, is quite common in Urdu as well as in English. In Urdu such terms are borrowed from Arabic and Persian while in English they come from Latin and Greek.

The point, then, is that Punjabi literature resorts to the same stylistic strategies as other literatures of the world when dealing with tabooed areas. The popular impression that Punjabi has no ‘polite’ equivalents of tabooed terms is based on ignorance of Punjabi literature. This ignorance is but inevitable in a country where Punjabi is used only in the informal domains and educated people code-switch increasingly to English when they venture into areas which are even remotely connected with sex. Thus even the Punjabi words for wife and woman are falling into disuse as people prefer to use the circumlocution \textit{bacche} (literally, children), family, and \textit{kar vale} (the people of the household) instead of \textit{run}, \textit{zanani}, and \textit{voti}. To conclude, all the myths about the inadequacy of Punjabi are consequences of its non-use and marginalization by the state. Hence, whether they fully understood the role of power in language planning and use or not, Punjabi activists were right when they insisted that their language should be taught at some levels if it was ever to take its place as a respectable language.

However, lack of understanding of the political dimensions of language policy (and use), also resulted in enabling the Punjabis to believe in some self-congratulatory and ego-boosting myths. One is that the Punjabis are so large-hearted and generous that they have accommodated Urdu even by sacrificing their own language. A variant of this myth is that Punjabis, being truly Islamic and nationalistic, care more for Urdu, which symbolizes the Islamic and Pakistani identity, than their own mother tongue. Still another variant is that, being ardent lovers of Urdu, the Punjabis
have forgotten their mother tongue in their enthusiasm for Urdu. These myths are wrong because they do not take cultural shame, language-policy, political and economic reasons into account at all. More politically aware Punjabi activists, like Shafqat Tanvir Mirza, argue that the predominantly Punjabi ruling elite give Urdu more importance than the other indigenous languages of the country in order to keep the country united through the symbolism of one national language; to increase their power base and in order to keep the centre stronger than the periphery. By appearing to sacrifice their own mother tongue the elite can resist the pressure of other ethnic language-based pressure groups to make themselves stronger at the expense of the Punjabi-dominated centre (Mirza 1994: 91). This, indeed, is the consequence of the policy of marginalizing Punjabi. However, it appears to me that many decisions of the ruling elite, as indeed of other human beings, are not so calculated and rational. It is more likely that the low esteem of Punjabi; the idea that it is not suitable for formal domains; is as much part of the Punjabi ruling elite’s world view as it is of other educated Punjabis. To this, perhaps, one may add the conscious feeling that any encouragement of their own mother tongue will embolden the speakers of other indigenous languages to demand more rights and privileges for their languages thus jeopardizing the position of Urdu as a national language. In short, the Punjabi elite’s marginalization of Punjabi is not because of generosity or disinterested love of the country but a mixture of cultural shame, prejudice against their own language and the desire to keep the centre, and therefore themselves, dominant in Pakistan.

**Punjabi-teaching in Pakistan (1950s and 1960s)**

The University of the Punjab permitted students to take Punjabi as an optional language in the early fifties. Critics said that there would be no students who would study it. Faqir Mohammad Faqir agreed but, not being daunted, suggested that it should be compulsory not optional (Faqir 1953a). This did not, however, come to pass. In 1954 the question of Bengali being accepted as a national language of Pakistan was very much in the air. The greatest opponent of the proposal was Maulvi Abdul Haq who still insisted that Urdu alone could symbolize the unity of the Pakistani nation. The Punjab Youth League’s secretary, Farooq Qureshi, took this opportunity to demand that they would celebrate a Punjabi Day. This was probably the first time that the fair of Shah Hussain was used in March 1954 to raise the demand of Punjabi being made an official language. The post-graduates’ union of Punjab University decided to hold a discussion on the issue. The Vice Chancellor, M. Sharif, who was sympathetic to Punjabi and who, above all, did not want the students to get out of hand presided. Masood Khaddarpash, who was present, relates how the students became so unruly in their enthusiasm that they drowned everybody’s speech in full-throated shouts if someone used a non-Punjabi word in the speech. Khaddarpash says that he went on the stage, congratulated the students on becoming free of the oppression of other languages, and said that a new policy consistent with independence should now be created. Then only would there be people who would deliver speeches without putting in Urdu and English words in them (handwritten report by Masood in my personal collection). Although Masood perceived the students’ exuberance as their desire to discard Urdu and English, such a conclusion is not warranted because the students respond in the same enthusiastic manner to Punjabi *mushairas*, debates, discussions and other cultural events even now. In *a mushaira* at F.C. College Lahore on 17 February 1998 the students were equally exuberant (*Savera*, March 1998: 44). It appears that they take Punjabi as part of fun and, since it is a change from the languages they use in the formal domains, they tend to relax and take the whole thing as entertainment. This does not mean, however, that they hold Punjabi in prestige and want to discard other languages.
A concrete step in favour of teaching Punjabi was that in 1961 the Board of Secondary Education accepted it as an optional language in schools from class VI to XII (FA). In 1962 Abdul Majeed Bhatti and Mohammad Afzal Khan wrote the first book for class VI (Sultana 1975: 27). This was, of course, a triumph for the Punjabi activists especially because this was the Ayub Khan era when the centre, being dominated by the military and the higher bureaucracy, was highly intolerant of multi-lingualism and multi-culturalism. Indeed, since West Pakistan was one unit, the indigenous languages were at the lowest ebb of their fortunes. Ayub Khan’s centrist government looked at language-based assertions of identity with great suspicion. In the case of Punjabi it was felt that the Punjabi activists would join the Sikhs across the border to undermine the two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan was made. Thus the Punjabi Majlis, an organization to promote Punjabi, was banned in 1959 while the Punjabi Group of the Writer’s Guild was banned in 1963. Despite these setbacks the sixties saw something of a renaissance of Punjabi literary and cultural life (for details see Rahman 1996: 200–202) which need not be repeated. An important development, which bears repetition, is that short stories, plays and poems which were produced during this period laid the foundation for the MA in Punjabi which started in the 1970s at the Punjab University.

**Reaction to Nur Khan’s Education Policy**

Ayub Khan’s government was toppled in March 1969 by students and politicians. In his place came General Yahya Khan who imposed martial law while promising elections and transition to democracy. Yahya Khan, like Ayub before him, appointed a commission headed by Air Marshal Nur Khan to propose changes in the education policy. Nur Khan’s emphasis was on the nation and hence he favoured the two national languages, Urdu and Bengali, while ignoring all the other indigenous languages of the country. The reaction to this by the Sindhi and Punjabi activists is given in Rahman (1996: 118 & 203). Here reference will be made to those aspects of language-teaching which have not been given sufficient space in my previous book.

About 500 Punjabi activists presented a memorandum on behalf of thirteen pro-Punjabi organizations to General Yahya Khan on 31 August 1989 (D, 2 September 1969). Among them were the Punjabi Adabi Sangat, Majlis Shah Hussain, Punjabi Adabi Society, Majlis Mian Mohammad, Majlis-e-Bahu, Majlis Waris Shah, Majlis Shah Murad, and Rahs Rang, a dramatic group of Lahore. The writers of the document took their stand on social justice possibly because Ayub Khan’s regime had enriched a very narrow elite and, in reaction to that, ideas like socialism, Islamic socialism and social justice were in the air. The document said:

> Languages used by different classes of the people are often taken as representatives of their social placing and economic background and aptly reflect the stratification that has taken [place] in our society. If we have to safeguard ourselves against this perpetuation of privileges, which has been rightly marked as a major social problem, we shall have to give these languages of the masses their due in society (Memorandum 1969: 5).

This reference to social stratification was all the more forceful because Nur Khan himself had spoken out against the privileged position of English and that there was a caste-like distinction between Urdu and English medium students (Edn. Pro 1969: 3; 15–17). Now the activists of Punjabi argued that there was another caste-like distinction too—between the users of Urdu and those who knew only Punjabi. Indeed, the knowledge of only Punjabi was considered ignorance—so low had the language policies of the past and the present brought down Punjabi. This, said the Punjabi activists, could only be reversed if Punjabi was taught. The practical steps
they recommended have been given in my book *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (1996: 203) and it would be repetitive to enumerate them in detail. Suffice it to say that they wanted it as a medium of instruction for adults and at the primary level and an optional subject at all others. They also felt that the language should be honoured by introducing it at the highest level in the university.

The September 1969 issue of *Punjabi Adab* also devoted itself to the education policy. Well-known figures—Masood Khaddarposh, Shafqat Tanwir Mirza, Safdar Mir (Zeno), Asif Khan, among others—wrote in favour of Punjabi. It was in the sixties too that the Punjabi language movement came to have a slightly left of the centre image. This image came from the fact that the Communist Party favoured the languages of the common people. According to Safdar Mir, Eric Cyprian, an important member of the party in the 1940s, said it was necessary to use Punjabi to communicate with the people (Interview in *Viewpoint*, 25 Jan. 1990). Earlier, in the forties too some leftists, such as Mrs Freda Bedi, wife of the Communist leader of Lahore B.P.L. Bedi, addressed ‘rural audiences in Punjabi from a public platform’ (Anand 1998: 16). Although Punjabi did not become the preferred language of the Communist Party in Pakistan, leftists did sympathize with it. Thus there were avowed socialists like Major Ishaque, Safdar Mir, and Ahmad Rahi in the movement. Moreover the anti-establishment, rebellious themes of Najam Hussain Bhatti’s plays were left-leaning. In any case, supporting any Pakistani language other than Urdu was seen as being leftist by the establishment. The Punjabi activists, however, made Shah Hussain, a suf saint, their symbol of inspiration. Shah Hussain is said to have rebelled against orthodoxy by having fallen in love with a boy (Madho Lal), drinking wine and dancing and was, therefore, an anti-establishment symbol. Moreover, the Punjabi activists took to celebrating the anniversary of his death in the Mela-e-Chiraghan with much fanfare. They also danced on the day much to the disapproval of the puritanical revivalists of the Jamaat-e-Islami-i-Islami and ordinary, somewhat orthodox, middle-class Punjabis. Thus, when 100 Punjabi writers demanded all regional languages as media of instruction on 5 April 1965 at the Mela-e-Chiraghan (*PT*, 6 April 1965), the demand must have appeared as part of a conspiracy to undermine the foundations of orthodoxy to many people.

**Department of Punjabi at the Punjab University**

The demand for opening the Punjabi department at the University became stronger. Apart from old champions of Punjabi like Faqir Mohammad Faqir, even people otherwise associated with Urdu like Dr Waheed Qureshi, voiced this demand on 5 August 1969. General Bakhtiar Rana, a member of the Punjabi Adabi League, also made the same demand and numerous small organizations lent their voices to it. The Punjabi Adabi Sangat, for instance, gave several statements in the press demanding MA in Punjabi (*Musawat*, 24 August 1970).

Faqir Mohammad Faqir’s role in the establishment of the master’s degree at the Punjab University has acquired legendary overtones. Junaid Akram, his biographer, says that he met Alauddin Siddiqui, the Vice Chancellor of the University, and persuaded him not to oppose the idea. Finding the Vice Chancellor willing, he met members of the Academic Council and other decision-making bodies and won their approval (Akram 1992: 56). The popular legend has it that he lay down in the office of the Vice Chancellor saying that he would live on the floor unless the MA was instituted. The Vice Chancellor, completely dismayed by these unorthodox tactics, made the required promises to persuade Faqir to lift the siege. According to Syed Akhtar Jafri, who has written a critical appreciation of Faqir’s life and works, he was helped by Abdul Majeed Bhatti
and Rauf Shaikh who visited the opponents of Punjabi and persuaded them by all means orthodox and unorthodox (Jafri 1991: 37). In any case in 1970 the MA Punjabi classes began at the Oriental College, Punjab University, Lahore. Faqir Mohammad Faqir’s jubilation knew no bounds. According to a witness, Arshad Meer, he celebrated this great advance in the status of Punjabi at Gujranwala. The Vice Chancellor, Waheed Qureshi, Mian Mohammad Shafi and other notables attended. Faqir paid homage to the Vice Chancellor in verse and the activists of the Punjabi movement felt that their dream had come true.

The first members of the faculty in the Punjabi Department were people who lacked formal degrees in the language but were known for having written in it. Among others were Alauddin Siddiqui, the Vice Chancellor, himself; Ashfaq Ahmad, the noted Urdu dramatist and short story writer; Khizar Tameemi, Sharif Kunjahi, and Qayyum Nazar (Akram 1992: 56). In the beginning, under the influence of Dr Waheed Qureshi, right-wing views dominated. Even Bulleh Shah was not taught because of his allegedly ‘heretical’ views (Saleem Int. 1999). Punjabi was also taught at the masters level in the Shah Hussain College in Lahore in the early seventies. Ahmed Saleem, one of the lecturers in the early years, said that all the lecturers were volunteers in that college and the student’s took the university examination as private candidates (Saleem Int. 1999).

In 1973 Najam Hussain Syed, a well-known intellectual whose book on Punjabi literature Recurrent Patterns in Punjabi Poetry (1986) is still a milestone in the field, was invited to chair the new department. Najam, himself a creative writer of somewhat left-of-the-centre orientation, made a comprehensive curriculum for the MA which did not exclude leftist, identity-conscious, Punjabi literature (Syed Int. 1999). His colleagues were Asif Khan, Sharif Kunjahi, and Abbas Jalalpuri. All of them were part-time lecturers and Najam himself was on deputation from government service. Najam and his colleagues, being liberal in views, included the socio-economic background in which literary texts are created as part of the curriculum. They even taught Gurmukhi, though it was not part of the approved curriculum, so as to enable students to study Punjabi literature from India. The teaching of Gurmukhi was especially suspect in the eyes of their right-wing opponents because they thought Indian Punjabi literature would dilute the ideological orientation of students. Later, when Ziaul Haq took over, all institutions had to move towards the right because the regime was not only centrist, like all previous regimes, but legitimized itself so emphatically in the name of Islam that it became paranoid even about trivialities (Asif Khan Int. 1999). Thus, according to Khalid Humayun, lecturer at the Department of Punjabi, some lines of Anwar Masood’s humorous poem ‘Aj Ki Pakaiye?’ (What shall we cook today?) were expunged because they referred to Pakistan’s friendship with the USA (Humayun 1986: 231).

Shahbaz Malik, who became the chairman of the Punjabi department during Ziaul Haq’s days, was known for his rightist views. It was during his tenure that most of the changes mentioned above—such as the exclusion of identity-conscious, political or Sikh literature—took place. Complaints against the department kept coming (Sajjan, 30 September 1989), but Shahbaz Malik continued to head it (see his interview in Chowdhry 1991). Khalid Humayun complained that so absurd was the ideological witch-hunting at this period that theses on Ustad Daman and the folk songs of the Punjab were accused of subverting the ideology of Pakistan—the former because Daman had criticized martial law; the latter because popular values were contrary to those which the state supported (Humayun 1990. Also Humayun Int. 1999). In an interview Afzal Randhawa, a prominent writer of Punjabi, also accuses the Punjab University authorities of being selective allegedly for both personal and ideological reasons, about the texts to be taught to students (Randhawa 1990: 15).
Masood Khaddarpash and Punjabi-teaching

During the seventies and early eighties, a new figure came to invigorate, and even dominate at times, the Punjabi scene. This was the somewhat enigmatic figure of Mohammad Masood who was popularly known as Masood Khaddarpash (one who wears rough cotton clothes). Masood was an Indian (and then Pakistan) Civil Service officer. The ICS-CSP cadre as a whole was known for being very Anglicized and alienated from the people and their indigenous culture. Masood, however, proved himself to be different when he associated with the tribal people of India, called the bheels and won their trust. They are said to have called him Masood Bhagwan (god). Later, in Pakistan he wrote a ‘Minute of Dissent’ to the Sind Hari Commission Report (1950). The Hari (peasant) of Sindh was supposed to be the worse example of feudal oppression in Pakistan. The main report, being written under the influence of the feudal lobby, did not highlight the injustices done to the Haris. Masood’s ‘Minute of Dissent’, however, did so. The press, therefore, welcomed it as enthusiastically as it condemned the main report. The chief minister of Sindh, Ayub Khuhro, himself a Sindhi feudal lord, remarked in March 1951: ‘the problem of haris does not exist in the province it exists only in some newspaper offices’ (Khuhro 1998: 393). This made Masood even more popular and he came to be known as Masood of the Hari Report. What Masood’s minute of dissent was about can best be understood only by reading it, but even its opponent, Ayub Khuhro’s historian daughter Hamida Khuhro, condemns it in no worse terms than this:

This [Masood’s Minute] did not concern itself with the terms of reference but was a diatribe on the iniquities of the zamindar and their supposed penchant for women and an idle life; their cruelty towards the cultivators whom they treated like ‘slaves’; the evils of absentee landlordism of which there could have been hardly any example in Sind at this period! He then wrote an essay on Islamic history and his opinion of the rights of ‘peasant proprietors’ in the Holy Quran of which he also said, ‘Barring a few exceptions, the precepts of the Quran in this regard have not been practiced by the Musalmans throughout the Islamic history’ (Khuhro 1998: 393).

But, however much Hamida might ridicule Masood, people agreed with him. The ‘Minute’, therefore, increased his prestige very much.

Later, this unusual bureaucrat became even more unique, indeed legendary, because he started dressing up in khaddar which the impeccably dressed South Asian officers, both civilian and military, never wore in public till the 1970s when Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto gave respectability to this dress by wearing it in public. Thus, instead of the usual suit complete with necktie, Masood often turned up in the indigenous shalwar qameez which was taboo in official circles. So it was this legendary, somewhat enigmatic, figure who became a champion of Punjabi. Even while he was in service he often used Punjabi in conversation. This, however, was hardly unusual. What was somewhat unusual was that he often asked people to give evidence in Punjabi because he felt they would express themselves more clearly in the mother tongue. Even more unusual, and bordering on the eccentric this time, was his insistence that prayers should be said in Punjabi because one should know what one was saying to God (Akhtar 1986). This alienated the ulema but, luckily for Masood, the idea was generally ignored and the religious opposition against him did not become widespread. After his retirement Masood became the convener of the Punjab Forum—an organization for the promotion of Punjabi.
Now it was this man who wrote in favour of using Punjabi in different domains and, above all, of teaching it. His arguments referred to the Quran (that God guides people in their own language); conspiracy theories (that the Jews wanted only one international language), and ideas of cultural preservation, ease of developing new concepts in the mother-tongue and so on (Masood 1969). Masood was an energetic man and, having been in the machinery of the state, he believed in influencing the decision-makers in the state apparatus. Thus, apart from writing articles, memoranda, letters to the editor, and making speeches from different fora, he also wrote letters to high government officials asking them to take steps to teach Punjabi. Among others, he wrote to the president, the governor, cabinet ministers like Abdus Sattar Niazi and Dr Mahbubul Haq, and the chairman of the Literacy Commission to make policies in favour of teaching Punjabi. When the state functionaries did not respond satisfactorily he released his letters, or a summary of his efforts to persuade them, to the press. A typical release of 16 September 1984 states:

At last I went personally just last month to Islamabad to speak to the present Head of the Literacy Commission and I quoted several verses from the Quran to make it clear that all education and literacy must be imparted in the mother tongue.

Among his several interviews to the press—in Punjabi, Urdu, and English—the one which had circulation outside the Punjabi-language activists was the one which I.A. Rehman published in the Herald (July 1984). In this Masood pointed out that he had advocated multi-lingualism in Pakistan for more than twenty-five years. He denied that Urdu was necessary even as a link language but conceded that it should be retained. All Pakistani languages, he said, should be national languages and should be taught in the country (Rehman 1984).

Masood’s hour of triumph came when on 2 January 1985 he collected some leading figures of the country including Dr Mubashir Hasan, said to be the architect and theoretician of Z.A. Bhutto’s left-leaning Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), A.H. Kardar, Fakhar Zaman (PPP senator and Punjabi writer), Mazhar Ali Khan (editor of Viewpoint), Abdullah Malik (the famous Urdu novelist), and Mumtaz Daultana (famous politician) and made them agree to adopt a charter for the ‘restoration of the cultural dignity of the Punjabi-speaking people of Pakistan’. The teaching of Punjabi was the focus of this charter. The basic thesis was that colonial values had deprived the Punjabis of the use of their language in formal domains. Now, if the lost dignity of the language was to be reclaimed, it was necessary to use it in the administration and the judiciary. But this meant that it should be taught first, and this is what the 139 signatories of the charter vowed to bring about (Viewpoint, 10 Jan. 1985; The Muslim, 3 Jan. 1985).

These were the Ziaul Haq years and the presence of known leftists among the signatories—people like C.R. Aslam, Mazhar Ali Khan, Safdar Mir, Mubashir Hasan—alarmed the right wing. The press, especially the Urdu press, attacked the charter when it did not ignore it. The charter, therefore, became as politically controversial, as much a part of the ongoing left-right debate, as most other intellectual matters did at that time. In the same way the International Punjabi Conference of 1986, organized by Fakhar Zaman in Lahore also became controversial. This conference has been described earlier (Rahman 1996: 205–206) and all its proceedings have been collected in one volume (Qaisar & Pal 1988), so there is no point in describing it here except to say that the demand for teaching Punjabi was not only the subject of resolutions but also an issue around which many of the papers revolved.
The second International Punjabi Conference, after having been postponed several times, was held from 26 to 29 December 1992. Fakhar Zaman, its convener, was also the Chairman of the Academy of Letters and had much power being close to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who was enjoying her second tenure in government. But, possibly because the PPP did not want to confront the centrist military and the bureaucracy, and since the bias against Punjabi was well entrenched in the establishment, the conference lacked the fervent anti-establishment enthusiasm of the 1986 conference which had become a political statement against Ziaul Haq’s martial law. Once again the teaching of Punjabi was a crucial issue. Although Fakhar Zaman did say that Punjabi would become a medium of instruction (Ghumman 1995: 300) everybody seemed to feel that no substantial change would be made. The third Punjabi Conference, held in Lahore in April 2001, also became a controversial issue between the conservatives and the liberals. It too emphasized the teaching of Punjabi

Neutralizing the Ideological Threat from Punjabi

Although Punjabi was taught to so few children, the state ensured that the textbooks for teaching it were saturated with state-sponsored ideology. Several steps were taken for this purpose. In 1986, 2009 primary schools of the Punjab were selected and 46,930 pupils of class I were interviewed. The idea was to write down the words they used so that words common to Punjabi and Urdu could be identified. N.K. Shaheen Malik, the Director of the Project, made some textbooks called *Entry Vocabulary of Pre-School Children* based upon his major finding that 68.8 per cent words of small children were common to Punjabi and Urdu, while only 27.7 per cent words belonged only to Punjabi (Malik n.d.: 14). The idea, however, was not so much to teach Punjabi as to point out that teaching Punjabi children through Urdu was justified, because children understood new concepts in a language which was so close to their own that they were already familiar with it. However, the project did deal with the teaching of Punjabi too. This teaching was very little but such as it was, it had to be ideologically correct. Thus, in a workshop for teachers of Punjabi held in April 1986, care was taken to emphasize that ‘Musalmani’ and not ‘Sikhi’ Punjabi should be taught (Malik 1986: 19).

The Punjabi textbooks, like the textbooks in the other Pakistani languages, are saturated with ideological moralizing. The three main themes here too are Islam, Pakistani nationalism and glorification of war and the military. The items (prose or verse) on these subjects out of the total number of items in the textbooks were as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Textbook</th>
<th>Percentage of ideological items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class VI (<em>Punjabi Di Paehli Kitab</em> 1998)</td>
<td>50.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII (<em>Punjabi Di Doosri Kitab</em> 1991)</td>
<td>46.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII (<em>Punjabi Di Teesri Kibaba</em> 1998)</td>
<td>35.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The preface of all these books explicitly states that the student should learn Punjabi in the light of Islam, the ideology of Pakistan, and nationalism. In short, while some of the activists of the Punjabi movement point to Punjabi literature as an antidote to establishment views, the actual teaching of it by the state does not allow such views to be disseminated through textbooks.

**Efforts to Popularize Punjabi**

Between 1980 and 1986 the Punjabi Adabi Board got around a hundred books written in Punjabi. These books were written by well-known writers on subjects as wide ranging as folk songs (*Lok Geet* by Tanwir Bukhari) to fiction, biography, religion, and history. There were books on Harappa and other cities and even books on games and women’s problems. The books were not written in only the Lahori dialect (the language of institutions working in Lahore and most Punjabi language activities) but included those in Siraiki, such as Musarrat Kalonchvi’s *Vaddian da Adar* (1986), too. This was in keeping with the policy of the Punjabi Adabi Board, which considers Siraiki only a dialect of Punjabi and not a separate language, and agrees to promote its teaching in this capacity. It is also because of this policy that the Punjabi activists have never opposed the teaching of Siraiki literature.

The demand for teaching Punjabi took three forms in the 1990s. First, there was the old demand that it should be made the medium of instruction at the primary level. Secondly, there was the demand that serious efforts should be made for teaching it in schools where it was an option. Thirdly, that the masters courses should be comprehensive and not propagandist, i.e. that they should not exclude the literature of the Sikhs or anti-establishment Pakistanis. Eminent figures like Hanif Ramay, chief minister of the Punjab in the PPP government, launched a campaign for introducing Punjabi at the primary level in November 1991 at Pakpattan—for symbolic effect, from the shrine of the sufi saint and first poet of Punjabi, Baba Fariduddin Masood Ganj Shakar (*FP*, 25 November 1991). He also announced the creation of yet another organization, Punjab Eka (Punjabi union), to work towards this aim but, like all the other such organizations, its efforts proved futile.

Those who demanded more serious efforts in teaching it pointed out from various fora, including Punjabi publications like *Sajjan*, *Maan Boli*, etc., that schools did not encourage students to take Punjabi; Punjabi textbooks were not available; teachers were not available and so on. State functionaries, like Zulfiqar Khosa, the Minister of Education of the Punjab in 1990 (the first tenure of Benazir Bhutto) reiterated the old excuse that, since Punjabi was divided into dialects, it could not be used as a medium of instruction at all (Sajjan, 27 April 1990).

**Increase in the Teaching of Punjabi**

Although government policy towards the teaching of Punjabi did not change significantly, it had to accommodate itself to the presence of an increasing number of graduates in the language which the Punjab University was turning out every year. They had to be absorbed somewhere and generally it was college and school teaching they aimed at. However, very few schools and colleges offered Punjabi. It was, after all, a ghettoizing language with little prestige in society. It was not useful for procuring jobs either. Thus all private schools eschewed it altogether. As for the state run Urdu medium schools in the Punjab, they too refused to hire teachers though here
and there, because of the personal efforts of one person or the other, teachers were hired and the subject was introduced. It appears that the government did not spend much money on hiring teachers in schools and lecturers in colleges to teach Punjabi. The Lahran of November 1987 gives the insignificant figure of only seven lecturers in the whole province. Other people give similarly depressing figures (see Mitr 1989a who claims that in Lahore there were six vacancies for Punjabi; 115 for English, eighty-five for Urdu, nine for Persian, and six for Arabic), and laments that the new graduates (with MA in Punjabi) were jobless (Mitr 1989b). The regular students in the department were around forty during the eighties but since the Punjab University allows candidates to take the examination privately (i.e. without attending classes), many students obtain the MA degree in it. They can even obtain the degree only after having acquired another, more instrumentally useful one, but even so quite a large number of MA in Punjabi degree holders do enter the extremely limited job market of Punjabi teaching as several articles point out (see the editorials of Sajjan, 25 May 1989 and 14 March 1969). The Punjabi activists often claim that a large number of students were keen to study Punjabi (Mitr 1989b) but the sad truth is that, given the lack of prestige and jobs, students take Punjabi as a ‘soft’ option. Indeed, the high percentage of students who pass in Punjabi at all levels (Appendix 5.1 & 5.2), and even take Punjabi in the civil service examination without having studied it before (Appendix 9), prove that it is not a difficult subject. Indeed, there are reports that examination papers at some levels are so easy as to ensure that everybody passes. Thus the MA in Punjabi is often seen as being of lower academic standard than other MAs.

The charge of Punjabi being a ‘soft’ option is resented and indignantly refuted by some supporters of the subject. In formal interviews Punjabi activists claim that students are denied Punjabi and are keen to study it. Informal conversations with students and teachers, however, reveal that Punjabi is taken as an easy option. Such kind of revelations are given only in confidence but sometimes they are given in formal interviews too. For instance, the monthly Punjabi Likhari (January 1997) interviewed several lecturers in Punjabi in government colleges and it emerged from the interviews that these lecturers knew that students were attracted to Punjabi to get high marks. Out of six lecturers five conceded that the main attraction was the possibility of getting high marks. The sixth one, Ibad Nabael, said that although previously this was the main motivation, students had started taking genuine interest in Punjabi now because some studied it as an option in schools too (Nabael 1997: 63). Almost everybody had some complaint against the syllabi. In a penetrating essay Shafqat Tanwir Mirza has pointed out that Punjabi textbooks excluded the best known writers such as Asaf Khan, Abdul Majeed Bhatti, Shahbaz Malik, Afzal Ahsan Randhawa, Saleem Khan Bimmi, and so on. Instead, they had included Ataul Haq Qasmi and Sarfraz Zahida whose contribution was very little (Mirza 1995 b) (also see another critical article on the Text Book Board by Mirza in The Nation, 20 October 1996). In interviews with me, Najam Husain Syed, Asaf Khan, and Khalid Humayun, all connected with the teaching of Punjabi at the highest level, said that the standard of the MA was below that of the MA of other languages in Pakistan and also below the standard of the MA in Punjabi in India (Syed Int., Asif Khan Int., and Humayun Int. 1999).

In 1994 there was again a spurt of activity in favour of teaching Punjabi. A number of organizations and individuals issued statements in favour of it and 125 members of the Punjab Assembly signed a resolution for the teaching of Punjabi in the provincial assembly. Fakhar Zaman, incharge of the Cultural Wing of the PPP, addressed a forum organized by the Urdu daily Jang in which a number of well-known Punjabi intellectuals also spoke (Shafqat Tanwir Mirza, Abdul Majeed Bhatti, Afzal Ahsan Randhawa, Akhtar Husain Akhtar, Abdul Ghani Shah among them). He promised much but no major change took place (J, 17 Jan. 1994). Arif Nakai, Chief Minister of the Punjab, set up a committee for the promotion of the Punjabi language and culture
with a budget of 50 million rupees. An important aspect of promotion was making Punjabi compulsory not just in state run Urdu schools but even in English-medium schools which were mostly in private hands. Moreover, at the primary level, it would be a medium of instruction (PT, 20 June 1996). But all these ambitious intentions came to nothing and before long Benazir’s PPP government, of which Nakai was a member, was thrown out.

In the late nineties the movement for teaching Punjabi became weaker. Either for this reason, or for some other, at least one Punjabi organization adopted angry, even chauvinistic, tones while advocating the age-old demands about promoting Punjabi. This was Lok Seva Pakistan of which Nazeer Kahut, who was at daggers drawn against the Mohajirs having lived and observed the militancy of their political party, the MQM, at Karachi, was the leader. In one of his press conferences he said that if ‘Punjabi was not taught at the primary level, Pakistan would break up’ and that Pakistani Punjabi children should be allowed to go to the Indian Punjab to get educated in their mother-tongue (Nazeer 1994: 15).

However, as mentioned earlier, for utilitarian and historical reasons, the Punjabi middle class is not keen to teach Punjabi to its children. A survey carried out by the US Aid on primary education in 1986 revealed that about 65 per cent of the interviewees in the Punjab were against the teaching of Punjabi even in the first three classes of school. Even this number might be high because ‘the Siraiki speaking sections wanted it taught and/or used all day’ because language identity is stronger there (Jones et al. 1986: 38). It seems that this attitude towards Punjabi has not changed. While talking informally to parents, teachers and students during the field work for this book, I found that it was only rarely that anybody wanted to study Punjabi or be taught other subjects in it.

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<tr>
<td>Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil (with 0.57 English (0.27)</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Q-6. Desired as the language of provincial jobs in Punjab?</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Students who have ticked merely ‘the language of the majority the people’ have not been included in any category above except that of Punjabi speakers.

Source: Appendix 14.7 and 14.18. Question 3, given in full in Appendix 14, has been broken into two parts here. All figures, except
In ‘Survey 2000’, very few Punjabi students demanded that Punjabi should be used as a medium of instruction or even be taught as a subject to them as the above figures in Table 38 indicate. However, in response to Q. 4 (Do you desire your Mother Tongue as Medium of Instruction?) 40.32 per cent students answered ‘Yes’; 58.33 said ‘No’; and 1.34 per cent did not respond at all (Appendix 14.17). This question, however, always elicits a more ‘ethnic’ response than other questions of a similar nature where students appear to bring pragmatic and practical factors into consideration not only for themselves but for other students as well. This is probably because people evaluate languages according to their position in the power index (who uses them and where and whether they lead to powerful positions in society).

Several Punjabi publications, such as the monthly Ravel, kept reporting that a movement for teaching Punjabi was going on. A number of enthusiasts did promise books for students, and teachers were demanded (several issues of Ravel in 1991–92). The Maan Boli Parhao movement held workshops (13 Oct. 1991 at Gujar Khan reported in Ravel November 1991). The movement got more momentum in 1994 but nothing substantial came about. Punjabi publications pounced upon every little event—a school’s headmaster starting classes in Punjabi, a teacher reporting success and so on—but no major breakthrough came about. Roughly, this is the condition at the time when this book goes to the press (2001).

Informal Learning of Punjabi

This account of the failure of the activists of Punjabi appears to suggest that literacy in Punjabi must be so less as to be non-existent. However, there is a considerable body of the public, ordinary people and not only activists, who read chapbooks in Punjabi. Among other people, the Punjabi scholar and activist Asif Khan told me that his mother knew a number of Punjabi poems which she would read out to him (Khan 1998: 51 and Int. 1999). Punjabi is also the informal medium of instruction in the rural schools of the Punjab. According to Ahmed Saleem, for instance, he was taught in Punjabi at the primary level in the fifties and even now the teaching at that level is actually in Punjabi though the textbooks are in Urdu. Some madrassas also reported that they used Punjabi to explain difficult concepts to younger students. In the cities, however, Urdu is mostly used even for teaching though here too Punjabi sometimes takes over as the language of explanation (Saleem Int. 1999). Books containing stories in verse and prose as well as other matters of popular interest are still available in the older, inner city bazaars of the cities of Punjab. As mentioned earlier, Hanaway and Nasir (1996) have listed hundreds of such chapbooks and the present author has read many of them. As in the case of Pashto, they are of three major kinds: religious; romantic and utilitarian. The religious ones generally have the same themes and even the same titles as their predecessors mentioned earlier (Nur Nama, Jang Nama, Lahad Nama, etc.). The romances are about the mythical lovers—Laila Majnun, Mirza Sahiban, Heer Ranjha, Sassi Punnun, etc.—but they are much smaller than the classical books available in Punjabi and other languages. They are in simple Punjabi verse and do not exceed sixty or so pages. There are also stories about princes and princesses from exotic countries in the Alf Laila, fairytale, tradition. The utilitarian books, again as in the case of Pashto, are about magic, astrology, sexology, medicine and more mundane matters such as letter writing. Almost all the myths of Pashto books—whether they be about the qualities of plants, medicines, women or about invoking the supernatural—are also part of these books. This is not surprising since the pre-
modern, magical worldview of the Pashto books is also one which the common people of the Punjab share even now.

Apart from chapbooks, serious literature in Punjabi is also read by a number of people though it is not possible to determine their numbers. According to Ahmed Saleem, he met many students and lecturers who had taught themselves Gurmukhi. Moreover, private study circles such as the one organized by Sarwat Mohiuddin in Islamabad, teach Punjabi classical literature and the kind of language necessary for understanding it. Visitors sometimes bring books in Gurmukhi from the Indian Punjab and they are passed around among the cognoscenti (Saleem Int. 1999).

Thus, while Punjabi is not taught, it is still learned both at the elitist level by language activists and at the popular one by ordinary people who still remain comfortable in the pre-modern worldview of popular texts which they read for pleasure.

NOTES

1. However, Punjabi was not discouraged by some British officers in the Sikh regiments as the following report indicates:

   With an *esprit de corps* that does him honour, he [the Commanding Officer] desires to have his men animated with the old warlike spirit of Sikhs, and fancies that the national feeling can best be preserved, by their being educated in their own familiar tongue (Edn. P 1864a: 69).

   Captain Fuller, the Director of Public Instruction who wrote the above report, was not otherwise in favour of teaching Punjabi which he considered ‘a barbarous dialect’. However, he, and other British officers, felt that the creation of in-group, or nationalistic, feeling in the army under British command would help in using sections of the army against Indians of other nationalities while teaching it to all could set them against the British themselves. In any case by 1858, the British were sure of the loyalty of Punjabi soldiers and the reasons for not teaching Punjabi do not appear to be fear of consolidation and revolt.

2. Incidentally, Aurangzeb is reported to have said in his harangue to his tutor: ‘Can we repeat our prayers, or acquire a knowledge of law and of the sciences, only through the medium of Arabic? May not our devotions be offered up as acceptably, and solid information communicated as easily, in our mother tongue?’ (Bernier 1826: 178). No answer is given by any historian to this question but Imam Abu Hanifa, founder of the Hanfi school of Islamic jurisprudence said that languages other than Arabic, such as Persian, could be used for prayers. The *Hidaya* which records this opinion also adds that Imam Hanifa eventually agreed with the other scholars of law and that the overwhelming consensus now is that prayers may only be said in Arabic (Ali n.d.: 349).
The census of Pakistan gives figures for Balochi (3.02 per cent) and Brahvi (1.21 per cent) but the ‘other languages’, which are spoken by 2.81 per cent households in the country are not individually enumerated. From the perspective of what is called language acquisition in this book this is understandable because the ‘other languages’ are hardly taught or learned informally to any significant degree. Their literatures, of which several histories are now available including a synoptic account in Tareekh-e-Adabiyat (Vol. 14, Part 2), are generally oral though nearly all have writing systems now and many have produced writings at different periods of history. However, none is taught formally as a language in Pakistani educational institutions at the elementary level. Some are, however, taught as options or at the higher levels. Even Balochi and Brahvi, important as they are being the mother tongues of the Baloch, are not taught in the manner and the degree to which they would have been had the state adopted multi-lingual language-teaching policies. The question is whether their teaching, such as it is, is part of resistance (or ethnic) language-teaching? One answer to this question is given by Richard A. Slimbach who, after field work in Lyari (Karachi) in the mid-1990s, described certain organizations which ‘create and sponsor an assortment of “resistance pedagogies” aimed at raising political consciousness, revitalizing Baloch culture and resolving local binds’ (1996: 148). These organizations do not concentrate much on teaching Balochi or Brahvi, as will be described later, but they do try to create ethnic consciousness through literary, cultural and political motivation. They also enable young students to learn Urdu and English so as to help them do well in school. Does this mean that the Baloch accept the dominance of the languages of power—Urdu and English—while using their own mother tongue as symbols of ethnicity? These are questions which the following section of this chapter will attempt to answer. But first let us look at the history of literacy, and hence of learning, Balochi and Brahvi.

The earliest book of Brahvi which exists today is Khidmat-e-Deen. It is a book on advice and instructions of a religious nature of a hundred pages probably written in 1693. After this there are magical spells and cures in Brahvi (Brahvi 1982: 90–91) till we come to a major work known as Malik Dad Kalati’s Tuhfat ul Ajaib. The book is said to have been completed in July 1760 but the manuscript is missing. The printed edition dates from 1882. It appears that, while Balochi and Brahvi might have been used as informal media of instruction and explanation for pupils, they were not the formal languages of scholarship or religious propagation till the British arrival. The British unwittingly promoted the acquisition of these languages in Balochistan—we shall not look at Pashto which is also used in Balochistan in this chapter because it is covered elsewhere—in two ways. First, they made formal arrangements to examine their officers in them. And second, they allowed the missionaries to preach and translate the Bible in them. This made the ulema apprehensive of losing the Baloch to Christianity and they too started writing in Balochi and Brahvi. Let us look at both developments turn by turn.

The first printed books on Balochi and Brahvi grammar were written for and by Englishmen. They had to learn and pass examinations in these languages and the purpose of these books was to enable them to acquire them. The earliest manuscripts of a linguistic nature dated between 1820 and 1877, have been written, Elfbein opines, for British officers (Elfbein 1983: 364 and Jahani 1989: 23). One of the most well-known books of this kind are Longworth Dames’s A Text Book of the Balochi Language (1901). While Dames wrote in English, an Indian official, Hathu
Ram, wrote his *Balochi Nama* (1875) in Persian and Urdu. In the preface of the latter, which is in highly stilted and Persianized Urdu, the author says that it had been written because he had helped British officers to learn the language and had decided to put his knowledge in one place. Both books, the latter translated and transliterated into English, were part of the proficiency examination in Balochi which British officials, such as H. T. Lambrick, took. In Lambrick’s case the examination, held on 28 April 1941, comprised not only a translation from English to Balochi and vice versa, but also conversation with natives or examiners in Balochi (Balochi Examination 1940–41).

While the English officers learned Balochi and Brahvi in order to project their power onto the people of this region, there are those who learned them in order to resist this power. How Balochi and Brahvi became symbols of resistance in the hands of the ulema has been mentioned in passing in my previous book (1996: 159–60). In this chapter more details of this resistance movement, the Maktaba-e-Darkhani, are provided and some of the books written by it are described.

The work by the Maktaba-e-Darkhani can be described as a movement for spreading religious awareness among the Baloch to counter Christianity. Since the missionaires had translated the Bible in the local languages between 1905 to 1907, there was apprehension among the ulema that Christianity would spread among the Baloch. The Quran, therefore, became available in Brahvi in 1914 and in Balochi in 1949. Other texts of a religious nature too became available in these languages. These texts also served to spread literacy in Brahvi and Balochi. The pioneer of the movement was Maulvi Mohammad Fazil (1823–96) whose village, Darkhan, which is about six miles from Dhadhar, gave its name to it. According to Nadir Qambrani, Fazil was inspired by Abul Khair, who was the religious mentor (*Pir*), of a number of people upto Afghanistan. Qambrani’s grandfather himself was his disciple and the story comes from Qambrani who heard about the events described here as part of family lore. According to the story *Pir* Abul Khair had come from Delhi, where he was normally resident, to pay a visit to his disciples in Afghanistan in the 1870s. For some reason he also came to stay at Quetta. From there he went to Dhadhar, most probably in a *tonga* (one-horse carriage), to persuade Mohammad Fazil to write Islamic books for the common people in Brahvi and Balochi. Fazil agreed and the Maktaba-e-Darkhani started getting books written and printed, generally at the Steam Press in Lahore, for publication from Darkhan (Qambrani Int. 1999).

It is not known whether these books were used as additional reading material in the madrassas—where the core curriculum was based on the Dars-e-Nizami—but what is certain is that they were read out among the common people. According to Abdullah Jan Jamaldini, one of the foremost pioneers of Balochi and Brahvi languages in contemporary times, he used to hear the *Durrul Majeedi* in Brahvi read out in a sing song voice when he was a child. A certain blind man was famous for his recitation in the bazaar. Women, some of whom were literate in the Quran, also read it out to others (Jamaldini Int. 1999). In short, literacy in Balochi and Brahvi was facilitated by the presence of books in these languages. As the people learned the written languages themselves, this was a classical case of voluntary language-learning.

Exactly how many books were published by the Maktaba-e-Darkhani is not easy to determine. Guesses and a few incomplete lists are all we have to go by. According to Abdur Rahman Brahvi, while about 1000 books were published in Brahvi, only about sixty were published in Balochi (Brahvi Int. 1999). Shahwani lists 210 books in Brahvi and ninety-one in Balochi (1993: 63). *The Catalogue of Books in Minor Languages* (Vol. 2) at the British Library records eight books in Brahvi but none in Balochi. There are scattered lists in different places in Pakistan but none is complete or reliable. While nobody has the definitive list, everyone agrees that more books are available now in Brahvi than in Balochi. A large number of books are lost because books were buried when they became torn and worn out (Brahvi 1987: xxix). This was presumably to save
them from desecration. However, even if they were buried one assumes that both Brahvi and Balochi books were buried. Thus, the lesser number of Balochi books cannot be explained unless one assumes that less were published to begin with. Out of the books available now, the present author saw the following:

**Tuhfat ul Ajaib.** This is a printed copy of 1888. As mentioned earlier, it was written in 1760 by Malik Dad Kalati. It is in Brahvi verse. It explains the requirements of prayers, ablutions for prayers, and other rituals of Islam.

**Shumail Shareef.** This book, in Brahvi verse, was printed in AH 1355 (1936–37). The author is Maulana Abdullah Darkhani and this copy was printed in Quetta. The book is an example of hagiography as it describes the physical appearance, behaviour, and qualities of the Prophet of Islam. The titles are in Arabic.

**Shahad-o-Shifa.** This book, in Brahvi verse, was written by Maulvi Abdul Majeed of Mastung. It was printed by Abdul Baqi at Quetta but all other details are missing. It mentions Shah Abul Khair of Delhi who, being the initiator of the Maktaba-e-Darkhani, is praised highly. Most of the book is a hagiography describing the Prophet’s marriage and life with his first wife, Khadija. Brahvi ghazal, in praise of the Prophet, is also included.

**Munaffehat ul Awam.** This book probably by Mohammad Omar, is a *nasihat nama*—a book of advice and admonition. It specially targets those who do not say their prayers. It was either printed, or reprinted, in 1957 at Mastung.

**Tuhfat ul Gharaib** (Brahvi verse). By Mulla Nubbo Jan, a prolific author and a leading figure of the Maktaba-e-Darkhani, this edition was published at Darkhan in 1888. It too is about the essentials of Islam including prayers, etc. Another edition comprises both *Tuhfat ul Gharaib* and *Tuhfat ul Ajaib*. This is called *Naseh ul Baloch* and Mulla Nubbo Jan has compiled and published it.

**Umdat ul Bayan.** This book, also by Mulla Nubbo Jan, is in Brahvi verse. The subtitles, however, are in Persian. The book describes the fundamentals and rituals of Islam. It is also in the tradition of the *nasihat namas*. The author especially warns people against neglecting prayers and deviating from the rituals of Islam. The date is missing in this typescript.

**Durrul Majeedi.** This book, in Brahvi verse, is written by Mulla Abdul Majeed Chotoi (Choto is a place near Mastung). The book has the well-known tale of Yusuf-Zulaikha along with discussions of heavens and hell. Wrongdoers are threatened with dire consequences. According to Abdullah Jan Jamaldini one of his relatives would threaten him with punishment for not saying the daily prayers by reciting couplets from it (Jamaldini Int. 1999). The date of printing is torn out but is probably 1909.

**Muajzat-e-Mustafa.** This book, in Brahvi verse, is by Mohammad Omar. It was published by Abdul Ghafoor Darkhani and the edition available to the author was dated 1958. It contains stories of the conquests of Khalid Bin Walid and the martyrdom of famous figures in Islamic history. It also has a narrative about the *mairaj*.

**Tuhfat ul Khaleel.** This book, in Brahvi verse, is written by Abdul Majeed Chotoi. It is published by Abdul Ghafoor Darkhani and printed at the Civil and Military Press at Quetta. It narrates the
Quranic tales about Nimrod, Abraham, Ishmael and advises Muslims to follow the faith based upon past exemplars of piety and rectitude.

Sakrat Nama. Written in Brahvi verse by Abdul Majeed Chotoi, this book belongs to the sub-genre of admonitory writing about death. It also contains the ghazals of Mohammad Omar Dinpuri. This particular copy is torn so the printing and publication details could not be ascertained.

Raghib ul Muslimeen. Written in Brahvi verse by Mohammad Omar Dinpuri, it falls into the sub-genre of hagiographical writing about the Prophet of Islam. Events from the life of the Prophet, the conversion of his admirer Abu Zar (whom the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati used as a symbol of resistance against exploitation later, see Rahnema 1998), and other inspiring stories are given. The first and last pages are missing and no details of printing and publication are available. Omar Dinpuri is also famous as the first translator of the Quran in Brahvi. He is said to have written 48 books (see list in Brahvi 1987: 116–17).

Qasas ul Anbia. This book was written in Brahvi verse by Mian Abdul Aziz. The date of printing is 1945 and the publisher is the Maktaba-e-Darkhani. It falls into the sub-genre of hagiographical writing about the several prophets mentioned in the Quran. The mairaj is also described. In the end there is a ‘Shahadat Nama’—the story of the martyrdom of the imams at Karbala.

Nur ul Islam. This is a manuscript in Brahvi verse written in black ink. The date is AH 1350 which corresponds with 1937–38. It is a hagiography of the prophets and divine messengers mentioned in the Quran. It ends in a ‘Shahadat Nama’.

Balochi Books

Sad Pand Luqman Hakeem. This book, written by Mian Huzoor Baksh Jatoi, is in the Eastern dialect of Balochi. The sub-titles are in Persian. This is a ‘Naseehat Nama’ especially condemning and admonishing those who do not say their prayers. It was printed at the Balochistan Press in Quetta and published by Abdul Ghafoor Darkhani.

Hidayat ul Muslimeen. Another book in Balochi verse by the same author. It is a ‘Naseehat Nama’ but it condemns the Baloch for being shameless. There are passages admonishing the Baloch about their lack of manliness—probably references to the compromise with British rule which most of the chiefs found expedient.

Radd-e-Shia. Yet another book by the same author also in Balochi verse. No date is given but the last page has AH 1355 (1936–37) written on it. It is a hagiography of the Prophet of Islam. From page 110 to 146 (the end), the doctrines of the Shia sect are condemned in virulent terms. Indeed, the Shia are even called unbelievers.

Usul-e-Salat. Yet another book by Huzoor Baksh Jatoi; it too is in Balochi verse. This particular copy was printed on 6 February 1944 at the Civil and Military Press in Quetta and published by the Maktaba-e-Darkhani. However, Dr Abdur Rahman Brahvi says that the book was actually written in AH 1318 (AD 1900–1901) and its manuscript is lost (Brahvi 1987: 286). The major theme of the book are the rituals and principles of Islam. Prayers, ablutions, ritual cleansing of the body and such other matters are dwelt upon.
Khilasa Kaedani. This is a translation of an Arabic work in Balochi. The date of printing is AH 1357 (11 Rabi ul Awwal corresponding to May 1938). The Arabic version is given in bold and the Balochi, done by Fazil Mohammad, is given below it. The subjects are beliefs and practices in Islam.

There are other books too which a researcher can discover in peoples’ private collections. Among the eight books at the British library only one, Nabbo Jan’s Tuhfa Gharaiw wa Tuhfa Ajaib, has been mentioned above. Most of the others fall in the broad category of religious books though one contains ghazals and another one is on medicine. An excellent description of books in Brahvi is available in both Dr Abdur Rahman Brahvi’s published book (1982) and unpublished doctoral thesis (1987). In the latter he also describes some Balochi books (1987: 285–6). However, even if one does not get the chance of seeing all the books, one can form an idea about their themes and objectives. As we have seen, the themes are religious and the major objective is to give the Baloch an awareness of their Islamic beliefs. These beliefs are strictly sunni and the ulema felt that their enforcement alone could save the Baloch from falling prey to heterodox ideas. For the Baloch ulema these came from internal as well as external sources. The internal ones were the ideas of the Zikris who live in Southern Balochistan and whose ideas are considered heretical by the Sunni ulema (Baloch 1996). Since the Zikris believe that the obligatory prayers said by Muslims have been abolished, there is much emphasis on prayers in Balochi and Brahvi books. The internal threat was taken care of by this emphasis. The external threat was from the Christian missionaries who wanted to win converts among the Baloch. The Darkhani movement, therefore, is aimed both at countering the missionaries as well as the Zikris. This movement is the ulemas’ reaction to heterodoxy as well as modernity which appeared to them as a continuation of the crusades when Islam and Christianity battled with each other for supremacy.

While there is no proof that these books, or any other books in Balochi and Brahvi, were part of the formal curricula of the madrassas, it is very likely that they were used informally. The existing translations of the Quran in both the languages might have been read by interested students or their teachers. Some books of the Dars-e-Nizami were also translated into the languages of the Baloch. For instance the Risala of Qutab Uddin Mohammad Ibn-i-Ghias Uddin (abbreviated to Qazi Qutab) was translated as Namaq Faraiz in Balochi by Huzoor Baksh Jatoi (Brahvi 1987: 286). Similarly the famous Meezan us Sarf, one of the best known books of Arabic grammar in the Dars-e-Nizami, was translated by Qazi Abdus Samad Sarbazi into Balochi (Brahvi 1987: 1036). Similar books—such as the Shuroot as Salat and Kanz ul Musli—also exist in Brahvi translations. The latter book, translated by Maulana Abdullah Darkhani, is a well-known Arabic work on ritual cleanliness and the basics of Islam and is well-known to madrassa students (Brahvi 1987: 292). Books of this kind, already read by madrassa students in Arabic, must have been the models for later works of this kind for the general public. In any case the presence of madrassa texts in translation suggests that the ulema used the mother tongues as informal media of instruction and provided these translations for their students and colleagues. It is also said that some ‘Zikri rites of worship are conducted in Balochi; in consequence, Zikri poets and religious scholars have enriched Balochi literature’ (Baloch 1996: 229).

Teaching of Balochi and Brahvi in Pakistan

Balochi and Brahvi are still used informally to explain texts in Arabic and Persian in some madrassas of Balochistan. The head of the Madrassa-e-Jamia Ashrafia in Mastung told me that he
explained texts to junior students in Brahvi (Ababaki Int. 1999). The maulana was the author of several books in Brahvi and had translations of Sa’adi’s Pand Nama, Gulistan, and Bustan ready for the press. However, since his students are examined either in Urdu or Arabic, they mostly learn Urdu in order to answer their examination questions. In the madrassas in Khuzdar and Kalat, as well as other places, students are reported to read books in Brahvi. In Turbat and some other Balochi-speaking areas, they read Balochi books. The purpose of books in these languages is to make the young ulema preach to ordinary people in their own languages (Baidar Int. 1999).

Balochi and Brahvi are also the informal languages of explanation in the Urdu medium schools of the small towns and rural areas where non-Baloch students do not study. The teachers of these schools are rather ashamed of these languages because it was with considerable reluctance that they conceded that explanations are often in them. Moreover, both the students and the teachers ordinarily talk to each other in them though the official language of the classroom is Urdu (Mohammad Int. 1999).

Apart from the madrassas and the state schools where Balochi and Brahvi are used for explanation, there have been experiments to teach it in some schools in Karachi. However, Tim Farrell, who visited schools in Lyari (Karachi) and other places in Balochistan, says that students have to compete with Urdu-knowing students and concentrate less on learning Balochi than the language activists would wish for. However, Lyari remains a vibrant centre of Balochi language and literature. A social activist, Ms Gulrang, teaches children and adults in Balochi since 1993. Children are made to write essays and stories in Balochi and, of course, there are some of the traditional chapbooks (Nur Namas, etc.) which are still read out to assembled groups of (mostly women) in Balochi. Besides, poets read out their verse and there is a lot of awareness among the Baloch of Lyari that their area has been a prominent centre of writing and intellectual activity in Balochi. Even the Baloch ulema of Lyari, such as Jan Mohammad, give their sermons in Balochi (Azad Int. 2000). Not everyone, as mentioned above, learns Balochi in order to serve the ethnic cause. They do, however, listen to ‘resistance’ poetry by nationalists such as Gul Khan Nasir, Abdul Qayum Sarbazi, Syed Zahir Shah, Bashir Badar, Mubarak Qazi, Murad Sahir, and G.R. Mullah in marriage ceremonies and other community associations. This poetry, set to music, is also distributed throughout the crowded bazaars of Lyari and other Baloch areas (Slimbach 1996: 152–3). However, starting from 1951 when Maulvi Khair Mohammad Nadwi published his Balochi Qaidah and ABC Book, the language activists have made great efforts to produce primers and books for children. A brief history of these productions is given by Farrell (1998: 4–5). In the end he comments:

Of these, as far as I am aware, Lal Baxsh’s books were used in a formal literacy programme for a while, and the Azat Jamaldini Academy books are at present being used in a literacy programme. Apart from those the Shal Association’s Buni Kitab was used in a small number of schools in Balochistan and Sweden (Farrell 1998: 5).

Indeed, ironically enough, Balochi seems to have been taught more outside the Baloch areas than it is either in Pakistani or Iranian Balochistan. It was taught, though in an experimental way, in Sweden. It was taught more seriously in Turkmenistan from 1932 onwards. The Balochi texts from Turkmenistan seen by me were written in the Roman script and were published in 1935. Later, according to Saba Dashtiari, they were written in the Cyrillic script and now once again they are in Roman (Dashtiari Int. 1999).

Given this lack of formal teaching at the school level, it is only to be expected that there would not be much literacy in these languages. However, since a number of books are written in them, it is obvious that some people learn to read them—which is not difficult because they are written in variant forms of the script of Urdu taught in all schools—on their own. Thus, although I could not
find chapbooks either in Balochi or Brahvi in Quetta, there were a number of literary books—
poetry, short stories, novels—in the book shops. There were also a number of magazines and,
from January 1999, a daily in Balochi called *Nawai Watan* is being published from Quetta. Apart
from the literary activity in Balochistan, which the government can oversee easily because the
cities are so few and the literary Baloch even fewer, there is much activity in Karachi. Lyari has
been home to literary activity in Balochi since the 1950s. The Syed Hashmi Academy, The
Baloch Cultural and Research Association, the Balochi Literary Society and the Azad Jamaldini
Academy between themselves publish Balochi poetry, books on Baloch legends and other works
(Slimbach 1996: 151). In my own field trip to Lyari in March 2000, I too found these sporadic
publications but could not determine what percentage of young people could read them. This
means that, despite all odds, Balochi and Brahvi are read at least by some people in Pakistan.

**Formal Teaching of Balochi and Brahvi**

Balochi and Brahvi are also identity markers of the Baloch and have been part of the ethnic
politics of Balochistan. Baloch intellectuals and ethnic activists have been demanding the
teaching of these languages. Such teaching is part of what has been called ethnic or resistance LT
in chapter 2. As we have noticed before, such demands come from the activists of the ethnic
movement and their purpose is to ‘construct’ an ethnic identity, a nationality, by evoking such
symbols of unity as indigenous languages. The activists did succeed in getting Balochi and
Brahvi (as well as Pashto) accepted as media of instruction at the primary (1, 2, and 3) level in the
rural schools of Balochistan in 1990 (LAD-Bal 25 April and 21 June 1990). They prepared
textbooks and helped train teachers. The experiment, however, lasted only two years as the
government of Taj Muhammad Jamali effectively brought it to an end by making these languages

The fact that as soon as the languages were declared optional they ceased being used, points to
a fact about resistance LT which has been mentioned in chapter 2. It is that the languages used for
resistance are taught to make a political statement. They are symbols of ethnic identity. However,
since such minor languages are ghettoizing because they are not used in the domains of power,
parents are not keen to teach them to their children.

The way the experiment on mother tongue teaching was conducted between 1990 to 1992 was
also ghettoizing. First, the experiment was confined to non-elitist schools in rural areas. A letter
of the Education Department (No. 3-6179-E of 3 August 1990) exempted English-medium
schools from the provisions of ‘The Balochistan Mother Tongue Use Bill’ (No. 6 of 1990). Even
the Urdu-medium schools of the big cities did not switch over to the indigenous languages. In
short, only those who were already in ‘the ghetto’, so-to-speak, were to study in the mother
tongue. After the first three classes they too were to compete with others who had learned either
Urdu or English. In short, those who were less privileged already were to be burdened with the
learning of languages which were neither useful at higher levels of study nor for procuring jobs.
No wonder, the parents of children as well as schools themselves preferred to switch back to
Urdu as soon as the mother tongues became optional. However, the Baloch students whose
opinions were collected through a questionnaire during the survey I carried out in 1999 were
generally supportive of teaching Balochi as the following data indicates:
Table 38 (1 of Chapter 13)
Baloch Students’ Opinion about Balochi

(N=17)

Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>41.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>41.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>05.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>47.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>05.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochi + English</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-4. Desire MT as medium of instruction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>82.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>17.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 14.8. Question 3, given in full in Appendix 14, has been broken into two parts here.

The answers indicate that, whatever the practice because of pragmatic considerations, Baloch students are prone to making an (ethnic) nationalistic statement through their demand for being taught Balochi, i.e., they use their languages as symbols of resistance.

In short, Balochi and Brahvi are used to resist the hegemonic power of the centre, and of the Pashtuns of Balochistan, as ethnic symbols. However, when there is a conflict between the empowerment of the ethnic group and personal empowerment, people choose the latter. Thus, apart from a few committed activists, the Baloch teach their children Urdu and English which are the coins which buy power at the personal level.

One result of the efforts of the language activists is that Balochi and Brahvi are optional languages at the matriculation, intermediate (Arts) and Bachelor’s level. The students opt for them because they are easy but, nevertheless, literacy in these otherwise marginalized languages increases. To get a better idea of students’ choice of optional languages let us look at the results of Intermediate (FA) and BA in Balochistan. The passing percentage in Balochi was 76.6 while that in Brahvi was 78.3 in the FA (Intermediate) examination in 1996 (Appendix 5a). In the BA examination of 1998 it was 92.6 and 96.6 in the above mentioned languages respectively (Appendix 5b).

Balochi and Brahvi are seen as easy options by the students as many students concede and the high passing percentage confirms. Both languages are also options, and easy ones again, in the civil service examinations of the province and the centre (Appendix 9). However, even if they are easy options, the Baloch nationalists are happy that the teaching of their language has got some support. They are especially pleased that the MA degrees are now given in these languages and literatures.

MA in Balochi and Brahvi

The masters degree is a symbol of pride for identity-conscious nationalists in Pakistan. It is seen as coming of age or a sign of recognition that a language is no longer regarded as a mere unwritten dialect or rural patois. The Baloch nationalists too wanted the prestige of having MA
degrees in their languages. A beginning was made by the Adeeb Alim and Fazil certificates. Then the Pakistan Study Centre started teaching Balochi, Brahvi, and Pashto. Meanwhile Abdullah Jan Jamaldini, Abdur Rahman Brahvi, Abdurrahman Kurd, and Nadir Qambrani made efforts to extend this teaching up to the MA level. Their efforts bore fruit when in 1984 the MA courses started. It took a decade, however, for separate departments of these languages to be established. Since the end of 1994, however, Brahvi and Balochi (and Pashto) have departments of their own (Qambrani Int. 1999; Sana Int. 1999; Sabir Int. 1999). The departments are seen as symbols of identity and ethnic pride. They produce young people who, even if they initially join to get an MA degree more easily than they would have otherwise, are nevertheless acquainted with the written languages, their literature and nationalist writers and academics. Such people form a group, albeit loosely bound and scattered, which is both ideologically persuaded to expand the role of these languages and for whom this expansion provides better job opportunities. As such, the fact that it is possible to take MA degrees both as regular students from the university and private candidates; makes Balochi and Brahvi more powerful. That is why as many as sixty-nine students appeared in Balochi and 177 in Brahvi in the MA examination of the University of Balochistan in 1996 (for details see Appendix 5.2).

The power of the languages, though much lesser than Urdu and English, has increased potentially since the MA started. Thus the Baloch nationalists I talked to in Quetta were optimistic about the future of their languages. They feel that by teaching them, under whatever constraints, they have made their ethnic identity at least potentially stronger. However, since this teaching is controlled by the state, it cannot be widespread. In short, although the Baloch nationalists wanted the teaching of Balochi and Brahvi to be an expression of resistance (or ethnic) LT, it is in fact no more than a token or symbolic phenomenon which serves to dilute the stridency and fervour of the nationalist’s complaint of being ignored by the centre. For the students it serves a utilitarian purpose—that of being an easy option chosen to get high marks with less effort in their quest for empowerment through state employment. If at all this experiment has benefited Baloch nationalism, it is by creating more people literate in the language. It remains to be seen whether these literate young people will become a force for increased identity-consciousness or merely join the salariat on its own terms. These remarks, however, refer only to the state-sponsored teaching of Balochi. Baloch nationalists do train their cadres for challenging state power and perceived domination by the ruling elite of the centre. However, in the alternative, community-based tuition centres they have created, in Lyari, Balochi Town, old Golimar and Mauripur, Urdu and English are taught so as to equip the young Baloch children to compete with the dominant mohajirs in Karachi (Slimbach 1996: 157). Balochi takes the inspirational but symbolic form of identity-conscious resistance poetry, songs, stories, political speeches and lectures. In short, while Balochi and Brahvi remain the symbols of resistance of the dominant centre, in reality the Baloch empower themselves by learning the languages of power in the present setup—Urdu and English. As in other cases, Balochi LT is split between the desire to resist perceived hegemony while simultaneously seeking empowerment in the same system of power-distribution.

**Balti**

Balti is not taught at present though there are primers in it. The British made attempts to write it in the Roman script. The missionaries appear to have felt, as they did in the case of other languages, that the Christian faith could be spread through it. That is probably why they wrote some books in the language using the Persian script. Two such books, both in the British Library,
are as follows:

1) **Balti Paehli Soo Qaboo**. This is a primer in which slightly modified letters of the Urdu-Persian *nastaliq* script are used to denote Balti sounds. It is published by the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore, in 1903.

2) **Qurban na Deche Ishara bia se Harfung** [The significance of Sacrifice]. This comprises the Biblical story of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. It is in the modified *nastaliq* script introduced above. It too has been published by the same society as (1) in Lahore in 1905.

It does not appear that these books were ever read widely or made any inroads into the Islamic faith of the Baltis.

**Burushaski**

It is not taught in schools though primers, folk tales and songs in it are available. Some form of religious poetry, called *ginaan*, is also chanted in Burushaski or Persian. The ‘man chanting the *ginaan* translates the Persian words into Burushaski on the spot’ (Willson 1999: 158). Pir Shah Nasir Khusrau wrote many of them and Naseer Uddin Naseer’s *ginaans* and other works are in circulation at present. Naseer Uddin’s Burushaski Academy has done much to preserve the language and to create an awareness about the need to preserve it. The Aga Khan Education Service is said to be considering the question of introducing it in primary schools but has not done so as yet. Some members of the intelligentsia are interested in this but the lure of English and Urdu remains strong because they are the keys to empowerment through employment (Aman. PC: 2000).

**Garwi**

Maulana Abdul Haq Kalami is said to have written some poetry and folk lore in Garwi but the present author has not seen this work (Shaheen Int. 2000).

**Gujrati**

As Gujrat was one of the early centres of the development of Urdu literature, it was natural that words of Gujrati came to be used in early Urdu works. It is reported, for instance, that Muhammad Khub (d. 1614), a sufi of the Chistiyya order, ‘wrote in Hindavi with a considerable mixture of Gujarati’ (Suvorova 2000: 7). It also came to be used by several religious communities of Gujrat: the Dawoodi Bohras, the Ismaili Khojas (Aga Khanis), and the Parsis—in their religious texts.

Gujrati is a major language of education in the Indian Gujrat state, but in Pakistan it is no longer learned by many Gujrati-speaking pupils. Before the partition, there were Gujrati-medium schools. The record of the Sind Madressa tells us that a certain ‘Muhamedali Jinnabhbhay’ was admitted to standard 1 on 14 July 1887 after having passed standard IV-Gujrati (Shaikh 1995: 50). This student grew up to be the most illustrious alumnus of the Madressa—the creator of Pakistan; the Quaid-i-Azam.

The Sind Madressa too had primary branches of Sindhi, Urdu and Gujrati in the 1890s. Gujrati was the mother tongue of Hindus, Muslims and Parsis (Zoroastrians) and was an important
language in the schools of the Bombay Presidency and the city of Karachi. A number of books for Muslims also existed in it. In common with other languages, there were books in Gujarati for the religious guidance of ordinary Muslims. The immense literature of the Bohras, the Ismailis, and other religious communities of Gujrat has not been touched upon by me. However, brief references to it are available in Farhad Daftari’s voluminous and extremely informative book on the Ismailis (Daftari 1990). Apart from this literature, which should be described by a scholar who knows both Gujarati and comparative religions, there are the usual chapbooks which, as mentioned earlier, also exist in other languages. Three of them are as follows:

1) Majmu’ah-i-Mu’jazat. This book, about the miracles of the Prophet of Islam, is written in the Arabic script. Its author is unknown and it was printed in Bombay in 1878.

2) Sahifut al-Salat. A manual giving rules for prayers by Mulla Abdul Qadir in the Arabic script. It was printed in Bombay in 1879.


The Catalogue of Gujarati Books in the British Library (Vol. II, Pt.V, B) also records three books on Islamic law dating from 1871. These books were written to help the British administer the law for Gujarati Muslims because, among other works, there is a translation from English (Manibhai Jasbhai and Chhotaiala Sevakarama’s Musalmani Diwani Kayada: A Manual of Muhammadan Civil Law published in 1871).

Other translations from English, such as that of Gulliver’s Travels, were also available by the end of the nineteenth century (Marzban 1888). This seems to suggest that the Gujarati-speaking community, living as it did in major port cities, was more exposed to English (and Urdu-Hindi) than speakers of minor languages in remote areas.

Before the partition of India, Urdu was so strongly associated with the Muslim identity that even Gujarati Muslims opposed the demand that primary education for Gujarati Muslim girls should be in their mother tongue (LAD-Bombay 30 Nov. 1935). However, there were seventeen Gujarati-medium primary schools in Karachi with 3616 pupils in 1948 (ABE 1950: 59). After 1954 only one Gujarati-medium school for boys was opened and later Gujarati medium schools disappeared. The Bai Virbaiji Suparivala Parsi High School, however, still teaches Gujarati as a compulsory subject for Parsi children from classes I to III. However, the children do not use the script they have learned in these early years of their schooling and hardly any of them read Gujarati publications as they grow up (Mulla Int. 2000).

The Dawoodi Bohra community still teaches its own form of Gujarati called Lisan ud Dawat. This is Gujarati written in an Arabic-based script with many words of Arabic giving a distinctive Islamic character to the language. The Bohris have twenty-five religious schools in Karachi as well as a seat of higher learning called Al-Jamia tus Safiyah Burhania. In the schools they teach the Lisan ud Dawat and in the Jamia, although the language itself is not taught, a number of texts in it are studied. Moreover, Lisan ud Dawat is also the medium of instruction at some levels as well as the language of sermons. Thus the Bohra clergy (alims) with Al Faqih ul Jayyed degrees (equivalent to MA in Islamic Studies) keep Gujarati alive in Pakistan and abroad wherever the Bohra community is settled (Rasheed Int. 2000; Nadwi 1995).

The Ismaili Khoja (or Aga Khanis as they are called) community also used to teach Gujarati and the Khojki script. The Khojki script is an early script for writing Sindhi though it is also believed that it was invented by Pir Sadruddin (1300–1416) as a secret script for the Ismaili Khoja community. It is very close to the script of Gujarati. While both are taught in India, they are not
taught compulsorily to all children in Pakistan. Some interested students do sometimes volunteer for attending extra classes of Gujrati as part of their religious instruction in the evening. Rasheeda Mohammad Ali, a member of the religious board of studies of the community in Hyderabad, said that she herself learned Gujrati from her father and taught it to students in the summer (Ali Int. 2000). However, most young Ismailis do not know either Gujrati or the Khojki script because of which the Ginans (wise and sacred lyrics) in Khojki are read in translation by the young. There are books, like Tajddin Sadiq Ali’s *Glossary of Holy Ginans* (1993), which are meant to keep the young acquainted with the religious heritage of the community (Waliani Int. 2000). Although the Ginans are written in many languages, most of them are in Gujrati (Daftari 1990: 452). That is why some of the Ismaili intellectuals are so keen that knowledge of Gujrati and Khojki should be preserved. In short, the Gujrati community is less interested in education in its mother tongue than other communities. Gujrati is still an optional language at various levels in Karachi though very often students do not opt for it. However, there are still a fairly large number of publications in Gujrati. But even here the news is discouraging. Among the newspapers *Dawn* (Gujrati) has closed down since 1997. Ibrahim Shahbaz, the editor of *Dawn* (Gujrati) confirms that literacy in Gujrati is now almost entirely confined to the older generation in Pakistan (Shahbaz Int. 2000).

**Kalasha**

The Kalasha-speaking people live in mountainous, nearly inaccessible valleys, in Chitral. Because of the difficulty of reaching them they have so far maintained the autonomy of their culture. However, recently the number of tourists has increased and even schools have started functioning in the valleys.

The Kalasha language is not generally taught though Kendall D. Decker, a researcher from the Summer Institute of Linguistics, reported that it was used at the primary level (SSNP: 5: 112). There is also a primer, written in the Urdu script with a few additional diacritical marks to denote the special sounds of the language. Recently members of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, have published the most comprehensive dictionary of Kalasha till date (Trail & Cooper 1999). According to a teacher in a boys’ school, children show a lot of interest when something is explained in their own language. However, the language is not taught.

**Kalami**

Kalami, like the other minor languages of Pakistan, is not taught formally. The present writer, however, visited primary schools in Kalam Kohistan where it was used informally for explanation in the classroom. Dr Johann Baart, a linguist working on Kalami (Baart 1997), has written an *ABC Book* with his informant, Mohammad Zaman. There is also a primer in Urdu by Zaman. Both Primers are untested yet, but Baart hopes they would be used in some kind of pre-school programme of reading in Kalami (Baart Int. 1998). Zaman, who is also a member of the Kalam Cultural Society, wants the language to be taught so as to preserve it. He and other members of the society agreed that there was some cultural shame among Kalami speakers who used Pashto or Urdu. Baart felt that it is for instrumental reasons that the Kalam Kohistanis learn other languages making their own weaker (Zaman Int. 1998). Basically, not being used widely or in any domain of power, Kalami is a weak language and its speakers empower themselves by learning more powerful languages. Pervaish Shaheen, a researcher from Swat, reports a translation of the Quran by a certain Ghulam Isa in Indus Kohistani but the present author has not seen this work (Shaheen Int. 2000).
Kashmiri

Kashmiri has been a written language for a long time. Abul Fazl tells us about books in ‘Kashmirian’ in Akbar’s library. Moreover, says the same writer, ‘The History of Kashmir, which extends over the last four thousand years, has been translated from Kashmirian into Persian by Mawlana Shah Muhammad of Shahabad’ (Fazl 1590: 110 & 112). Translations of the famous tales of Yusuf-Zulaikha, Sheereen-Khusrau, and Laila-Majnoon in Kashmiri by the poet Mahmood Ghani are extant (d. 1800) (Aziz 1971: 151). There are only small pockets of Kashmiri speaking people in different areas of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. Some intellectuals belonging to this community have been urging the government of Pakistan to teach Kashmiri so as to counteract the Indian claim of promoting the culture of Kashmir. However, in Pakistan religion rather than language is emphasized as the symbol of the Kashmiri identity. Thus the demand for teaching Kashmiri in Pakistan has met with only lukewarm response. Efforts have, however, been made from time to time to teach it at various levels. In 1983 the Kashmiri Language Committee was formed to prepare courses for the language for class VI to VIII (Aziz 1983). The biggest impediment for teaching at this level was that the Kashmiri-speaking immigrants were not concentrated anywhere in such large numbers as to warrant separate classes. Moreover, the younger generation generally speaks the language of the peer group, which is mostly Punjabi, rather than Kashmiri.

The initiative which did succeed was to teach Kashmiri at the university level. According to Yusuf Bukhari, presently (in 2000) chairman of the Department of Kashmir Studies at the Oriental College, Punjab University, a number of intellectuals had been trying to begin the teaching of Kashmiri in this University since the nineteen seventies. Among them he himself had obtained a doctorate in a subject related to Kashmir in 1976 while others, such as the indefatigable Mir Abdul Aziz, kept lobbying the university authorities to allow them to establish a department. At last the Punjab University gave the necessary permission in 1980. Initially, upto 1982, only certificate and diploma courses were run but in 1987–88, MA classes were also begun. At present, the department also offers M.Phil and Ph.D degrees.

Kashmiri was taught briefly for the MA course in Pakistan Studies at the Quaid-i-Azam University. It is also taught at the intermediate level at the Allama Iqbal Open University. However, no serious effort has been made so far to teach it so that even refugees from Kashmir soon learn other languages forgetting their native Kashmiri in Pakistan.

Although Kashmiri is not given much importance in Pakistan, such teaching as exists is coloured by the Pakistan-India conflict on Kashmir. The script of Kashmiri used in Pakistan is that of Urdu, while in India the old Sharda script as well as Devanagari are used to write it. In India Sanskrit and Hindi provide some of the modern vocabulary of Kashmiri, whereas in Pakistan Urdu, Persian, and Arabic do so. At the MA level the subjects the students read, the texts they are referred to and the theses they write are overwhelmingly ideological. Indeed, one could say that the MA offers more a course in indoctrination about Pakistan’s point of view about Kashmir (that it had been forcibly occupied by India and should be allowed to join Pakistan) than a study of the Kashmiri language and literature.

Kashmiri, like other minority languages, is taken as an easy option by students at the higher level. The MA is easy because the examiners cannot afford to fail the few students they have. The students, therefore, take the subject so as to put MA before their names without much effort.

Khowar
Khowar, or Chitrali as it is sometimes called, is not taught in schools though it is used informally to explain Urdu textbooks in primary schools. Recently, primers and basic textbooks in it have been prepared by the Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Khowar. Some religious books in manuscript form and a commentary on the Quran are reported to exist in the language (Din PC. 2000). There are also some chapbooks, consisting of Islamic themes or tales, in the language.

Shina

Shina is widely spoken in the Northern Areas and is used to explain texts in primary schools. However, it is not formally taught in schools. There are primers in the language and some members of the intelligentsia do want to preserve the language as a symbol of their distinct cultural identity. However, they also want to enter the mainstream of public employment through learning English and Urdu. Despite these conflicting pressures, literature in Shina has increased in the last few years (see Taj 1989; Zia 1986; Chilasi n.d.; Razwal 1997). Western scholars too have written on Shina (Buddruss 1996) and made some of the oral literature in the language available to readers of English (Radloff 1998), but their interest is academic whereas that of the local writers is to preserve the language for reasons of identity.

Siraiki

There are many manuscripts of religious tracts, romances and other popular writings which have elements of Multani. Indeed, the classics of Punjabi include works produced in what is called Siraiki nowadays. There are conjectures that the Sumras who ruled Multan, Uch, and Sindh after the downfall of Ghaznavide power used Siraiki as an official language. However, this is based on no more than an inscription in words which may be interpreted as being close to Siraiki, written in the Devanagari script, on a brick in a fort in Bahawalpur. This fort was repaired in 1491 when a Sumra ruler recorded this fact, and that of his rule over it (Haidri 1971: 267). Early versions of religious literature, such as Nur Namas, are said to date from as far back as the twelfth century. For instance, a Nur Nama by a certain Mian Qabool is said to be from about the same period. Another poet, Azam, wrote a Hulia Mubarak—a description of the Prophet of Islam. The usual versified tales of famous lovers also came to be written from the thirteenth century onwards (Haidri 1971). However, as I have not personally seen these manuscripts, I shall not venture any definite opinion as to the antiquity of this literature. There are also books on Arabic grammar, such as Shah Wilayat Multani’s Qawaneen Sarfia Manzooma Hindia, dating from the sixteenth century.

In this book, however, what are now called Siraiki or Hindko are not distinguished from Punjabi. Meer Hisan ul Haidri, who contributed the chapter on Siraiki literature of the Muslims of South Asia published by the Punjab University (Lahore) in 1971, attempts to distinguish Siraiki and Punjabi literature. However, it is difficult to make such a distinction especially in view of the fact that local expressions were used in all works of literature, and the features of the various varieties of the language of southern Punjab—the present-day Siraiki belt—were used by many writers. This is why no distinction has been made in this book between the learning of Punjabi and Siraiki till the present age—indeed, till the time of this birth of the Siraiki language movement. As the movement itself has been described in considerable detail by Christopher Shackgle (1977a) and more recently by me (Rahman 1996: Chapter 10), it will only be mentioned in relation to language-teaching.

The demand for teaching Siraiki, at least to young children, was part of the assertion of an
identity distinct from the Punjabi identity in the 1960s and 1970s. A major cultural event was a conference in Multan between 14 to 16 March 1975 (Kamal 1975). One result of this movement was the publication of magazines and other reading material. A number of Siraiki organizations, such as the Siraiki Lok Sanjh (created in 1985) passed resolutions to promote ‘the cause of the Siraiki language and culture’ and literacy in the language was part of this promotion. Siraiki language activists, like the Punjabi activists, have been trying to get their language recognized as separate from Punjabi and a language worthy of being taught at various levels. They have had no success as far as the schools are concerned. Like Punjabi, Siraiki too is not a medium of instruction in any government school. However, it is used for explanation both in schools and madrassas. There is more consciousness of Siraiki being a symbol of identity in southern Punjab than among the Punjabi-speaking central Punjab. Thus, teachers in some madrassas as well as other schools specifically said that Siraiki was their informal medium of instruction at the elementary level. In other parts of the Punjab, while they did say that they explained things in Punjabi, nobody called it a part of identity in the institutions visited for this study (Appendix 10).

At the higher level the activists of the Siraiki language movement have had some success. They wanted to establish an MA in Siraiki for symbolic reasons. In this they were not opposed by the supporters of Punjabi. In the view of Punjabi intellectuals, the teaching of Siraiki would only prove that the literary roots of all the dialects of their common language are the same. Thus when Taj Mohammad Langah, the leader of a Siraiki political party, said that a separate department of Siraiki should be opened at the Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Shafqat Tanwir Mirza, the well-known Punjabi intellectual and activist, agreed with him. Said Mirza:

No Siraiki MA student can ignore Baba Farid, Sultan Bahu, Bulleh Shah, Shah Husain, Shah Murad and ultimately Waris Shah.

Thus, in his view, the difference between Siraiki and Punjabi, being deliberately created by politicians, will come to an end (Mirza 1995a).

The MA was finally opened at the Islamic University of Bahawalpur in September 1989. It was a triumph for the Siraiki activists and intellectuals but, unfortunately, it did not attract many full time students. In the session of 1999–2000 there were only seven students in the MA (previous) and none in final. On an average 25 to 30 students appear in the MA as private candidates and over a 100 of them have taken the MA degree so far. In order to neutralize the ethnic contents of the MA course, the syllabus includes a course on ‘Pakistani’ literature and another one on the mysticism of Sheikh Fareed, the major sufi saint of the Siraiki belt. According to Javed Chandio, the chairman of the department in 1999, there was enthusiasm for taking the MA in the first seven years but, since there were no jobs available after acquiring the degree, this enthusiasm has decreased. Things came to such a pass that in October 1999 there were rumours that the department was being closed down and a number of wall posters and slogans appeared that the Siraikis would not allow this to happen (Chandio PC. 1999). At the moment the department is open but its future is uncertain.

Wakhi

It is not taught in schools though the Wakhi Cultural Association has collected some reading material in the Urdu and the Roman script for young learners. This organization wants their language to be allowed as an option in schools but this has not happened so far (Baig PC. 2000). According to a researcher, John Mock, some Soviet era linguists working in this area taught a modified form of the International Phonetic Alphabet to the poets of this language who used it to
write their poetry (Mock 2000)

**Conclusion**

The dynamics of learning minor languages is closely related to issues of power. There is the imperative of empowerment through employment which discourages demand for learning these languages while increasing the demand for English and Urdu. This is most obvious for Gujarati speakers and in the Northern Areas. In a sample of matriculation students questioned for this book, students in the Northern Areas overwhelmingly said that they do not want their mother tongues to be used as media of instruction. Indeed, most of them did not even want them to be taught in schools. They chose English and Urdu, in that order, because that is the order of the relative potential for empowerment of these languages.

**Table 39 (2 of Chapter 13)**
Language-teaching Preferences of the Speakers of Some Minor Languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Khowar</th>
<th>Shina</th>
<th>Burushaski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=50)</td>
<td>(N=90)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All figures below are percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Khowar</th>
<th>Shina</th>
<th>Burushaski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>89.47%</td>
<td>86.00%</td>
<td>93.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu, English</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.0 (F+E)</td>
<td>1.11 (F+E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-4. Desired MT as medium of instruction?

| Yes | 5.26 | Nil | 01.11% |
| No  | 94.74 | 100 | 95.55% |
| NR  | Nil  | Nil | 3.33% |

Q-3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Khowar</th>
<th>Shina</th>
<th>Burushaski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>78.95%</td>
<td>76.00%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>1.11% (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Arabic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Khowar</th>
<th>Shina</th>
<th>Burushaski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English +</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>14.00%</td>
<td>14.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu +</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>14.00%</td>
<td>12.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT +</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto +</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic +</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian +</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi +</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other +</td>
<td>5.26% (F)</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>1.11% (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F,I,C)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q-6. Desired language for provincial jobs?
In the case of Balochi and Brahvi, language activists feel that their power base as a group with an identity of its own would suffer if their languages are allowed to die or be marginalized, but even this imperative is not strong enough to convince the parents of students of the necessity of over-burdening their children with languages which are not used in the domains of power. Yet, if only in order to preserve an identity under threat of extinction or dilution, members of the intelligentsia of these language communities are making efforts to preserve their languages by informal means as well as through schooling. This has led to the writing of primers and collections of folk tales but the minor languages are still not formally used in schools. They are, however, used informally as auxiliary languages of facilitation. Small children in Chitral, parts of Balochistan, Baltistan, Kohistan, and the Northern Areas are explained lessons in Urdu and English in their mother tongue. This process is purely unfficial, informal, unreported and sometimes unacknowledged. However, it ensures that speakers of at least the more frequently used of the minor indigenous languages of Pakistan do play a role in the process of education even if it remains unacknowledged and hidden.
14
FOREIGN LANGUAGES

For the Muslims of north India Arabic was a sacred language while Persian was so essential a part of education as to be a second rather than a foreign language. Turkish was a foreign language and, except possibly to the Mughal princes whose ancestors spoke it as a mother tongue, it was not ordinarily taught. No other foreign language was taught though Aurangzeb is said to have complained to his tutor that ‘a familiarity with the languages of surrounding nations may be indispensable in a king’, but that he had only been taught Arabic (Bernier 1826: 176). There is evidence, however, that Akbar’s interest in comparative religions led to some contact with foreign (European) languages. The Portuguese missionaries at Goa sent a mission to Akbar’s court. The mission, comprising Father Antony Monserrate, Rudolf Aquaviva and Francis Henriques reached Fatehpur Sikri on 27 or 28 February 1580. Monserrate was assigned to teach the Portuguese language to the eleven-year-old Prince Murad by the King (Maclagan 1932: 33). In 1595 the Jesuit Father Jerome Xavier (1549–1617) taught Portuguese and Latin to a certain Abd al-Sattar so as to help him translate the bible into Persian. Gulsfishan Khan, who mentions this incident comments that, ‘this is the first known example of the collaboration and cooperation of an Indian Muslim to translate European knowledge into Persian’ (G. Khan 1998: 145). The Jesuit Fathers also set up a school at Lahore to teach Portuguese ‘to the sons of the chiefs, lords and captains of the court’ of Jahangir (Guerreiro 1930: 124). Later, in the reign of Aurangzeb (1659–1707), Mutamad Khan, an officer of the empire, visited, ‘Portugal, where he learnt Latin and translated Clavius’s Eight Books of Gnomics into Arabic’ (G. Khan 1998: 270). This book is still available in the British Library in London. In the eighteenth century, Tafazzul Hussain Khan (1727–1800) learnt Latin and Greek and translated a number of works, including Newton’s Principia, from Latin into Arabic (ibid.: 272).

There are, of course, legends of some people having learned many languages even earlier. For instance, the historian Ferishta tells us that Peroze Shah, the Bahmuny ruler of Deccan (r. 1397–1422) used to speak to the inmates of his seraglio in their own languages. As these women are reported to be ‘Arabians, Circassians, Georgians, Toorks, Russians, Europeans, Chinese, Afghans, Rajpoots, Bengalees, Guzeraties, Tulinganies, Maharattins, and others’, the king must have known many languages (Ferishta c. 1612, Vol. 2: 369). However, we do not know how he acquired these languages and to what degree. Even if true, this is merely an isolated example. However, these isolated examples notwithstanding, Indian Muslims did not learn foreign languages, and therefore remained isolated and ignorant of the West which was becoming more and more powerful by the discovery of the scientific methodology.

This chapter is not meant to provide merely a history of the teaching of foreign languages among the Muslims of North India and Pakistan. Rather, it aims at discovering whether the acquisition of foreign languages is somehow connected with power (in this case national interest). As foreign languages are taught by the Pakistani state and foreign states support the teaching of their languages, the question to be answered is what national interests, if any, are served by the knowledge of foreign languages. For this purpose, then, we should consider two kinds of national interests: those of Pakistan and those of the country whose language is taught in Pakistan. As these interests might be contradictory, the teaching of foreign languages is an important part of political decision-making rather than an innocent pedagogical exercise.

Because of this focus on power, it is helpful to begin by looking at the teaching of English which has been connected with cultural imperialism. The classic study in this field is Robert
Phillipson’s *Linguistic Imperialism* (1992). Phillipson argues that the British Council and the American Centers have been instrumental in spreading English as part of the attempt to dominate the world intellectually, financially and culturally. In the end the author hopes that his book has:

Hopefully shed some light on how the ‘white man’s burden’ became the English native-speaking teacher’s burden, and how the role played by ELT is integral to the functioning of the contemporary world order (Phillipson 1992: 318).

Iftikhar H. Malik, a Pakistani scholar now settled in Britain, brings much evidence to support his claim that the United States uses visits, exchange programmes, the radio, the television, libraries, foreign aid, academia, schools and popular culture to influence elite opinion in Pakistan. A particularly useful insight is that notwithstanding the Pakistani hostility to some actions of the US government, ‘academic and cultural channels would sustain a permeating American public diplomacy in Pakistan for a long time to come’ (Malik 1999: 247). At present that is the position of English. The elite in South Asia, ex-British colonies of Africa and elsewhere speaks English and not to understand at least some English is almost like being illiterate in the global context. Language-spread—through teaching, films, cartoons, books, radio, comic books, computers, the BBC and CNN—have all made English and Western culture a global phenomenon.

The other side of the coin, mentioned in the chapter on the acquisition of English earlier, and very cogently argued by Honey (1997) is that English (or, rather, standard English) is empowering. It is, therefore, the kind of imperialism which is supported and maintained by the quest for power by individuals and groups (nations, classes) of the non-English-speaking countries, especially those where English is an elite preserve. It may be argued that the access English gives to American and British cultural products have the potential to bring in an alien world view thus destroying traditional values. However, it is just this alien world view which supports democracy, human rights, womens’ rights and religious tolerance. In short, the relationship between Pakistan and the West is far too complex to be pontificated upon in a one-sided manner.

The French too had embarked on a similar operation, the idea being that ‘where they speak French, they buy French’. Indeed, France was in that position up to the nineteenth century when the Russian aristocracy spoke French and not to understand common French terms was a sign of philistinism. In Pakistan too, the French government makes efforts to promote the teaching of French. In order to do that, teachers are sent to be trained in France (in 2000 about 600 teachers were supposed to be sent); institutions are given books, language-learning material and other help; and about a 100 students are sent to study scientific and technological subjects in France (Buti Int. 1999). According to Georges Lefeuvre, the Head of Alliance Francaise in Islamabad, there is a programme to disseminate the knowledge of French through the television in cooperation with the distance-teaching Allama Iqbal Open University in Islamabad (Lefeuvre Int. 1999). Both Gabriel Buti, the Cultural Attaché of the French Embassy and George Lefeuvre, were quite clear as to how such an active French-teaching policy was in the interest of France. Buti said that knowing French and visiting France helps Pakistanis understand the point of view of France. Referring to a bureaucrat who had recently visited France he said: ‘Maybe he will take a decision for France some day’. Lefeuvre said that the power of the United States could be countered by building up Europe as a centre of excellence and influence. Making Pakistanis understand Europe was, therefore, politically important. It is also in France’s interest if France, rather than any other European country, is taken as an intellectual and cultural exemplar.

Language-spread policies are part of the foreign policy of most countries which can afford them. Apart from the English-speaking countries and France, the cases of the spread of German (Ammon 1992); Japanese (Hirata 1992); Portuguese (Da Silva & Gunnewiek 1992); Russian
(Haarmann 1992); Quechua (Gleich 1994) and Hindi (Dua 1994) have been documented. The reasons for the policies are different. In the case of German and Russian, as in English and French, the real motivation is that Germany’s international presence is related to the presence of German in the world. In addition to that, the German community abroad maintains its language through German-teaching institutions (Ammon 1992). The Soviet policy of spreading Russian through schooling has made it the language of educated intercourse throughout the former Soviet Union. However, it did not spread much outside the borders of the former USSR despite sporadic and sentimental interest of leftists in it (Haarmann 1992). In the case of Portuguese, the policy is meant more for the preservation of the language among emigrants than for maintaining an ex-colonial cultural dominance. Even so, Brazil does try to preserve the ‘Lusophone culture, together with some small economic interests, except in the case of Angola (oil)’ (Da Silva & Gunnewiek 1992: 79) in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Principe, Angola, Mozambique and, of course, Brazil. Rich Arab countries too spend money on the teaching of Arabic in Islamic countries. The aid they have given to Pakistan has been mentioned earlier. It may also be mentioned here that in the 1970s, when the oil producing Arab countries had suddenly become very rich, they gave a lot of aid to African countries with Muslim populations. The outcome of their policies resulted in increased teaching of Arabic in Somalia, Chad, Mauritania and Northern African Arab countries (Laïtit 1992: 90–91).

The teaching of one’s language to foreigners serves national interest in various ways. It is a benign way of promoting trade, tourism, educational and cultural exchanges, military dependency and so on. It also makes foreigners understand one’s point of view and thus projects one’s power abroad. An interesting example is the way the BBC Persian service made Britain seem far more powerful in Iran than it was. An ex-diplomat and banker who wrote an eyewitness account of the events of the fall of the Shah tells us that Iranians listened to the Persian service and took it as the voice of the British state. He concludes by saying:

I reckon that if a body broadcasts in a foreign language such as Persian to a volatile region, it has a grave responsibility to ensure that it does not open itself to the charge of partisanship and therefore of interference. People are quite obsessive of the BBC and it is colouring Iranian attitudes to Britain for years—far more effectively, for good or ill, than the embassy (and of course it could cut either way) (Harney 1998: 109).

The same could be said about the BBC’s Urdu service in the case of Pakistan. It is always listened to in crises because the government is not trusted. But, even if truthful, there are those who see the ‘foreign hand’ in these broadcasts. Since such people use conspiracy theories they are generally wrong but they do have a point: those who can speak your language can make you understand things, do have power, however benign, over some of your thoughts.

In short, trying to make foreigners learn one’s language is very much in the national interest of nation-states. That is why most great powers invest in teaching their languages abroad.

**Foreign Languages and National Interest**

Foreign languages are also learned because of a country’s own national interest, i.e., to empower one’s nation state in some way or the other. The empowerment comes from the satisfaction of certain military, diplomatic, economic and scientific interests. The most recent example of this is the United States policy’s policy after 9/11 to hire people who can understand Arabic, Pashto, Persina and Urdu so that they can help fight the war help screen visitors from Muslim countries. One of those programmes is being administered by the University of Chicago as the present
author found in his stay in the U. S during 2004-05. As in the case of other countries, this is also true in the case of Pakistan where the state facilitates the learning of foreign languages in the national interest. Although not spelled out in any available policy document, this interest was explained by various eminent people connected with the establishment of the National Institute of Modern Languages (now the National University of Modern Languages) for the teaching of foreign languages to state functionaries—especially to army officers. Among these people were Lieutenant-General Sahibzada Yakub Khan, Chief of the General Staff in 1968 when the idea of the NIML was discussed by the military high command; Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed, Director of the Army Education Corps and the man who wrote the concept paper of the NIML; Brigadier Syed Naseeruddin, Director of the Army Education Corps during the initial part of the Zia period; Dr Laeeq Babri a civilian Director of the NIML and intellectual; Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, Inspector General Training and Evaluation of the army in 1992 and Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) between 1990 and 1992; Tanvir Ahmed Khan, ex-Foreign Secretary and ambassador to many countries and a number of other people who have been interviewed for this purpose (for dates and other details of the interviews see section of the bibliography under the last name of the interviewees).

Sahibzada Yakub Khan, who served as ambassador in many countries as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that in diplomatic intercourse the key issue was to enter the mind of one’s interlocutor. Foreign languages help one do that. He narrated how he himself had benefited much from his knowledge of German, French, and Italian. As a general rule, much personal warmth enters the conversation if a diplomat can converse in the language of the interlocutor. This gives more effectiveness to the diplomat and increases the chances of the state’s interests being served better. General Durrani, who was a military attache (1980–84) as well as ambassador to Germany (1994–97), also confirmed that the personal relationship established through language was very helpful for one’s official work. He and Tanvir Ahmed Khan both emphasized that a diplomat could not be effective if he did not know the language of the host country. Almost all media reports, academic seminars, drawing room conversation and informal small talk was in the country’s own language and if one missed that, one could never send an accurate report about the country of one’s accreditation back home.

Tanvir Ahmed Khan also pointed out that trade was now of crucial importance. If one wanted to be effective in buying and selling things, especially now that new business partners like the Central Asian Republics had emerged, one could not do better than learn the languages of one’s business partners. Coming to the military advantages of learning foreign languages, everyone pointed out that manuals of instruction about weapon systems had to be translated and weapons bought. Sahibzada Yakub Khan said that he had fought an individual battle to be deputed to the French rather than the English or the American Staff Course. General Durrani had chosen to go to Germany. Such ventures represented a diversification of opportunities for training and the chance of exposure to new experiences. Tanvir Ahmed Khan pointed out that military attaches represent a second line of reporting, the first being the diplomats themselves, without whom modern states could not function effectively. Moreover, there was direct intelligence work too for which undercover officers, both military and civilian, were posted to the embassies. Tanvir Ahmed Khan pointed out how crucial it was for such officers to know even the nuances of the language and narrated how he himself had experienced that if they did not, they were reduced to mere post offices.

All the interviewees said that intelligence gathering was an important aspect of the military and this often needed the knowledge of foreign languages. Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed pointed out that Hindi documents had to be translated during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Brigadier Naseeruddin said that radio messages in South Indian languages, unknown to Pakistanis, had to be intercepted and that the GHQ had to make some ad hoc arrangements for this. General Durrani too said that
the intelligence agencies needed to listen in to messages, read intercepts and send under-cover functionaries for intelligence duties.

It was because of the crucial necessity of such work that it was the army which gave most importance to the acquisition of foreign languages. The diplomatic service too needed them but, as Tanvir Ahmed Khan pointed out, it sent young officers on foreign postings and trained them there. This cost much more than training people in Pakistan and was, in any case, convenient only for the foreign service but not for other state functionaries—armed forces, employees of intelligence agencies, scientists working on military or other projects of the state etc. It was probably with this in mind that the idea of establishing an institution for the teaching of foreign languages was floated soon after Pakistan’s independence.

The National Institute (now University) of Modern Languages

On 23 February 1948 Nur Ahmed, member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, asked the Minister of Education, Fazlur Rahman, whether the government proposed ‘to set up a Central School of Modern Studies’ to teach ‘the languages, literature and history of some of the most important nations of Europe, Asia, America and Africa’. To this the Minister replied that an Institute of Languages had been proposed but that he could not say when it would be established (LAD-P 23 Feb. 1948: 329). An year later Liaquat Ali Khan replying to a question about this institute said that courses in the required languages were arranged (LAD-P 23 Dec. 1949). In 1963 an embryo institution was reported to have been set up in Karachi (LAD-P 13 June 1963: 380).

However, according to General Asad Durrani, military officers were trained in a transit camp in Karachi. He himself was selected for the Staff Course in Germany in 1966 and was taught by a German instructor who came to the transit camp for six months for that purpose. For the army, foreign languages were so important that there was a staff officer of the rank of colonel—a General Staff Officer Grade I (abbreviated to G-I) for languages—in the GHQ who dealt with them. In 1968 this officer happened to be Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed (then colonel). As mentioned earlier, he wrote the concept paper for the establishment of the National Institute of Modern Languages for the specific purpose of training army officers. The concept paper was not made available to me but Brigadier Nazeer enumerated the reasons given earlier for the establishment of the Institute.

The Institute would train army officers, other functionaries of the state, as well as civilians in the modern languages actually used in the world. The aim was to produce interpreters or people who could function in these languages rather than literary or linguistic scholars. Thus spoken and written languages were to be emphasized and classical literature was to be of secondary importance or nonexistent. The academic control of NIML was to be in the hands of civilians with the Vice Chancellor of Quaid-i-Azam University (then called the University of Islamabad) being the chairman of the Board of Governors.

The NIML started functioning in 1970 with Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed as its director. The Chinese, Persian, French and German departments were the first to start functioning. During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the army realized that it needed the knowledge of the Devanagari script to read certain documents from India. The GHQ hurriedly arranged for translation but one result of this was the establishment of the department of Hindi at NIML (Nazeer Int. 1999).

For sometime, beginning from 1974, a civilian academic, Dr Laeeq Babri, also remained the director of NIML. However, in 1979 he was replaced by a brigadier from the army. Since then all the directors have been from the army. According to Brigadier Naseeruddin, who was Director Army Education when the change took place, the reason for the change was that young army
officers could not be controlled by a civilian head. Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed, commenting on the same event said that there were apprehensions of army officers being subverted in their allegiance to the state by foreigners. Basically, the senior army officer was supposed to ensure that student army officers would not feel free to fraternize with foreigners and thus become unwitting or knowing intelligence sources. There was always the fear that foreigners who enrolled as students could be under-cover agents themselves. Dr Laeeq Babri, however, says that he wanted the NIML to become a university and to have the relaxed atmosphere of a university campus rather than an army school. Moreover, he says he wanted to establish more MA courses which the army did not consider necessary. In short, his view is that because of disagreements between the army high command and himself, he was removed by an order of General Ziaul Haq. Ironically, in 2000 the army itself was said to be considering a proposal to upgrade the Institute to a university.

Upto April 2000 when it was upgraded to a University, the NIML was governed by a Board of Governors the chairman of which was the Inspector General Training and Evaluation, a general in the army. The day to day administration was carried out by a director who was a brigadier. Even now that it is a university it is still directly controlled by the army as it was before. The recurring budget for the year 1999–2000 was Rs 20,409 million (Expenditure Vol. 1, 1999: 310). At the moment the following departments are functioning in the NUML:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Date of establishment (Approximate)</th>
<th>Strength (Approximate)</th>
<th>State Nominees (Approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>40–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhasa Indonesia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Only state nominees yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50 per cent but variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
<td>800 (+700 in Evening classes)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50 per cent but variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7–but variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>All state nominees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Less than half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7 state nominees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>All foreigners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 158 state nominees 109 are from the army. There are also 51 foreign students from seventeen countries out of whom the largest number (13) come from Saudi Arabia followed by China (9). [Source: Cyclostyled Information from the Higher Education Wing, Ministry of Education, Govt. of Pakistan. Field research conducted in February to April 1999 gives slightly different figures but the differences are negligible except in the case of English where the figures quoted are from the department concerned.]

There are three courses in most departments, a certificate course of six months; a diploma course also of six months; and an advanced diploma or interpretership course of eighteen months.
In the case of Chinese, however, the diploma is of one year and the advanced diploma is also of an year. In the departments of French, German, Arabic, Persian and English there are also MA courses. These courses are of two years and, in keeping with the tradition of the NUML, there is emphasis on language and modern literature rather than the classics.

Table 41 (2 of Chapter 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Certificate</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>Advanced</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>Short</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>3246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>2279</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>6687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>6469</td>
<td>6256</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>3304</td>
<td>18,115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Records in NUML; Ministry of Education, Higher Education Wing; Quaid-i-Azam University, Office of the Controller of Examinations, Allama Iqbal Open University.

The number of students who have qualified courses in various languages from 1970 till June 1999 are given in table 42. NUML is primarily a teaching and not a research institution. The advantage of being controlled by the army, according to members of the faculty and other people associated with it, is that there are no strikes and classes are held regularly and in time. The disadvantage, which many members of the faculty pointed out, is that individual faculty members are too rigidly controlled and get no time for research. It may also be true, although nobody made this point, that rigid control makes people lose their sense of academic independence without which really original research is impossible. Moreover, since power cannot be held by academics and there are hardly any other academic positions available for them, they may have few inducements to do much research. This lack of research, however, did not seem to disturb any of the senior military officers associated with the NUML. For them, the purpose of the NUML is to teach foreign languages and this it is doing. Whether this attitude changes now that the former Institute is a University is to be seen.

The question whether the NUML is teaching foreign languages competently produced contradictory responses. Brigadier Nazeer Ahmed said ‘that the academic standards were satisfactory’. Brigadier Naseeruddin said that the interpreter of Arabic during King Khalid’s visit was so incompetent that General Ziaul Haq, then the military ruler of Pakistan, expressed great dissatisfaction with the standards of the NIML. This was one of the reasons, he explained, why the army took complete administrative control of it. As for the standards under the army, he
expressed his ignorance of them. General Asad Durrani said that officers trained by NIML had to do a German language course in Germany again. As Inspector General of Training and Evaluation (IGT&E), he says he visited NIML and found fault with the teaching of German—a language which he knows well. Tanwir Ahmed Khan also said that the standards were not satisfactory. As ambassador in Moscow, he said, a Pakistani colonel came on his staff after having done a course in Russian. This officer was lodged in a hotel with his family for a few days in the beginning. Unluckily, somebody fell ill in his family and the officer could not communicate adequately with the Russians and had to call the embassy for help. When I myself hired an interpreter of French from the NIML to translate a thesis from French to English for this book, I found his linguistic skills quite inadequate though he had obtained an A grade in his examination. However, Georges Lefeuvre, the Head of the Alliance Francaise in Islamabad, said that the best students from NUML were comparable to the best students from any French-teaching institution in the world. He said that he had talked to several students and even employed some as teachers for a number of years and he found them excellent. This evidence, anecdotal, incomplete, and contradictory as it is cannot help us determine whether NUML’s standards are really high or not. My conjecture is that, if compared with private institutions of a similar kind, they must be good even if they do not come up to international standards of excellence in the opinion of many of my interviewees. In the absence of proper tests based on random sampling of students it is impossible to venture any definite opinion.

Private Attempts at Teaching Foreign Languages

Generally, people do not invest time, effort and money on acquiring a foreign language unless they hope to gain something out of it. Traditionally, the gain was non-material and intangible. Knowledge of foreign languages was part of education, genteel status and good breeding. In Europe Latin, Greek, and French were regarded as the languages of prestige and education was not complete without them. These foreign languages, then, gave one prestige. They enabled one to enter a closed club; that of ‘polite’ society. In short, they empowered one. The gain can be material too. Some people get their living out of foreign languages. At the highest level these are diplomats, scholars, academics, ecclesiastical dignitaries, and so on. At more modest levels they may be language teachers, agents of business houses, interpreters, translators, tourist guides, guest relations personnel in hotels, information clerks and so on. Such jobs may be few but the persons qualified for them are also few. To know a foreign language, then, is a means of empowering one’s self—this time in a material way. Thus, there is a demand for the acquisition of foreign languages.

Writing on the nature of this demand Zofeen T. Ebrahim tells us that when tourism became an industry, foreign NGOs opened their offices, multinationals established local contacts and translators were required, the demand increased. In the late nineties, the travel agencies Waljis and Sitara, among 100 others, started handling 300–400 groups of tourists every year. In 1995 a tourist guide drew a salary of Rs 5000 per month, and allowances which could add up to as much as Rs 250 per day. Interpreters could get between Rs 2000 to 5000 per day while translators earned between Rs 200 to 600. At private institutions teachers are often paid on an hourly basis which was between Rs 100 to Rs 300 per hour (Ebrahim 1995: 8). These are recent developments, as the writer points out, but there must have been some actual or perceived demand for foreign languages even in the nineteen fifties soon after the birth of Pakistan.

It was probably to cater to these demands that some private institutions came into the market quite early. As Karachi was a cosmopolitan city and the seat of the government, the first such institution was established there. This was called the Institute of Foreign Languages and a
German lady, Mrs S. Swallhay, was its director. To start with, classes in French, German and Russian started and Shahid Suhrawardy, the brother of the famous politician S.K. Suhrawardy, gave his name to it as chairman (PT, 7 May 1950). However, the Institute does not seem to have prospered because French and German, the only languages in demand among students, were already being taught elsewhere.

Among the best known attempts by the private sector to get into the teaching of foreign languages is the Pakistan Institute of Foreign Languages (PIFL) in Islamabad. This institute was established in 1992. They teach English (especially Business English), Russian, German, French, Spanish, Arabic, Persian, Chinese, and Japanese. Italian, Korean, Turkish, Ugeur (language of Xinkyang province in China) and Urdu for foreigners. There are five levels of courses of three months each (72 study hours). In 1995, the teaching was described as follows:

Their English classes are dominated by non-Afghan refugees, mainly Somalians, Iraqi, Chechens etc, put up by the UNHCR. These people are here for re-settlement and have to learn the English language. In the morning, the class rooms are filled up by foreign children who are taught English before they can be put to schools. Evening is when the adult teaching programme starts (ZTE 1995).

According to Ehmar S. Salam, the present director, they teach about 500 students. There are two levels; the first of 54 and the second of 108 study hours. After the first, students can write a letter and comprehend the target level while after the second they can communicate more proficiently in the language. Foreign governments sometimes give donations and the Chinese give scholarships but most of the funds come from the tuition fees. They have sixteen teachers out of whom eight are full time faculty. They earn between Rs 150 to 500 per hour (Salam Int. 1999).

Another private institution, again in Islamabad, is the Federal Institute of Modern Languages. They teach English, French, German, Arabic, Russian and Persian to about 200 students per year since 1996. The programmes, called certificate and diploma as in the other cases, cost between 3000 to 4700 rupees for courses of between 8 to 12 weeks. English seems to be a major attraction for students because the market for foreign languages, limited as it is, is being adequately catered for by other teaching institutions (field research in January 1999).

Another such institution, called the Pakistan Institute of Modern Languages, is in Satellite Town, Rawalpindi. It was established in April 1996 and caters mostly for those who want to improve their English. However, a few students (between 4 to 5 on the average) also take French and German. The Institute advertises instruction in other languages too. Among them are Arabic, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Persian, Turkish, Italian, Spanish and all Central Asian languages. Their courses are of about four months but Shaikh Asad, the Director of Academics, said that special classes are arranged if students demand instruction in a language. Permanent teachers are only for teaching English. This being so, one doubts whether such arrangements can always be made (Asad Int. 1999).

As in the case of the NUML, it is not possible to venture a definite opinion as to the standard of the teaching and the competence of the students in the languages they learn at private institutions. One gets the impression, however, that they are in no way better, and are probably worse, than the NUML. Once again, this opinion is not based on a random survey but only on anecdotal and impressionistic evidence which needs to be tested rigorously to be credible.

After having described some of the institutions for the teaching of foreign languages, it may be useful to focus on some of the most frequently taught languages one by one. The institutions for teaching them, if there are any, will receive passing mention in this context.

1. **Arabic.** It is being taught in the traditional translation and grammar drill method at the major universities of Pakistan. It is also taught at the NUML as a modern language with emphasis on
communicative competence (Haq Int. 1999). Other relevant information about Arabic is in chapter 3.

2. **Chinese.** Taught at the NUML. The increasing number of Chinese nationals in Pakistan and Pakistani students and travelers in China will probably increase the value of the language in a country.

3. **English.** Information given in chapter 9.

4. **French.** French was probably the most frequently taught foreign language by the British in India. It was first taught at the Fort William College to British civil servants (Fort William Vol. 1, 1802). Examinations in it could also be taken by army officers who then qualified as interpreters. There are several letters from officers seeking permission to go to France to do interpreter courses though at one place an official notes that ‘it would not appear that much importance is attached by the Indian army to a knowledge of French’ (Letter of 25 March 1938 in Language Study 1938). It was also taught in the universities and other institutions to Indians. It was optional except in the most fashionable English-medium schools, but it existed in the most prestigious institutions at all levels. It was studied ‘mainly by girls in European institutions’ but in Bombay it was also studied by boys ‘where it is useful for commercial purpose’ (Edn. I 1917: 126).

   In Pakistan it is taught at Punjab, Karachi, and Peshawar universities though the teaching has never been sustained or consistent. It has depended more often than not on the availability of a qualified teacher. The French government has helped in the teaching of French not only at the NUML but also at the Aitchison College, Overseas Pakistani Foundation School in Islamabad, the Centre for European Studies (Karachi University), Kinnaird College for Women (Lahore) and the Ghulam Ishaque Khan Institute, Topi. The budget for 1999 was US $650,000 which, if divided over 3300 students, comes to $200 per student per year (Lefeuvre Int. 1999). At the Oriental College of the Punjab University, the French Department has been functioning since 1954. It was headed by Dr S.H.A. Rasool for many years (d. 1996). Nowadays it has four faculty members and there are between ten to fifteen students every year. The MA, of two years duration, is still offered besides the certificate and diploma of one year each. In Peshawar University, the Department of English used to offer courses in basic French in the evening till 1987 but, with the death of Dr Aurangzeb Shah, they have come to an end. French was traditionally considered a language of sophistication and cultural refinement because of which it was very popular among girls from upper middle and upper class, modern, families. That is why elitist girls’ institutions—such as the O.P.F. College for girls Islamabad and Kinnaird College—have been teaching it. In 1999, out of the ten regular students in the Department of French at the Punjab University, seven were girls. It was also taught in elitist boys schools such as Burn Hall (Abbottabad) and Aitchison College, Lahore. In Burn Hall it came to an end in the seventies while at Aitchison it was not taught for many years but has been reintroduced in 1995. The connection of French with the elite is still illustrated by the fact that in Karachi, examination centres at elitist institutions such as St Joseph’s, have candidates appearing for French in the BA examination. This traditional, romantic attitude toward French is still in evidence among some elitist circles in Pakistan. Moreover, students of elitist English medium schools are more desirous of studying French as a subject than other students:

   Among younger people it is rare, but there are some like Shaukat Nawaz Niazi whose book *Memoirs of a Wanderer* shows that love of the French language and literature still inspires some people—moreover, that it can enable one not only to earn a living but to move with grace in French society (Niazi 1997).

   Most Pakistani students pick up French in the Alliance Francaise which has been operating in Pakistan since 1968. At the time of writing there are branches in Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, and Karachi. The Alliance Francaise offers three courses: beginners, advanced, and superior. All
these levels are recognized in France and students can take a Test of French as a Foreign Language (DELF) to qualify as students in France.

**Table 42 (3 of Chapter 14)**

Students’ Demand for French

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Madrassas (N=131)</th>
<th>Urdu-medium (N=520)</th>
<th>English-medium Elitist (N=97)</th>
<th>English-medium Cadet Colleges (N=86)</th>
<th>Ordinary (N=119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q-2. Desired as medium of instruction?</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3a. Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q-3b. Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.19 (F &amp; Sp)</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendixes 14.1; 14.2 and 14.3. All numbers, except those in brackets, are percentages. Question 3, given in full in Appendix 14, has been broken into two parts here.

Most of the information given below on the Alliance Francaise has been taken from Sohail Nazir’s MA dissertation on the subject (Nazir 1996). This information has, however, been updated and added to in the light of information given by Gabriel Buti and Georges Lefeuvre (Buti and Lefeuvre Int. 1999).

The Alliance Francaise was formed in July 1883 in order to project the French language and culture overseas. Gradually it spread out to foreign countries and presently it has a presence in 112 countries with 357,341 students in 1991 (Nazir 1996: 7). In Pakistan the Alliance was established first in Karachi in 1959 and then in the other cities. Most Pakistani students who learn French attend the Alliance Francaise as the following figures illustrate:
Table 43 (4 of Chapter 14)
Number of Students in Alliance Francaise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td>1663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2464</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2305</td>
<td>2183</td>
<td>2780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most students take French in order to find jobs in French-speaking business concerns or to visit France for study or employment. The profiles of students are as follows:

Table 44 (5 of Chapter 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Most (28.3 per cent) are between 21–25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.3 per cent are between 26–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>57.7 per cent are males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Status</td>
<td>71.9 per cent are single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Most (49.4 per cent) are students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.5 per cent are private or government employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>83.1 per cent are Pakistani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nazir 1996 (See Tables 1 to 5).

Although most students (64.8 per cent) claim to have an interest in the language as such, their interest in understanding (of 57.4 per cent) rather than reading and writing suggests that they are really interested in interaction in real life situations, i.e., living or working among French-speaking people. Instrumental interests are not generally revealed in Pakistan because they are not considered as respectable as purely academic interest is. The fact, however, is that nowadays French is mostly learned in Pakistan for instrumental rather than academic reasons. According to Georges Lefeuvre the demand for French increased when the United Nations started working in Pakistan and Afghanistan after the war beginning in 1979. Moreover, the French government offers training in science and technology for which students have to learn French. Some people also learn it for cultural, or snobbish reasons, because it is still considered a symbol of good breeding and sophistication but, such people are generally from the educated and affluent classes and very few. Both motivations are related to power as both tangible benefits (such as increased job opportunities) and social prestige empower one.

5. **German.** Besides being taught by the universities—notably by Karachi and Peshawar Universities—German is taught by the Goethe Institutes in Pakistan. The Goethe Institute has been closed down in Lahore but the Karachi branch is still operational. There are both intensive and extensive courses. The first is of 7 months but there are five classes a week of 3 hours each.
The other course is of 2 years but the classes are thrice a week and are of one and a half hours in the evenings.

According to Helmut Landes, Head of the Cultural Section at the German Embassy, the number of Pakistanis who have studied German is only between ten to fifteen. However, almost 350 DAAD scholars—people who visit Germany to attend universities there—do attend a 4 to 6 month German language course (Letter to writer dated 4 May 1998).

At the universities, German was taught when teachers were available for it. Karin Mittman, who started teaching it in Peshawar in 1960, says that it was taught at the Edwards College and the Cantonment Girl’s College in Peshawar at the BA level. The University of Peshawar offered certificate and diploma classes in it, but those who took it seriously were less and the dropout rate was high. Nowadays, besides the places mentioned above, the Pakistan German Friendship Society in Lahore runs classes in it (Mittman Int. 1999). On the whole, the presence of German is not as great as that of French on the Pakistani educational scene. A few students of elitist, private English-medium schools mentioned German as one of the languages they desired to be taught in addition to other languages.

6. Hindi. Hindi was taught both in schools and at the higher level in the areas now comprising Pakistan before 1947. The Oriental College of the Punjab University boasted a department of Hindi where faculty members, such as Pandit Seva Datt (1894–1926), and Dr Banarsi Das Jain (1928–47) carried out research in the language (Qureshi 1980). After the partition when most of the Hindus migrated to India, the teaching of Hindi came to an end. In Pakistan there was much prejudice against the language, just as there was prejudice against Urdu in parts of India, because of which the teaching of Hindi came to an end.

As mentioned earlier, Hindi was introduced at the NUML after the 1971 war (in 1972) when the military authorities realized that they needed it for intelligence purposes. At present, according to Dr Naseema Khatoon, Head of the Hindi Department at NUML, the usual certificate, diploma, and interpretership courses are taught to sponsored students (between eighteen to twenty per course). The texts are made by the department itself (Khatoon Int. 1999). At the Oriental College, Dr Shahida Habib offers diploma and certificate courses. At present she has between five to ten students but she used to have more, between eighteen to twenty-five, when the fees was lower four years ago. This department has been functioning since 1982. Earlier, courses in Hindi were offered by two people at different times but it is only because of Dr Shahida Habib that the department is functioning now. She uses textbooks comprising selections from different prose articles from India. Hindi was also taught as a part of post-graduate diploma course in Indian studies and General History at the University of Karachi. Waqar Ahmed Rizvi, who used to teach it, said in an interview that he ran Hindi Certificate and diploma courses, both of one year, from 1972 till 1986. There was also a post-graduate diploma course but not more than five or six students attended these courses. Because of such lack of interest and no encouragement by the university, Dr Waqar discontinued the courses (Rizvi Int. 1999). He also compiled a Hindi Reader in 1975 for his students. Hindi has now been discontinued but the reader is used at Lahore by Shahida Habib.

Hindi is also taught by the Hindu community in Karachi, Jacobabad and other parts of Sindh. It is taught in patshallas in the evening by volunteers. The interviewees said that Hindi was taught so as to enable the Hindus to read their religious books (Chabria Int. 1999; Tekchand Int. 1999). However, it appears that Hindi is also an identity marker of the Hindu community in the Pakistan areas, and one reason why the community still teaches it is to maintain this identity. Surprisingly, Hindu girls are taught the Gurmukhi script through the same informal methods. Not surprisingly at all, in view of the general antagonism against India, no student in my survey said that Hindi should be taught even as one language out of many (Survey 2000; Appendices 14.1 to 14.19).
7. **Italian.** An experimental beginning of teaching the language was made at the Institute of European Studies, University of Karachi in 2000. It is also taught at the International Schools sponsored by the American embassy in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The Italian embassy has also partly financed its teaching to a few students in Islamabad. A few students mentioned the language among one of the languages which they desired to be taught (Appendix 14.18).

8. **Japanese.** Japanese is taught at the NUML, the Consulate of Japan at Karachi, and in two schools run for Japanese nationals in Islamabad and Karachi. Pakistani students generally study it at the NUML and at the Japanese Consulate in Karachi. However, a certain Islamic institution called the Minhaj ul Quran University in Lahore consulted the Japanese embassy in Islamabad to begin courses in elementary Japanese for their students. The cultural section of the embassy and the Japan Foundation have been supplying books, teaching aids and teachers to these institutions. A language laboratory was given to the NUML as a gift in 1984. The teachers at the NUML used to be Japanese but, since the last two years, the Japan Foundation is slowly withdrawing from the field. The Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Sindh University, Jamshoro, was about to start the teaching of Japanese ten years ago but for some reason the programme never started (Mamiya Int. 2000). No student in my survey opted for the teaching of Japanese (Survey 2000).

9. **Portuguese.** As the Portuguese were the first European people who established a colonial presence in India (Goa), it was their language which became almost a lingua franca in the southern part of India. Even in north India Portuguese seems to have been used not only by the Jesuit priests who have been mentioned earlier but also by others. John Jourdain, for instance sent a letter to Jahangir which was translated into the ‘Persian tongue and was made up with the other which was in Portuguese, and was delivered to the Mogoll’ (Jourdain 1612: 224). Indeed, Jurdain asked the Dutch to deal with him in this language rather than any other (Jourdain 1612: 267). Other travelers also testify to the usefulness of Portuguese as a language of wider communication in parts of India. For instance Ralph Fitch, who traveled to India between 1583-91, spoke ‘Portuguese fluently’ (Foster 1921: 6). John Mildenhall, who traveled between 1599-1606, has tombstone in Portuguese (Joa de Mendenal, Ingles, moreos aos 1 [d] e Junhou 1614) (Foster 1921: 51). Hawkins even encountered a Pathan ‘captain’ whose name is written as Sherehan [probably Sher Khan] and he knew ‘the’ Portogall language perfect’ (sic) (ibid, 79). However, the Indian Muslims do not seem to have acquired it formally.

10. **Spanish.** Apart from an odd course at the NUML and being a rarely taken optional subject in the BA of some universities, the language is not taught. Pakistani students of the International American schools do, however, study it as an option. A few students in Survey 2000 mentioned the language as one they desired to be taught.

11. **Latin & Greek.** Apart from the few translations mentioned earlier, Latin and Greek were not taught in South Asia. They were taught, however, at the Fort William College to young English civil servants. The curricula between 1801 to 1805 include Tacitus, Cicero, Horace, and Virgil in Latin; and Sophocles, Homer, and Xenophon in Greek (Fort William, Vol. 1, 1802). Latin was also taught in ‘European’ schools where some Indian children also studied. It was seen as a highbrow subject appropriate for the education of the English elite. It was therefore taught more for its snob appeal than its utilitarian value. That is why a certain Mr Davies, who visited Martiniere College at Lucknow in 1869 noted that the syllabus ‘is framed rather as if the boys were intended hereafter for the liberal professions of Europe. Hence Latin takes up a disproportionate space, while Urdu is almost entirely neglected’ (Report of 3 December 1869 quoted in Lawrence 1873). Both Latin and Greek were optional subjects in the major universities of British India (Edn. I 1904: 72). They are still mentioned as optional subjects in university
courses but are not taught in practice. In my survey only one student mentioned Latin as a language to be taught (Appendix 14.1).

12. **Turkish.** Turkish is a language of only minor importance taught at the NUML nowadays. However, it is of great historical significance. A number of the Muslim rulers of India, notably the Mughals, came from Turkish-speaking families. Babar, the founder of the Mughal empire, wrote his famous autobiography, the *Tuzk-e-Babari*, in Turkish. Jahangir tells us in his Persian autobiography, the *Tuzk-e-Jahangiri*, that although he had been born and brought up in India, he could speak and write Turkish (Jahangir 1617, Vol. 1: 109–10). He also used the language with Sir Thomas Roe when he was the British ambassador at the court from 1615 to 1619 as reported by the Jesuit, Father Guerreiro (Guerreiro 1930: 80). He must have learned it not only from the ladies of the *harem* but also from instructors. Apart from the Mughals, whose ancestral mother tongue was Turkish, other princes and nobles also knew it and must have had private arrangements for learning it. Amir Khusrau (d. 1325) is said to have made a primer for learning Turkish called *Nisab-e-Turki*. It is on the lines of the famous *Khaliq Bari*. Later, in 1519, a certain Mohammad Laad also made a glossary with sections of Turkish words called *Muveed ul Fuzala*. It too was meant to facilitate the understanding of Turkish (Ghani 1971: 255). Whatever the arrangements for learning Turkish, it was known by some upper class people. For instance, Mujahid Shah Bahmany (r. 1375–78), ruler of Deccan, ‘spoke the Toorky language fluently, which he acquired from his favourite companions, who were for the most part either Toorks or Persians’ (Ferishta Vol. 2: 328). One does not know how good the system of instruction was because Babar tells Humayun in a letter that ‘Thy spelling, though not bad, is not quite correct’ (Babar 1528: 626). Later, King Shahjahan (r. 1628–58), did not know Turkish well and Mohammad Saleh Kumboh, the official biographer of the king, tells us that he was not inclined to learn this language from childhood nor was Ruqayya Sultan Begum insistent upon teaching it to him. However, he did understand words of Turkish because he had been brought up by the Begum who spoke to most people in Turkish. Apparently he was not good at the language because Kumboh tells us that he did not speak it for fear of making mistakes (Kumboh 1660, Vol. 1: 218–19). A number of nobles of Jahangir’s time, notably Abdur Rahim Khan-e-Khanan, however knew Turkish in addition to Persian, and Hindi (Jahangir 1617, Vol. 2: 505).

Whatever any individual king’s competence in Turkish, the Mughals continued learning it. Aurangzeb is said to have obtained proficiency in ‘writing the various hands, and in learning the Turki and the Persian languages’ (Khan 1668: 162). Muhammad Sultan (b. 1639), Muazzam Shah (b. 1643) and Mohammad Kam Bakhsh (b. 1667), all sons of Aurangzeb, knew the Turkish language and several modes of writing (Khan 1710: 318–22). Indeed, Aurangzeb is said to have taught, or taken interest in the education of his children, who ‘gained skill in writing different kinds of hand, and mastered the Turki and Persian languages’ (ibid.: 318). But, of course, their proficiency varied. While Muhammad Sultan knew Turkish ‘sufficiently well’, Kam Baksh had ‘great knowledge of’ it and Muazzam Shah had ‘a perfect knowledge of the Turki and Persian tongues’ (ibid.: 319). Such variation is only to be expected because of individual motivation and other factors even if the teaching arrangements were the same. There must have been some arrangement for teaching the princes because Niccolae Manucci, the Italian traveller who knew Mughal nobles, tells us that at the age of five the princes were taught to read and write ‘Tartar’ (Turkish), (quoted from Jaffar 1936: 183–4). Turkish must have been a linguistic asset even at this time because at another place Manucci says that ‘confiding in my knowledge of the Turkish, but more especially of the Persian language, which is that chiefly used and most current at the court of the Mogul, I resolved to go to the secretary of the king’ (Manucci 1701: 40). Some of the later Mughals even made use of Turkish as a secret language at times. Thus Abdullah Khan, one of the ministers of King Farrukh Siyar (ruled 1713–19), received daily intelligence that a certain nobleman and courtier of the king called ‘Mahmed Aamin-qhan now and then made use of the
Turkish language, to enter into a close conversation with the Emperor’ (Khan 1789, Vol. 1: 152). This nobleman [whose name would be transcribed as Muhammad Amin Khan nowadays] once dropped ‘a few Turkish words, by which he advised him [Farrukh Siyar] to be ready and upon his guard’ in an emergency (ibid.: 176). Another king, Muhammad Shah (r. 1719–48) also spoke Turkish with a Turk called Aghir Khan on a hunting expedition (ibid.: 226). At another occasion Alamgir 11 (r. 1754–59) sent a message in Turkish to a brigade of ‘Turks and Tartars’ (Khan 1789, Vol. 3: 346). The Waqi’at-e-Azfari, a memoir written by a Mughul prince Muhammad Zahiruddin Ali Bakht Azfari Gurgani (1759-1819), records the author’s love for and competence in Turkish. He seems to have also taught the language to others interested in it (Azfari 1819). After this there is no evidence whether Turkish was acquired by anyone else among the Muslims of north India till modern times. It is, however, learnt now by specialists and others.

Apart from the NUML, Turkish was also taught in the Oriental College, Punjab University but in February 1999 there was only one part-time lecturer and certificate classes were being held. According to the information given by Abdul Mannan, Administrative Officer, the Turkish Embassy had not helped the university acquire teachers and teaching material despite repeated requests (Mannan Int. 1999). The only major institution where Turkish is regularly taught is the NUML. Here certificate, diploma and interpretership courses are held. The government of Turkey sends teachers (Dr Mustafa Irkan in February 1999 was one) and gives books and other help. Private institutions, such as the Pakistan Institute of Foreign Languages, also teach it. Besides these, there is a Turkish school in Islamabad which has been established by an organization called Gag Ogrftim in Istanbul. It has nearly 250 branches of ‘Turkish schools’ all over the world. The Pakistan Turkish International College in Islamabad teaches the same courses as the model schools of the federal government except that it also teaches Turkish as an optional language. There is, therefore, only one teacher of Turkish and he spends four hours a week teaching the language (Field Research, 1998).

13. Urdu. It is taught as a foreign language at the NUML and private language-teaching institutions. See the chapter on Urdu in Pakistan for other details.

14. Other Foreign Languages. During British rule the list of classical languages was quite extensive, including not only Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek which have been mentioned earlier, but even Hebrew, Pali, Aveyda, and Pahlavi (Edn. I 1904: 72). None of these languages are taught nowadays. Professor Ahmed Hasan Dani, one of the few Pakistanis who knows Sanskrit, says that he taught it for about three years at the University of Peshawar, department of Archaeology from 1961–63. He adds that ignorance of Sanskrit and Prakrits makes ancient history a closed book for Pakistani historians (Dani Int. 1999).

To conclude, foreign languages are not popular in Pakistan. They are not seen as necessary accomplishments of an educated person and, therefore, are not learned in the way French was learned by the elite in Russia upto the nineteenth century. However, the snob value of European languages, especially French, still exists and inspires elitist young people to learn it. This connects with power obliquely because the desire to emulate the elite, to be part of it, is also a consequence of being impressed by power and desiring association with the class which has it. Apart from these very few people who study French or some other foreign language for snobbish reasons, most others learn them because they are made to do so by the state (as in the armed forces) or for utilitarian reasons. In the latter case they are looking for employment as translators, interpreters, guides etc. with local or foreign employees. They may also desire to travel abroad for study or business. In these cases, the individuals want to improve their skills and thus empower themselves. The Pakistani state’s major objectives in supporting the teaching of foreign languages
are connected with power as are those of the foreign countries which promote their languages in Pakistan. Pakistan wants to understand foreign countries for business, educational and military purposes. The foreign countries in question want to be understood so as to gain friends and so that their world view, their perspective on the international situation, is conveyed to Pakistanis and they become sympathetic to it. These objectives are ultimately connected with national interest and power. The acquisition of foreign languages, then, is connected as much with power as most other attempts at language acquisition are.
We have seen how languages, and especially the discourses to which they give access, privilege a
certain world view. We have also seen how school textbooks, especially those of history and
social studies which we have not focussed upon, but also those of languages and literature which
are our focus, project a certain world view. We are not talking merely of those deliberately
‗ideological‘ texts written by individuals, corporate bodies or groups in order to privilege and
disseminate their views. We are talking of all texts which, being the products of a certain culture,
carry the world view of that culture, however unconsciously. This world view influences the
reader and brings about changes in his or her world view. In this chapter, then, let us go a step
further and try to relate what changes have come in language teaching textbooks—literature
textbooks fall in this category—taught to the Muslims of north India and Pakistan in the past
many centuries. The aim is to investigate whether these changes are related in some way with
ideology, world view and, in the final analysis, with power.

We have seen that Arabic and Persian were the major languages taught to students in medieval
India. Arabic was used in more formal domains before the Mughal period but even under the pre-
Mughal sultanate period, Persian was the major subject of study. The texts which dominated in
the field of language studies were either grammatical, literary or didactic. The grammatical texts
in Arabic—Misbāh, Kāfiyā, Sarf-i Mīr, Nahw-i Mīr, and so on—which have been taught from the
thirteenth century onwards were contingent upon a world view in which change was perceived as
being potentially threatening. The golden age of Islam, it was felt, lay in the past and change
could only be deterioration at best or heresy (bidā‘h) at worst. Hence, the subject of linguistic
studies (grammar), literary studies (traditional romances with mystic undertones) and the ways
they were acquired (memorization)—all served a conservative function. Grammar was meant to
make it possible for Indian Muslims to understand classical Arabic in which the Quran and other
religious texts were written. Along with recitation, it was to enable them to preserve the linguistic
forms, spoken and written, of Quranic Arabic—the sacred language which must be pronounced
exactly right.

The literary texts in Arabic too served the same purpose. Whether prose or poetry, they
belonged to a great tradition, an approved canon, which preserved the authority of the past.
Modernity was to change the nature of the classical text by making it widely available in a
printed, and even translated, form. As print came to South Asia and the Muslims adopted it, a
number of changes in Muslim World view, pointed out by Francis Robinson, occurred. Among
these were ‗the emergence of a protestant or scriptural Islam; the strengthening of the Pan-Islamic
layer in the Muslim sense of identity; the levelling of an assault on the ulema as sole interpreters
of Islam; the outflanking of oral, person-to-person, systems for the transmission of knowledge;
the colonizing of Muslim minds with Western knowledge; and the opening of the way towards
new understandings of Islam such as those of the modernists and the “fundamentalists”‘
(Robinson 1996: 90). The ulema tried to resist the changes which undermined their authority and
one of the strategies they used was to make the written text resemble the memorized oral text as
far as possible. Other powerful people in Indian Muslim society, inclined to be conservative since
conservatism keeps power relationships intact, also tried to treat texts as conventional metaphors
of normality. The Indian Muslim attitude towards poetry, fiction, and other forms of writing was
to treat them as unchangeable cultural paradigms—something like a societal ritual which cements
bonds and creates unity of identity rather than dissent. The Arabs too have this kind of attitude towards literature. The classical Arab attitude towards rhetoric, the use of linguistic devices to create beauty and power, was meant to preserve and perpetuate the past. Texts like the *Saba Mu'allaqat* and the *Maqamat al-Hariri* were exemplars of that attitude and were, therefore, important. The first was a model of poetic excellence which survived the great revolution of Islam in Arab literary culture. The second, as we have seen, retained its eminent position in Arabic literature because it too appealed to the Arab fascination with eloquence; with beauty and fluency in language; with rhetorical embellishment—in a word, with the Arabic language itself. This love for Arabic was, of course, a pre-Islamic attitude but it was perpetuated as it also received the blessing of the Muslim theologians, literary people and other powerful opinion-moulders among Muslims. The reason, as we have seen, was that Arabic was the language of the Quran and therefore a symbol of Islam and religious identity itself. Thus the literary canon and the attitudes on which it was based were preserved against change. That is why even now the madrassas insist on teaching grammatical texts which, being written in Arabic couplets, do not help students to learn how the language functions but actually hinder that understanding by the mere fact that they have to be memorized which takes much energy and time.

Interestingly enough, as mentioned earlier, Aurangzeb Alamgir, who is now seen as a symbol of Islamic orthodoxy, did not see much utility of teaching Arabic. In a passage from Francis Bernier which has been quoted before (1826: 176–8), Aurangzeb proves himself to be a pedagogic radical: he wanted to learn languages, and other subjects, to exercise power. He was not interested either in interpreting religion as a scholar or manipulating the sacred word like a priest. As for the perpetuation of Arabic as a symbol of Muslim identity or a continuation of the past, Aurangzeb could hardly be expected to consider that as justification for a general study of the language. He was, after all, secure in his power and such symbols are needed by communities when they lose power.

The Persian writings were initially part of a heterodox movement, that of the Islamic mystics (sufis), when they emerged out of Iran in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The earliest sufis belonged to the ascetic tradition. Among them were Hasan al-Basri (642–728), Rabī‘ah ‘Adawiyah of Basra (d. 801?); Fuzail ibn Ayaz (d. 803), Ibrahim ibn Adham (d. 782), Zu an-Nun Misri (d. 859), Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 874), and Abul Qasim al-Junaid Baghdadi (d. 910) who reacted against the opulence and tyranny of rulers preferring seclusion, retirement, and self-imposed poverty instead (Schimmel 1975: 35–50). Later, the sufis developed the ideas for which they are known nowadays—the ideas of love of God (ishq); annihilation of one’s self in the essence of God (fana); mystic or intuitive knowledge of God (ma‘rifah); the continuity of the creator and the created sometimes translated as ‘Unity of Being’ and pantheism (Wahdat al-Wujud); and nonconformity with the letter, or literal interpretation of, the Islamic law (following *tariqa‘h* rather than the *sharia‘h*). These ideas were expressed in the Persian ghazal and the Urdu ghazal which was based upon it. They were also used by writers of famous romances—*Sheereen-Khusrao*, *Yusuf-Zulaikha*, *Sohni-Mahinwal*, *Heer-Ranjha*, and so on—which became both formal and informal literary paradigms for Indian Muslims.

The ideas of love and nonconformity, which are the central themes of Persian texts from the thirteenth century till British times are highly problematic. The central question is how is it that a society which restricted female sexuality and mobility, denied the right of marrying for love to all young people, and insisted upon conforming to tradition, gave such central place to literary texts celebrating just the opposite? We are not talking here of the eroticism of the pre-Islamic era which exists in works like the *Saba Mu’allaqat*. If these poems celebrate the beauty of ‘wide hipped’ desert maidens one could say that they were written in pre-Islamic times and are part of the literary canon not because of, but despite, their erotic references possibly because the urge to value the past is too great to exclude them from the canon. Moreover, the Arabic in which they
are written is valuable as a model of the Quranic Arabic besides being of literary significance in its own right. Eroticism is a minor issue and one to which we will come later. At the moment let us deal with what is far more paradoxical—the presence of nonconformist, indeed radical, literary texts in a rigidly conformist society.

If placed in their historical context, the ideas of love and nonconformism come from the sufis. The idea of love existed as a central sufi idea even in the early period of the self-denying sufi recluses. Thus Rabi‘ah Basri is said to have rejected Hasan Basri’s proposal for marriage on the plea that she had ‘become naughted to self and exist only through Him’ (Attar c. 13 C in Arberry 1966: 51). In early sufi poetry, such as that of Rabia and Zu an-Nun Misri the ‘allegory of love in frankly erotic imagery is used to express gnostic meaning’ (Arberry 1950: 61–3). Ibn al Arabi (1165–1240), a great sufi master and one who is associated with having developed the concept of wahdat ul-wujud, used the language of love for the mystic’s desire for union with the immanent deity. His symbol for the deity is a beautiful young girl while the lover speaks in a male voice. In Persian poetry, for reasons explained by me in another article, the symbol for the deity, the beloved of the sufi poet, became a beautiful, adolescent boy while the lover speaks as a grown man (Rahman 1989: 23). In Punjabi and Sindhi love tales, however, the Beloved is a grown man while the lover, the sufi poet, speaks in the voice of a woman (Krishna 1977: xxvii–xxviii).

Love in sufi symbolism stood for the desire for renouncing the world in order to annihilate one’s self in God. The poetry on love also uses other words which have esoteric meanings. A list of these words is given by Mohsin Faid Kashani (c. 17 C) in Risala-i-Mishawaq quoted by Arberry (1950: 113–19). In this, wine (sharab) stands for the ecstatic experience due to the revelation of God which destroys reason while the down on adolescent boys’ cheeks (khatt), an attribute of beauty, stands for the manifestations of Reality in spiritual forms. The sufi was so oblivious of the world that he did not care for its norms of conduct. He renounced wealth, the love and support of other human beings and even risked his life for love. Thus sufi versions of the romantic tales of love and passion disdain societal norms. The lovers meet before marriage (Sohni and Mahiwal) and even if one is married to someone else (Heer and Ranjha). And in this enterprise, apparently of illicit sex, all the great sufi saints support the lovers (Sabir 1986: verses 584 & 586, pp. 378–9). This nonconformity comes from the fact that at the symbolic level the sufi poet was talking about the reason-destroying passion for God. He was talking about transcending conventional behaviour precisely because such passion was experienced by the mystic not the ordinary, worldly, man. Thus non-conformism was valued as a higher form of behaviour than conformity if it was seen as being part of mysticism.

This brings us to the connection between non-conformism and mysticism which is another theme of Persian (and Urdu) ghazal. Among the ideas which gave birth to this connection was that of malama (blame). Some of the sufis deliberately brought blame upon themselves so that the public would not revere them to the point of creating a personality cult. The desire for invoking opprobrium rather than adulation comes from sincerity (ikhlas) because spiritual sincerity was inconsistent with any show of piety (quoted from Schimmel 1975: 86). The malamati sufi did not actually deviate from the sharia’h though he appeared to do so. The sufis’ spiritual path was called the tariqa’h, equated with form without the spirit. The follower of the tariqa’h, then, could be seen as the kind of sufi who does not follow the sharia’h in appearance but only because his spiritual eminence has made him absorb its essence. In the sufi texts written in India, especially in the ghazal, the dogmatic priest was derided and condemned for lack of spiritual depth and narrow-minded literalism. The sufis celebrated indifference to conventions, differences of social status, and even differences of religious sect and religion itself. Thus they extend their blessings to Hindus and Muslims, Shias and Sunnis, landlord and serf—in a word, to all human beings. The ghazal, therefore, apparently celebrates heterodoxy and radicalism but may be interpreted to represent the gnostic quest for God
In short, the theme of heterodoxy and radicalism of Persian poetry do not have the meaning which such themes would have in modern, secular literature. They are not meant to revolt against, or deviate from, spiritual values in the name of free will or self-fulfilment. Instead, they are meant to endorse so true a spirituality, so complete a dominance of the true faith, as to hold the mundane world in indifference or contempt. But even so, the celebration of love and beauty (jamaliyat) and wine (khamariyat) did become autonomous discourses. Whatever their origins, they served the mundane purpose of giving pleasure to a male dominating, phallocentric society. This was one way in which this poetic discourse, so radical in its themes, was co-opted and made to support the system of the distribution of power.

The other way in which this came about was the conventionalization of the unconventional. Poetic discourse was separated and sealed from ordinary life just as religion itself was. Thus, in the world of poetic discourse one enjoyed stories about love which defied societal norms; in real life daughters were killed for trying to elope with their lovers. The passion in the poetry was either a symbol, or an embellishment appropriate for that discourse, or a reality so elevated about ordinary mortals as to be completely irrelevant for real life situations. The authority of the king over his subjects; the feudal lord over his serfs; the father over his wives and children; the grown-up over the child stayed intact no matter what egalitarian ideals the priest or the poet talked about. Both were to be listened to, and even deferred to, but only in limited domains. Equality was fine while saying prayers in the mosque but it could not make the poor man dare marry, or even sit down, in the presence of his social superiors. Poetry, then, became a convention itself. It became emasculated. It became a grandiose illusion of radicalism and was never taken as anything more than form. Thus, Persian poetry became part of the ideology of paternalism and resignation to arbitrary power which led to non-questioning acceptance of the powers that be.

This point needs further elaboration. The world view of medieval Muslim India can be characterized as the magical world view. In this cause and effect are not obvious linkages. Events occur, as it were, according to unknown causes. Disaster is not far off and is averted, if it is, by the grace of God. The power of God is not only unquestionable but also inscrutable. Thus, one cannot rest content in the illusion that one has deserved a reward. If the reward comes, it is because of God’s grace not one’s merits. Likewise, earthly power too is inscrutable. One’s rulers, or feudal superiors, may appear to punish one unjustly but this may be part of one’s fate or a test of one’s piety by God. The beloved of the ghazal, both in Persian and Urdu, is apparently fickle, indifferent and even cruel to the lover. At the realistic level this might appear to be so because she is a secluded lady unable to gratify her lover. Conventionally, however, she is a courtesan, at least in India, which makes it unlikely for her to be faithful to a particular lover. The beloved is also often presented as a boy. If this is really so then a normally constituted boy would be unable to respond to his lover’s amorous advances. At the mystical level the Beloved, being God, appears to be indifferent because the ways of the deity are inscrutable. Moreover, the separation between God and man can only end by the death of the latter. That is why the sufi speaks of death as ‘visal’—union with the beloved. An interesting insight into these several interpretations of the convention of depicting the beloved as indifferent and inscrutable is that it could refer to the nature of absolutist power. As the article on ‘Islamic Arts’ in the Encyclopaedia Britannica puts it: the ghazal could refer to ‘the remote despot, the wisdom of whose schemes must never be questioned by his subjects’ (22: 57). This connection between the ideal Beloved of literature and absolute power is expressed very insightfully by Andrews and Kalpakli in their study of love in early-modern Ottoman and European cultures:

What we would like to emphasize is our contention that the character of a poetic (and artistic) scripting during the Age of Beloveds is bound to a broadly imagined (but not imaginarily absolutism in which an all-powerful monarch (the shadow of God on earth, if not the incarnation) stands as the ideal beloved and grounds the meaning of all other beloveds, actual
or fictional, spiritual or carnal, male or female (Andrews & Kalpakli 2005: 323).

In this age of faith, it may be said, ‘love’ too had to be taken as ‘faith’. Since cause and effect were not connected, one could not make the connection between a system of bad governance and one’s sufferings under a particular powerful person. The sufis had taught renunciation of the world or indifference to it because the world was bad. Persian literature confirmed that the world was bad but it did not encourage political activism or questioning. Instead, it diverted one’s attention to the rarified realm of the world of love and the spirit. The message was that it was not in this imperfect world that either reward or goodness or bliss or even change were to be sought. They existed for the faithful, for those who were indifferent to this world, in another world. Such an attitude does not make for political activism which, of course, was in the interest of the arbitrary rule of medieval kings and feudal lords.

At another level, the mental energies of the intellectuals were absorbed by literature which became a convention-ridden domain in India. The themes were fixed, the rhyme and rhythm were a strait jacket and the institution of immediate acceptance by one’s peers in the poetry recital (the mushaira) saw to it that one could not deviate much from the conventions. Moreover, the aesthetic and erotic gratification which this literature gave made it a male preserve. It belonged to the world of gentlemen, a world which excluded both the poor working classes and respectable women. Courtesans, however, could cultivate literature to please their aristocratic clients. An exclusive elitist preserve like this could not in its essence be revolutionary. It was based upon exclusiveness. Its language, Persian, was a foreign language. Its themes were exclusive. They were couched in metaphors and allusions which were foreign to the people. And precisely because it was so exclusive, it became an identity marker of the elite, which was predominantly Muslim but also included martial and educated Hindus. The taste for this kind of poetry gave a sense of solidarity to this elite and helped to consolidate its class power.

This elite, as we have seen, was mostly Muslim and male. Thus, literary texts generally ignore the fact that they were produced in India, a country where most people were not Muslims. The referents in the ghazal are from Iran. Local colour is absent. The stories in Persian take place in exotic lands but the world of magic depicted in them precludes the possibility of realistic representation of any country. This literary fashion ignores the Hindus and their culture. The message which emerges is that only Muslim culture is worth writing about. This has the effect of maintaining the cultural dominance, and hence the power, of the ruling Muslim elite in India.

This Persian literature also maintains the power of the male over the female. It was, after all, created by people who were born in a culture which believed not only in the intrinsic superiority of the male but also the congenital corruptibility and inferiority of women in general. In Bahar-e-Danish, which we have noticed in chapter 4, the four wives deceive their husbands to fornicate with their lovers. In Sa’adi’s didactic couplets in the famous Karima which all schoolboys had to read, the wise man was advised not to trust women. In short, the message of the texts was that, being susceptible to lust, folly, deceit and betrayal, women were to be controlled by men.

Being the product of a male dominant, phallocentric culture and written by males, this literature appealed to mens’ aesthetic and erotic susceptibilities. We do not know whether these texts functioned like the cinema or the erotic magazines of today, but in a society which practiced segregation of the sexes, they must have served some such function. After all there are legends of people falling in love with females in fiction. A certain Hafeez Ullah of Kashmir fell in love with Sheereen when he was reading about the scene in which she takes a bath in the tale of Sheereen and Khusrau (Aziz 1971: 187). Thus convention ordained that feminine beauty was to be described according to a certain formulaic manner. Thus all women, or all those who were possible sex objects, were beautiful and this beauty was of a certain kind: long black tresses, long eyelashes, large beautiful eyes, a small mouth, a mole or dimple on fair cheeks, a slender neck,
hard rising breasts, narrow waist, wide hips, slender legs, tapering fingers, and a smooth, fair, skin. In the ghazal kissing and embracing are mentioned and meeting the beloved (visal) is desired. However, physical union is not described nor are tabooed words used. In the tales, such as Bahar-e-Danish, physical union is referred to though in metaphorical language but tabooed words are not used. As we have noticed before, in some texts, like the famous Bagh-o-Bahar, vulgar words, now tabooed in textbooks, are used. In general, it was part of convention to describe scenes of drinking, sexual indulgence, and the fun and frolic of young lovers. This was not iconoclastic or radical because it was a literary convention. This was how life was and the writer merely described it. Such descriptions reinforced the idea that women were mere playthings, or frail of character. They created, or helped sustain, the existing social reality; a social reality which made men believe that they should guard and control women. Writers, like readers, were part of a system which worked without anybody’s conscious knowledge. They did not know that they worked together to maintain male domination but that is how systems of knowledge always work—without conscious awareness of what world view they perpetuate.

Another aspect of medieval literary texts—especially Persian (see Najmabadi 2005) and Turkish (see Andrews & Kalpakli 2005)—which might appear radical to the reader, especially the modern reader, is that they include what contemporary readers would call a ‘gay’ sensibility. Many texts refer to beautiful boys as possible objects of men’s love and lust. As mentioned earlier, the beloved of the ghazal is addressed by the male pronoun and has down (khatt) on the face but also has female attributes (Rahman 1989: 11–14), but there are texts which specifically and unambiguously refer to beautiful boys. Muhammad Akram Ghanimat’s Masnawi Nairang-e-Ishq with its boy hero whom men and women both fall in love with has been mentioned earlier. So have Sa’adi’s tales about religious men and tutors falling in love with beautiful boys in the Gulistan. It would be a misunderstanding to interpret such references as radicalism. They were based on the medieval, Muslim conception of love and beauty. The conception was that beautiful boys (amrad) and women were both attractive for men. Such beardless boys were not men (mard) but in a category by themselves (amrad) which, like women, was a category of beings which men could desire and penetrate. The role of the beautiful boy, then, was that of a female; not necessarily a female surrogate but that of an alternative to the female. This was not only true of the Muslim or the Roman world but also that of ancient Greece (Dover 1978; Foucault 1984). Indeed, the change from regarding a man who desired women or boys as normal (but lustful or sinful) to one who was ‘sick’, ‘effeminate’ or ‘abnormal’ occurred sometime during the transition from the pre-modern to the modern world view in the West (Mcintosh 1968; Plummer 1981: 55; Foucault 1984; Rahman 1988). Since such a transition had not taken place in India, the texts here treated boy-love, called amrad parasti, as part of love. This transition took place in Iran during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Here too Western categories of thought replaced indigenous ones. As Afsaneh Najmabadi puts it:

The nineteenth-century distinctions of woman, amrad, amradnama, and man meant that gender differences were not read through a template of gender. Specifically, gender was not the male-female binary we now take for granted. Adult manhood was not just, or ever in the first place, marked away from womanhood but from young manhood, from “amradhood” (Najmabadi 2005: 237).

This being so, no theory of abnormality was evoked to explain the emotional or sexual desire of a man for a beautiful, beardless boy. What was abnormal, and most contemptible, was for a grown man, a mard, desiring another man as women do. This was considered unnatural because ‘real’ men could not desire to be penetrated. They could only desire to penetrate. The latter desire was natural even if it was sinful and the sex of the object of desire did not make it unnatural though, according to the ulema, it did make it more sinful. Whether such an attitude towards the
act of penetration was consciously connected with ideas of male dominance, male power and the capability of penetration as part of this power can only be conjectured. However, the fact is that whereas in the modern West romantic or sexual relationships of men with boys are seen as subversive of the established order, in the medieval (Muslim) world they were not. Rich and powerful men kept seraglios of both concubines and catamites, and literature celebrated their taste in both however much the ulema might condemn them for sinful lust. In short, boy-love was as much a convention of literature as love for women and was in no way seen either as being radical or subversive of the system of power distribution.

The medieval literary texts were not puritanical though they claimed to endorse a high moral order. Indeed, because of their use of the imagery and language of love, they were probably a source of aesthetic, emotional, and sexual gratification. That is why the stricter ulema were against all kinds of literature but such ulema were, after all, only a very small minority. Even after the puritanical movements pioneered by Shah Waliullah and the Wahabis, they remained a small proselytizing minority though one which gained influence over the middle class as Muslim political power decreased. Other men—and the readers were mostly men—enjoyed literary texts because they combined the mystical and the moral with sensual delight and intellectual entertainment. The Persian texts, then, served to keep the male power wielders entertained. This may be another reason why they were taught for centuries.

A paradigmatic Arabic text which has several erotic passages is the *Alf Laila Wal Lail* (The Thousand Nights and One Night). It was translated by Richard Burton, whom we have encountered earlier in his role as an expert on education in Sindh, into English for the entertainment of Victorian men. The book was well known in India though it is not mentioned as a textbook before the British era. The symbolic significance of *Alf Laila* is described by Abdulwahab Bouhdiba, a scholar of sexuality in Islam, as follows:

> But we can now see that at the level of everyday life and at every level of social life the sacral and the sexual support each other and are both engaged in the same process: that of the defence of the group. This ethic of marital affection based on a frenetically lyrical vision of life leads to a veritable technique of Eros that is itself indissociable from its religious base. Just as there is a religious ritual, there is an erotic ritual and each parallels the other. Arab eroticism, then, is a refined, learned technique whose mission is to realize God’s purpose in us. It is therefore a pious, highly recommended work. Indeed it is a matter of helping nature, concretizing life in its most beautiful, most noble aspects and realizing the genetic mission of the body (Bouhdiba 1975: 139).

Another explanation offered by Bouhdiba, and one which may be more convincing for modern readers, is that the whole narrative is ‘*mujun*’. The term *mujun* comes from the Arabic root *ma ja na* which, in the words of Bouhdiba, signifies ‘the art of mixing the serious and the lighthearted, pretended austerity, true banter’. It is ‘the art of referring to the most indecent things, speaking about them in such a lighthearted way that one approaches them with a sort of loose humour. In principle *mujun* ought not to go beyond words. In fact it is fantasy presented through words. It is oneirism, collective experience and liberation through speech’ (Bouhdiba 1975: 127). In short, one purpose of the erotic was to keep men from becoming humourless and dour. It was, in this sense, a safety device against puritanical zeal which was present in Muslim societies but which became a powerful force only when these societies lost political power from the eighteenth century onwards.

This erotic aspect of literature was, however, disquieting for some of the more puritanical ulema who suspected not only poetry and fiction but also music. Thus Aurangzeb Alamgir, who was a strict Muslim, banned music (Khan 1710: 45). However, so much was Persian literature a part of the Indian elitist ethos, that it flourished even under Aurangzeb and remained an indicator
of education, good taste, and gentlemanly upbringing right till the early twentieth century as we have already seen. However, being romantic and erotic, men were apprehensive of women having access to it. The only women who could, and sometimes did, read literature were the courtesans of the urban centres of India whose occupation was to provide intellectual entertainment in addition to aesthetic and sexual gratification to elitist males. Respectable ladies were not taught to read and write not only because these skills would have empowered them as mentioned earlier, but also because the classical texts used in the schools had an erotic and amorous side from which women were to be protected. In other words, the very eroticism of the texts made them a male preserve. It further reinforced the idea that only elitist males were responsible enough to read them with profit. Women could not derive benefit from them not because there was something intrinsically wrong with them [the texts], but because they were meant to be enjoyed and benefit readers with a certain level of intellectual and moral maturity and these, by definition, were gentlemen.

The texts were taught through translation and memorization. The informal medium of instruction, as already pointed out, was the language both pupils and teachers understood best. However, the explanations in the margins was in the official, or formal, medium of instruction which was Persian. The test of one’s knowledge was the ability to memorize and then quote verses in Persian or refer to the texts in one’s writing and conversation. Memorization reinforced the idea that the learning of the past was so authentic, so correct, so authoritative that it could not be improved upon or analysed to be reflected upon. It had to be preserved and reproduced. Memorization is a legacy of the age of orality. As Milman Parry tells us in his study of the Homeric epics, oral literature used many mnemonic devices including constant repetition so as to enable the text to be stored in the human memory easily. This means that the new, the original, the deviant or the heterodox is not at premium. What is valued is the old, the conventional, the familiar. As Notopoulos tells us:

Oral poetry of all nations, it has been shown, is essentially composed of fixed, stereotyped clichés or formulas, ranging all the way from phrases or fixed epithet to whole lines and even whole passages (1938: 470–71).

The most important mental faculty, then, is memory rather than analytical skill.

The ‘learned’ person in South Asia too was one who could quote from past authorities, embellishing the conversation with appropriate lines from famous poets, rather than one who analysed texts in order to come to new conclusions. This conservative bias of pre-modern teaching prevented knowledge being used to question feudal and imperial power. Convention and conservatism were embedded in the whole enterprise of acquiring education. So, even if the literary texts appeared to contain heterodox messages, they were taught in such a manner that their function was no more than to be memorized for display of erudition in conversation and writing.

Most writing for educated people, other than clerics or poets, was epistolary and this followed rigid rules which upheld the conventions of society. These conventions were governed by the contemporary hierarchy of power. The key determinant of the form of address one had to use was social status and rank. Thus a letter to one’s father or social superiors would use very elaborate forms of address (alqab-o-adab). The language of all writing was literary, idiomatic and ornate. Aurangzeb’s letters in Dasturul-Aml, collected by Raja Aya Mal in 1743, have been described by their editor as follows:

The King was very fond of figurative language, the compiler takes the opportunity of giving in this preface the real meaning of the peculiar expressions used by the king (Elliot & Dowson Vol. VII, 1867:
Scholarship consisted in deciphering meaning and creating intricacy. It did not consist in creating new ideas. New ideas are subversive and threaten to change the system; the insistence on a rigid, conventional form and memorization created a fixation on tradition which kept new ideas at bay.

**British Attitudes to Indian Texts**

The British conquest over India brought an agricultural, medieval, despotic society in contact with modernity. Modernity was manifestly powerful technologically, administratively and, above all, militarily. And it was assumed, both by Englishmen and Indian reformists, that it was also culturally and morally superior. Education was the major modernizing project. The British felt that it was a civilizing force which would impress the natives with their intellectual and moral superiority and hence legitimize their rule. The Indians had ambivalent perceptions of it: on the one hand, it was felt to be instrumentally useful; and on the other, it was potentially threatening since it could disrupt the basic norms and values, the world view, of their society. One response to this dilemma, especially of the Muslim reformers of north India whom we shall mention in more detail later, was to allow the males to empower themselves through Western education while making it incumbent upon the females to preserve tradition (Chatterjee 1986 & 1989; Saigol 1997). Thus, modernity was to be appropriated, yet warded off from the essential self. This project of the appropriation of modernity brought about changes in world view which made the Persian classics unacceptable among the Indian Muslims; marginalized Arabic texts and, in the field of language studies, brought in two new contenders in the field: Urdu and English. Let us see how the Persian classics lost their place in the curricula of South Asian Muslims.

The British started with approval of the major Persian classics. Later, this changed to mere acquiescence though complaints about ‘immorality’ became more frequent. In the end they replaced the classics with new books which had been written by people who, like them, considered the classics immoral. The complaints can be dated roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century when sexual prudery, which became the hallmark of the Victorian age, was just beginning to influence morality in England (Craig 1963). H.S. Reid, responsible for education in what is now UP in the 1850s, called Bahar-e-Danish ‘highly objectionable’ in tone (Reid 1852: 54). He felt that the Hindus could learn from the literature of the Muslims as their own literature was even worse but lamented about ‘the indelicacy of many of the popular authors’ (ibid.: 35). Colonel Holroyd, Director of Public Instruction in the Punjab in the 1880s, also found the Bahar-e-Danish ‘of a highly immoral tendency’ (Edn. P 1882: 35–6). By the late nineteenth century, of course, Englishmen in India came to regard the eroticism of the Persian and Urdu classics as proof of the degeneracy and perversity of the ‘natives’ in general and the Muslims in particular. Then came the imperative to change such a scandalous state of affairs.

The desire to change was part of the growing confidence of the British and the feeling that their civilization was superior. Oriental literature and history, argued the Anglicists, killed the reason. As Gauri Viswanathan puts it:

> By the terms of this argument, not only did Oriental literature lull the individual into passive acceptance of the most fabulous incidents as actual occurrences; more alarmingly, the acceptance of mythological events as factual description stymied the mind’s capacity to extrapolate a range of meanings for analysis and verification in the real world (Viswanathan 1989: 111).

People so incapable of thought might be docile but they remained aliens. Their minds were
forever in the control of mullas and pandits. For the British this by itself could be politically hazardous in the long run. In any case they sincerely believed that their system of rule was rational, hence better, for Indians.

Adam seems quite sincere in his report when he pleads for spreading education both because people will appreciate the government if they are educated and because, in any case, it is the moral duty of a good government to spread education and enlightenment (Adam 1838: 297–8). Educated Indians would presumably understand this because their world view would be influenced by the texts they studied and the new British-created discourses they were exposed to. But the Indians would understand this only if their prejudices, which the old texts only reinforced, were removed. Adam echoed the views of many Englishmen when he says that Persian literature was ‘for the purpose of conveying lessons in language’ but not for ‘sharpening the moral perceptions or strengthening the moral habits’. Thus, he opines, those educated in Muslim literature ‘possess an intellectual superiority’ over those educated in Hindu literature ‘but the moral superiority does not seem to exist’ (Adam 1835: 104–105). The question was larger than just the teaching of the language; it was one of change in world view. According to the British author of a report about the teaching of Arabic by rote:

The older system stands for an education based upon religion, for the acceptance of authority, for respect of persons and institutions; the newer system stands for rational teaching, for liberal views, and for the spirit of development and evolution and each system has much to learn from the other (Edn. I 1929: 235).

The central concern here is with world view and power. The older world view, based upon the acceptance of traditional institutions and values, reinforced the power of the traditional elite as well as the old, conventional patterns of power distribution. Indeed, the purpose of language-teaching—as indeed of all education—was moral. It was to produce, in Gail Minault’s words, ‘an adult who was competent but modest, aware of his place in the social and administrative hierarchy, but able to speak when it was appropriate and to learn from experience’ (Minault 1998: 20). The new world view, consisting of Western rationalism and liberal ideas, reinforced the moral and intellectual authority of the British and the Anglicized Indian elite which they had brought into being. Hence the question of which language was taught and how (as a sacred duty as in the case of memorizing the Quran or reading it without comprehension) was really part of world view and power. Modernity, introduced by the British, shifted the emphasis from memorization of texts to an analysis of them. The change took a long time and we are still in various stages of transition, but the idea that one could question old ideas and create new ones was born. This meant that the theoretical grounds for challenging a traditional authority—feudal, colonial, clerical, familial, divine—were laid down.

Besides, the erotic aspects of the Muslim classics were becoming more and more embarrassing for the mid-Victorians. They were not innocent as we know through scholarly writing on their fascination with the erotic, but such tastes could not be expressed publicly (Marcus 1966). In public the appropriate response was prudish. Above all, they were scandalized by the mention of paederasty (the ‘unspeakable vice of the Greeks’) which was bowdlerized in Greek lessons in English public schools. Not surprisingly they thought of purging such things from the curricula in India too. To bring about such a change was not difficult for the British because they controlled the schools, colleges, and the universities. They also influenced, though they did not directly control, the madrassas and the Hindu seminaries which were, therefore, less affected by them. In the schools they introduced new textbooks. The principles on which the textbooks were to be written had been discussed by such eminent British empire builders as Monstuart Elphinstone and Lord Moira. In 1815 Moira had said that village school masters should be supplied ‘little manuals
of religious sentiments’ but without reference to ‘any particular creed’. Elphinstone, in a report of 25 October 1819, had also recommended that religious sentiment be used as an ally but ‘passages remarkable for bigotry or false maxims of morality might be silently omitted’ (quoted in Adam 1838: 269). In short, the idea was to use reverence for religion to restrain Indians from crime and rebellion without, however, touching upon those aspects of Hindu or Muslim faiths which might create sentiments of hatred or antagonism for the British. In 1830 the school books society reported that it had published textbooks in Bengali (9 in number), Hindi (3), Arabic (2), Persian (5), Hindustani (1), and English (6), (Fisher 1826: 89). According to a report of 1878 on the vernacular textbooks, the textbooks were supposed to include lessons on:

i. Reverence of God, parents, teachers, rulers and the aged.

ii. A simple sketch of the duties of a good citizen, and universally admitted principles of morality and prudence (Textbooks 1878: 243).

Textbooks of languages invariably reiterated the subjects of the blessings of British rule. Even textbooks of grammar had sentences which propagated the notion of British supremacy and justified colonial rule (Singh 1987).

The British also set out to change the world view of not only the school textbooks but also creative literature. The Governor of the Punjab, Sir Donald Mcleod, told the senate of the Punjab University how he had written letters for the improvement of ‘vernacular’ literature (Mcleod 1871 and Proceedings 1871b: 23). Colonel Holroyd, Director of Public Instruction at Lahore, made efforts to make the poets write only on ‘healthy’, ‘natural’ subjects. In a historic poetry session in 1874 in Lahore, Holroyd stated: ‘This meeting has been called to discover means for the development of Urdu poetry which is in a state of decadence today’. He said a new kind of poetry would have to be created since that which existed was not suitable for the classroom. What would be suitable was what he suggested—poems on subjects such as the rainy season. The Anjuman-e-Punjab would hold monthly mushairas in which, instead of reading out ghazals, poets would read out poems on the prescribed subject beginning with the ‘rainy season’ (quoted from Pritchett 1994: 35). Holroyd implied that it was the English poetic tradition which had to be held up as the moral ideal. The conquered civilization and its cultural artefacts, the products of its world view, were to be dominated, and at least partly replaced, by the culture of the conquering civilization.

The Indian Reformers’ Crusade against Obscenity

Those who joined Holroyd, and other English reformers of his views, were some of the most brilliant literary figures of the day—notable among them were Mohammad Hussain Azad and Altaf Hussain Hali (1837–1914). Frances Pritchett tells us how Azad and Hali discredited the themes, values, and ideas of the old literature of Urdu (and by implication Persian) and recommended new, essentially Victorian, models (Pritchett 1994). Javed Majeed argues that Hali and Sir Syed appropriated modernity in Urdu literature despite their ambivalence towards it (Majeed 1998). The argument which follows draws upon the work of both Pritchett and Majeed but emphasizes the discrediting of established literary texts and the world view which had created them in the first place.

Mohammad Hussain Azad in his Aab-e-Hayat (1880), an epoch-making history of Urdu literature, regrets that Urdu should be so full of exaggeration and empty rhetoric. Like Hali he too finds the description of the beloved unnatural and reprehensible and implies that Urdu literature should change its normative, thematic, and linguistic basis. Azad hints that the younger generation, which commands both Eastern and Western tradition, might be able to change the
hackneyed and decadent ideas and themes of Urdu poetry (Azad 1880: 73).

Hali too proposes change. His model too is the ‘natural’ language and literature of England. Indeed, he mentions many English poets as models to be emulated. In his *Mugaddama-e-Sher-o-Shairi* (1893), which Pritchett calls ‘by far the most influential work of Urdu literary criticism ever written’ (1994: 43), Hali finds fault with the poetic diction; poetic technique; theme and, above all, the eroticism of the old poetry. Such is his puritanism that he does not only content himself with condemning the description of boyish beauty but goes on to proscribe even descriptions of feminine beauty (on the grounds that if she is a wedded wife it is mere shamelessness to advertise her charms and, if she is not, one is revealing one’s own vices) (Hali 1893: 112–13; full treatment in Pritchett 1994: 179–82).

So contemptuous of traditional literature was Hali that he went so far as to deliver the following vitriolic diatribe against it in his *Musaddas*(1879):

```
Vo sher o qasaid ka napak daftar
Afoonat men sandas se jo hai badtar
Zameen jis se hai zalzale men barabar
Malik jis se sharmate hain asman par
Hua ilm o deen jis se taraj sara
Vo ilmon men ilm o adab hae hamara
```

That obscene collection of poems and panegyrics,
Which is more noisome than a dunghill,
Which shocks the denizens of the earth,
Of which the angels in heaven are ashamed,
Which has ruined both learning and religion –
That is the sort of literature we have.

(Translation from Urdu, in Sadiq 1964: 44).

Moreover, Azad and Hali were not alone in their contempt for the old literature. Sir Syed, another reformer, in his letter of 10 June 1879 to Hali acknowledging the receipt of his *musaddas* (excerpt out of which lampooning the old literature is given above) agrees with his scathing condemnation of the old poetry. He then goes on to praise Hali’s *musaddas* as follows: ‘It is surprising that themes have been expressed without exaggeration, lies, far-fetched similies which are the pride of our poets and poetry’ (Khan 1879—my translation from Urdu). Another famous contemporary, Nazeer Ahmad, says in one of his lectures that Persian literature could ‘sow the seed of iniquity’ in a child and make him licentious. He added that he was saved from its bad influence because he had studied it from his own father (Siddiqui 1971: 36). In his fiction, he expressed his anti-Persian literature ideas clearly. Indeed, he is said to have based his famous novel *Taubat un Nusuh* (1873) on a puritanical English model, possibly written by Daniel Defoe (1660–1731), (Siddiqui 1971: 348). The protagonist, Nusuh, becomes a reformer and rails against obscene literature. In a climactic scene he enters his son Kaleem’s room and burns his books in the courtyard. Among the books which are destroyed are: *Fasana-e-Ajaib, Qissa Gul Bakaoli, Araish-e-Mehfil, Masnavi Meer Hasn, Bahar-e-Danish* and several volumes of Urdu ghazal (Ahmad 1873: 152). As Pritchett puts it: ‘The rejection of the old poetry (and prose) was thus enacted in a literal form as well: as a gesture of violent, deliberate physical destruction’ (Pritchett 1994: 186). In the same novel another character, a schoolboy called Aleem, tells his father, Nusuh, that he was once asked by a priest to read *Bahar-e-Danish*:

```
That day’s ill starred lesson was so indecent and frivolous that reading it aloud in that crowd of people was difficult for me (My translation of Ahmad 1873: 83).
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Even the *Gulistan*, that archetypal text, was not fit for ladies. Nusuh blackens out one fourth of it when he teaches it to his wife (Ahmad 1873: 156).

Another reformer, Mumtaz Ali (1860–1935), is known for his pioneering role in Urdu journalism for women. He founded the weekly newspaper *Tahzib un-Niswan* in 1898 in Lahore in partnership with his wife Muhammad Begum (for details see Minault 1998: 73–95). But Mumtaz Ali too wonders whether Meer Amman’s *Bagh-o-Bahar*, easy though it’s simple Urdu style may be for learners, is ‘appropriate for either boys or girls’. However, Mumtaz Ali does allow Meer Amman despite his misgivings but he is not so tolerant of novels (Minault 1998: 83). Syed Husain Bilgrami, a famous personality from the princely state of Hyderabad Deccan, attacked Urdu literature as ‘coarse, pernicious, and unclean’—references no doubt to the amorous and erotic aspects of this literature—and suggested that it was a product of aristocratic (nawabi) culture (Bilgrami 1900). Some Hindus based their case against Urdu during the Urdu-Hindi controversy on the alleged corrupting influence of Persian and Urdu literature. Testifying before the Education Commission in 1882, Babu Haris Chandra says that ‘these are the letters which teach us Gul, bulbul, sharab, piyala, ishk, áshiq m’ashuq and ruin us’ (Edn. Com. NWP 1884: 201). This was not a charge which the supporters of Urdu, who were mostly Muslims, could refute. Indeed, so apologetic was the attitude of the upholders of the new literature that, like the British, they were either silent about the erotic aspects of the classics or dismissed them as trash. They derived these attitudes, as McDonald argues, from the Arnoldian values of the curricula, especially the literary curricula, introduced by the British. These values, as well as an anxious concern with the revival of religious vitality and identity, gave the reformers their ‘appreciation of the moral quality of personal conflict, both external and internal, into which the members of the educated elite were plunged’ (McDonald 1966: 470). However, the Muslim modernist reformers of Central Asia (the Jadids), who had not been brought up upon Arnoldian values, expressed educational views which were very similar to those of their reformist counterparts in India. They too felt that the study of romantic poetry in the *maktabs* ‘was the cause of widespread paederasty in Central Asia’ (Khalid 1998: 171). In short, Muslim elites in contact with the modernity of the West were in a situation of a crisis to which they responded in similar ways.

The crisis of these elites can be summed up in one word: modernity. They had lost power. They had been militarily and politically vanquished. To gain some of that lost power they felt they needed to fall back upon their true faith (hence the hankering for Islamic fundamentalist revivalism). But they also wanted to copy the British model because it was manifestly successful (hence the urge for certain types of modernization). The eroticism of the medieval texts took such a strong beating because it seemed to be disapproved of both by Islam, as interpreted by the ulema of the day, and the British rulers. The emancipation of women, on the other hand, got a mixed response because, while tradition and Islam, as interpreted by Indian ulema, were against it, Western liberalism was not. However, many of the early Muslim reformers were ambivalent towards women’s emancipation. In a very perceptive analytical study of the way gender impacts on modernity, Partha Chatterjee argues that the Indian nationalist project was built around the need to preserve an essential ‘Eastern self’ in opposition to the ‘Western other’. Women were an essential part of this problem because they were part of the ‘self’ and, therefore, had to be educated according to indigenous (Eastern) rather than (‘other’) norms (Chatterjee 1989). This meant that women were to be socialized to be good wives and mothers and taught to read religious and other normative texts. Men, on the other hand, were to be taught to acquire Western learning so as to obtain power through (British) employment. With this insight in mind Rubina Saigol analyses the work of Indian Muslim reformers such as Sir Syed and Nazeer Ahmad with reference to the question of what ideas were to be given to women through the process of education. Sir Syed and Nazeer Ahmad, though modernists, agreed in keeping women firmly
anchored to the traditional world view of the Indian ashraf. The values of feminine docility, the internalization of male superiority and the primacy of the husband and family over self were part of this world view (Saigol 1997). In short, nationalism and modernity brought in contradictory and conflicted discourses even from those who were known for desiring change in the name of modernity. Even so, the idea of women’s emancipation stole in through some reformist texts such as the Majalis un Nisa (Assemblies of Women) which Hali wrote in 1874. Although the Majalis discusses nothing more inflammatory than the need to educate women, its theme ‘was radical by the standards of the time’ (Saiyid 1998: 67) and it had the potential to influence the world view of Muslims. Precisely for that reason Hali was given an award for the book by the Viceroy and it was used as a textbook in girl’s schools in the Punjab and the United Provinces for many decades to come’ (Saiyid: 67). The British, obviously, approved of texts which could modernize Indians.

Apart from the reformers, the ulema too had their agenda of reform the focal point of which was the Islamization of South Asian Muslims who, in their eyes, followed tradition more than Islam (as interpreted by them). Thus, one of the foremost of them, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, wrote his Bihishti Zevar (for translation see Metcalf 1990) to Islamize women (and men too). As Rubina Saigol has pointed out, the Maulana’s major themes are female invisibility and silence. This leads her to the conclusion that the ‘seclusion imposed upon women is designed to preserve the purity of race demanded by a threatened nationalist self’ (Saigol 1997: 170–71). However, the imperative of seclusion was much older than the impact of modernity and nationalism. If at all it has anything to do with ‘purity of race’ then it must go back to Muslim rule when upper class Muslim women were, so to speak, besieged by the lower classes most of whom were non-Muslims. An alternative hypothesis I would like to advance is that it is a product of male insecurity which took the form of virtue and purity. Anyway one way of preserving this purity was by controlling the language texts which women were exposed to. Thus, the Maulana excludes all the traditional textbooks of Persian and Arabic in vogue substituting in their place didactic works such as the Urdu translation of Shah Rafiuddin’s Qiyamat Nama (The Last Judgement). As Gail Minault points out, novels and romantic tales are the special objects of the Maulana’s wrath. Among the ‘approximately thirty harmful books are, predictably, a number of novels and romantic tales, including the Dastan-i Amir Hamza (Tale of Amir Hamza), Alf Laila … books of poetry (none are specified; it seems to be a blanket condemnation)’ and so on (Minault 1998: 71–2). The only novel which the Maulana does allow is Nazeer Ahmad’s Taubat un Nusuh which, as we have seen, condemns the very literature the Maulana finds so offensive.

As we have already noticed, some books with allusions to love and wine remained a part of the curricula even in the madrassas. Thus the Maqamat and some Arab poetry continue to be taught though erotic portions are either omitted or taught in a manner which makes them appear as exercises in language. The reasons for doing this have already been dwelt upon at length and need not detain us now. Suffice it to say that the British influence discredited most of the traditional texts though some survived in the less noticeable places of mainstream learning—departments of Arabic and Persian in the universities and the Islamic madrassas.

The stage was now set for the exit of traditional language and literary texts. The British did not have to ban them. Indeed, Thomas Arnold, a very enlightened man, reported that not all Persian books but only those which were ‘grossly indecent’ were banned (in Richey 1922: 302). But the British puritanical definition of indecency was not contested any longer. If anything, Indians became even more prudish than the British. These new attitudes, reinforced by the paradigmatic model of Victorian English literature, can therefore be seen as being indirectly created by the colonial order. However, the new values were internalized quickly and, blessed as they were by the ulema who had always opposed erotic, amorous and even aesthetic products of the imagination, they came to be accepted more as part of Islamist reformism rather than a concession to the dominance of Victorian morality. Nor was it a question of morality alone.
Morality was only a part of a larger world view which included other values and assumptions about life such as nationalism and individualism—in short, modernity itself. To conclude, the British control of education, of which language texts were an important part, initiated a change in the world view of the reformers; a change which can be subsumed under the label of modernity; which created the beginnings of a change in the whole society.

Language Textbooks and Ideology in Pakistan

In Pakistan Islam was emphasized as the cornerstone of the Pakistani identity from the beginning. Hence education, at least in state vernacular-medium schools, included an Islamic component in the humanities texts from the beginning. However, in Ziaul Haq’s regime (1977–88), Islamization of education became more imperative and thorough. In a description of the rewriting of history, Pervez Hoodbhoy and A.H. Nayyar make the point that the concept of the ‘ideology of Pakistan’, a phrase used by the Jamaat-e-Islami-i-Islami in its manifesto in 1951, became the focal point of ideology. Part of this ideology was that Pakistan was made for Islam (not just for Muslims but in order to create an Islamic state and society); M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was not secular in his political views but really wanted a religious state; and the essence of the Pakistani identity was religion and not ethnic nationalism. The revised textbooks were even less liberal than those of previous regimes with Islam (of a ritualistic type), chauvinism, and militarism as their major components. Hoodbhoy and Nayyar sum up the changes as follows:

…In Pakistan, because of the adoption of an exclusivist national ideology, there are no constraints on the free expression of communal hatred. Thus, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters. This Hindu is responsible for the breakup of Pakistan (Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 1985: 175).

A number of other researchers have carried out even more detailed and in-depth studies of school textbooks with a view to determining what ideologies they are based upon. K.K. Aziz, the famous Pakistani historian, studied 66 textbooks on social studies, Pakistan studies and history in use in the schools and colleges from class I to the BA level. Among other things, he points out that these textbooks glorify wars and create hatred for India (1993: 192–3). The ‘bitter fruit’ of all this propaganda is summed up by K.K. Aziz as follows:

…the textbooks are training and bringing up the students in ignorance, bias and false logic. Ignorance and bias travel together because one reinforces and encourages the other. Through them the textbooks elevate the prejudice of the society into a set of moral absolutes (Aziz 1993: 243).

Rubina Saigol, in her study of social studies textbooks from a feminist perspective, agrees with the previous researchers that Pakistani textbooks create myths which help the state maintain a high level of militarization and aggressive nationalism. She further points out that the categories of thought which are reinforced in the textbooks help to support male dominance. Women and working class people are relegated to the same level since they are expected to perform manual, concrete, mechanical, and lower order tasks which do not involve original thinking (Saigol 1995; for details about the portrayal of women in Pakistan see Hussain et al. Vol. 2: 1997 ). Sabeeha Hafeez, in her analysis of 79 Urdu textbooks for adults concluded that ‘discrimination is apparent in the social treatment received by boys and girls’. Out of the 28 statements about gender roles, ‘21 deal with expectations from women against 5 about those from men, and 2 with expectations from both’ (Hafeez 1991: 230). Sibte Hasan, in his study of school texts, also points out that ‘they
create hatred for Hindus, blind and fanatical nationalism and the idea that women are only fit for non-intellectual, socially less prestigious, works’ (Hasan n.d.). Surriya Shaffi Mir, a researcher working on gender bias in primary level textbooks of Urdu, examined twenty four such textbooks used in Pakistan. Her conclusion is ‘that abundant discrimination against females exists in the Urdu textbooks. Women are not only marginalised by their low representation in the texts, but are also discriminated against in the content and illustrations of the lessons’ (Mir 1998: 9).

Language texts are, so to speak, the B team of the state while the A team is the whole complex of Pakistan Studies, social studies and History. One of the avowed aims, indeed the major one, of all language courses is to promote the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ expressed in different ways. Urdu is said to be the national language, to which the Quaid-i-Azam gave his approval, and must be taught to defend the ideology of Pakistan (Urdu 1986: 9 & 14). Persian too is to be taught for ideological reasons (Farsi 1987: 1). Arabic, above all, is to be the vehicle of Islam.

**Methodology for Determining Ideological Bias**

Just how frequently language-teaching textbooks expose students to ideological messages is not easy to determine. A rough estimate can be obtained by counting the number of ideological items—poems, prose pieces, exercises—in every language-teaching textbook used in schools. This assumes that the more children come in contact with ideological lessons in the classroom, or in the course of their studies, the more are they likely to be influenced by the ideologies they propagate. There are, of course, other influences on children and much depends on the teacher, the atmosphere at home, the locality and the peer group, to say nothing of the child’s own temperament. However, other factors being equal, the assumption upon which the analysis of texts in this book is based is that the greater the exposure to ideological items the greater the chances of a students’ acceptance of them. For this purpose the percentage of ideological lessons in textbooks has been determined. Such an exercise has never been undertaken by researchers as far as language-teaching school texts are concerned. However, as already mentioned, Sibte Hasan carried out an analysis of Urdu textbooks from class I to V on these lines. He divided lessons into those on nationalism and religious or moral indoctrination. He then subtracted the number of these ideological lessons from the total number of lessons in the books (Hasan n.d.). Unfortunately he neither took out percentages nor did he compare the percentage of ideological lessons in Urdu textbooks with textbooks in other languages or subjects (such as Pakistan Studies or History).

For this book too the number of ideological lessons out of the total number of lessons in language-teaching textbooks has been determined in order to understand how school textbooks support the ideologies used by the state for legitimation. For the purpose of this exercise, ideological texts were defined as texts pertaining directly or indirectly to Islam, nationalism, and the military. In the first category are texts pertaining to Islam, Muslim civilization, cultural achievements, and eminent personalities from the history of Islam. In the second category are texts pertaining to Pakistani nationalism, Pakistani identity, the movement for the creation of Pakistan, eminent leaders of Pakistan and so on. In the third category are texts pertaining to the glorification of war, the armed forces, or military heroes of Pakistan. In many cases these themes overlap but the text is classified under the dominant theme. The percentage of the ideological lessons is calculated on the basis of the total number of lessons in the textbook. These percentages are given at the end of this chapter and in other relevant chapters.
Table 45 (1 of Chapter 15)
Ideological Contents of Language Textbooks Expressed as Percentages of Total Number of Lessons
(Level of schooling, language and province-wise data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Punjab &amp; Islamabad</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Pashto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IX</td>
<td>33+</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class X</td>
<td>33+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Figures on the right in the column for Persian are for books prescribed in the NWFP. Figures on the left are for Balochistan. The new textbooks of the Punjab Board are the same as those of the NWFP Board.
# Arabic books are compulsory for all non-elite government schools in Pakistan in classes VI–VIII.
@ English starts from class VI under the old system and in class 1 under the new one. Not all schools have adopted the new system.
+ Same book for IX and X.

NT Not taught

The state’s major objectives—creating nationalism and support for the military—are attained by repeating a few basic messages in all the books. First, the non-Muslim part of Pakistan is ignored. Second, the borrowing from Hindu culture is either ignored or condemned. Third, the Pakistan movement is portrayed mostly in terms of the perfidy of Hindus and the British and the righteousness of the Muslims. After the partition, in which Hindus are reported to have massacred Muslims while Muslims are not shown to have treated the Hindus in the same manner, India is portrayed as the enemy which is waiting to dismember Pakistan. The separation of Bangladesh in 1971 is portrayed as proof of this Indian policy rather than the result of the domination of the West Pakistanis over East Bengal. Above all, the 1948, 1965, and 1971 wars are blamed entirely on India and Pakistan is shown to have won the 1965 war. The armed forces are not only glorified but treated as if they were sacrosanct and above criticism. All eminent personalities associated with the Pakistan movement, especially M.A. Jinnah and Iqbal, are presented as orthodox Muslims and any aspect of their thoughts or behaviour which does not conform to this image is suppressed. Indeed, the overall effect of the ideological lessons is to make Islam reinforce and legitimize both Pakistani nationalism and militarization. Thus, the state uses the emotive power of religion, patriotism, and romanticized history to create a Pakistani identity which supercedes kinship, regional or ethnic identities. By making India the ever-threatening ‘Other’ it also uses all these sentiments as well as fear to support a large military, occasional adventurism across the border, and nuclear weapons.

It must be emphasized that the ideology-enforcing items in Pakistani textbooks pertain to Pakistani nationalism and the military or war. Islam is used to convey the impression that these three components belong to a unified, sacred, religious tradition. Even poets of Punjabi, Pashto, and Sindhi, whose Sufi Islam was quite different from the official Islam endorsed by the textbooks, are put into the same ostensibly orthodox tradition. This whole tradition is then
dovetailed into Pakistani nationalism. The demand for a separate nation is not made to appear as the product of the desire to escape Hindu domination for economic and political reasons but an effort to establish a country for the free practice of Islam. Since the Quaid-i-Azam and Iqbal are also converted into upholders of these ideals, Islam supports Pakistani nationalism. The third component of the ideology, the military, is also sacralized because it is contingent upon the first two. The nation, which is a fort of Islam, needs soldiers who are nationalists in as much as they are fighters in the path of Islam. With such a meshing of the secular and religious ideologies the state ensures that the Pakistani citizen is not seduced by ethnic nationalism which bases itself on linguistic or cultural identities. It also ensures that support of the army and war mongering is seen as support of both the nation and Islam. In short, dissent can be equated with both treason and apostasy.

The percentages given below pertain to the textbooks of Urdu, English, Pashto, Sindhi, Arabic, and Persian used in the schools of Pakistan. The textbooks of Sindhi are used in the schools of (mostly) rural Sindh whereas those of Pashto are used in some schools of the Pashto-speaking parts of the NWFP. The figures for the percentages of ideological items have been arrived at by the procedure described earlier. From these figures one can create a hierarchy of language-wise ideological content in Pakistani textbooks. This is given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Content (in percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Research in 1998 described above.

The role of Arabic in this context is understandable. It was introduced in Ziaul Haq’s period in government schools as part of the Islamization process. But, whereas Arabic textbooks mostly contain Islamic items, those of Urdu contain items on nationalism and the military also. Moreover, Arabic is already associated with Islam but Urdu is taken as a language. Also, while Arabic is only compulsory in middle school, Urdu is read throughout the school years and even in the intermediate classes (i.e. XI and XII). Thus, it is Urdu which is the primary ideology-carrying language, not Arabic. This, incidentally is also the impression of most students in the survey I carried out in 1999–2000 (Survey 2000, Appendix 14). Persian is an optional language which only some students study and that too at a very elementary level and for a short period. Thus, Persian too has little influence on world view formation. Pashto and Sindhi languages are taught only in some parts of the NWFP and rural Sindh. Their textbooks are also ideologically burdened, one would surmise, because these areas have had ethnic, language-based movements which the state counters in schools through education. English, always associated with modernity and liberal values, is the least (Pakistani) ideology-reinforcing language. However, the percentage of ideological items is quite high in books of class VII and VIII. Why the overall percentages are
less is because in Sindh the books for class I to VII were written by ELT specialists such as Zakia Sarwar, Abbas Hussain, Ambreena Kazi, Kaleem Raza Khan, etc. All these writers are liberal academics and the textbooks they have produced are completely devoid of state-sponsored ideological content.

This book has touched upon the issue of disempowering women by stereotyping or ignoring them in language-teaching texts only in passing. The work of other people, however, may be mentioned in this context. Muhammad Anwar, for instance, analysed 105 textbooks of the Punjab Textbook Board. His results are that, out of 3819 human characters ‘81 per cent were males and the remaining 19 per cent were females’ (Anwar 1982: 12). One reason for this could be that 78 per cent of the authors were male (ibid.: 11) and the other could be that in our male-dominating world public interaction is predominantly among men. Also, power-oriented and macho values permeate in the culture and are reflected, and in turn reinforced, in fiction too. Perhaps because of this women’s work is simply ignored. They do work in the fields, graze animals, fetch water and even carry bricks as labourers. However, as women activists often point out, even this substantial contribution to the economy is ignored (SAHE 1997: 55). Perhaps the construction of social reality in our male dominating society is such that all this labour does not register itself as reality in the mind. One reason for this could be that women are supposed to be hidden and men are not used to considering them as partners in public interaction. According to Anwar:

(i) Service occupations [cooking, nursing, washing dishes, etc.] seem to be associated more with females than with males, and

(ii) such an association is more prominent in Urdu than in English books (Anwar 1982: 38).

Working class characters, like women, are also less in number. The following table illustrates this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Frequency of Appearance</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2907</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anwar 1982: Table 7: 15.

It may be said that this is only realistic. Any attempts at glorifying working class characters would appear as false and sentimental. What is possible, without inviting cynicism, is to endow marginalized characters with potential qualities which have not been realized as yet. Unfortunately, the qualities of ‘learned’, ‘rational’, ‘patriotic’, and ‘genius’ ‘have been minimally portrayed in female characters’ (Anwar 1982: 59) reinforcing the myth that only men can have these qualities. Similarly, qualities of the mind and good manners are not associated with working class people. In short, as some intellectual theorists would have it, women and the ‘lower classes’ correspond to the body, middle and upper class men to the mind. This binary classification creates, and reinforces, a view of reality which is unfair to the working classes and women to begin with. In *Engendering the Nation-State* (1997, Vol. 2), several analyses of the images in texts, public spaces, art and other discourses show how male-centred and macho our culture is. If women are represented they are either domesticated and desexualized or commodified and highly eroticized.
In this context the Society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE) also pointed out that women are ignored or negatively portrayed (this is true for the media too\(^5\) PWI 1982). Those who are in prestigious and traditionally male professions—such as physicians, engineers, architects etc—are ignored. In short, the gender bias against women is evident and all the messages we get, whether from the formal lesson, fiction or the media, reinforce it (SAHE 1997: 56–68).

**Efforts to Remove Biases**

As far as women are concerned, a change is being made—or, at least, proposed—by some NGOs. SAHE, for instance, conducted workshops of school teachers to sensitize them to gender bias. In a book written specifically for teachers of primary and secondary schools in simple Urdu and aptly entitled *Main Jaag Uthi* (I woke up), (SAHE 1997), a number of model lessons about women and the necessity of educating and empowering them have been given. The Simorgh Women’s Resource and Publication Centre is also engaged in developing materials for schools with human and womens’ rights as a focus. Other NGOs, such as Aurat Foundation, also support the production of teaching material without gender bias. Rubina Saigol, Fariha Zafar, Asma Ajmal, Shahla Zia, Asma Jahanigir, Neelam Hussain, and Surriya Shaffi Mir—to name only a few activists—are busy contributing in various ways to the development of such teaching material.

**Language-teaching at the Higher Level**

At the BA and MA level certain textual messages not allowed at the school do inevitably come in. However, efforts have been made to support the state’s basic policies of creating nationalism and support for militarization among the people. Thus, Urdu is taught along with Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies, at the bachelors level in some universities. In Sindh, however, students can opt for Sindhi instead. Even masters courses tend to exclude literature written in India, literature considered subversive of religion, and erotic literature. Thus the MA course of Punjabi was changed during Ziaul Haq’s rule, as mentioned earlier, because it was felt that Najam Husain Syed and his colleagues had included too much of leftist, Punjabi identity-conscious, and Sikh literature. In Sindh, where ethnic nationalism is strong, radical poets like Sheikh Ayaz are taught but they were discouraged earlier. In the MA in Pashto, at both Peshawar and Quetta, literature from Afghanistan, especially that produced by identity-conscious writers, is not taught. In the MA courses of Urdu, Persian, and Arabic, the erotic aspect is glossed over and often omitted altogether. In the MA of English literature, an attempt was made to remove or downplay the agnostic writings of Bertrand Russell during Ziaul Haq’s time. The sexual revolution of modern English literature is excluded by confining the students’, to reading authors whose writings are not sexually explicit. Thus D.H. Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterly’s Lover* (1929), now considered a classic, is not part of the MA course in Pakistan in any university.

**Popular Reading and the Peoples’ World View**

Those who read do not confine their reading only to school textbooks or highbrow literature. As mentioned earlier, ordinary people also read chapbooks in their mother tongues while the children of the Westernized classes read popular literature in English. As we have seen before, chapbooks in all Pakistani languages belong to the pre-modern, magical world view. They are either about Islamic themes—reverence for famous Islamic personalities, narration of religious events, hagiographies of saints, etc.—or about romance. In both the world of causality and rational ratiocination are superceded by the world of enchantment, magic and the preternatural. Justice is
the major desideratum but it comes from divine grace or human compassion and not from formal institutions. In short, the model of governance invoked by this kind of literature is pre-modern benevolent dictatorship and not modern, faceless, legal-rational democracy. In this world view the discourse of women’s rights, or for that matter any rights, is non-existent. One exists in a world of macho heroism and the preternatural which is not changeable by human agency. It is therefore to be taken for granted as a constant factor. However, books on magic, necromancy and astrology do provide for the possibility of magical intervention. This intervention consists of suspending rules in favour of somebody and not a change in the rules themselves. Indeed, the idea that one is governed by fate and, short of magic, nothing can really be changed, is a strong feature of the pre-modern world view purveyed in the chapbooks, in oral literature, in anecdotes, and in the pre-modern discourse as a whole. Unfortunately, it cannot be ascertained how many people read chapbooks and, further, how many are influenced by them. Perhaps the chapbooks are read simply because they are an extension in print of the world view the ordinary Pakistani child is born into. They are congenial simply because they are reassuringly familiar being in one’s mother tongue and about one’s intimate thoughts and concerns. There is evidence from Tamizuddin Khan’s autobiography that chapbooks (Puthis in Bengal) were not only sources of pleasure but also created an Islamic world view in Bengal. Says he:

I think the reading of Puthis was beneficial to me in many respects. It made me acquainted with a large number of Arabic and Persian words, which stood me in good stead when I learnt those languages as well as Urdu. Further, it gave me a glimpse of Islamic history and traditions and some knowledge of our religion (Khan 1995: 31).

In short, the chapbooks do contribute towards educating the common people and giving them entertainment without forcibly transporting them to alien world views supported by the state or other powerful agencies. But precisely because they are not supported by powerful agencies, they are not taught. As we have seen, language teaching policies are an extension of other policies. They are meant to reinforce systems of belief which directly and indirectly support the system of distribution of power. In medieval India the Arabic and Persian texts supported the arbitrariness of feudal despotism and male domination. During British rule the texts were changed as the medieval world view was replaced, though only in part, by the colonial, Victorian one. The new age encouraged such prudery that, in the name of morality, an attitude of contempt for all Muslim classical literature was created. A new literature, owing much to colonial influence, was created and a transition in world view was initiated among Indian Muslims. In Pakistan the state’s objective of creating Pakistani nationalism and support for the military led to the privileging of textual messages which endorsed these values. Meanwhile the madrassas continued their policy of teaching the old texts in the traditional way in order to conserve the past and resist modernity and Westernization. The underlying political aim of language teaching texts, then, is to uphold certain values, certain ways of apprehending reality, certain myths of existence which are, in the final analysis, supportive of the prevalent system of the distribution of power.

NOTES

1. The Musaddas of Hali, along with the revivalist verse of Mohammad Iqbal were later used to support Pakistani nationalism, based as it is on Islam and Western nationalistic ideas, in Pakistan later. Its inclusion in school curricula is recommended by a government report of 1966 (CSPW 1966: 28).
2. The novel is probably The Family Instructor (1715) in which the mother burns offending books and novels.
3. These words, explained in the glossary, are conventional symbols with mystic roots used in both Persian and Urdu ghazal.
4. Two studies show that in Urdu fiction, both for adults (Parween 1984) and children (Bano 1985), power-oriented values, themes and attitudes are more preponderant than achievement or affiliation oriented ones. Being so focussed on power, macho and militaristic values are easily accepted by students. Indeed, Meher Bano also shows that the NWFP textbooks, like fiction, also show the highest scores for power followed by achievement, which is followed by affiliation (1985: Table 19).

5. A good journalistic article (Ahmar 1997), shows how Urdu popular fiction reinforces traditional values showing ‘good’ women as demure and docile drudges.

**Annexure 15-A**

Language-wise Average Ideological Content in Textbooks
Expressed in Percentages!of the Total Number of Lessons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Sindhi</th>
<th>Pashto</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Zero-or not taught (NT)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Not taught (NT)</td>
<td>Not taught (NT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2 / NT</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5 / NT</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7 / NT</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Average Ideological Content</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: English is taught at the discretion of the headmaster in urban schools. It is not taught in rural schools in most parts of the country.

NT Not taught
CONCLUSION

The foregoing account of language-acquisition among the Muslims of Pakistan and north India has made it clear that power is a useful referent for understanding why people learn and why policies are made to teach certain languages. Basically, as we have seen, people learn languages to acquire goods, services and prestige—all those desiderata which power enables one to acquire. In short, language-learning is empowering for individuals and groups. The group which is exclusively dependent upon the manipulation of the written word, the salariat, therefore pays greater attention to the learning of the language(s) of the domains of power than other groups. As power passes more and more into the hands of the salariat along with modernization, language-learning becomes far more important than it was in pre-modern, agrarian setups. Because the acquisition of power, rather than a particular language, is the objective, people pay the greatest attention to the language(s) of the domains of power. These languages are standardized, elaborated codes which serve many purposes in highly technical, bureaucratized, modern societies. In Pakistan power is divided between the modernizing world of the urban areas and the pre-modern (although in transition towards modernism), feudal world of the rural areas. Let us take the latter first.

The feudal world, was and still is, in a state of transition from orality to literacy. As Walter J. Ong (1982), who has been referred to earlier, has so brilliantly demonstrated, the world of orality is not analytic, it is conservative; it is close to the human lifeworld; it is subjective; it is situational rather than abstract and it leads to group-oriented thinking. The illiterate are even now immersed in this world, of course, but it is also part of the world view of the literate. Even the literate South Asian Muslims memorized the Persian classics and some liturgical formulas from Arabic. The overall effect of this education was to preserve the prevalent pattern of distribution of power not to change it. Though feudal society among the Muslims of north India was in a state of rapid change during most of the period of our study, some generalizations about the knowledge of languages in it, though at some risk of simplification, may be useful.

In the feudal society of Pakistan and north India, apart from military service which was part of feudal obligation, the feudal lord constituted a state within his own right. Thus, while the knowledge of the language of power, Persian, might have been necessary at court, he could do without it through the help of clerks. Thus, it was possible to possess power, and despotic power at that, without knowing Persian. One could also get by without knowing the religious language Arabic. Arabic was necessary, of course, for religious functions. Thus those whose power depended upon religion—whether as maulvis, the ulema or sajjada nashins (the representatives of venerated saints)—were required to know Arabic. This power was not supported by law or by the institutions of the state. It existed only because people believed in it. A part of that total belief-system, the overall world view, which gave this power to the religious elite was its association with Arabic. This knowledge of Arabic was not necessarily linguistic; it was incantational. One did not have to know the vocabulary, sound system or the literature of Arabic, nor was it necessary to be proficient in speaking, writing or understanding it. All that was required was reading without understanding and the memorization of a number of words which were to be recited at appropriate occasions. The whole exercise was one in the manipulation of the sacred language rather than of knowledge of that language. But not to know Arabic at all disqualified one from a world of power which was as real as the world of feudal power.

As we have seen, Arabic is memorized; it is not learned. The oral tradition, which is contingent
upon memorization rather than analysis as we have mentioned before, is still very strong though it is in transition because of the onslaught of modernity since the British advent. Madrassa students still memorize most texts. The vernacular medium students also memorize language teaching and other texts. However, some of the brighter students do exercise their analytical faculty while solving problems in scientific subjects. The students who are taking British examinations (ordinary and advanced level from London or Cambridge) in the elitist English medium schools are given questions which appear to require analysis rather than memorization but, as guide books and solved examination papers are available, only the best students actually come up with original thinking. Thus the educational enterprise is largely orthodox and conventional in Pakistan. It does not lead to serious questioning of the way power is distributed in the country. This means, on the one hand, that the repressive bases of traditional power—of the feudal lords over the peasantry; the clergy over gullible believers; men over women; bureaucracy and military over the civil society; grownups over children—remain more or less intact despite some questioning by modernists. But it also means, on the other hand, that the kind of crisis in all legitimate authority and the ensuing moral vacuum one witnesses in the West is still not part of the Pakistani scene. While rote learning results in acceptance of the powers that be; questioning and analysis may lead to the repudiation of the very basis of moral authority. This is because all moral authority, in the final analysis, boils down to some basic premises which are a matter of faith rather than scientific logic. It is, after all, an article of faith for the human race that its own life is more important than either animal or plant life. If we believed that animal and plant life is more important we could never administer antibiotics (which kill life) or even eat anything. While such beliefs are not seen to be what they are—matters of faith—analysis can destroy other areas of ideological consensus leading to moral anarchy, deracination, disorientation, and anomy. In short, in the long run there are no absolutely correct solutions to the human dilemma. However, it does appear to anyone who values human rights, liberal democracy, and knows that modernity cannot be reversed, that the feudal world, supported by memory-oriented language teaching as it is, is less conducive for the birth and nourishment of democratic cultural values than modernity.

These two worlds—that of feudal and religious power—exist even now in Pakistan where the medieval exists cheek by jowl with the modern. Even now the feudal lord enjoys power not dependent upon the acquisition of English and Urdu without which one cannot enter the more powerful sections of the salariat in Pakistan. Sometimes when the feudal lords become members of the legislature or the executive we have the anomalous situation of persons with less, and possibly even no, proficiency in English possessing more political power than members of the salariat whose proficiency in that language is far greater. As for the world of faith, it remains powerful through the networks of shrines, madrassas, mosques, orphanages and political parties. New militant political parties or organizations have come up recently and they believe in radical philosophies of imposing an Islamic order upon the country. While these are modern, urban phenomena, the countryside in Pakistan is dotted with shrines. The mystic saints buried there must have been really saintly to have won the peoples’ reverence, but some of their sajjada nashins (spiritual representatives) exercise despotic control over their followers. The extent of this power, and the possibility of its corruption, has been the theme of several works of fiction including Tehmina Durrani’s novel Blasphemy (1998). The world view which supports this power, whether that of the shrine or other religious institutions, is different from the modern. It is contingent upon believing rather than questioning; being anti-western rather than western; and being power, rather than right, oriented. While Arabic, even at a rudimentary and incantatory level, is necessary for it, other languages are not. Indeed, languages which can enable one to get acquainted with other world views may weaken it. This is probably why the religious elite in Pakistan has always been dubious about the acquisition of English—the language most associated
with an alien, liberal-humanist, world view. This may also be the reason why feudal lords, whether ordinary *waderas* or *peers*, are not keen to let universal literacy prevail in their area.

The urban world is dominated by the salariat. In all state or private employments—bureaucracy, judiciary, military, academia, education, media, business, commerce, and public services—one needs a standardized printed language to function. This language is English at the highest level, and Urdu (with some Sindhi in parts of Sindh) at the lower. In Pakistan, as we have seen, English is not so much imposed as rationed. It confers much prestige and has high utilitarian value, giving privileged access to the international and the most powerful national salariat groups, and is greatly in demand. This means that it is priced as an expensive commodity to which access is limited. Among those with the easiest access to it are the elite of wealth and the elite of power (as in the chiefs’ colleges, expensive private schools and military institutions, etc.). In short, the elite finds it easier to replicate itself. For others the elite tends to close its ranks. English is one of the devices which helps the elite to do this.

Urdu comes second in power, in prestige and lack of accessibility. It confers more prestige than the knowledge of one’s mother tongue alone. It has more utilitarian value than all the other languages used in Pakistan other than English. It gives one access to moderately powerful but subordinate positions in the salariat all over Pakistan, except in rural parts of Sindh, and is, therefore, in demand only next to English. It is not an expensive commodity being available to children at much lower prices than English. However, it is not available to all children. There are people who are so far away from schools, so poor, or so enslaved by tradition that they cannot send their children to school at all.

Both English and Urdu are learned by Pakistani children to empower themselves. Sindhi serves this purpose as well but only to a limited extent. Moreover, Sindhi is also used to reinforce and strengthen the Sindhi identity. However, even Sindhi nationalists are aware that not learning Urdu or English would disempower them. Hence to avoid being disempowered, they do learn the languages of the Pakistani salariat. Other ethnic nationalists—Punjabis, Siraikis, Baloch, and Pashtuns—keep making efforts to teach their languages to strengthen, or create an awareness of their identity. However, since these languages are not used in the domains of salariat power, the resistance to teaching them comes not only from the state but also from the parents of children whom the ethnic nationalists would teach. In short, utilitarian or rational demands are in conflict with non-utilitarian, emotional (or extra-rational) ones.

Apart from the role of languages in the domains of power, they have a psychological role in the shaping of personality too. A number of psychologists and linguists have argued that if one’s language is devalued, one feels as if one’s self is devalued and this may create a negative self image. John Edwards, a psychologist who writes on languages, argues that children whose language is seen as non-standard may be categorized unfairly as being academically incompetent (Edwards 1994: 192). He therefore presents the case for multilingualism of the kind which adds to one’s language skills in the mother tongue—additive bilingualism—rather than the loss of the mother tongue itself while one becomes competent in other languages (subtractive bilingualism). Edwards is talking of immigrant children or minorities in English-speaking countries. If we use his ideas to analyze Pakistani society would we be justified in concluding that Punjabis, whose mother tongue is seen as an uncouth language not fit for sophisticated use, feel put down or inferior to, say, Urdu-speakers? Do the speakers of Balochi, Brahvi, Sindhi, Pashto, Siraiki, Hindko, and other languages feel inferior to Urdu-speakers? Do Urdu-speakers feel inferior to fluent speakers of English? Such questions are not easy to answer though I have quoted evidence from some surveys earlier that people tend to regard English speakers more sophisticated and intelligent than the speakers of Urdu while Urdu speakers, in their turn, rank higher than Punjabi speakers on this scale (Mansoor 1993). In my own survey of opinions on language teaching I found many Punjabi and Hindko speakers put down Urdu as their mother tongue. When I asked
them whether their parents had come from India and their families spoke Urdu there or not, I was
told that they did not. It emerged finally that their mother tongue was not Urdu. While the
speakers of other languages did write the names of their languages, it is often observed that they
are impressed by competence in English if not much in Urdu. The term ‘English medium’ is
sometimes used jocularly for sophistication while ‘Urdu medium’ connotes lack of it. This also
connects with the fact that somebody who knows only the mother tongue in Pakistan is generally
illiterate and, more often than not, working class and rural. Hence the snobbery of the urban as
against the rural and the educated as against the uneducated come into play. This suggests that
while looking down upon monolinguals in the ethnic mother tongues of Pakistan, the Pakistani
educated person is bringing his (or her) prejudices against the illiterate, rural masses into the
equation. Thus, for many complex reasons, Pakistanis are not always positive about their ethnic
mother tongues. Whether this has lasting effects on their personalities, making them prone to
have negative self-images about their culture, cannot be determined. Personally, I believe that a
negative image about one’s mother tongue cannot be a good thing. Thus, if there are policies
which give importance to the mother tongue, they would be psychologically and culturally
beneficial.

Another question which we have considered is that of ideology and world view. While no
particular world view unalterably or unchangeably inheres in any language despite the fact that its
vocabulary does reflect aspects of the world view of the community in which it was originally
used, languages do facilitate access to texts which may reflect one world view or ideology more
than others. In Pakistan, the texts which come through Arabic are either about the sources of
Islam or about the Arabic language itself. In both cases they give access more to the theocentric,
medieval world view rather than to the modern one. However, the theocentric ideology is now
transmitted through Urdu and Pashto more than it is through Arabic. While Francis Robinson
(1996) argued that print has interiorized religion and reduced the ulema’s power, it may also be
true that the ulema have reacted to this by using modern means of communication and firepower
to gain power. At the moment there are strong possibilities that the theocentric medieval
worldview will become powerful in Pakistan simply because all governments have failed to give
justice, economic stability, and good governance to the country. Persian is not taught to a
noticeable degree in Pakistan but those who know it have access to the medieval world view,
especially that which concerns human behaviour and themes of love, fate, and the erotic. They
also have access to the work produced in contemporary Iran but only a few people seem to be
aware of it. Urdu, at least in theory, gives access both to the medieval and the modern world
views. Urdu has translations of modern texts and the Progressive Writers Movement created
literary texts with a leftist ideology which are among the masterpieces of Urdu literature.
However, the texts prescribed for teaching Urdu in schools are meant to create a nationalistic
Pakistani who would support the state’s militaristic policies. English, then, is the language which
is most strongly associated with the liberal ideology in Pakistan. This is not only because of the
school textbooks, which are ideologically biased though to a much lesser extent than the
textbooks of other languages, but also because the knowledge of English exposes one to the
Western world view. One reads books and comics and, above all, watches TV and works on the
computer. All these, being made by western people, are carriers of the Western world view. The
computer, as Carmel (1996), argues, is programmed by people who belong to what is known as
the ‘hacker sub-culture’. This places a premium upon aggression, individuality, and mobility.
These western values, products as they are of individualism, can create deracination and anomie
among individuals. They can lead to a breakdown of the family, loneliness for the very young and
the very old, and an attenuation in and eventually fragmentation of human relationships. These
possibilities make Kenneth Keniston, Professor of Computer Studies at MIT, suggest that
computer languages may be localized—i.e. that languages like Urdu might be used to create
computer programmes instead of English (Keniston 1999). This, it may be conjectured, may save Pakistanis from the negative consequences of exposure to the darker aspects of the Western world view.

However, the Western world view also has concepts which cannot be lost sight of if liberal, humanist values are to survive. Among these values are human rights; the rights of women; the freedom of expression, conscience and belief; democracy and so on. If these values are lost sight of in the name of tradition, indigenousness or religion, the oppression of large segments of people, people who are already weak and marginalized, will increase. This puts the liberal humanist in a strange dilemma. If one supports English in order to retain Pakistanis’ access to liberal views, then one unwittingly becomes an accomplice in supporting the Westernized elite of the country. It is the elite, after all, which has a near monopoly over English and as long as English continues to be used in the domains of power, this elite will also retain its privileged access to power, social prestige, and goods and services. If, with a view to undermining the power of the Westernized elite, one attacks English there may be other unintended consequences. First, there would be the problem of what to substitute in its place in the domains where it is used? Whichever language is substituted would have implications on power relations in the country. If, for instance, Urdu is substituted the distribution of power could change as follows.

In the long run there will be a change in the world view of the ruling echelons of the Pakistani salariat. However, the Westernized elite would not be immediately dispossessed of power. Even at the moment the upper echelons of the salariat are no longer dominated by those for whom English is almost a first language. Such people work in business firms, international institutions, elitist NGOs and often live abroad. What would happen is that the non-liberal world view, associated with Urdu at this point in time, might become dominant. This would take some time, of course, because the international position of English and sheer inertia itself will slow down social change—after all it took almost a century for Persian to lose its privileged position and Persian did not have an international presence in the nineteenth century which English does enjoy at the moment.

Secondly, middle-class young people who aspire for foreign scholarships and jobs, would find it even more difficult to compete with affluent Pakistanis who might study abroad and other aspirants from those areas of the world where English remains more widespread. Thus, if Urdu is privileged over English, there will be a further restriction in the number of people who will qualify to enter the international bureaucracy. The other side of the coin is that those who know only English, or less Urdu than English, will not be able to find employment in Pakistan. In the long run this might change the composition of the upper salariat. However, in such a case the likelihood is that while the state sector becomes vernacularized the private one will remain Westernized. If this happens then the Pakistani state, and the Pakistani identity itself, will be perceived as being backward, reactionary and non-liberal. Moreover, this might result in an intensification of religious consciousness with accompanying sectarianism and intolerance rather than liberal values. This is because Urdu, as we have seen, is associated with Islamic revivalism. The rhetorical formulas, clichés and references used in Urdu—one can see them in Urdu newspapers and Urdu debates in any Pakistani educational institutions—are religious in nature. Whether this brings about ultimately a Talibanization of Pakistani society cannot be conjectured (in any case such changes are brought about by many factors), but what is likely is that it will further polarize Pakistani society. Foreigners, and foreign-educated Pakistanis working for them, will be the dominant mandarins among their hosts for whom they will have nothing except contempt.

Thirdly, the domination of Urdu will make language-based ethnicity more assertive. English may be a stumbling block but it is seen as a foreign language. Urdu, on the other hand, is already associated with the Mohajirs, whose mother tongue it is, and the Punjabis, who study it in schools
and very often speak it socially. If Urdu becomes the language of the most powerful positions in
the salariat, the Sindhis, Pashtuns, Balochis, and Siraikis—and even the activists of the Punjabi
language movement—will certainly resent and resist this development. Indeed, their worst
nightmares will come true because such a step will be an Urduization of Pakistan more thorough
than has occurred so far. As they have, quite rightly, complained about the ubiquitous
Urduization, the veritable dominance of the Mughal Urdu-speaking culture, they will get further
alienated from the centre. In short, giving the place of English to Urdu in Pakistan might lead to
an intensification of ethnic antagonism such as the partial replacement of English by Sinhala did
in Sri Lanka (Kearney 1978).

What then should be done? There are no easy answers because there are so many
complications and unforeseen possibilities that one cannot come to an unambiguous conclusion.
What is recommended here is subject to the same incomputable factors and is of as doubtful
validity as any other solution. At best it may be offered as a tentative and interim rather than a
definitive solution.

First, schooling should be in the six major mother tongues of most Pakistanis—Punjabi,
Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi, Brahvi, and Urdu. Punjabi might be standardized separately in Multan,
Lahore, and Abbottabad corresponding to the languages called Siraiki, central Punjabi, and
Hindko. Other languages would need a single standardized variety which could include features
of other varieties so as to create no further dissension. In Brahvi-speaking areas that language,
rather than Balochi, may be used in the first three years of schooling. Indeed, as far as practicable,
the state should ensure that Khowar, Shina, Burushaski, Balti, and Gujrati are also used for
teaching small children and illiterate adults. These and other minor languages may be too small to
be used in the domains of power. Thus, their own mother tongue speakers may not be willing to
learn them because they would rather spend their energies on learning the languages of power.
However, they do wish to maintain their languages as identity symbols and for what Kendell
Decker, in a perceptive study of the Dangarik community in Chitral, calls ‘in-group functions’.
Whether they can do so in the face of adverse conditions—mobility, availability of the languages
of power in schools, communication and the desire for empowerment—is doubtful. As Decker
says: ‘we can promote language vitality by making more information available in that language
and by encouraging its use in more domains’ (Decker 1996: 166). The domain which first comes
to the mind is that of primary education or, if the language is too small and widespread, that of
informal instruction in local schools. But what is to tip the balance in favour of these minor
languages? The answer is jobs but it is not obvious why any government should create jobs at
tremendous expense only to allow a minor language to survive or retain strength.

The six major ethnic languages mentioned above should also be the languages of the domains
of power in newly created linguistic provinces. In this case the example of India which adjusted
its state boundaries so as to create linguistic states between 1956 and 1995 may serve as an
example (King 1997: 120–21). In these linguistic provinces the provincial language should enable
one to get the highest jobs. This would be costly as we know that translation and interpretation is
always difficult, time consuming, and expensive. However, the payoff may be the reduction of
ethnic antagonism. The problem I foresee here is of the readjustment of Sindh. Here, if the Urdu-
speaking areas are separated, the Sindhi nationalists will not accept the partition. If they are not,
and Sindhi is declared the language of the whole of Sindh, the Mohajirs will not accept the new
policy. Whether there can be a compromise solution can only be determined by referring to both
the communities living in Sindh.

The provincial languages should also be the national languages thus ending the erroneous
notion that Pakistan is a monolingual and uni-ethnic (rather than multi-ethnic) country. However,
it might be administratively convenient to use Urdu as a link-language. For this purpose, Urdu
may be taught as a subject, without being the medium of instruction, in all schools from class III
onwards. As jobs will be available in the indigenous languages, except in the Mohajir-dominated areas, Urdu will no longer be as much in demand as it is now. This means that the centrist, mostly right-wing world view of the Urdu-speaking middle class will be under pressure from the newly resurgent world views of the speakers of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. If Mehtab Ali Shah (1997) is right, the Punjabi-dominated perceptions about Kashmir, India, and the Muslim world as well as such vital internal issues as the construction of the Kalabagh Dam will be challenged. In my own survey of the opinions of students of class X, I found that students from Northern Areas and Balochi speakers were less in favour of conquering Kashmir and developing nuclear weapons than students from the rest of the country (among Urdu-medium school students), (Appendices 14.8; 14.9; 14.11; 14.13). In short, differences could come up. It cannot be predicted whether this will further polarize Pakistani society along ethnic lines or allow a plurality of views to be heard and change the dominant positions now linked with the Centre.

English, I believe, should be taught to all children so as to give them access to the liberal-democratic world view and the possibility of international mobility. English is, after all, a world language. Indeed, because it is only now that the elites of the world need to travel and interact with each other so much more than ever before in known history, it is the first international language in the real sense. Thus, to keep the windows of the world open for Pakistan, it is essential that English is taught as a subject. Indeed, it should be a major subject to which children should be exposed through news, motion pictures, literature, cartoons the internet and other sources in the school. So far these informal sources of exposure to living English are only accessible to elitist children. What is being suggested is that they should be made accessible to all children without exception at state expense.

This might slow down Pakistan’s march towards religious intolerance and fascist forms of rule and bring in foreign exchange from expatriates serving abroad. However, the way English is taught is class-based and this should be changed. This means that all English-medium schools, whether private or public, should be abolished (note that most students in Survey 2000, Appendix 14.7, oppose this step but, in my opinion, they do so on the assumption that the present state of affairs will not change). English should no longer be a medium of instruction at the school level though it should be a compulsory subject. Moreover, no school should be allowed to prepare candidates for foreign examinations because if this is permitted, the privileged schools will be back in business on the pretext that they are preparing candidates for such examinations. The idea is to dismantle the bastion of privilege and social snobbery which is associated with English as a medium of instruction at the moment.

The experiment of teaching English as a subject to all children will face many impediments because, no matter which books are prescribed, undeveloped areas will not have teachers as competent in English as the cities. Moreover, even if schools expose children to informal sources of learning English, affluent children will remain more exposed to English-using adults. These problems cannot perhaps be overcome fully but if the state is prepared to invest more in schooling, while banning expensive private schools, some of the injustices of the past might be redressed. So far, Pakistan has experimented in producing a very small elite highly competent in English; a much larger proto-elite competent in Urdu; and the masses who are either illiterate or self-taught in the rudiments of Urdu, the Arabic script and, at times, their mother-tongue. This language-teaching experiment was the product of the relative power of these groups—the users of English, Urdu, and the indigenous languages. This experiment resulted in privileging languages which made Pakistanis dismiss their indigenous culture either as inferior or as an obstacle in the path of national integration. It may also have helped create a siege-like mentality among the people so that they generally agree in supporting high defence spending, living in perpetual antagonism towards India and remaining insensitive to human and women’s rights. In short, the language-teaching policies were meant to make people support the present power structure and
probably contributed towards doing so.

Above all, language-teaching should not be based upon memorization; it should be skill-oriented. The learners should be prepared to acquire the languages as living languages; as means of understanding discourses and creating them. The analytical faculties should be sharpened so that students can learn to question traditional power structures which repress and exploit so many people. This may eventually lead to a crisis in authority and moral scepticism as it has in the West but the realities of feudal, state, and male exploitation are so painful and harsh in Pakistan at present that it is a risk one cannot help taking.

The language-teaching experiment I have recommended could change the distribution of power and the world view which supports it. If implemented it should make more Pakistanis knowledgeable about English without there being a narrow elite highly competent in it. In other words, English will be spread out more widely and less unevenly in society. Moreover, it will be less concentrated in its traditional host group i.e. the Westernized elitist salariat group. The privileging of the indigenous languages will bring hitherto marginalized groups and their world views to the fore. Such changes might serve to decentralize power giving the subaltern salariats—Sindhis, Balochis, Pashtuns, Siraikis, and Mohajirs—their due share of it. Moreover, it will make people feel more positive about their indigenous languages and culture. This, as I have mentioned before, is a psychological and cultural benefit which should bring about a secure and positive attitude towards one’s self and one’s roots in the country. This, coupled with the empowerment of the subordinate classes, i.e. the vernacular-educated lower-middle classes, will bring about a new pattern of distribution of power. If the latter change is not to take a fundamentalist turn, the state will have to ensure that the ruling elites do not continue to exploit and befool the people in the name of the sacred. So far, our ruling elite has used the emotive force of two symbols—Islam and Urdu—to create nationalistic unity. Madrassa students have been armed and trained to fight in Afghanistan by Pakistan and the United States. Later, they have been encouraged to continue the covert battle with India over Kashmir. The same students could take up arms against Pakistan’s ruling elite too. This is not a remote possibility because, as my survey shows, the desire for Islamization is strong among the poor (students of low-fees institutions), (Appendix 14.7). Indeed, Islam is the rallying cry of the poor against the rich; the dispossessed against the powerful. It represents the rage of the dispossessed. It served a similar function during the Iranian revolution which journals like Desmond Harney’s The Priest and the King (1998) bring out so vividly. In Pakistan too the breaking of the cars of party-goers on New Year’s eve; the hatred of the Western-funded NGOs; the execration of liberal values are most prominent among madrassa students as well as other poor students (Appendix 14.7). The madrassa students are, after all, the rejectees of the system. They either opt out because the state is still an alien entity for them or, as is more often the case, are too poor to survive in the state system which does not provide free food, lodging, books, clothes, and shelter. In short, it is because of the omissions and ineptitude of the ruling elite that a powerful religious lobby has been created. If, however, the state offers social security and free education, this will in itself reduce the strength of the religious lobby.

Perhaps the analytical nature of studies will contribute to more questioning and ratiocination among people than they have been accustomed to so far. These are complicated matters about which nothing can be said with certainty. Suffice it to say that language-teaching policies are so linked with power that fundamental changes in them will change the nature of the Pakistani society and state. If these changes are to bring about peace, happiness, and prosperity for greater numbers of Pakistanis than ever before in history, they will have to cater for the aspirations of the masses rather than only the elite.

It should, however, be emphasized before ending this book that making changes in language-teaching policies would be of little use unless corresponding changes are first made in power-distribution. For instance it is useless to declare that from such and such date all
children will get compulsory education without ensuring first that there are schools at a walking distance from their homes, their parents are given wages which can sustain them comfortably without exploiting the labour of their children, and the children themselves are given stationery, books, and nourishing food to enable them to study. Similarly, it is useless to declare the mother tongue as the medium of instruction without providing any jobs in it and allowing elitist schools to keep teaching their students in some other, more prestigious, language. This means, as Tollefson argues in the conclusion of his book, that ‘to understand the impact of language policy upon the organization and function of society, language policy must be interpreted within a framework which emphasizes power and competing interests’ (1991: 201). In short, one should begin at the power-end rather than the language-end of language acquisition planning. This is a tall order considering that all ruling elites want to preserve their own interests and, at the moment, the Pakistani ruling elite seems to be satisfied with the present policy. However, if public opinion, or at least the opinion of the articulate section of the intelligentsia, can persuade the ruling elite to understand that its own long-term interests lie in the satisfaction of the ethnic and subaltern groups which constitute the ‘people’, it might agree to allow a dilution of its power to take place. It is exactly this process which has brought about successful welfare state models like the Scandinavian countries and multilingual entities like Switzerland and Canada. The day such changes take place in Pakistan may be far in the distance, but if it is realized how-language acquisition is linked with power, the purpose of this book will be served.
### APPENDIX 1

**Consolidated Summary of Results in Compulsory Languages**

**English (Matriculation and Intermediate)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (Year)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(1995)</td>
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<td>17,845</td>
<td>78.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1996)</td>
<td>10,255</td>
<td>6083</td>
<td>59.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Federal (Islamabad)</td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>40,122</td>
<td>31,962</td>
<td>79.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>25,368</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Hyderabad (Sindh)</td>
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<td>38,083</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Karachi (Sindh)</td>
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<td>370,104</td>
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<td>58.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Lahore (Punjab)</td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>70,833</td>
<td>58.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>58,950</td>
<td>31,501</td>
<td>53.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Multan (Punjab)</td>
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<td>60,039</td>
<td>37,574</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1999)</td>
<td>32,128</td>
<td>16,608</td>
<td>51.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Peshawar (NWFP)</td>
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<td>81,262</td>
<td>48,188</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>24,655</td>
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<td>60,039</td>
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<td>(1999)</td>
<td>32,128</td>
<td>16,608</td>
<td>51.39</td>
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**Urdu (Matriculation and Intermediate Levels)**

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<td>(1996)</td>
<td>10,255</td>
<td>9122</td>
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<td>(2) Federal (Islamabad)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>25,270</td>
<td>24,093</td>
<td>95.34</td>
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<td>(3) Hyderabad (Sindh)</td>
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<td>26,251</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1999)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Karachi (Sindh)</td>
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<td>102,504</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Lahore (Punjab)</td>
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<td>105,550</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1998)</td>
<td>55,173</td>
<td>51,217</td>
<td>92.83</td>
</tr>
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Source: Gazettes of the respective Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education.
APPENDIX 2.1

Consolidated Summary of Results in Classical Muslim Languages

Arabic (Matriculation and Intermediate)

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<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
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<td>05</td>
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<td>204</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter (1998)</td>
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<td>427</td>
<td>89.9</td>
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<td>89.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter (1998)</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2337</td>
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<td>Inter (1998)</td>
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<td>2695</td>
<td>87.56</td>
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<td>2851</td>
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<td>Inter (1998)</td>
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Source: Gazettes of the respective Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education.
APPENDIX 2.2
Persian (Matriculation and Intermediate Levels)

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>Inter (1998)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter (1999)</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter (1999)</td>
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<td>Inter (1999)</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>93.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>Matric (1998)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter (1999)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>92.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
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<td>516</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>92.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Inter (1999)</td>
<td>2773</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>72.37</td>
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</table>

Source: Gazettes of the respective Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education.
### APPENDIX 3

Consolidated Summary of Results in Main Languages  
(BA & MA Levels)  

#### ENGLISH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Balochistan</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No Information but all those who passed also passed in English and pass percentage is 56.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Karachi</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Multan</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>21,294</td>
<td>8283</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>(4) Peshawar</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3560</td>
<td>1200</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>33.28</td>
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<td>(5) Punjab (Lahore)</td>
<td>BA</td>
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<td>101,531</td>
<td>25,183</td>
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<td>3871</td>
<td>448</td>
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<tr>
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#### URDU

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>172</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>57.6</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Karachi</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3578</td>
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<td>80.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Multan</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>50.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Peshawar</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8680</td>
<td>4546</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>405</td>
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<td>12,560</td>
<td>49.13</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5333</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>35.27</td>
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<td>(6) Sindh</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>4986</td>
<td>3633</td>
<td>72.86</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>61.67</td>
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Sources:  Respective Controller of Examinations.  
*Regular (semester system) candidates only.
APPENDIX 4

Consolidated Summary of Results in Muslim
Classical Languages

**Arabic (BA and MA)**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1998)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (1998)</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (1997)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>151</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>95.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
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<tr>
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<td>51.20</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1997)</td>
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<td>88.88</td>
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<td>MA (1997)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular)</td>
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</table>

**Persian (BA and MA)**

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<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Balochistan</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MA (1996)</td>
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<td>04</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1998)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (1998)</td>
<td>*02</td>
<td>*02</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1998)</td>
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<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (1998)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1998)</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>MA (1997)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular+ Private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1998)</td>
<td>54,653</td>
<td>28,818</td>
<td>52.73</td>
</tr>
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<td>MA (1997)</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Regular+ Private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA (1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>01</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(Regular)</td>
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### APPENDIX 5.1

Consolidated Results in Pakistani Indigenous Languages (Optional)

#### Balochi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1995)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not indicated but 108 appeared in Balochi, Brahvi, Pashto, and Persian out of whom 104 passed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Inter (1996)  | 538             | 412      | 76.57  |

No other Board offers it.

#### Brahvi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1995)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not indicated but 108 appeared in Balochi, Brahvi, Pashto, and Persian out of whom 104 passed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Inter (1996)  | 483             | 378      | 78.26  |

No other Board offers it.

#### Pashto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1995)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not indicated but 108 appeared in Balochi, Brahvi, Pashto, and Persian out of whom 104 passed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Lahore         | Matric (1998)   | Nil      | Nil    | Nil        |
| Inter (1998)  | 1               | 1        | 100    |

| Peshawar       | Matric (1998)   | 22,882   | 19,960 | 87.23      |
| Inter (1998)  | 12,752          | 10,228   | 80.20  |

| Rawalpindi     | Matric (1998)   | 5        | 4      | 80.00      |

#### Sindhi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1998)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter (1998)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hyderabad      | Matric (1999)   | 66,511   | 40,260 | 60.53      |
| Inter (1999)  | No information  |          |        |

| Karachi        | Matric (1998)   | 2337     | 2236   | 95.67      |
| Inter (1998)  | No information  |          |        |

| Karachi (easy Sindhi) | Matric (1998) | 121,393 | 110,055 | 90.66 |
| Inter (1998) | No information |          |        |
### Punjabi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1999)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,259</td>
<td>27,932</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Inter (1998)</td>
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<td>700</td>
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<td>1722</td>
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Source: Gazettes of the respective Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education.
## APPENDIX 5.2
Consolidated Summary of Results in Pakistan’s Indigenous Languages

### Pashto (BA and MA)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Pass Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<td>1497</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MA (1996)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72     (Regular+Private)</td>
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<td>3500</td>
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<td>MA (1997)</td>
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</table>

### Sindhi (BA and MA)

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<th>University</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Pass Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
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<td>5122</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>MA (1997)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>02</td>
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<td></td>
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### Punjabi (BA and MA)

<table>
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<th>Degree</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Pass Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>*MA (1998)</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>51.27</td>
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### Balochi (BA and MA)

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<th>Degree</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Pass Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1056</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>33</td>
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### Brahvi (BA and MA)

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Pass Percentage</th>
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<td>64</td>
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*Regular (semester system) candidates only.
**APPENDIX 6**

Consolidated Results in Optional Foreign Languages

French (Matriculation and Intermediate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Matric (1998)</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Federal</td>
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Source: Gazettes of the respective Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education.

French (BA and MA)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>82.93</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(Regular+Private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Regular (semester system) candidates only.
APPENDIX 7

KARACHI
(BA)

Number and Percentage of Students Opting for Languages/Literatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Students Opting for Languages</th>
<th>Percentage who opted for languages (out of 4335)</th>
<th>Percentage who opted for languages (out of 41,935)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Advanced</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi Advanced</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu Advanced</td>
<td>3578</td>
<td>82.54</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All languages</td>
<td>4335</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BA Pass (1/11) Annual Examination 1998. Results of colleges affiliated with the University of Karachi. Compiled from records in the office of the Controller of Examinations, University of Karachi.
APPENDIX 8

Performance of Candidates in Languages in the Civil Service Competitive Examination 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Appeared</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>Pass Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English (Precis &amp; Composition)</td>
<td>2793</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Literature</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>88.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>89.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>95.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NB: Except English (Precis & Composition) no other language is compulsory. English is the only language students find difficult. The others are seen as soft options.
### APPENDIX 9

Performance of Candidates in the Civil Service Examination (1998) in Relation to Previous Education in the Relevant Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Appeared Number</th>
<th>Previously Educated Percentage</th>
<th>Written Qualified</th>
<th>Pass Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10 (48%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>06 (23%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Literature</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35 (51%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English French</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>02 (100%)</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12 (27%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>42 (07%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25 (10%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>21 (9%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inference: Students consider Pashto, Punjabi, Urdu, Sindhi, Balochi, and Persian so easy that many of those who appear in them in the competitive examination of the civil service are those who have not studied these languages previously.

*This pass percentage is not in these optional languages but in all the subjects in which the candidate has appeared.

## APPENDIX 10

Survey of Madrassas

### PUNJAB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Institutions Surveyed</th>
<th>Teaching Persian</th>
<th>Medium of Instruction</th>
<th>Teaching Urdu</th>
<th>Teaching English</th>
<th>Teaching the Local Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Urdu mostly but some wrote Arabic. One wrote English after class 11. One wrote Punjabi and two Siraiki. However, they also added Urdu and Arabic after these languages.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2 said it is taught but did not explain how or what texts were used. 4 said it is used for explanation. 7 said it is used in informal conversation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NWFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Institutions Surveyed</th>
<th>Teaching Persian</th>
<th>Medium of Instruction</th>
<th>Teaching Urdu</th>
<th>Teaching English</th>
<th>Teaching the Local Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pashto except in Hazara (4 schools)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>All Hindko areas said they used Hindko for conversation and explanation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Surveyed by Tahir Waseem, M.Phil Student of Quaid-i-Azam University, in March-April 1997. Henceforth abbreviated as Waseem, field work, 1997.
APPENDIX 11

Percentage of Judgements about Teaching Languages in Grade 1-3 (by Area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Local Language</th>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Teach</td>
<td>Period per day</td>
<td>Use all day</td>
<td>Not teach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones et al. 1986: Table 13, p. 39.
## APPENDIX 12

Percentage of Judgements about Teaching Languages in Grades 4-5 (by Area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Local Language</th>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Teach</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Use all</td>
<td>Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Areas</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones et al. 1986: Table 14, p. 41.
### APPENDIX 13

Percentage of Judgements about Teaching Languages in Grades 6-8 (by Area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Local Language</th>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Teach</td>
<td>Period per day</td>
<td>Use all day</td>
<td>Not teach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Area</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones et al. 1986: Table 15, p. 41.
APPENDIX 14
Survey 2000

This survey of the opinions of school students of matriculation (Xth class) or equivalent was carried out in 1999 and 2000. The matriculation level was chosen because after this students enter college life in Pakistan. However, in elitist English-medium institutions, whether they call themselves schools or colleges, students stay on for another year till they complete their ordinary level (British standard) examination. In the madrassas too they stay on after sania, the equivalent of class X, till they get their final degrees. As the purpose of the questionnaire was to find out about students’ views about language-teaching as well as their ideological bias, it was necessary to choose students of class X (i.e. 16-year olds). After this level, language-teaching is reduced or becomes optional. The views of students of this age might be considered immature but this is precisely the age when, if students have any definite views at all, they are the ones which have impinged more upon them than alternative ones. Thus, those are presumably also the views of their families, localities, peer group, and teachers. In short, they represent the most powerful influences on these young adults. So, although no claim is being made as to whether the views of these students also represent the views of the grown-ups of their class, it would not be wrong to conclude that they probably do.

The survey was non-random as it was not possible either to obtain a complete list of all institutions or to visit them. Indeed, even when the institutions were visited it was not possible to persuade the school authorities to provide complete lists of students so that they could be chosen at random. Because of these difficulties, two different methods were adopted. Between June to December 1999, five or ten students were chosen from each matriculation class of the schools visited. Every fifth or sixth student was chosen so as to make a total of ten who then filled out the questionnaires. From January to April 2000 all the students in a classroom were requested to fill in the questionnaire. The second method made it possible to get more questionnaires filled in without as many visits to different schools as the first one entailed.

The questionnaires were in English, Urdu, and Sindhi and they were explained in other languages whenever necessary. In most of the cities of the Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP I administered them myself. In the Northern Areas, parts of NWFP, and Punjab they were administered by voluntary research assistants whose names have been mentioned in the acknowledgements section. A pilot study was made. The questionnaire used in it had some open-ended questions which got so many subjective responses that they could not be computed. The results of the pilot study were not used. All the results given below are those of the questionnaire which developed through trial and error. However, some questions were not computed because they were not clearly understood by the students whose responses to them were not considered valid. They have been left out in the questionnaire given here.

The survey does not claim to represent the views of all Pakistani students between the ages of 15 and 16 because most of the schools visited were in cities and some in small towns. Thus, the views of rural schools are generally not represented. However, the vernacular-medium schools have strong connections with the rural areas. First, the students studying there are often the children of rural parents who live in the cities because they are doing jobs there but keep in touch with their ancestral homes in the countryside. Second, their teachers too have rural roots and often visit their villages. As such, it may not be wrong to claim that the world view of working class children in the cities is not completely different from their rural counterparts. There must, however, be differences and it must be admitted that, because of lack of resources, the views of rural students could not be ascertained. However, the survey does include the views of students from small towns.

Although the survey is according to mother-tongue and type of institution, i.e. (1) Urdu-medium schools; (2) Sindhi-medium schools; (3) English-medium schools, and (4) Madrassas, the actual variable in question in the second case is socio-economic class. In institutions of the first two types, the vernacular-medium ones, working and lower-middle-class children study because their tuition fee is very low. In the madrassas too working-class and very poor children study because they are free. The English-medium schools are for children whose parents can afford to pay a tuition fee between Rs 50 to Rs 10,000 per month or more. In this category are three types of institutions (a) the elitist private English-medium schools (fee: Rs 1500 plus); (b) state influenced public schools and Cadet Colleges (fee: variable but not less than Rs 500); (c) ordinary or non-elitist English-medium schools (both government and private; fee: Rs 50 to Rs 1499 per month). Besides these major categories, information using the mother tongue (ethnic identity) has also been provided. This information will be useful for those doing research on ethnicity in Pakistan.
The total number of questionnaires filled in by the students were 1519, but 93 had to be discarded because they had not been filled correctly. Thus only 1426 questionnaires have been tabulated here. The breakdown is as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urdu-medium schools</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-medium schools</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi-medium schools</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassas</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The English-medium schools are further sub-divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdivision</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private elitist English-medium schools</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet Colleges/Public schools</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary, low fees, English-medium schools</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The language-wise breakdown is as follows. Please note that students of madrassas have been included in the total given below. However, they have been excluded from the language-wise results in this appendix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi-speakers</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu-speakers</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi-speakers</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto-speakers</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochi-speakers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahvi-speakers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khowar-speakers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siraiki-speakers</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindko-speakers</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brushaski-speakers</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shina-speakers</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakhi-speakers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrati-speakers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian-speakers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri-speakers</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The abbreviations for languages are given in the List of Abbreviations, but other abbreviations and codes for understanding the way the questions have been tabulated in this survey are as under:

Name of language + The language which has been named as well as other languages. For instance English+ means that the students desire that English should be taught in addition to other languages such as Urdu, Arabic, Persian, etc.

Foreign French, German, Spanish, etc.

The questionnaire is as follows:
# Questionnaire on Language-teaching and Ideology

Name (Optional) | Male | Female
---|---|---
Age | Class (grade in school)

**Mother tongue**

1. What is the medium of instruction in your school?
   - Is it your mother tongue? Yes  No
2. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?
3. Which language or languages out of the following should be taught in schools (you can tick more than one language if you wish):
   - (a) English
   - (b) Urdu
   - (c) Arabic
   - (d) Persian
   - (e) Pashto
   - (f) Sindhi
   - (g) Baluchi
   - (h) Brahvi
   - (i) Punjabi
   - (j) Any other (name it)
4. Should your mother tongue be used as a medium of instruction in schools (if it is not being used)? Yes  No
5. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English? Yes  No
6. Do you think jobs should be available in your province in
   - (a) English
   - (b) Urdu
   - (c) The mother tongue of the majority of the people of your province
   - (d) Any other language, please specify.
7. Should English-medium schools be abolished? Yes  No
8. Have you become aware of Pakistan’s strengths and problems because of these types of lessons in textbooks, such as Pakistan Studies, Social Studies, and Islamic Studies, etc.? Yes  No
9. Have you become more aware of Pakistan’s strengths and problems because of these types of lessons in language-teaching textbooks? Yes  No
10. Which language do you READ most at school?
11. Which language textbooks have the largest number of ideological lessons (i.e. on nationalism, the military, and Islam)?
12. Do you think the lessons you read about Pakistan’s wars or history are correct? Yes  No
13. Please circle the reply with which you agree most: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = don’t care, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree.

**What should be the most important priorities for Pakistan in your opinion?**

- a) Conquer Kashmir.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- b) Develop nuclear weapons.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- c) Develop a strong army.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- d) Reduce defense budget and spend on development.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- e) Implement the Sharia’h (Islamic Law).
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- f) Make the press completely free.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- g) Make the TV / Radio completely free.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- h) Establish democracy fully.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- i) Give equal rights to women.
  
  1 2 3 4 5

- j) Give Ahmedis (or Mirzais) the same rights (job, opportunities, etc.) as others in Pakistan (please note
that at the moment they do not have the same rights as others).

1 2 3 4 5

k) Give Hindus and Christians the same rights as others in Pakistan.

1 2 3 4 5

l) Establish the equality of provinces/ethnic groups in Pakistan.

1 2 3 4 5
APPENDIX 14.1

Consolidated Comparison of Opinions of Students of Different Types of Schools Expressed in Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Medium</th>
<th>Madrassas (N=131)</th>
<th>Sindhi Medium (N=132)</th>
<th>Urdu Medium (N=520)</th>
<th>Elitist Cadet Colleges (N=97)</th>
<th>Ordinary Colleges (N=119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Figures Below are Percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Medium Desired?

- Urdu: 43.51% (N=131) 9.09% (N=132) 62.50% (N=520) 23.26% (N=97) 24.37% (N=119)
- English: 0.76% (N=131) 33.33% (N=132) 13.65% (N=520) 67.44% (N=97) 47.06% (N=119)
- IMT (Pashto): 0.76% (N=131) 15.15% (N=132) 0.38% (N=520) 2.06% (N=97) 1.68% (N=119)
- Arabic: 25.19% (N=131) Nil (N=132) 0.19% (N=520) Nil (N=97) 0.84% (N=119)
- NR: 16.79% (N=131) 37.88% (N=132) 16.54% (N=520) 5.15% (N=97) 8.40% (N=119)

3. Languages Desired?

- Urdu: 3.82% (N=131) 6.06% (N=132) 21.54% (N=520) Nil (N=97) 9.24% (N=119)
- English: Nil (N=131) 33.33% (N=132) 12.31% (N=520) 19.59% (N=97) 15.13% (N=119)
- IMT (Sindhi): 1.52% (N=131) 14.39% (N=132) 0.76% (N=520) 3.09% (N=97) 0.84% (N=119)
- Arabic: 18.32% (N=131) Nil (N=132) 0.19% (N=520) Nil (N=97) 0.84% (N=119)
- NR: 16.79% (N=131) 37.88% (N=132) 16.54% (N=520) 5.15% (N=97) 8.40% (N=119)

4. Desire MT as medium of instruction?

- Yes: 54.20% (N=131) 79.55% (N=132) 53.65% (N=520) 30.93% (N=97) 43.70% (N=119)
- No: 45.04% (N=131) 15.90% (N=132) 45.39% (N=520) 68.04% (N=97) 54.62% (N=119)
- NR: 0.76% (N=131) 04.55% (N=132) 0.96% (N=520) 3.49% (N=97) 1.68% (N=119)

5. Desire higher jobs in English?

- Yes: 10.69% (N=131) 30.30% (N=132) 27.69% (N=520) 72.16% (N=97) 45.38% (N=119)
- No: 89.31% (N=131) 63.64% (N=132) 71.15% (N=520) 27.84% (N=97) 53.78% (N=119)
- NR: Nil (N=131) 6.06% (N=132) 1.15% (N=520) Nil (N=97) 0.84% (N=119)

6. Desired language for provincial jobs?

- Urdu: 70.99% (N=131) 8.33% (N=132) 71.54% (N=520) 20.62% (N=97) 32.56% (N=119) 50.42% (N=119)
- English: 1.53% (N=131) 33.33% (N=132) 10.77% (N=520) 41.24% (N=97) 47.67% (N=119) 21.85% (N=119)
- Arabic: 8.40% (N=131) Nil (N=132) Nil (N=520) Nil (N=97) Nil (N=119)
- IMT: 15.28% (N=131) 45.45% (N=132) 16.35% (N=520) 24.74% (N=97) 6.98% (N=119) Nil (N=119)
- NR: 1.53% (N=131) 6.82% (N=132) Nil (N=520) 1.03% (N=97) 1.16% (N=119) 1.68% (N=119)

7. Desire abolition of English schools?

- Yes: 49.62% (N=131) 13.64% (N=132) 20.19% (N=520) 2.06% (N=97) 12.79% (N=119) 5.88% (N=119)
- No: 49.62% (N=131) 84.09% (N=132) 79.04% (N=520) 97.94% (N=97) 86.05% (N=119) 93.28% (N=119)
- NR: 00.76% (N=131) 2.27% (N=132) 0.77% (N=520) Nil (N=97) 1.16% (N=119) 0.84% (N=119)

8. Have Social Studies books made you aware of Pakistan’s problems?
9. Have languages text books made you aware of the above?

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10. Languages most read at School?

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11. Which language textbooks are most ideological?

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12. Are History textbooks true?

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13. What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

(a) Conquer Kashmir?

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(b) Develop nuclear weapon?

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(c) Develop a strong army?

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(d) Reduce Army budget?

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(e) Implement Shari’ah?

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### (f) Make press free?

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### (g) Make TV free?

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### (h) Establish democracy?

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### (i) Give equal rights to women?

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### (j) Give equal rights to Ahmedis?

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### (k) Give equal rights to Hindus, etc?

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### (l) Give equal rights to provinces?

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Note: In question 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11 there are overlaps so that the percentage totals do not add up to 100. Only the major languages have been computed while smaller languages and combinations of different languages have been ignored. In Q-10 some students seem to have responded as if the question was about the languages they spoke most in the school.
## Appendix 14.2

### CONSOLIDATED COMPARISON OF OPINION OF SPEAKERS OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGES EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES

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12. Are History textbooks true?
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   N: 58.82 | 12.22 | 11.36 | 21.05 | 11.22 | 16.00 | 15.13 | 5.26  | 2.63  | 6.72
   NR: 8.88  | 6.66  | 2.27  | 5.26  | 1.02  | 4.00  | 6.58  | 1.75  | 1.13  | 3.45

13. What should be the priorities of Pakistan in your opinion?
   a. Conquer Kashmir?
      Agree: 11.76 | 32.22 | 86.36 | 42.11 | 84.69 | 42.00 | 90.13 | 98.83 | 94.74 | 94.09
      Disagree: 88.24 | 51.11 | 9.09  | 42.11 | 5.10  | 46.00 | 5.92  | 1.17  | 5.26  | 4.30
      Don't Care: NIL | 16.66 | 4.55  | 15.78 | 10.20 | 12.00 | 3.95  | 1.75  | NIL   | 1.61
   b. Develop nuclear weapons?
      Agree: 17.65 | 55.55 | 54.55 | 52.63 | 74.49 | 62.00 | 49.34 | 87.13 | 55.26 | 80.65
      Disagree: 76.47 | 36.66 | 43.18 | 31.58 | 14.29 | 30.00 | 36.18 | 5.85  | 42.11 | 12.90
      Don't Care: 5.88 | 7.77  | 2.27  | 15.79 | 11.22 | 8.00  | 14.47 | 7.02  | 2.63  | 6.45
   c. Develop Army?
      Agree: 11.76 | 72.22 | 97.73 | 68.42 | 89.79 | 90.00 | 90.79 | 95.91 | 100.00 | 96.51
      Disagree: 83.25 | 18.88 | 2.27  | 21.05 | 3.06  | 6.00  | 5.26  | 1.17  | 5.26  | 2.42
      Don’t Care: 5.88 | 8.88  | NIL   | 10.53 | 7.14  | 4.00  | 3.95  | 2.92  | NIL   | 1.08
   d. Reduce Army budget?
      Agree: 88.24 | 68.88 | 72.73 | 84.21 | 40.82 | 70.00 | 75.00 | 64.91 | 71.05 | 60.22
      Disagree: 11.76 | 26.66 | 18.18 | 10.53 | 31.63 | 24.00 | 11.84 | 24.56 | 23.68 | 31.18
      Don't Care: NIL | 4.44  | 9.09  | 5.26  | 27.55 | 6.00  | 13.16 | 10.53 | 7.89  | 8.60
   e. Implement Shari’ah?
      Agree: 17.65 | 10.00 | 90.91 | 21.05 | 91.84 | 24.00 | 80.92 | 94.15 | 89.47 | 92.47
      Disagree: 58.82 | 81.11 | NIL   | 63.16 | 4.08  | 70.00 | 7.24  | 1.17  | 5.26  | 2.69
      Don’t Care: 23.53 | 8.88  | 9.09  | 15.79 | 4.08  | 6.00  | 11.84 | 4.68  | 5.26  | 4.84
   f. Make press free?
      Agree: 88.24 | 80.00 | 52.27 | 84.21 | 62.24 | 90.00 | 63.82 | 46.78 | 81.58 | 61.83
      Disagree: 5.88 | 16.66 | 22.73 | 5.26  | 25.51 | 8.00  | 19.74 | 35.09 | 10.53 | 21.77
      Don’t Care: 5.88 | 3.33  | 25.00 | 10.53 | 12.24 | 2.00  | 16.45 | 18.13 | 7.89  | 16.40
   g. Make TV free?
      Agree: 94.12 | 67.77 | 27.27 | 73.68 | 35.71 | 36.00 | 48.03 | 30.41 | 52.63 | 38.17
      Disagree: 5.88 | 12.22 | 56.82 | 21.05 | 44.90 | 12.00 | 30.26 | 51.46 | 36.84 | 47.58
      Don’t Care: NIL | 20.00 | 15.91 | 5.26  | 19.39 | 52.00 | 21.71 | 18.13 | 10.53 | 14.25
   h. Establish democracy?
      Agree: 100 | 76.66 | 70.45 | 89.47 | 65.31 | 88.00 | 73.68 | 64.33 | 86.84 | 76.61
      Disagree: NIL | 17.77 | 11.36 | 5.26  | 16.33 | 12.00 | 6.58  | 11.70 | 7.89  | 8.87
      Don’t Care: NIL | 5.55  | 18.18 | 5.26  | 18.37 | NIL  | 19.08 | 23.98 | 5.26  | 14.25
   i. Give equal rights to women?
      Agree: 100 | 83.33 | 79.55 | 94.74 | 74.49 | 86.00 | 86.84 | 81.29 | 78.95 | 89.52
      Disagree: NIL | 14.44 | 13.64 | NIL   | 12.24 | 8.00  | 5.26  | 11.11 | 18.42 | 5.65
      Don’t Care: NIL | 2.22  | 6.82  | 5.26  | 13.27 | 6.00  | 7.89  | 7.60  | 2.63  | 4.84
   j. Give equal rights to Ahmedis?
      Agree: 11.76 | 25.55 | 43.18 | 42.11 | 29.59 | 18.00 | 59.87 | 45.61 | 42.10 | 48.92
      Disagree: 41.18 | 30.00 | 28.55 | 15.78 | 38.78 | 20.00 | 17.76 | 33.33 | 36.84 | 32.26
      Don’t Care: 47.06 | 43.33 | 27.27 | 42.11 | 31.63 | 62.00 | 22.37 | 21.05 | 21.05 | 18.82
   k. Give equal rights to Christians and Hindus?
      Agree: 5.88 | 37.77 | 43.18 | 63.16 | 45.92 | 24.00 | 68.42 | 54.39 | 65.79 | 58.60

336
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Don’t Care</th>
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<td><strong>1. Give equal rights to provinces?</strong></td>
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<td>NIL</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In question 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11 there are overlaps so that the percentage totals do not add up to 100.

Only the major languages have been computed while smaller languages and combinations of different languages have been ignored. In Q-10 some students seem to have responded as if the question was about the languages they spoke most in the school.
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351


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INDEX

A
Acquisition (of languages), see Language
Afghanistan 13, 30, 31, 33, 34, 72, 94, 179, 220, 221, 222, 229, 230, 260, 287, 312, 322, 380
Africa 14, 42, 45, 65, 277, 280, 358, 360, 367, 370, 375, 379
Ahl-e-Hadith (see Sect)
Aga Khan (also see Ismailis) 65, 79, 189, 268, 272, 350, 355
Ahmad, Nazeer 112, 113, 127, 137, 238, 305, 306, 378
Ahmeds 174, 192, 193, 342, 345, 347
Aitchison College 102, 119, 125, 183, 184, 201, 285, 356
Akbar (King) 55, 56, 84, 85, 130, 131, 148, 236, 276
Al-Beruni 202, 203
Alexander 54, 135
Alf Laila 58, 62, 63, 71, 74, 79, 87, 135, 228, 258, 299, 306
Aligarh 59, 72, 115, 116, 120, 122, 139, 140, 141, 143, 147, 149, 154, 162, 165, 370, 376
Armaic 83, 359, 364
Amman, Meer 134, 305, 356
Anglicists (-ism) 97, 109, 117, 125, 301
Anjuman-e-Punjab 63, 101, 122, 140, 144, 303
Ansari, Bayazid 218, 219
Ansari, Zafar Ahmad 66, 67
Arabic language 55, 56, 60, 63, 64, 67, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 294, 318, 363, 372, 373
Arabic literature 26, 63, 77, 294, 356
Arabic textbooks 73, 80, 310
Arwi language 54, 154, 356
Asoka 83, 359, 379
Aurangzeb (King) 56, 57, 68, 91, 113, 131, 258, 290, 294, 300, 356
Azad, Muhammad Hussain 102, 137, 303, 357
Aziz, Shah Abdul 106, 111, 115, 141, 357
B
Babar (King) 83, 84, 85, 130, 290, 357
Balochi language 13, 259, 264, 349, 363, 367
Balochi textbooks 264, 265
old books 259, 260, 261, 262-263
in Pakistan 263-267
Balti language 29, 268, 320, 353
Bangladesh (East Pakistan) 17, 65, 101, 309, 367
Islamization of 65, 66, 170
Bhasa Indonesia 53, 281, 383
Bhutto, Benazir 51, 162, 178, 176, 194, 253, 254, 256
Bhutto, Z.A. 51, 75, 121, 174, 211, 251, 252
Bible 86, 136, 239, 259, 260, 276
British Council 27, 182, 197, 198, 199, 277, 383
teaching of English 27, 182, 197, 198, 199
Bureaucracy 42, 53, 168, 172, 184, 188, 226, 248, 253, 316, 317, 319
examination to enter 19, 78, 93, 98, 101, 104, 134, 142, 179, 187, 188, 200, 230, 231, 255, 266, 334, 335, 349
Burton, Richard 119, 204, 299, 359, 371
Burushaski language 29, 30, 34, 268, 274, 320
Cadet colleges (also see English-medium Schools) 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 201, 340, 341
Calcutta Madrasah 60, 61, 62, 97, 98, 113, 114, 127, 137
Catalan language 44
381
Shirani, Mahmood 55, 90, 129, 130, 131, 132, 141,
144, 234, 237, 378
Sinhala language 320
Sindh 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 46,
54, 63, 64, 65, 67, 73, 75, 77, 89, 99, 100, 102, 105,
118, 119, 120, 121, 128, 168, 169, 171, 172, 177, 180,
181, 194, 195, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 251, 272,
288, 289, 299, 309, 310, 311, 312, 317, 320, 324, 325,
327, 328, 331, 337, 338, 339, 340, 349, 351, 358, 359,
363, 369, 378, 382, 383, 384
Sindhi language 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 46, 63, 67, 100, 119, 120, 139, 167,
171, 178, 185, 193, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 231, 248,
251, 269, 270, 275, 295, 309, 310, 312, 314, 317, 320,
329, 330, 333, 334, 335, 340, 341, 342, 343, 346, 347,
349, 355, 356, 358, 367, 377, 379, 382
Sindhi-teaching in Pakistan 22, 20, 46, 73, 87,
100, 168, 171, 172, 178, 180, 183, 185, 193,
200, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213-214, 215, 232,
309, 310, 314, 317, 329, 330, 331, 333, 334,
335, 342, 346, 347
pre-Partition Urdu-Sindhi Controversy 205207
post-Partition Urdu-Sindhi Controversy 210213
higher Studies in 214-215, 331
Sindhi Language Authority 214, 355, 356, 358, 382
Sindhi-medium Schools 168, 171, 210, 216, 340, 341,
343
Sindhi books 203, 204
Sind Madressah 121, 376
Sikhs 14, 93, 222, 225, 226, 233, 237, 238, 239, 240,
241, 242, 243, 244, 248, 250, 254, 258, 312, 369
Siraiki language 13, 18, 19, 22, 27, 31, 32, 42, 169,
234, 235, 254, 256, 272, 273, 317, 320, 336, 341, 346,
354, 365, 368, 377, 382
Socialism (see Left) 37, 51, 174, 195, 229, 248
Spanish language 44, 282, 274, 289, 341
SPELT 25, 26, 182, 197, 198, 352, 384
Standard (-ization) 15, 24, 34, 40, 41, 44, 45, 61, 63,
70, 88, 120, 125, 126, 133, 138, 153, 158, 170, 189,
199, 203, 206, 215, 223, 233, 242, 245, 255, 269, 277,
283, 284, 306, 315, 317, 320, 340, 349, 357, 364, 366,
367
Sufis (Sufism, mystics ) 19, 23, 25, 41, 55, 57, 61, 63,
69, 80, 85, 87, 90, 91, 98, 99, 103, 107, 129, 132, 219,
229, 233, 243, 249, 254, 268, 273, 294, 295, 296, 297,
309, 357, 369, 377, 379,
Suri, Sher Shah 130, 131
T
Tamil language 54, 134, 153, 154, 157, 356, 368
Tajik language 33, 282

Textbooks 24, 26, 27, 48, 49, 50, 58, 61, 66, 67, 73,
74, 77, 80, 81, 87, 103, 104, 107, 153, 154, 158, 161,
162, 174, 177, 178, 180, 191, 194, 195, 196, 197, 203,
206, 221, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 244, 253, 254, 255,
257, 265, 272, 288, 293, 298, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310,
311, 313, 314, 318, 342, 344, 346, 347, 350, 352, 357,
363, 366, 380
changes in 48, 73, 77, 154, 173, 177, 230, 253,
293, 302, 303, 306, 307-309
Turkish language 27, 53, 83, 130, 276, 281, 282, 284,
290, 291, 298, 357, 383
U
Ugeur language 284
Ulema (see Clergy)
Universities 48, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 74, 75, 76,
77, 78, 93, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 116, 119, 138,
139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153, 156, 162,
163, 165, 169, 170, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180, 184, 196,
197, 198, 199, 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217,
221, 231, 240, 242, 244, 247, 248, 249, 250, 254, 255,
267, 271, 272, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 285,
287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 302, 303, 306, 312, 327, 328,
331, 332, 333, 336, 356, 351, 352, 356, 357, 358, 359,
360, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372,
373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383,
384
Jamia Millia 149, 161
Osmania 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 172,
371, 373
University College at Lahore 144, 240, 350,
351, 352
UP 48, 58, 59, 100, 136, 139, 143, 150, 151, 152, 155,
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165, 301, 360
Urdu 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29,
30, 34, 36, 39, 41, 42, 46, 51, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
80, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 104, 106, 111, 112, 115, 116, 122, 123, 127, 129,
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162,
163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186,
189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 200, 201, 205, 206,
207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217,
218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231,
232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244,
245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257,
259, 260, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272,
274, 275, 278, 281, 282, 284, 284, 288, 290, 291, 294,
295, 296, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310,
311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322,
324, 327, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341,
342, 343, 344, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 354, 355,
356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368,
369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379,
380, 381, 382, 383, 384
and the Congress 143, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159,
225


European poets of 94-95
USA (America) 25, 47, 180, 182, 250, 280, 364
Uzbek language 282

V
Vernacular languages 39, 41, 89, 96, 97, 99, 100, 117, 118, 125, 134, 146, 240, 242, 350, 366, 380

W
Wahabis 22, 299
Waliullah, Shah 57, 62, 103, 141, 299
Wars
  of 1857 68, 112, 115, 124, 135, 140, 222, 239, 381
  of 1948 50, 309
  of 1965 178, 309
  of 1971 279, 280, 288, 309
Afghan Jihad 229, 230, 379
Wakhi language 34, 274
Welsh language 43, 44

Z
Zafar, Bahadur Shah 124, 137, 359
Zakaullah, Maulvi 112, 113